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Identity Diplomacy: A Study in Diplomatic Representation and the Ordering of 
International Society
This dissertation focuses on a protracted exchange of insults that occurred between 
Russian and Baltic diplomats in the early to mid-1990s, revolving around the issue of 
which of these nations had the right to call themselves “European.” It argues that 
scholars interested in diplomacy and in concepts of international society can find much 
of interest in this seemingly marginal diplomatic spat, which, due to historical 
circumstance, throws into stark relief three features of international politics that often 
have been underplayed in the bulk of the International Relations literature. First, 
diplomatic exchanges are permeated with debates on the nature or fundamental 
qualities—one might say the identities—of nations, governments, and other pertinent 
actors in the global social arena. Second, they are also permeated with debates over the 
existence and membership of collectivities of actors—regions, for instance, or ‘clubs’ of 
states. Third, emerging from and feeding into these debates run further debates over the 
relative social position, or status, of these collectivities as well as of individual actors. 
The international ‘order’ being negotiated through diplomatic exchanges is thus as 
much a social order as it is the presence of rules or the absence of war. Furthermore, the 
struggles within these exchanges—over self-representation, inclusion and exclusion, 
and the establishment and maintenance of social hierarchies—are all ones that have the 
potential to carry powerful emotional charges. By putting these three sources of 
emotional involvement together, we can begin to understand how Russian and Baltic 
diplomats could be so engaged and frustrated by the task of creating knowledge about 
the nature, not only of their own nations, but of their neighbors and antagonists.
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Introduction
“Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the 
governments of independent states...” Sir Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice.
“You don't frighten us, English pig-dogs! 1 fart in your general direction! Your mother was a hamster and 
your father smelled of elderberries!” Monty Python and the Holy Grail.
Diplomatic exchanges between post-Soviet Russia and the Baltic states of Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia have often been, to say the least, undiplomatic.
“Imperialists!”1 
“Apartheid-mongers! ”2 
“Soviet holdovers!”3 
“Ethnic cleansers!”4 
“Fascists!”5 
“Nazi sympathizers!”6 
“Revanchists!”7 
“Ingrates!”8
“Historical revisionists!”9 
“Hysterical screamers!”10 
“Cannibals!”11
No one actually said “I blow my nose at you,” but then, who needed to? The 
Lithuanians, with the heroic exception of President Vytautas Landsbergis, bowed out of 
some of the harshest language fairly early on, satisfied that their generous citizenship 
policies had earned them enough Russian goodwill to ensure a relatively speedy 
withdrawal of former Soviet troops from their territory. But Latvian representatives 
continued to weigh in until the last troops had left Baltic soil; and well after that 
watershed, the Russian-Estonian exchange continued, now sotto voce, now at full 
volume, like mutterings and imprecations between a mastiff and a fox terrier stuck on 
adjacent podiums at a dog show.
1 Estonian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany Tiit Matsulevits: ITAR-TASS, 5 June 1992
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Soviet Union/Central Eurasia (henceforth 
FBIS SOV) FBIS-SOV-92-110, 8 June 1992: 22).
2 Russian President Boris Yeltsin: ITAR-TASS, 23 June 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-122, 28 June 1993: 8).
3 Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis: The Baltic Independent, 27 December 1991-8 January 1992:
2 .
4 Political adviser to the Russian President Sergei Stankevich: Rossiskaya Gazeta, 19 November 1992: 7.
5 Estonian delegation to the CSCE, May 1992.
6 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement, 21 July 1994.
7 Estonian delegate to the OSCE Tunne Kelam: The Baltic Independent, 26 January-1 February 1996: 6.
8 Russian Ambassador at Large Sergei Zotov: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 October 1992: 1.
9 Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas: Estonian Foreign Ministry Press Release, 25 April 1996.
10 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev: Ostankino Television First Channel Network, 19 January
1994 (FBIS-SOV-94-014, 19 January 1994: 3).
11 Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri: The Baltic Independent, 10-16 April 1992: 3.
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I loved it. Trudging dutifully through the research for one worthy dissertation topic 
after another, I looked forward to each next Baltic or Russian sally with the furtive 
pleasure of a librarian sneaking off on her tea break to watch “South Park.” The blatant 
exaggeration, the shameless manipulation of historical and contemporary analogies, the 
pious self-justifications all made for high drama in the otherwise rhetorically restrained 
world of Russian relations with the former republics of the Soviet Union.12 Fateful 
issues were being hashed out between the Russian Federation and its other former 
Union-mates: the destiny of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the division of the Black Sea 
Fleet and other Soviet military and financial assets, refugee flows, energy supplies. But 
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had emphasized in 1992 that former fellow- 
republics of the USSR needed even more careful public handling than traditional 
partners, lest “our neighbors...believe that we do not treat them as they deserve;” and for 
the most part, Russian diplomats and officials hewed to this punctilious line, and were 
addressed with similar restraint by their counterparts in the “near abroad.”13 In this 
tense but drab environment, Russian-Baltic scenery-chewing came as welcome comic 
relief, particularly since the facts seemed to stand in such sharp opposition to the 
rhetoric. Certainly, the issues looming behind the epithets were crucial ones. The three 
Baltic states demanded the speedy and orderly withdrawal of former Soviet military 
forces, over which the Russian government assumed command in January 1992, from 
Baltic soil; the Estonian and Latvian governments had also raised questions about the 
validity of their post-World War II borders with Russia. Meanwhile, the Russian 
government was sharply critical of Estonian and Latvian disenfranchisement of 
residents (mostly post-World War II immigrant ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers and 
their descendents) who lacked direct connection to the pre-World War II Estonian or 
Latvian states. But Russian-speakers were not fleeing the Baltic region in fear for their 
lives, as their fellows were from parts of Central Asia and the Caucasus; troops were 
exiting in a steady trickle from all three Baltic states, unlike those in Moldova or 
Georgia, where the Russian government paid not even lip service to the notion of a 
withdrawal.14 It all seemed a bit over-wrought.
The more Baltic-Russian invective drifted under my nose, the more intriguing the story 
appeared. First, these insults, while they sometimes figured in direct Russian-Baltic 
communication, clearly were not intended exclusively for each other’s ears. Nor, if the 
environments and publications in which they emerged were any indication, were they 
primarily aimed at domestic audiences, as some observers opined.15 Rather, they 
appeared to be directed toward other governments, both directly and through the 
medium of international and intergovernmental organizations. Primary among these 
organizations were the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 
which became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in
12 Many Baltic representatives take sharp objection to references to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as 
Soviet “republics,” arguing that the three interwar states never relinquished their independence— a 
position supported by Western non-recognition policies during the Soviet period. This thesis uses the 
term “republic” exclusively as a matter of convenience to help distinguish between events taking place 
during the period of Soviet control over the Baltic states and those taking place after the restoration of 
Baltic independence in August 1991.
13 Moscow Television, 3 August 1992 (FBIS SOV-149, 3 August 1992: 13); for further discussion, see
Russell 1995b, Kreickemeyer 1995: 98. The term “near abroad” is used here to refer to the non-Baltic 
former republics.
14 For example, a poll conducted by the Moscow-based Russian Minorities Research Centre found that by
early 1995, 93% of ethnic Russians living in Estonia intended to stay on, although approximately one- 
half had not applied for Estonian citizenship (The Baltic Independent, 5-11 May 1995: 2).
15 See, for example, Foye 1992: 30 or Hurlburt 1995: 14.
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December 1994); the Council of Europe; and the consultative arm of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, which 
became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in July 1997). It was in the 
arena of meetings—not only those open to the public but also those (as I was to discover 
later) taking place in camera—of these organizations that Russian and Baltic 
representatives conducted some of their most persistent mutual denunciations.
Second, this exchange of insults appeared to have a life of its own. Initially, Baltic and 
Russian recriminations appeared to be part of efforts to drum up international 
(particularly Western) support for their positions on issues of bilateral or multilateral 
concern—troop withdrawals, citizenship, and the like. Amidst broader efforts to 
“internationalise” these issues, the vituperations of Russian and Baltic representatives 
added rhetorical fire to claims that one or the other side was acting in a way that 
threatened the interests of other European states, or was failing to meet its legal 
obligations under the charter of one or another European organization. Yet well after 
institutional sway had been brought to bear on offending parties, well after the majority 
of member governments had come down for one or the other side, well after 
organizations had declared issues effectively closed, the sniping continued.
Protracted exchanges of insults seem at odds with general conceptions of “diplomacy,” 
and not just because of the public’s association of the profession with tact and 
compromise. Few who have observed diplomacy up close believe that it is a province of 
wise and gentle individuals tirelessly seeking international accommodation, even though 
diplomatic manuals from the Renaissance on have certainly held up this image as an 
ideal towards which diplomats should strive. Most commentators nevertheless do 
consider diplomacy and its rhetoric to be strategic in character, aimed at producing 
particular outcomes. The strategy behind the Russian-Baltic exchanges, however, was 
far from clear.16 As noted above, international support for particular positions had 
already been won or lost by mid-1993. Furthermore, it was evident that Baltic-Russian 
rhetoric was generating bad feeling in all four capitals.17 Analyses with titles like 
“Relations with Russia turn bitter” or Overcoming Unfriendly Stability opined that the 
rhetorical battle was increasingly counterproductive.18 Indeed, emotions were running 
sufficiently high to provoke both sides, in the description of the head of the Riga CSCE 
office, to “unnecessary and provocative acts.”19 Some European diplomats, aware of the 
effect that Baltic rhetoric was having on Russian moderates, were indeed advising 
Baltic representatives to “choose a psychologically prudent language” in their relations 
with Moscow.20 So what explained the bad language of the Russian-Baltic dispute? 
Was it simply the irrepressible effect of “historic animosities?” Or was something more 
interesting going on?
16 For analyses of Russian-Baltic relations that, while often informative and insightful, do not adequately
address this question, see Girnius 1994, 1995, and 1996b, Kionka 1994, Malachov 1997, or Medvedev 
1998, as well as Russell 1995a, 1995b. For a partial exception (partial because it discusses only 
Estonia), see Girnius 1996a.
17 Estonian President Lennart Meri: The Baltic Independent, 11-17 December 1992, p. 2; Latvian Foreign
Minister Georgs Andrejevs: The Baltic Independent, 12-18 March, 1993, p. 9; Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department director Sergei Yastrzhembskiy: FBIS-SOV-92- 
110, 8 June 1992, p. 22; Russian Ambassador at Large Sergei Zotov: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 
October 1992, p. 1.
18 See, for example, Girnius 1996a or Moshes 1999.
19 Forced Migration Projects 1997: 10.
20 Moscow News, 18-24 March 1994, p. 4; personal interviews, Tallinn, December 1997.
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“Identity diplomacy” and its consequences
This dissertation argues that scholars interested in diplomacy and in concepts of 
international society can find much of interest in this seemingly marginal diplomatic 
spat. Due to historical circumstance, the Baltic-Russian relationship of the early 1990s 
throws into stark relief three interlocking features of international politics that often 
have been underplayed in the bulk of the International Relations (IR) literature. First, 
diplomatic exchanges are permeated with debates on the nature or fundamental 
qualities—one might say the identities—of nations, governments, non-state actors, or 
indeed any pertinent actor in the global social arena. Second, diplomatic exchanges are 
also permeated with debates over the existence and membership of collectivities of 
actors. The “society” of states is itself one such collectivity; so, however, are smaller 
groupings within it—“regions,” for instance, or “clubs” of states. Third, emerging from 
and feeding into these diplomatic debates run further debates over the relative social 
position, or status, of collectivities as well as of individual actors. In this way, 
diplomatic exchanges are an important part of the constitution, grouping, and status of 
identities in the global arena. The international “order” being negotiated through 
diplomatic exchanges is thus as much a social order as it is the presence of rules or the 
absence of war.
This dissertation argues that all three of these debates are clearly visible in the Russian- 
Baltic acrimony of the early 1990s. It observes that Baltic and Russian representatives 
waged a protracted battle to gain the upper hand in international debates over the 
fundamental natures—the “national identities”—of the nations and governments they 
represented and of those of their opponents.21 It suggests that these debates were part of 
a broader effort to gain recognition of Baltic and Russian association with a valued 
collective entity. Europe. And it argues that Europe’s value in the eyes of Russian and 
Baltic representatives stemmed from their conviction that Europe and its institutions 
represented loci not only of power, of security, and of belonging, but also of status in 
the interstate social order.
The Russian-Baltic exchange further provides an unusually clear view of an aspect of 
international social interaction that frequently is ignored in the international relations 
literature: its emotional charge. The emotional consequences of social interaction, 
including struggles over self-representation, inclusion and exclusion, and the 
establishment and maintenance of social hierarchies, are well-documented in the 
literatures of social psychology and the sociology of psychology (the former focusing 
on the impact of individual psychic needs on social interaction, the latter focusing on 
the impact of social interaction on the psychic state of the individual).22 With only a 
few exceptions, however, scholars of international relations and of diplomacy have 
chosen to avoid discussion of these dynamics, judging their presence difficult to
21 Drawing on discussions in Hopf (1996: 148-153), Neumann (1997, 1999: 2-20), and Somers (1994) 
and on Peter Gries’ discussion of the dialectics o f “face nationalism” (1999), I proceed from the 
position that the ‘national identities’ being presented, like all collective identities, exist primarily in 
the stories told about them and the debates that surround them. The identities presented in these stories 
and debates can be thought of as both ascriptive (“primordial”) and constructed, as well as both 
affective and instrumental. Furthermore, they can be thought o f as evolving through a process of 
debate that involves input from both elite and masses within and outside of national borders and 
cultural polities, constituting an ever-emerging relationship between the national self and salient 
others as well as between present and past national selves.
" For an excellent overview of different approaches to the sociology of emotion, see Smith-Lovin 1995.
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establish and their impact difficult to quantify. However, it is by putting together the 
impact of disagreements over self-representation—in terms of normative qualities, in 
terms of group membership, and in terms of social position, or status—that we can 
begin to understand how and why Russian and Baltic diplomats could be so engaged 
and frustrated by the task of creating knowledge about the nature, not only of their own 
nations, but of their neighbors and antagonists.
This dissertation will proceed in six chapters. The first two chapters are largely 
historical: Chapter One sketches the history of the triangular relationship between the 
Baltic polities, the Soviet Union, and leading Western powers and institutions—the 
predecessors of the “Europe” of the 1990s—across the twentieth century, while Chapter 
Two goes on to outline the immediate circumstances behind the Baltic-Russian 
acrimony of the early 1990s. Chapters Three through Six, however, move on to discuss 
how each of the three debates outlined above—over identities, groupings, and social 
status—manifested themselves in the Russian-Baltic conflict and the implications of 
these vignettes for the IR literature. Chapters Three and Four expand the diplomatic 
studies literature’s traditional focus on diplomacy as a venue for negotiation of action, 
rules, and values to discuss the protracted battle that Baltic and Russian diplomats 
waged to gain the upper hand in international debates over the fundamental natures— 
the “national identities”—of the nations and governments they represented and those of 
their opponents. Chapter Five draws on the IR literature on region construction to move 
from debates over individual identities to debates over collective identities, discussing 
Baltic and Russian efforts to portray their nations as fundamentally European in 
character as well as in practice. And Chapter Six uses the international society literature 
as well as sociological approaches to international politics as jumping-off points from 
which to discuss battles for status in interstate society, with special focus on the way in 
which exclusion of rivals plays a role in status competitions—a theme that has been 
insufficiently examined in the IR literature on status.
Interstate society and its ordering
This dissertation adds its voice to a broad body of literature that emphasizes the societal 
quality of state interaction. The idea that states (or their historical predecessors) exist in 
a form of society is one that can be traced back in the European tradition at least as far 
as Jean Bodin (1530-1595).24 In this conception, the sovereign state is the constitutive 
community of an interstate society; its obedience to the norms of this society both 
reaffirms its own identity of the sovereign state and reconstitutes the structure of the 
society in which it operates. The existence of this society (as opposed to an anarchical 
system), in the view of its believers, can be seen in the evolution of not only rules, but 
also social institutions shaping interstate behaviour, permitting the application of 
domestic societal analogies.26 In the twentieth century Anglophone IR literature, it is 
writers at least loosely affiliated with what has come to be known as the “English 
School” who have not only posited most strongly the existence of such a society, but
23 Among the few exceptions, see Gries (1999) and to a lesser degree Ringmar (2002).
24 Knutsen 1992: 64.
25 Dunne 1995: 379. For reasons that will become evident in Chapter Six, this dissertation uses the term
“interstate society” to refer to the state-dominated social grouping that many writers refer to as 
“international society,” although authors’ terminology will be retained in quotations.
26 Bull 1977: 13; Suganami 1989: 24-39. In this view, the expansion of these rules and institutions to
govern the domestic behaviour of states— as in the case, for instance, o f human rights law— simply 
strengthens the argument for the power as well as the existence of the interstate society.
5
have dedicated the most time to the examination of its social nature.2 *7 Martin Wight and 
Hedley Bull were seminal figures in the discussion of modern interstate society’s 
institutions and mechanisms; Bull and Adam Watson are among the primary historians 
of its development. As Tony Evans and Peter Wilson have observed, some of these 
scholars treat an interstate society’s existence as dependent on the meanings statesmen 
give to their actions and the assumptions that underlie these actions; others take a more 
positivistic approach, discerning such a society’s existence through the existence of its 
institutions.“ But all perceive the existence of this society as playing a vital role in 
maintaining order in world politics.
The issue of what constitutes “order,” however, is a complex one: the term means 
different things to different people. For writers in the self-styled “realist” spectrum, 
ranging from Hans Morgenthau in the classical camp to Kenneth Waltz on the neo­
realist end, “order” is essentially the absence of war that results from effective 
accumulation and balancing of power. For rational institutionalists such as Robert 
Keohane, “order” is also the absence of war, but that which results from the existence of 
rules that permit the maximizing of preferences.30 In both these views, order is 
essentially an outcome of particular types of behavior within conditions of anarchy. 
Bull, however, who devoted an entire book (arguably the most famous work of the 
English School) to the subject of order in world politics, attempted to move towards a 
broader conception of order, one that could accommodate more than outcomes. His 
definition of order, as “a pattern that promotes a particular result, an arrangement of 
social life” linked to the promotion of the elementary goals and values of the society of 
states, has informed most writers of the English School.31 This order, Bull argued, is 
maintained and enforced by the five main institutions of interstate society, which 
include two interstate mechanisms enjoying broad legitimacy among all states 
(international law, institutionalized diplomacy), one coercive practice (war), one pattern 
of modem state behaviour (the impulse towards power balancing), and one social
2' This is a slightly different issue than the social quality of international interaction, a topic to which
scholars across a variety of approaches—constructivist, post-structuralist, historical sociological—
have dedicated extensive attention. The interests of English School writers also differ in a number of
important respects from those of regime theorists, despite the focus of both groups on international
faw. For comparisons between English School writers and regime theorists, see Evans and Wilson
1992 and Hurrell 1993; for a discussion of the relationship between constructivist approaches and the
English School, see Reus-Smit 2002.
28 Evans and Wilson 1992: 332-333.
2q Morgenthau and Thompson 1985; Waltz 1979.
20 See, for example, Keohane 1989.
21 Bull 1977: 4. Goals that Bull considers to be “elementary” or “primary” are ones that he deems to make
social life possible: they are pursued by any group that wishes to live socially, and a group that failed
to pursue them “we should hardly call a society at all” (Bull 1977: 5). At the primitive or domestic
social level, Bull considers these goals to be threefold: the limitation of violence, the keeping of
promises, and the stabilisation of possessions through the rules of property. But although Bull
discusses the ways in which states meet these goals as well (through the just war tradition, the
principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the recognition by states of each others’ sovereignty), he begins
his discussion of international order by formulating three “elementary” goals specific to international
society—by which he means “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common
values...(who) conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one
another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 1977: 13). At the level of
international behaviour, in Bull’s estimation, the first of these goals is the general preservation of the
system and society of states itself; in other words, order becomes the means by which the society of
states strives for self-reproduction. The other two goals are more specific: first, the maintenance of
the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, and second, peace, in the sense of the
absence of war among states as the normal condition of their relationship (Bull 1977: 4).
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Convention increasingly under fire, even in Bull’s day: the special rights and 
responsibilities extended by the community of states to the Great Powers.32
A scholar of a sociological bent might argue that an interest in Bull’s last institution 
leads logically towards a different, still broader sense of the term “order.” It is possible 
to conceive of the entire global social arena as “ordered” in the sense that the separate 
elements of the group are arranged in relationship to each other—not only grouped, but 
ranked. 33 Of course, one of the critical ranking devices—indeed, the major fault line 
running through the global political arena—is the division between entities legally 
recognized as states and those lacking this recognition. This ordering is as evident in 
scholarly writing as it is in political practice. As Martin Shaw among others has noted, 
scholars interested in the society of states have tended to discuss this collectivity as 
though it is the only (rather than merely a major) social grouping or ordering 
mechanism in the worldwide totality of political interaction.34 Scholars such as Shaw 
and Yale Ferguson have taken objection, in Ferguson’s words, to “a definition of 
‘international society’ that allows for only one important polity type, the state, and only 
those values derived from European diplomatic culture that state polities hold in 
common.” 35 That the collectivity of states is not seen as only a “sub-society, or perhaps 
sub-culture, of human society in some wider sense” is, to these writers, a devastating 
comment on the discursive power of the dominant practice of statehood. 36
State-centric scholars would argue in their own defense that any privileging of the 
society of states in their work simply mirrors global realities. As Chapter Six will 
discuss further, the material distinctions between entities recognized as states and those 
deprived this status are often very fine, and the process of inclusion and exclusion from 
the club is a highly politicized and contestable one. However, this division is a powerful 
ordering force, in the sense of establishing a social ranking between forms of political 
organization. The practical outcomes of this division are clearly visible in Bull’s two 
interstate mechanisms, those of international law and institutionalized diplomacy. In the 
first instance, the state/non-state divide marks the line between the privileged group of 
entities possessing the legal power to create “order” (in Bull’s sense) and other social 
entities in the global arena lacking this legal power. The fact that the legal power 
enjoyed by entities participating in diplomacy stems from these entities’ relative 
monopoly over the instruments of violence does not obviate the fact that these entities 
also derive power from their reciprocally recognized status as legitimate law-making 
entities. In the second instance, the institution of diplomacy serves as a tangible dividing 
line demarcating the club of states: both in its essence, by serving as a marker of 
privilege, and in function, since it is through diplomatic activity that new actors are 
selected for statehood, which only existing states can grant. The privileged 
communications system that diplomacy sets up between diplomatic participants is of 
course a critical factor ensuring some degree of cohesion within that group, which in 
turn only toughens the divide between state and non-state actors.
32 Bull 1977: 195-223.
33 http://dictionary.oed.com/ (accessed 6 November 2000).
34 Shaw 1992: 427-431.
35 Shaw 1992; Ferguson 1998: 201-202. As Bui! himself put it: “States are simply groupings of men, and
men may be grouped in such a way that they do not form states at all. Moreover, where they are 
grouped into states, they are grouped in other ways also” (Bull 1977: 20).
3b Shaw 1992: 429. Different conceptions include those of Ferguson (who instead of the “interstate” and 
“intrastate” political arenas enshrined in the classical tradition sees “a single arena that encompasses 
countless individuals as well as layered, overlapping, and interacting political authorities,” which he 
also calls “polities”) and Niklas Luhmann (Ferguson 1998: 201-202; Albert 1999).
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An appreciation of the ordering power of the state/non-state divide in the global social 
arena should not, however, deflect attention from ordering principles operating within 
interstate society itself. The notion that that interstate society is ordered in its own right 
is of course hardly novel: the political effects of discrepancies in material capabilities, 
particularly military capabilities or wealth, have received extensive attention in the IR 
literature. It is the argument of this thesis, however, that the degree to which interstate 
society is ordered by principles of social status as well can be observed from the amount 
of attention that state representatives devote to seeing their nations’ inclusion in status 
groups, or “clubs,” in interstate society.
A word on language...
As the above discussion suggests, this dissertation takes a strong interest in language, 
and the relationship between characterization, understanding, and action. In so doing, it 
incorporates elements of three major approaches to language in the literature of 
International Relations. One group of scholars has focused on the way in which 
language can be used as a tool, permitting actors more or less consciously to manipulate 
audiences and justify decisions through the creation of categories such as “terrorist” or 
“freedom fighter.” 37 Another group has focused on how language can become a trap, 
examining the ways in which metaphors, analogies or terminology constrain cognition
T O
and hence limit decisionmakers’ ability to think creatively about problems. And a 
third group has focused on language as a productive force, examining the way in which 
language creates and naturalizes categories of being as well as documenting the 
relations of power inherent in and perpetuated by ostensibly value-neutral language.39 
Elements amenable to all of these approaches can be found in the Russian-Baltic 
dispute—for example, the deployment of terms such as “colonizers” or “human rights 
abusers,” the limitations put on creative solutions to border problems through the 
language of “sovereignty,” or the very debate over “Europeanness” itself.
For the most part, this dissertation is a historically-oriented examination of rhetoric, in 
its classical sense as persuasive discourse.40 The three genres or modes of rhetoric 
isolated by Aristotle—epidetic or ceremonial, dedicated to praise or blame and 
primarily present-oriented; deliberative, moving audiences to agreement on action and 
primarily future-oriented; and judicial or forensic, which looks into the past to^judge 
guilt or innocence—are richly evident in the language of Russian-Baltic relations.41 The 
association between the classical rhetorical tradition and the law is particularly 
appropriate to the Baltic-Russian example, where the behaviour of both sides resembled 
that of barristers in a courtroom, speaking not to, but about each other to an audience 
that would have the opportunity to vote on the persuasiveness of their arguments.
As is often the case with modern studies of rhetoric, this dissertation shows a number of 
similarities to many analyses of narrative or discursive practices. 42 This dissertation 
shares with these analyses an interest in the politics of representation and a focus on the 
relational positioning in which identities are placed and by which they are distinguished 
from one another. With them, it takes an interest in the way in which some actors are 
authorized to speak or act “definitively,” and how some voices are enabled and others
3 See, for example, Chomsky and Herman 1988.
38 See, for example, Khong 1992.
3Q See, for example, Doty 1993, 1996a; Fierke 1996.
40 Donahue and Prosser 1997: 147.
41 Donahue and Prosser 1997: 140.
42 Beer and Hariman 1996: 11.
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are silenced or excluded by particular definitions. It is also similar to discursive 
practices analyses in that it examines oppositions of identities that establish a 
relationship of power, in the sense that one element of the opposition is privileged.43
Many analyses of discourse or narrative, through their focus on the power of linguistic 
structures, downplay the degree to which speakers control language. Indeed, as 
Neumann has observed, poststructuralist analyses of discourse or narrative, due to their 
wariness over the possibility of any subject being “sovereign,” tend to background 
issues of intentionality. 44 This dissertation, however, is as interested in the rhetorical 
choices made by the speakers involved in the Russian-Baltic dispute as it is in the 
discursive structures in which they operated. This interest is understandable when one 
considers that this work focuses on a period of discursive instability, when the grip of 
dominant representations on the imaginations of actors all over Europe was loosened 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this period of conceptual turmoil, 
Russian and Baltic representatives palpably strove to achieve consensus on the validity 
of new as well as old metaphors, relationships, or notions of identity. In so doing, they 
certainly reproduced many elements of dominant discourses or narratives. However, 
under the pressure of new demands, Russian and Baltic diplomats also dove to salvage 
narratives and images that had been only shallowly submerged during the Soviet period, 
or dried off language that had resurfaced during the last days of the USSR. Furthermore, 
they recombined elements of existing discourses in new formations—visible, for 
example, in the argument by Russian representatives that Russia was harnessing great- 
power status to democratic values. In short, the Russian-Baltic dispute affords a nicely- 
framed view of agency meeting structure: of individuals, while operating within the 
constraints of discursive structures, nevertheless drawing on them creatively for 
particular political purposes.
Of course, Russian and Baltic diplomats were not the only agents in the theatre; in their 
choices of language, they were playing to European audiences. Russian and Baltic 
representatives chose figures of speech not only to stir European notions of material or 
practical interest, but also for their historical resonance or emotional impact, their power 
to flatter or reproach their hearers. Sensitivity to the potential responses of Western 
audiences influenced not only what themes Russian and Baltic representatives put in 
their speeches, but also what they left out. For instance, as several authors have 
discussed, the image of Russophone residents as a potentially disloyal “third column” 
permeated security discourse within all three Baltic states.4> Yet this was a theme that 
was almost never raised by Baltic representatives in European forums, probably 
because it both cast doubts on the success of Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies 
and raised the possibility that the three republics might, their vehement protestations to 
the contrary notwithstanding, become the kind of “security consumers” disdained as 
new members by NATO. Nor did Baltic representatives raise in European forums the 
kinds of racist anti-Russian language that was all too common in domestic political 
discourse but was certain to offend European sensibilities. 46 Institutional codes of 
conduct also had an impact on Russian-Baltic rhetorical styles. Familiarity with the 
rhetorical traditions of the Soviet-era CSCE, an institution with a tradition “of publicly
43 Milliken 1999: 228-229
44 Neumann 1997: 321-322.
45 See Jaeger 1997: 27 for a useful bibliography.
46 See, for instance, Neumann 1999: 107 for Estonian parliamentarian Tiit Made’s sweeping views on the
genetic sources of inherent Russian aggressiveness. Made, incidentally, consistently showed a creative 
turn of phrase: in discussion of the Estonian law on aliens, he referred to Estonia as a “cultivated 
garden” and to the Russophone minority as “vermin ants” who should be eradicated (Kommersant- 
Daily, 23 June 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-120, 24 June 1993: 6)).
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embarrassing members of the club into compliance with its standards,” may have 
encouraged Baltic and Russian confidence in the appropriateness of combative language 
there.47 By mid-1993, however, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
had made it quite clear that non-members in particular would do well to watch their 
language—a point that many Baltic and Russian representatives took to heart.48 Indeed, 
several Russian parliamentarians attending the Assembly publicly declared themselves 
appalled by the anti-Baltic tirades in the Assembly of fellow deputy Vladimir 
Zhirinovskiy, although they had not felt the need to respond to his views or his manner 
of presenting them at home.49 In short, the complex factors influencing the choice of 
language designed to persuade particular audiences bring actors even more sharply into 
focus.
Notably, the ends to which these rhetorical means were working were often ones that 
give concrete social meaning to the relational positioning of interest to post­
structuralists. The interests at stake in these debates were not just material interests. 
Rather, participants were pursuing, on behalf of the states and nations they represented, 
a complex set of social goals: acceptance, social standing, the ability to engage in self­
definition rather than be defined by others. The outcomes of these efforts were tangible 
manifestations of the hierarchies of power and virtue revealed in analyses of discursive 
practices or narratives; and the acrimony of the Russian-Baltic dispute represents the 
lived consequences of these hierarchies for participants in their negotiation. Rhetoric 
has often been denigrated as appealing to emotion over reason; but in these instances it 
is the structural consequences of rhetorical appeals, as well as the appeals themselves, 
that carry an emotional charge.
...and on feeling
The emotional dimension of international politics is one that the discipline of IR has 
largely ignored in recent years. It was not always thus; classical philosophers of 
international relations held an abiding interest in the relationship between reason and 
emotion in human action, underpinned by the assumption that the “passions” had an 
important role to play in international conflict. Thucydides, detailing the progress of the 
Corcyran civil war, saw revenge as more important than self-preservation; and his 
Athenians, explaining their expansionist ambitions to the Spartans, describe their 
primary motivation as fear of Persia.70 In the seventeenth century, Hobbes, Spinoza and 
Grotius all explained the causes of war in terms of human emotions such as greed and 
pride. While liberal thinkers of the eighteenth century such as Locke, Bentham, and 
Kant looked forward to a reason-based transnational consensus of interest, by the end of 
the eighteenth century both conservative (Burke) and radical (Marx and Engels) critics 
“took issue with the liberal axiom,” concluding that “man is passionate as well as 
rational.”51 Writers within the classical realist tradition of the twentieth century also do 
not shy away from emotion; for example, the writings of Hans Morgenthau are
47 Kritz 1993: 23.
48 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Official Record of Debates (henceforth PACE ORD),
13 May 1993: 1060, 1063, 1071.
49PACE ORD, 14 April 1994:416.
50 1972: 243, 80. Their second motive, ahead of profit, was concern for their state’s honor.
51 Knutsen 1992: 92-93, 112, 136. “History,” wrote Burke, “consists of the miseries brought upon the
world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train 
of disorderly appetites” (Burke 1986: 247).
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sprinkled with references to trust and love, exaltation and pride, and frustration, 
insecurity and fear. 52
Despite this history, emotion gradually disappeared from the IR and diplomatic studies 
literature after the second World War. At the formal level, as Jon Mercer has argued, 
emotion dropped from the list of concerns of IR theory; at the informal level, as Neta 
Crawford has pointed out, emotion remained ubiquitous but undertheorized.53 In part, 
this eviction of emotion coincided with and can be explained by the gradual 
marginalisation of diplomatic history within IR, as the discipline moved toward a search 
for general laws of behaviour rather than an elucidation of the behaviour of 
idiosyncratic players operating within specific historical and cultural contexts. As the 
search for monocausal explanation intensified, so the difficulties of focusing on 
emotion—whose relationship to cognition and action is notoriously difficult to 
quantify—shifted scholars away to more tractable areas. The main clusters of scholarly 
worldview within the discipline, while frequently treating collective bodies (whether 
states, organisations, or economic entities such as classes) as possessing some human 
attributes (motives, for instance), also showed themselves hostile to “irrational” 
attributes, including emotion. Realist scholars, attempting to portray the state as a 
unitary, rational actor, naturally shunted issues of emotion to one side. Liberal theories, 
seeking to replace or supplement the state as the primary unit of analysis, added on 
similarly dispassionate entities—international organisations, bureaucracies—without 
calling into question rationalist assumptions; Marxian discussions did the same with 
economic structures. The rise of rational choice approaches to social action further 
reduced interest in ‘irrational’ complexities. Even constructivist scholars, with their 
conscious opposition to rationalist assumptions and emphasis on social practices, 
through their lack of attention to theories of mind of the individual have avoided 
engaging with issues of emotion and its social sources or power.54 Even in the subset of 
the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature that that deals with decision-making, affect 
and emotion have not received the attention they deserve (especially given the interest 
of the discipline in conflict and conflict resolution); the focus has been on action and 
cognition.55 Finally, the diplomatic studies literature has been effectively mute on the 
subject, in the process stripping accounts of diplomatic interaction of much of their 
human quality.
This dissertation does not aspire to any causal analysis of the role of emotion in 
Russian-Baltic relations; it simply attempts to make respectable the proposition that we 
should expect diplomatic exchanges, particularly the type described in this dissertation, 
to generate feeling. The idea that diplomatic exchanges might be pervaded with feeling 
would not surprise one group of scholars, those focusing on the social sources of 
emotion. Sociological approaches to the study of emotion take as their point of 
departure the social environment surrounding the individual—interpersonal interaction,
52 Morgenthau and Thompson 1985:34-35, 119, 124-125.
53 Mercer 1999; Crawford 2000: 116.
54 Checkel 1997:489.
55 For example, affect is listed as an “additional factor” in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's list o f components
that shape a policymaker's “definition of a situation” (1962: 66). Indeed, a look at Herrmann et al. 
1997 reveals that even analyses that explicitly set themselves the goal of examining affect end up 
spending much more time on cognition. Most of the few FPA studies that focus explicitly on emotion 
and affect have used a psychoanalytic, individualistic approach; they focus on the individual in 
dramatic situations, such as crisis, defeat, or victory (see, for example, Hirschbein 1997). For good 
overviews of the FPA literature and its preoccupations, see Ripley 1993, Hudson 1995; for seminal 
works in the psychological approach to foreign policy decisionmaking, see De Rivera 1968 or Jervis 
1976.
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social structures--and examine the impact of participation in a social world on the 
emotional life of the individual. In this view, the focus of psychoanalytic and social 
psychological theories of emotion on the individualized, internally generated quality of 
emotion is at best excessive and at worst misplaced.36 “An emotion,” Robert Solomon 
writes, “is intrinsically tied up with our social existence and our relations with others ... 
[The problem] is to retain the personal and experiential (‘phenomenological’) grasp of 
emotions but place emotions in a larger social context, treating them not only as the 
result of but as constituted in relations with other people.” 57 In other words, sociologists 
of emotion use social independent variables to explain dependent variables at the level 
of the individual—such as emotional responses to various situations.58 This approach is a 
mirror image of that of social psychology, in which individual independent variables 
(psychic needs) are used to predict social dependent variables (social outcomes). The 
two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, individual and 
social outcomes can be viewed as mutually constitutive, and differences in emphasis on 
one or the other side of the equation may be seen as reflecting different scholars’ 
differing interests and research questions, rather than a battle to establish absolute 
analytic primacy. For example, a social psychological approach works well for the 
examination of particular types of group interactions; ethnocentrism, for instance, can 
be understood as a result of personal motivation of each group member to acquire and 
maintain positive social identity through group membership.39 A sociological approach, 
on the other hand, is particularly valuable for understanding the cumulative emotional 
properties of enduring social relationships, which are based not only on present and past 
interactions, but also on anticipations of future contacts.60 But on one fundamental point 
both approaches agree: emotions are a constant natural outcome of social interactions at 
every organisational level of human life, from the interpersonal to the intergroup to the 
international. Indeed, far from being solitary events, “a very large class of emotions 
result (primarily or frequently) from real, imagined, or anticipated outcomes in social 
relations."6' Most also agree that how events and interactions affect individuals 
emotionally depends on how they see themselves and others, and how they define 
events that occur.
It is evident from the discussion above that any dense social interaction such as the 
practice of diplomacy carries the potential to trigger a wide range of feelings. It is worth 
noting that not all of these feelings will involve the stereotypical outburst of rage, tears 
of joy, or suchlike. Smith-Lovin, for instance, draws distinctions between four concepts: 
affect, emotion, sentiment, and mood. “Affect” is the most general term, referring to any 
general evaluative orientation towards an object or situation. “Emotion” is generally 
used to refer to a subset of affect involving a degree of physiological response. 
“Sentiment” refers to a more socially constructed and enduring state than emotion; it 
refers to enduring, latent tendencies to respond emotionally in the context of a social 
relationship. And “mood” is also more enduring than emotional response, but is tied 
more to a person across situations than to a social context or relationship.63 Diplomatic 
exchanges may generate any or all of these four categories of response; for the purposes 
of this dissertation, therefore, all four categories will be grouped together under the
56 Smith-Lovin 1995.
57 Solomon 1997: 3.
58 Kemper 1990: 231.
59 Cinnirella 1996: 253-254.
60 Gordon 1990: 150
61 Kemper 1997: 2.
62 Dijker et al. 1996: 13.
63 Smith-Lovin 1995: 1 18-119.
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general term of “feeling.” 64 This dissertation focuses on one category of feeling issues, 
those arising from practices of representation, or (somewhat differently put) from the 
creation of knowledge, both about the self and about others.
Two notes on terminology
Two notes on terminology are in order. First, this thesis focuses on statements by 
individuals authorized to speak and act in the name of a particular state or 
intergovernmental organization. This authorization frequently extends beyond those 
individuals traditionally known as “diplomats”—individuals accredited to another 
state—to include heads of state, ministers, government officials, parliamentarians, or 
different specialists representing their state, either abroad or at home in exchanges with 
foreign delegations. Robert Jackson refers to these persons—“those special people who 
act on the behalf of sovereign states”—as “statespeople.” 65 However, in keeping with 
the focus of this dissertation, I will use the term “representatives.”
Second, no satisfactorily economical or rigorous term has evolved to denote ethnic 
Russians and Russian-speakers living in the Baltic republics who, due to their lack of 
connection (either personal or inherited) with the interwar Baltic states or to their 
service in the Soviet security apparatus, either believed prior to the restoration of Baltic 
independence that they might be disenfranchised, or who ultimately were denied 
automatic citizenship in the restored Baltic states.66 (While during the late Soviet period 
the ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking communities in all three Baltic republics faced 
these pressures, after the restoration of independence virtually all of the people in this 
category were residents of Estonia or Latvia, although a few Russians and Russian- 
speakers resident in Lithuania were denied automatic citizenship due to their 
connections to the Soviet security services.) For the sake of brevity, and to avoid 
confusion with representatives of the Russian Federation, I use the shorthand term 
“Russophones” to cover such peopled This designation does not cover ethnic Russians 
and Russian-speakers who gained Baltic citizenship automatically, either through 
Lithuania’s generous citizenship policy or through their connection to the interwar 
Estonian or Latvian states, who are referred to as “ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking 
Baltic (or Estonian/Latvian/Lithuanian) citizens.”
64 Indeed, in terms o f understanding long-term political relationships, “sentiment” may be the most useful
of the four concepts. For instance, in their discussion of the Athenian list o f concerns discussed above, 
Chittick and Freyberg-Inan note that “the term used by the Athenians for the concept of fear, deos, 
indicates a lasting state of alarm as opposed to a sudden fright” (Chitick and Frebyerg-Inan 2001: 73).
65 Jackson 2000: 34.
66 See Melvin 1998: 36-39 for a discussion of the various terms used by the Russian government and the
advantages and disadvantages of various English terms, as well as Simonsen 1996 for a discussion of 
the distinctions between russkie and rossiiane in the international as well as domestic contexts.
67 In quotes, however, I retain the terminology used by the speaker.
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Chapter One: Dejä Vu All Over Again?
In early 1992, Western governments and institutions found themselves the targets of 
intensive appeals by the Baltic governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia on the one 
hand, and their neighbor the Russian Federation on the other. Both sides were appealing 
for assistance with troublesome issues—troop withdrawals, citizenship issues. But both 
were also appealing to be reunited with the “civilized” world—to be let in, so to speak, 
from the Cold War.
But to understand where these appeals came from, it is first necessary to understand the 
triangular and later quadrilateral relationship between the Baltic states, Western powers 
and institutions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and finally the 
Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics (RSFSR), later to become the Russian 
Federation, over the course of the seventy-four years between 1917 and 1991. On the 
Baltic side, the watchcry of “No more Yaltas!” was a distillation of nearly a century’s 
pain, anger, fear, frustration, and determination. Since their declarations of 
independence after the collapse of the tsarist Russian empire in 1917, Baltic leaderships 
and populations had been all too aware of the degree to which their futures hung on 
relations between London, Washington, or Berlin to their west and Moscow to their 
east. Half a century of ineffectual and inadequate concern on the part of the Western 
great powers for the principle of Baltic self-determination had done little to alleviate the 
bloody and destructive consequences of Soviet rule, established through the forcible 
incorporation of all three states in August 1940. The Yalta Conference of February 
1945, at which US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill definitively abandoned the Baltic republics1 to Soviet General 
Secretary Josef Stalin and to their fate, was only the most famous example of Western 
unwillingness to “die for Daugavpils,” not the most decisive.2 Now Baltic leaders felt 
that they had to make sure that they would not be abandoned again by the West. 
Meanwhile, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the newly independent Russian Federation, 
had suffered diplomatic snubs of his own from Western leaders anxious not to do 
anything that might weaken the domestic position of former Soviet General Secretary 
(and later President) Mikhail Gorbachev, whose continued political survival Western 
leaders had considered to be of paramount importance. Russian as well as Baltic 
representatives thus found themselves in a struggle for recognition (first legal, and then 
symbolic) and acceptance by Western audiences.
To lay out the background to this situation, this chapter examines three periods of 
particular importance for Baltic-Western-Soviet-Russian engagement: 1917-1922, 
1939-1945, and 1985-1991.
As noted in the Introduction, this thesis uses the term “republic” as a matter of convenience to help 
distinguish between events taking place during the period of Soviet control over the Baltic states— 
which I define as starting with incorporation in August 1940 and ending with international recognition 
of the restoration of Baltic independence in August 1991— and those taking place prior to 
incorporation or after the restoration of independence. Similarly, in describing events during the 
Soviet period, I refer to cities and now-independent republics by their Soviet-era names (e.g. 
Leningrad, Belorussia, Moldavia).
2 As will be discussed later in this chapter, Anglo-American military strategy effectively doomed the 
Baltic republics to their eventual reoccupation by Soviet forces— a political reality, effectively 
complete by the time of the Yalta Conference, in the face o f which a more principled political stance 
would have counted for little. Furthermore, Roosevelt and Churchill had already signaled that they 
would not make Baltic annexation a sticking point in post-war relations with the Soviet Union by the 
Teheran Conference of November-December 1943.
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1917-1922
The political wishes of the populations of the Russian imperial provinces that now make 
up Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, or indeed of most of the subjects—Russian or non- 
Russian—of the Russian empire, came very low on the list of priorities of most Western 
governments in the years during or immediately after World War I. By the time that the 
tsarist Russian regime collapsed in February 1917, the imperial hold over the Baltic 
provinces of Estonia, Livonia, Courland, Kovno, and Vilna was already substantially 
weakened.3 In 1914, in the judgment of John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, it would have 
been impossible to predict whether, or at what point, Baltic nationalist demands for 
autonomy within the tsarist empire would be translated into a full call for 
independence.4 But German forces had occupied Lithuania and Courland by September 
1915, and the German government had permitted the formation of a Lithuanian National 
Council.5 In Estonia and Livonia, nationalist groups were also seeing the chance to 
become masters in their own house.
The Baltic populations met the installation of the Provisional Government in Moscow 
with enthusiasm, confidently expecting a speedy transformation of the empire.6 Baltic 
representatives rapidly approached Allied as well as Russian officials to discuss the 
issue of the formation of independent Baltic states. However, the Provisional 
Government in Moscow was one with which the Allied governments hoped to build 
good relations; American leaders in particular viewed the new government as a force for 
beneficial change across the territory of the former empire. Allied governments were 
able to justify their stance by pointing out that officials of the Provisional Government 
had professed themselves ready to forge partnerships with non-Russian nationalist 
leaders.7 And more importantly, no Allied government was willing to take steps that 
might put in jeopardy the Russian military contribution to the common struggle against 
Germany and her allies. Russian forces were suffering badly on the Eastern Front, but at 
least they were keeping German forces occupied.8 The fall of the Provisional 
Government and the Bolshevik assumption of power in Moscow in November 1917 was 
a virtual irrelevance in the face of this military consideration. While Allied forces 
moved onto Russian soil—for instance, in March 1918 British forces occupied 
Murmansk, which had been a point of entry for British war supplies since 1914—their 
intervention was directed against German forces and designed to take pressure off the 
Western Front. In line with Lenin’s prescription to wait out the period of the greatest 
weakness and capitalize on any conflicts within the bourgeois world, the new Bolshevik 
government kept avenues of contact with the Western powers open.9 Even the 15 
December 1917 Russian-German armistice taking Russia out of the war did not provoke
3 What is now Estonian territory includes the former imperial province of Estonia and Estonian-speaking
areas of Livonia; Latvia is made up of the remainder of Livonia and Kurland, while Lithuania 
incorporates most of Kovno and Vilna.
4 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 25.
3 Both the German Eastern High Command and factions in the Reichstag promoting a separate peace with 
Russia had encouraged the political integration of Lithuanian territory and the formation of a 
Lithuanian National Council. The High Command, however, expected that the Council could be 
pressured into severing ties with the Russian empire and seeking incorporation into Germany, while 
peace groups expected to join forces with the new Provisional Government in Moscow in securing 
self-determination for the empire’s borderlands (Page 1959: 32-35).
6 Von Rauch 1974: 27.
7 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 30.
8 Tarulis 1965: 34.
9 Ulam 1974: 84-85.
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the Allied powers; as Albert Tarulis writes, “Russia no longer stood on the Allied side, 
but she had not switched to the enemy side either.”10
Nevertheless, the weakening of central political authority in Russia and the potential 
fragmentation of imperial territory raised serious issues for Allied leaders, most notably 
Woodrow Wilson. Wilson’s substantial commitment to the principle of political 
independence and territorial integrity for small nations is well known. However, he and 
his adviser Colonel Edward House also viewed the dismemberment of empires as risky 
business: as House wrote, “empires cannot be shattered and new states created without 
disturbance.”* 11 Furthermore, Wilson was anxious for the future of the Russian people, 
who he greatly admired. He and other administration officials hoped that the Bolshevik 
government would be a short-lived phenomenon, a “black period” from which a 
democratic Russia, would re-emerge. And American leaders operated under the premise 
that in order to be economically and militarily strong, a post-imperial Russia would 
need access to Baltic ports, as well as a safety zone on the Baltic littoral.12 
Consequently, the Russian situation (according to House, who worked on the draft) 
formed the chief raison d ’etre of Wilson’s celebrated “Fourteen Point” message. 13 This 
address, delivered to a Joint Session of Congress on 8 January 1918, expressed 
commitment to the rights of small nations to “political independence and territorial 
integrity.” In the section specifically concerning Russia (Point VI), however, Wilson 
made no reference to the aspirations for independence of numerous non-Russian areas 
of the former tsarist empire, in effect advocating a hands-off policy toward Russian 
internal affairs.14 Baltic representatives were told that the US government would wait 
“until the majority of the Russian people had expressed their will.”15
Admittedly, the situation on the ground in the Baltic region was hardly one to inspire 
confidence in the concept or future of Baltic self-determination. In Estonia and Latvia, 
White Russian and Bolshevik forces, the latter both Russian and local, were battling 
with local nationalists and each other for political control. In Lithuania, the National 
Council, having hastened in December 1917 to declare independence before peace talks 
could open between Berlin and the new Russian government, nevertheless had agreed to 
the establishment of a military, transport, customs, and currency alliance with the 
German Reich.16 German control was rapidly spreading northwards and eastwards. Riga 
had fallen in September 1917, and in February 1918, after negotiations over a peace 
treaty between Berlin and the Bolsheviks seemed to have broken down, German forces 
occupied the remainder of Latvia in short order. With White Russian and Bolshevik
10 Tarulis 1965: 40. The Allied governments, seeking to put into place in Moscow a government that
would reactive the Eastern Front, did attempt in 1918-1919 a strategy o f direct intervention in the 
Russian Civil War, of what Adam Ulam calls “a most variegated character.” British and French 
agents conducted secret negotiations and intrigues; Allied marines landed in the north of Russia and 
Siberia (most notably Murmansk and Arkhangelsk); the Japanese sent a substantial contingent to 
Vladivostok; the Czechoslovak Legion sowed confusion along the Trans-Siberian railway. But 
ultimately, direct intervention was “puny and dispersed,” and (more importantly for our story) did not 
involve reaching out directly to non-Russian nationalists (Ulam 1974: 90-91).
11 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 22.
12 Tarulis 1965:28,55,75.
13 Tarulis 1965: 18.
14 Taruiis 1965: 18.
15 Tarulis 1965: 12. This position was not quite as disingenuous as it now sounds; for example, at the end
of July 1917 the Riga Conference of the most important Latvian political organizations initially 
declared for continuing association with a democratic Russia as an “autonomous political unit,” a 
position only abandoned after the Bolshevik revolution (Page 1959: 66; Tarulis 1965: 88).
16 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 28. A followup declaration, issued on 16 February 1918, dissolved all bonds
previously entered into with, or forced upon by, neighboring states.
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forces in retreat, Estonian nationalists were able to declare independence on 24 
February 1918, one day before German troops entered Tallinn. When the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk was finally signed between the Bolsheviks and the German government 
on 3 March 1918, under Article 4 “Estonia and Latvia (were) without delay (to) be 
cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guards (and were to) be occupied by a 
German police force until security (was) ensured by proper national institutions and 
until public order (had) been reestablished.” 17 The entire Baltic region was thus to 
remain under German occupation until the Armistice of November 1918.
In the midst of this confusion, British and French officials were increasingly 
considering the role that self-governing Baltic populations could play in controlling 
both German and Bolshevik expansionism in the Baltic region. Both governments, in 
an effort both to frustrate German efforts at legal incorporation of the region and to 
strengthen anti-German forces, extended de facto recognition to the Estonian 
government in May 1918; the same was extended to the Latvian government following 
its declaration of independence in mid- November (Lithuania had to wait until 
September 1919 because of its continuing border disputes with Poland). The Armistice 
of 11 November 1918 shifted Allied hostility from Germany to the Bolshevik 
government in Moscow, which the French government in particular viewed with 
undiluted antipathy. Indeed, French and also British leaders felt that the eastern forces 
of their former enemy provided the best chance of stemming a Bolshevik advance.18 
Plence, under Article 12 of the Armistice, German forces on former Russian imperial 
territory were to postpone their return to Germany until “the Allies (thought) the 
moment suitable having regard to the internal situation of these territories.”19 German 
troops, however—many of whom were already sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause due 
to the sufferings of the war—began a disorderly retreat immediately after the signing of 
the Armistice, with Bolshevik troops close on their heels.20 By December 1918, the 
Red Army had replaced Germans as the occupying force in much of the Baltic region.
Faced with the threat that Bolshevik power and ideology might spread as far as 
Germany, but also exhausted by the war and with unpleasant memories of direct 
intervention in 1918, the Allies now embarked on a messy strategy involving three 
prongs: the use of German volunteers in the Baltic region (particularly Latvia), direct 
support to Baltic nationalists themselves, and support to White Russian forces. German 
volunteers comprised a Baltic German Landeswehr as well as from former German 
troops; under leaders such as General Rüdiger von der Goltz, they proved formidable 
forces, driving back Bolshevik advances in Latvia and taking control of Latvia’s borders 
by early 1919. 21 However, the British and French governments remained highly 
suspicious of potential German expansionism; since German forces received most of 
their supplies and reinforcements by sea, the British went so far as to establish a naval 
blockade of coast of Courland.22 Allied fears were confirmed by an attempted putsch by 
General von der Goltz in Latvia in April 1919, which had as its aim the creation of a 
new German power base in the eastern Baltic. Allied governments resolved, at a series 
of conferences in Paris in 1919, to replace German volunteers with soldiers drawn from 
the Baltic countries or, if necessary, from Scandinavia.24 At the same time, a sizeable
17 Page 1959: 82. After three years of German occupation, Lithuania was free of Russian forces.
18 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 32.
19 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 95.
20 Page 1959: 96.
21 Page 1959: 145.
22 Page 1959: 147.
23 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 34.
24 Page 1959: 152-153.
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flow of Allied arms, equipment and money began to Estonia and Latvia. Thanks to 
Allied pressure on the German government and the efforts of Baltic fighters, Estonia 
and Lithuania were cleared of both Soviet and German forces by April of 1919.26
Baltic leaders not unreasonably assumed that this Allied enthusiasm for their military 
security might translate into political recognition. Baltic representatives advanced their 
own versions of the “buffer” thesis that was receiving discussion in Allied capitals. 
Lithuanian spokesmen depicted Lithuania and Poland as the “last line of defense 
between a Germany that was tending more and more toward Bolshevism and the forces 
of Lenin in Russia.”27 A memorandum of December 1918 from the Latvian Foreign 
Minister urged the establishment of independent Baltic states as a cordon sanitaire— 
possibly the earliest use of this term in this context.28 These campaigns were not without 
their success: efforts by Russian representatives—Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks 
alike—to depict the nascent Baltic states as German puppets, undeserving of 
recognition, and their leaders as German agents were for the most part greeted with 
skepticism in Western capitals.“ However, even though Baltic arguments for de jure 
recognition received a cautiously positive hearing in London and Paris, the American 
government—which had not yet extended even de facto recognition—greeted Baltic 
demands for military assistance and recognition with noncommittal replies, and 
attempted to convince their British and French counterparts to do the same.30 The State 
Department informed the British government that “(p)ublic and official declarations 
which have been made by the Government of the United States on various occasions 
proclaiming its friendship and loyalty to Russia and the Russian people cause it to feel 
honor bound to refrain from adopting any premature action before the meeting of the 
Peace Conference.”31 At the same time, the Allies broadened their support for Russian 
anti-Bolshevik forces; most importantly, although not recognizing Admiral Aleksandr 
Kolchak’s Siberian-based government, the Allies in June 1919 nonetheless declared 
their willingness to supply it with material aid for the purpose of creating an all-Russian 
government.32 The American government in particular hoped that Kolchak’s 
government would soon assume power over all of Russia, and that “the thorny Baltic 
problem could be solved by agreement between the Baltic and the Russian peoples.”33
This hope, however, and the attendant urgings by Allied governments that Baltic 
populations lend their strength to the White Russian campaigns, did not take account of 
the fact that none of the White leaders were willing to entertain the possibility of 
independence for the Baltic region.34 White forces were for the most part “headed by 
fervent Russian nationalists whose ideological frame of reference was expressed in
25
25 Page 1959: 175. Allied forces had already briefly intervened on the direct behalf of Baltic forces, albeit
only from a distance; a British naval squadron had foiled a Soviet naval attack on Tallinn in December 
1918.
26 Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 9-10.
27 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 114.
28 Tarulis 1965: 117.
29 Tarulis 1965: 78.
30 Tarulis 1965: 77. Von Rauch suggests that French interest extended only as far as developments in the
Baltic region affected the establishment of the new Polish state (von Rauch 1974: 62).
31 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 101. ironically, the result of this stance was that American diplomats adhered
closely to Bolshevik practice in regard to acts that might imply recognition o f the Baltic states (Tarulis 
1965: 84).
32 Page 1959: 149-150.
33 Tarulis 1965: 181.
34 Or indeed for any of the non-Russian peoples of the Russian empire (Ulam 1974: 102; Page 1959: 147-
148).
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[General Anton Denikin’s] term ‘Russia great and undivided’.”35 Kolchak had assured 
Allied leaders that he was willing to consider autonomy for the Baltic provinces; but it 
rapidly became evident that his idea of “autonomy” for the Baltic states extended to 
little more than education and public health.36 In such conditions, although Baltic 
forces were willing to assist White campaigns when they stood to gain something as 
well—Estonian forces, at British urging, supported the efforts by White Russian 
commander General Yudenich to capture Petrograd, and gained some 2,000 square 
kilometers of territory for Estonia in the process—their support was half-hearted.37 
Furthermore, with their territories largely secure (with the exception of one Latvian 
province held by Soviet forces and the persistent Lithuanian-Polish territorial crises) 
and their governments largely stable, the Baltic states were now able to wait for the 
world to come to them.
It was, ironically, the Bolsheviks who first offered Baltic governments de jure 
recognition. In July 1919, Bolshevik officials began to float talk of accepting Baltic 
self-determination and the territorial status quo, in hopes of encouraging Baltic 
governments to withdraw all support for the Whites. The Latvian and Lithuanian 
governments indicated some skepticism; nevertheless, the Baltic response was basically 
favorable.38 As an official Latvian government statement put it: “Neither Latvia nor her 
nearest neighbors recognize it as their mission to overthrow Bolshevism in order that its 
place be taken by Kolchak or Denikin, whose relations toward Latvia and all other small 
democratic states on former Russian soil (are) well known to everybody.”39 When the 
government in Moscow offered to open peace negotiations with Estonia “on the basis of 
irrevocable recognition of the independence of the Estonian state,” it was a difficult 
offer to turn down, although Tallinn made acceptance of the offer conditional on 
suspension of hostilities toward Latvia and Lithuania as well.40
The attitudes of the Allied governments to these developments ranged from the 
disapproving to the hostile.41 The French and American governments were particularly 
opposed; the Latvians “were bluntly told that the United States would take a negative 
attitude if Riga opened peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks, and it would break off 
relations if peace were concluded.”42 However, largely due to American intransigence, 
Allied advice that the Baltic governments avert their eyes from their Gorgon neighbor 
was not coupled with any promise of effective aid.43 Consequently, happy to turn their 
attention to other concerns and to receive a modicum of international legitimacy at last, 
all three Baltic governments signed armistices with Soviet Russia in late 1919 and early 
1920; between February (Estonia) and August (Latvia) 1920, each of the three 
governments negotiated and signed separate peace treaties. 44 In these treaties, Soviet 
Russia recognized the three Baltic states de jure as independent states and renounced 
“voluntarily and forever all rights of sovereignty held by Russia” over their peoples and 
territories.45 These treaties have subsequently been referred to by Baltic politicians as
35 Ulam 1974: 97.
36 Tarulis 1965: 193.
37 Lieven 1994: 58-59.
38 Von Rauch 1974: 71.
39 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 246.
40 Tarulis 1965: 246-247.
41 Tarulis 1965:247.
42 Tarulis 1965: 250.
43 Tarulis 1965: 258.
44 The Latvians delayed signing any armistice until the province of Latgale had been recaptured, with
Polish assistance, from Soviet forces (Von Rauch 1974: 74).
45 Bungs 1994.
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the “birth certificates” of the Baltic states. 46 However, the Baltic states were not the 
only ones for whom the treaties constituted a symbolic and legal turning point. Lenin 
called the conclusion of the Russian-Estonian agreement—Soviet Russia’s first 
permanent arrangement with a European state—an event of “gigantic historical 
significance.” Meanwhile, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgii Chicherin 
called the Estonian treaty “the first experiment in peaceful coexistence with bourgeois 
states” and “a dress rehearsal for understanding with the Entente.”47
Soviet recognition of the Baltic governments was the beginning of the end for the Allied 
non-recognition strategy. The Americans continued to stall, saying, as Secretary of State 
Bainbridge Colby put it in August 1920, that “(w)e are unwilling that, while it is 
helpless in the grip of a non -representative government, Russia shall be weakened still 
further by a policy of dismemberment, conceived in other than Russian interests.” 48 A 
note by Colby outlining reasons why the Baltic states should not be recognized by other 
nations reportedly even played an important role in the League of Nations’ rejection of 
Baltic applications for membership in December 1920.49 However, Washington could 
no longer hold its allies on the issue. As a British Foreign Office analysis somewhat 
ruefully concluded in April 1920, “In Russia, the Social revolution, in the ex-Russian 
states the Nationalist revolution have...come to stay.”50 On 26 January 1921 the major 
European Allied powers, with the French in the lead, recognized Latvia and Estonia de 
jure, while expressing reservations over Lithuania due to its border dispute with 
Poland.51 The League of Nations eventually followed suit, admitting all three Baltic 
states in September 1921. However, it still took over a year for the American 
government, which had never even extended de facto recognition, to finally recognize 
all three states de jure, in July 1922/2
The history of Allied policy toward the creation of independent Baltic states in the wake 
of the Russian empire’s collapse reveals the major themes that would recur in Western, 
approaches to Baltic self-determination over the course of the twentieth century. First, 
“the Baltic question” was to be consistently subordinate to “the Russian question,” 
whether relations with Moscow were good or bad. Second, although material aid might 
be forthcoming, Western lives were not to be risked for Baltic survival. And last, issues 
of principle, while not meaningless, were always to be subject to severe pressure from 
issues of practicality.53 Meanwhile, Soviet policy towards the Baltic states was on the
46 The “birth certificate” metaphor has been used by numerous Baltic politicians; see, for instance, 
Estonian President Lennart Meri at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE 
ORD, 25 April 1995:323).
47 Jacobson 1994: 18.
48 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 309.
49 Tarulis 1965: 313.
50 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 43.
51 Tarulis 1965: 327. The allied powers eventually announced their final intention to grant Lithuania de 
jure recognition in June 1921, but the recognition did not take effect until December 1921.
52 In its instrument of recognition, the State Department stated: “The United States has consistently 
maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the 
alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at 
this time of the Governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have been set up and 
maintained by an indigenous population” (Tarulis 1965: 363).
The American position in particular serves as a sharp rejoinder to idealized accounts of Woodrow 
Wilson’s commitment to self-determination for small nations. Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert 
Lansing, later wrote that to Wilson, pronouncements in favour of self-determination were nothing 
more than “an expression of a moral precept as something to be desired but generally unattainable in 
the lives of nations.” Indeed, in Lansing’s view, it was Wilson’s policy toward Russia that particularly 
discredited Wilson’s own slogan that “self-determination is not an empty phrase” (cited in Tarulis 
1965: 335).
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face of things somewhat more encouraging. However, as the next section will outline, 
1939 would reveal an aspect that Baltic leaders were later to fear could become a 
fundamental aspect of Baltic-Russian relations as well: perfidy. Between Soviet 
aggression and Western impotence, the principle of Baltic self-determination was about 
to be put on hold for fifty years.
1939-1945
With the rise to power in Germany of Adolf Hitler in 1933, the territories of the Baltic 
states acquired a new significance in the eyes of the western powers. From being buffers 
against an expansion of Bolshevism, they gradually became a zone outside the 
possibility of effective western concern, a political arena in which the German and 
Soviet governments “vied with one another for political supremacy.”54 With the failure 
of a policy of appeasement made palpable by Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
March 1939, the British government began in that month to consider security guarantees 
for those states considered to be at the greatest risk of Hitler’s aggression. Despite 
extending guarantees to Poland and Romania, however, British leaders made it clear in 
April 1939 that they would offer no such assurances to the Baltic states.55 London’s 
disinclination to draw the Baltic states under the British wing stemmed from several 
factors. First, Baltic governments themselves were pursuing policies of neutralism. 
Baltic leaders hoped through the formation of the neutral Baltic Entente in 1934 to keep 
clear of any great-power bloc, thereby (they hoped) protecting their states from being 
forced into “security” agreements that would bring troops from surrounding powers— 
Germany, the USSR, or Poland— onto their soil.56 Neutralist sentiments persisted in 
Estonia and Latvia even after Lithuania was forced, under threat of aerial bombardment, 
to transfer in March 1939 the port of Klaipeda (Memel) and its surrounding district to 
Germany.5' Second, British officials recognized that the Soviet Union was as immediate
ro
a threat to Baltic security as Germany. Since 1921, however, when the Royal Navy 
Baltic squadron was withdrawn, the British government had warned the Baltic states it 
could no longer promise material support against a Soviet attack.59 Now, at a time 
when the menace from Hitler was growing, conflict with a potential ally against 
Germany— particularly one as powerful as the USSR— was the last thing the British 
government needed. But finally, a degree of indifference toward Baltic self- 
determination also permeated British thinking. It is true that by 1932 a member of the 
Foreign Office felt able to assure an audience that “it was not necessarily to be
54 Von Rauch 1974: 175.
55 Dallin 1978: 103.
56 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 95-96.
57 Watt 1990: 157 If this neutralism veered off center in any direction, the tendency was in fact more 
toward Berlin. Many Baltic high officials had written off Britain and France, as well as the League of 
Nations, after Munich; many others were actively pro-German (Watt 1990: 363; von Rauch 1974: 
197).
58 In September 1934 the British Minister to the Baltic states, in a lengthy cable on developments in the
region, wrote: “There is a ‘lives of the hunted’ element in the attitude of these small states to their 
great neighbors, and it would be difficult to decide which in the last resort they fear most—the 
protective solicitude of the Soviet Union, the clumsy directness of Germany, or the devouring 
overtures of Poland. Obviously the intentions of none of the three are strictly Honourable...” (cited in 
Hiden and Salmon 1994: 88). Baltic fears of the Soviet government grew steadily as the 1930s 
progressed (Watt 1990: 224). By the late 1930s, the Estonian government in particular did not hide 
from British representatives its concerns (Von Rauch 1974: 208).
59 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 61. John Hiden and Patrick Salmon note somewhat ruefully that “[d]espite
Britain’s formal statements to the contrary, Baltic leaders continued well into the 1930s to believe that 
the Royal Navy would be on hand once again when the moment of crisis came” (Hiden and Salmon 
1994: 73).
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assumed” that Estonia or Latvia would “ultimately be re-incorporated with Russia, 
though that this fate was in store for them both was regarded as axiomatic a few years 
ago.”60 But such thinking did not change the fundamental British opinion, expressed in 
a 1926 Foreign Office memorandum, that “[a]part from obligations which may arise 
under the Covenant of the League [of Nations], we should not feel called upon to object 
to any change such as the federation of the Baltic states, or their reabsorption by 
Russia.”61 Although British commercial interests in the region had been growing 
steadily, to British leaders it was, as the British Minister to the Baltic states put it in 
1934, “idle to pretend that the Baltic States are a factor of first importance in European 
affairs.”62 The author of a December 1941 Foreign Office memorandum on the Baltic 
states therefore was probably not on his own when he wrote, “I do not feel that the 
independence of the Baltic states is a European necessity”.63
Another individual who shared this opinion was Soviet General Secretary Josef Stalin, 
who was increasingly fearful of what might develop in the Baltic states. The Soviet 
leadership had show busts of paranoia in relation to the Baltic states before; the 1925 
Treaty of Locarno that effected a degree of German-Western reconciliation sparked 
exaggerated fears in the Soviet Union that the Baltic states were about to become 
military outposts for a British anti-Bolshevik crusade.64 The Baltic-Soviet non­
aggression pacts signed between 1926 and 1933 had soothed Soviet fears for a while. 
But now the Soviet leadership was obsessed with the possibility of what they referred to 
as “indirect aggression:” the organization of a coup in the Baltic states or the adoption 
by those states of a pro-Hitler orientation, which they believed would be “precisely the 
most profitable manner of subordinating the Baltic to Nazi Germany.”6:> Since Baltic 
governments showed no interest in dealing with Moscow directly, the Soviet 
government tried to include them in the multilateral security arrangement it was 
pursuing with Britain and France.66 In negotiations between April and July 1939, the 
Soviet government pushed for the creation of a tripartite security system guaranteeing 
“assistance” in case of German aggression in a belt of states, from Finland to Turkey, 
lying between Germany and the USSR—whether or not the states in question desired or 
even refused such a commitment. The wording of the Soviet proposal was designed to 
extend its coverage to the “indirect aggression” that Stalin so feared, including the 
inciting of states to adopt a pro-German orientation. Baltic governments, who were 
kept at least partly abreast of developments in these negotiations, immediately informed
60 Cited in Hiden and Salmon 1994: 74.
61 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 72.
62 Cited in Hiden and Salmon 1994: 88.
63 Kirby 1978: 168. Even Edward Lord Halifax, who was not totally unsympathetic to Baltic concerns,
confessed that “he was rather cynical with regard to the Baltic states” and that “he did not think that 
the Baltic peoples were peoples who demanded very much respect or consideration” (Hiden and 
Salmon 1994: 122).
64 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 68.
65 Cited in Dallin 1978: 104.
66 The Soviet government had already tried approaching the Baltic governments directly, to no avail.
After the German annexation of Klaipeda, the Soviet government warned the Latvian and Estonian 
governments of “the immense importance the Soviets attached to the maintenance of their 
independence,” and that any agreement with a third power that could diminish that independence 
would be regarded by Moscow as a violation of the existing Baltic-Soviet non-aggression pacts (Watt 
1990: 223; Lithuania, since the annexation of Klaipeda, was already assumed to be a German puppet 
state). Unsurprisingly, this statement met with stiff replies: the Estonian government asserted that 
“Estonia intended to defend her independence herself, and could not allow anyone else to judge how 
she fulfilled her international responsibilities” (Watt 1990: 224). A subsequent offer by Moscow of 
Soviet assistance in the case of German aggression met with a similarly cool response in Tallinn and 
Riga.
67 Dallin 1978: 103.
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British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that they wanted no part in such a system, 
which they felt opened the doors to the same expansionist meddling that the pact was 
ostensibly designed to check.68 However, the broad definition of “aggression” also 
raised concerns among British leaders, who had not been that enthusiastic about 
bringing the Soviet Union into collective action against Hitler in the first place.69 The 
British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed that “[o]ur object is, of course, to 
prevent our being dragged into war by Russia over a Baltic state without our having any 
voice in the matter.”70 The British government temporized in talks with the Soviets, 
pointing out that the Baltic states had shown “a distinct disinclination to be 
guaranteed.” A British and French counteroffer, influenced by Latvian submissions, 
proposed that aid be granted to European states that had requested such assistance in 
order to resist a violation of their neutrality.72 These refinements Soviet diplomats 
refused to accept; indeed, British reluctance to sacrifice Baltic feelings or bring the 
Baltic governments to heel bolstered suspicions in Moscow that London was trying to 
direct German aggression directly at the Soviet Union through the Baltic States, 
bypassing Poland and Romania.73 The British Ambassador in Moscow in response 
advised London that “Soviet assistance is not worth purchasing at the price of extra 
hostility on the part of the Baltic states and other countries (not to mention the effect on 
British and probably American opinion) which we should earn by yielding to Soviet 
demands for what amounts to compulsory guarantees imposed on states who violently 
object to Soviet help.”74
As 1939 progressed, however, the worth of Soviet cooperation to both Allied and 
German strategy became increasingly evident. British and French diplomats were aware 
that the Anglo-French guarantee of Poland had little chance of deterring Hitler without 
Stalin’s support. Similarly, Hitler needed a guarantee that his movement against Poland 
would not be foiled by Soviet intervention. And it was evident in London, Paris and 
Berlin that concessions relating to the Baltic states would be critical to their courtship of 
Stalin.77 Even British Prime Minister Winston Churchill conceded that “for Russia it is 
of vital interest that these states not fall into the hands of Nazi Germany.”76 In these
68 Crowe 1978: 116. Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter indicated, however, that Estonia would 
welcome British support in the case of a Soviet attack. The Foreign Office replied blandly that if 
Estonian security appeared to be threatened by the USSR, “the British government would naturally be 
interested in dissuading (the) Soviet government from it” (Crowe 1978: 116). They further assured 
the Estonians that an Anglo-Soviet agreement, if reached, would reduce the danger of Soviet meddling 
(Tarulis 1959: 103).
60 Chamberlain felt “the most profound distrust of Russia...I distrust her motives, which seem to me to 
have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by 
the ears.” Cited in Feis 1957: 4.
70 Cited in Dallin 1978: 103.
71 Watt 1990: 364; Dallin 1978: 103.
72 Tarulis 1959: 104.
73 Crowe 1978: 1 16; Watt 1990: 224, 363. To make matters worse, on 15 April US President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt issued an open letter to Hitler and Italian leader Benito Mussolini, seeking 
assurances that they would not attack or invade the territory of thirty-one nations, including the Baltic 
states. Unfortunately, this well-meaning ploy backfired: German Foreign Minister Joachim von 
Ribbentrop promptly sent messages to all the capitals named, politely asking if the country concerned 
felt itself to be threatened by Germany. Unsurprisingly, none wished to answer “yes.” The Estonian 
and Latvian non-aggression pacts with Germany, although intended by Tallinn and Riga only to 
guarantee their neutrality, further strengthened Soviet fears that they had joined the German camp, as 
did visits of several high German military and intelligence officials, as well as warships, to the Baltic 
states in June 1939 (Watt 1990: 262, 364-365).
74 Tarulis 1959: 106.
75 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 100.
76 Dallin 1978: 106.
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conditions, British diplomats found it prudent to follow the example of the French 
government, which had on 22 April accepted the Soviet proposals. Setting aside Baltic 
concerns, British diplomats on 23 July 1939 agreed to attach to the proposed tripartite 
security agreement an accompanying protocol—to be kept secret—that would list 
Latvia and Estonia (among others) as objects of assistance in case of aggression.77 The 
pact included the provision that the three powers would come to each other’s assistance 
if any one of them was involved in defending against aggression a state “whose
"  70
independence or neutrality the contracting party feel obliged to defend.”
This British and French capitulation, however, was not as attractive to Stalin as the
German counteroffer.79 The British and French governments still, in the words of a
80Soviet account, “refused to act against Germany if she resorted to indirect aggression.” 
Meanwhile, Hitler was anxious to strike a deal: time was running out before the attack 
on Poland was due to be launched. And the German government was willing to offer 
terms that the Allies could never have matched. As late as 26 July, German negotiators 
were insisting that “the territorial integrity of the Baltic states must be respected at all 
costs.”81 However, on 3 August the German Ambassador in Moscow informed Soviet 
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov that Germany was willing to respect “vital Soviet 
interests” in the Baltic region, whereupon the Soviet side suggested a special protocol 
that would spell out mutual spheres of influence. In the end, the ten-year Soviet- 
German non-aggression pact signed by Molotov and German Foreign Minister Joachim 
von Ribbentrop on 23 August 1939 included a secret protocol regulating German and 
Soviet spheres of influence “in the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in 
the areas belong to the Baltic States.”83 The territories of Estonia and the former Livonia 
were assigned to the USSR from the start of the talks; the rest of Latvia was ceded to 
Stalin in last-minute negotiations.84 The bulk of Lithuania was renegotiated into the 
Soviet sphere on 28 September in exchange for other territories and a compensation of 
7.5 million gold dollars, and the final strip of Lithuanian territory was ceded to the 
Soviet sphere in September 1940.85
Western governments, reeling from the shock of Soviet defection and the speed of 
Germany’s invasion of Poland, offered little comment on Soviet activities in the Baltic
77 Lithuania was omitted because the earlier drafts spoke of “neighbor” states “bordering” on the Soviet
Union; in 1939 Lithuania was still separated from Soviet borders by a narrow strip of Poland (Dallin 
1978: 103).
78 Cited in Dallin 1978: 104.
79 Historians disagree on why the tripartite talks failed to produce an agreement; some blame British and
French footdragging and Soviet doubts about the wisdom of Allied military plans, while others 
suggest that Stalin used the talks with the British and French to acquire a safety net and strengthen his 
bargaining position while waiting to see what Hitler might offer. In his explanation to the USSR 
Supreme Soviet o f the decision to give up on the talks, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov 
focused on the disagreements surrounding the concept o f “indirect aggression,” although he did not 
mention the Baltic states directly. See Roberts 1989: 141, 152; Kissinger 1994: 345; Tarulis 1959: 
113.
80 Both cited in Dallin 1978: 104.
81 Von Rauch 1974: 209.
82 Dallin 1978: 105.
83 When the text of the agreement to be presented for public consumption came up for discussion at the
final meeting, Stalin immediately suggested that the magnificent preamble be scratched; “[a]fter six 
years of shoveling mountains of cow dung over each other, said Stalin (his language was much 
coarser), they could not suddenly go public with this kind of profession o f eternal friendship” (Watt 
1990:458).
84 For a dramatic account of the negotiations, see Watt 1990:458-461.
85 Wilmot 1952: 23; Dreifelds 1996: 32; Clemens 1991: 55. For a detailed discussion of negotiations over
the final strip of Lithuanian soil in July-September 1940, see Kaslas 1976: 256-261.
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States in 1939 and early 1940.86 After the Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 
1939, all three governments were pressured into signing “mutual assistance pacts” 
allowing Soviet military bases on their territory, although they retained nominal 
sovereignty.87 But by May of 1940 Izvestiya was arguing that:
The recent war events have once more proved that the neutrality of small 
states that do not have the power to support it is a mere fantasy...All 
considerations of small countries on the question of justice and injustice in 
relations with the Great Powers which are at war for their ‘to be or not to be’
O Q
are, at the very least, naive.
In the middle of June 1940, the Soviet government issued ultimatums to all three Baltic 
governments, demanding a change in all three governments and the free entry of 
unlimited troops to secure strategic points.89 Rigged elections to new “People's 
Assemblies” were held in all three republics on 14 and 15 July, and within a fortnight 
all three new governments had proclaimed their territories to be socialist and had 
formally requested admission to the USSR. Unsurprisingly, these requests were granted 
in the first week of August.90 As Bronis Kaslas writes, “[t]he Soviet authorities 
attempted to legitimize the annexation of the Baltic states by attempting to preserve the 
form, if not the substance of proper legal processes during the transition from 
independence to Russian control.” 91 Accordingly, Soviet officials were careful to 
portray all their acts, in spite of the fact of military occupation, as being in conformity 
with the constitutions of the Baltic states.
Western response to the Soviet incorporation, however, was unswervingly negative. 
Beside Germany and governments subservient to Berlin (like Vichy France), only 
Sweden recognized the annexations.92 The US State Department issued on 23 July a 
statement on the impending incorporation:
During these past few days the devious processes whereunder the political 
independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic 
republics...were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more 
powerful neighbors have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion...The 
people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter
86 The contents of the secret protocol on spheres of influence of course not yet having become known,
many in the Baltic states thought that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact would have little effect on their 
position. Indeed, the Estonian Minister in London transmitted on 25 August his government’s 
“sincere thanks for the understanding shown by His Majesty’s Government, during these last months, 
for Estonia’s policy of neutrality” (Tarulis 1959: 1 13).
87 Ulam notes that the Baltic agreements “offered a poignant commentary on the Russo-German alliance.
Against whom did the USSR need military and naval bases in the small Baltic countries?” (Ulam 
1974: 287). Interestingly, the three Baltic governments concluded trade agreements with Berlin 
between December 1939 and April 1940 under whose terms 70% of all Baltic exports went to 
Germany, giving the region considerable significance for Germany’s wartime economy (von Rauch 
1974:219).
88 Cited in Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 84.
89 Dreifelds 1996: 32.
90 Dreifelds 1996: 33. For an interesting discussion of whether incorporation was Stalin’s goal from the
start, see Roberts 1995.
91 Kaslas 1976: 283-284. The Soviet argument that the Baltic incorporations took place in actual, rather
than notional, conformity with Baltic constitutions overlooks the point that the constitutional law o f  
all three Baltic states rendered parliaments incompetent to perform acts by which the sovereignty of 
the state would be changed without express approval of their populations (Kaslas 1976: 285).
92 Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 29. The West German government withdrew recognition after the
partition of Germany (Waldren 1993: 21).
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whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force.
They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one 
state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign 
state, however weak...The United States will continue to stand by these 
principles, because of the conviction of the American people that unless the 
doctrine in which these principles are inherent once again governs the 
relations between nations, the rule of reason, of justice, and of law—in other 
words, the basis of modern civilization itself—cannot be preserved.93
Due to the circumstances of the takeover, there were no Baltic governments in exile 
around which international recognition could be organized. Nevertheless, Baltic 
legations continued to operate in the United States and Great Britain; the British 
government told resident Baltic ministers that “the circumstances attending recent 
political changes in their states were not such as to cease treating them as accredited 
representatives of their respective countries.”94 The US and British governments, as 
well as many others, also froze Baltic assets.95 The withholding of recognition 
provoked a protracted and vigorous exchange between the Soviet Ambassador to 
Washington and the State Department, and remained a sore point with Soviet diplomats 
worldwide; the response of the Soviet Ambassador in London to Churchill’s offer in 
April 1941 to provide aid should (as he anticipated) the USSR come under German 
attack was that “such help would be the more welcome if Britain first recognized Soviet 
absorption of the Baltic states.”96
The invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany in June 1941, however, moved Anglo- 
US-Soviet cooperation to an impressive new level. Churchill had secured US President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s agreement to welcome the Soviet Union as an ally in case 
of attack, a welcome that was extended the day after the German invasion began.97 
According to American sources, the total value of American Lend-Lease shipments to 
Russia, which began within weeks of the German attack, came to over US$11 billion, a 
figure to which British shipments and American private relief added considerably. The 
Soviet government accepted Western aid gratefully; in his May Day speech of 1942, 
Stalin assigned first place among the freedom-loving countries to Great Britain and the 
United States, “with whom we are bound by ties of friendship, and who render our 
country more and more military aid against the German fascist invaders.”99
However, cooperation did not preclude disagreements over a post-war order, about 
which American, British, and Soviet leaders had started thinking almost as soon as the 
war began. For the Americans, the issue was the Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt 
and Churchill on 12 August 1941—a “set of common principles” on which the 
signatories base “their hopes for a better future for the world”. The first article of the
93 Tarulis 1959:255-256.
94 Cited in Pajaujis-Javis 1980: 64. The Lithuanian and Latvian legations stayed in Washington, DC; the
Estonian Consulate General in New York performed the functions of a legation (Tarulis 1965: 370).
95 Waldren 1993:22.
96 Tarulis 1965: 364-370; Feis 1957: 6.
97 Feis 1957: 7. Herbert Feis cites Churchill’s response to criticisms that he was “bowing down in the
House of Rimmon:” “I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hitler, and my life is much 
simplified thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in 
the House of Commons.”
98 Gallagher 1963:21.
99 Gallagher 1963: 27. For a fascinating account of changes in Soviet historiography of World War II,
and in particular of the post-war downgrading in Soviet histories of the importance o f cooperation 
with Great Britain and the US, see Gallagher 1963 in toto.
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Charter asserted that the signatories sought no aggrandizement, territorial or other; the 
second expressed opposition to territorial changes that did not accord with the freely 
expressed wishes of the populations concerned; the third affirmed the signatories’ 
respect for the right of all people to choose their form of government, and their “wish to 
see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly 
deprived of them.” 100 The Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maiskiy, complained to 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that it seemed “as if England and the USA 
imagine themselves as almighty God called upon to judge the rest of the sinful world, 
including my country. You cannot strengthen the alliance on such a basis.”101 
Nevertheless, Maiskiy signed the Charter for the Soviet government on 24 September, 
although with the qualification that the practical application of the principles of the 
charter would need to be adapted to “the circumstances, needs, and historical 
peculiarities of particular countries.” 102
For the Soviet leadership, the burning issue was that of post-war borders. By December 
1941, when a British delegation visited the Soviet Union to discuss Anglo-Soviet 
cooperation, German forces were still menacing Moscow (in November they had come 
within 18 miles) and the Red Army was terribly weakened; there was no guarantee that 
Soviet forces would be able to recapture the Baltic region by the end of the war. In this 
context, the Soviet side raised the nature of an eventual post-war settlement; 
specifically, Stalin sought to retain territories gained under the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
pact. In discussions with Eden, Soviet negotiators justified the absorption by the Soviet 
Union of sections of Polish and Romanian territory on the grounds that the new 
frontiers were “ethnologically correct;” incorporation of the Baltic republics, 
however, needed no justification in Soviet eyes, since these populations had voluntarily 
requested admission to the Union.
British policymakers also were thinking over the longer term. Churchill was less 
idealistic than Roosevelt, and he would have agreed with the Foreign Office argument 
that “there will be no counterweight to Russia in Europe [after the war ends]...Common 
prudence requires that we should [assume] that if we want Russia’s collaboration after 
the war, we shall have to be prepared to make such a policy advantageous to her...”104 
But he nevertheless was anxious that a post-war order should not leave the democratic 
cause weaker in any vital sphere.1(b Upon being notified of Stalin’s demands, he shot 
back a response that the proposal was “directly contradictory to the first, second, and 
third articles of the Atlantic Charter.” 106 Eden, however, took a more conciliatory line 
with Stalin, assuring him that the British government neither took Soviet demands to be 
contrary to the Charter nor was inclined to dispute the justice of any of them; rather, its
100 Reproduced in Brinkley and Facey-Crowther 1994: xvii-xviii.
101 Cited in Gardner 1994: 52. Maiskiy’s comment does not take account of the fact that American and 
British leaders themselves were in some disagreement about the full implications of the Charter. 
Roosevelt clearly hoped that the self-determination clause would apply to British dominions in Asia; 
Churchill’s indignant response was that “I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to 
preside over the liquidation of the British Empire” (Brinkley and Facey-Crowther 1994: 57).
102 Gaddis 1997: 16. Gardner notes that British and American special emissaries to Moscow Lord 
Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman urged Stalin to adhere to the Eight Points, even if in an ambiguous 
fashion, since peace objectives were important to the American public opinion on which the Lend- 
Lease Program depended (Gardner 1994: 52).
103 Churchill 1956, vol. 5: 349.
104 Charlton 1984: 33.
105 Wilmot 1952: 130.
106 Cited in Schlesinger 1970: 81. Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Alexander 
Cadogan expressed the point rather more forcefully, complaining that it would be better not to “crawl 
to the Russians over the dead bodies of all our principles” (cited in Kirby 1978: 168).
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hands were tied by its promises to the Americans.107 And by March 1942, Churchill 
himself was sufficiently alarmed by the military situation that he wrote personally to 
Roosevelt, saying that the “increasing gravity of the war” led him to conclude that the 
Atlantic Charter “ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she 
occupied when Germany attacked her,” since “this was the basis on which Russia 
acceded to the Charter.”108 Churchill further communicated this position to Stalin.109 
The British Ambassador in Washington argued to Roosevelt that “the enjoyment of self- 
government by the Baltic states, which had not been very successful since 1919, could 
not be compared in important to the assurance that the Soviet Union would not sign a 
separate peace or refuse to cooperate after the war.”110 By May 1942, Eden explicitly 
stated to Soviet diplomats that his government was prepared to accede to Soviet 
demands on the Baltic states, although not on Poland.* 111
Roosevelt was not completely unsympathetic to the British or Soviet positions. In 
private conversations with his friend (and Assistant Secretary of State) Adolf Berle, 
Roosevelt “mused” that the Soviets “might have the Baltic republics” and the other 
territories transferred under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, if only they would stay in the 
war.112 Indeed, Soviet records indicate that in March 1942 Roosevelt assured the Soviet 
Ambassador to Washington, Maxim Litvinov, that he did not foresee “any difficulties” 
about the border issues after the war; “(h)e himself had always thought it had been a 
mistake to separate provinces from Russia after the war.” There were, however, 
strong opponents of such a stance operating in the State Department. US Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull had warned Eden before his Moscow visit that the US government 
thought it would be “a great mistake” for the Soviet, British, or American governments 
to enter into any agreements in regard to the specific terms of postwar settlements.114 
Now Hull described the Anglo-Soviet exchanges “as contrary to the Atlantic Charter, as 
a defiance of America’s historic opposition to territorial changes by force, and as a 
throwback to the power politics of a discredited past.”115 State Department experts were 
specifically opposed to extending recognition to Baltic incorporation: approving forced 
incorporations would not only destroy the meaning of one of the most important clauses 
of the Atlantic Charter but through the abandonment of “high principles of international 
conduct” would run the risk of losing the US the respect of the smaller countries of 
Eastern Europe.116 Roosevelt himself also disliked the idea of payment in advance, and 
feared the recriminations from vocal Baltic voters that would surely follow any deal.117 
And he entertained a persistent hope that he could convince Stalin that his security 
needs could be taken care of without violating the Charter. Indeed, Roosevelt 
believed that he had “gotten through” to Molotov during the latter’s visit to Washington 
in May 1942, telling a British diplomat that he had succeeded in getting the Russians to
107 Feis 1957:27.
108 Gardner 1994: 55. Churchill added that he imagined that “a severe process of liquidating hostile 
elements in the Baltic states, etc., was employed by the Russians when they took these regions at the 
beginning of the war.” As Gardner observes, this was a curious way of “defending” the Charter: 
Churchill was in effect arguing “that the self-determination clause could not be implemented because 
of the elimination of all prospective pro-independence elements!” (Gardner 1994: 55)
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110 Davis 1974: 26.
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116 Davis 1974: 21.
117 Feis 1957:60.
118 Gardner 1994: 66.
29
drop their demands— which he believed never to have been serious— for “those piffling 
little places.” 119 Accordingly, at American urging, Churchill refused to budge on his 
unwillingness to consider territorial questions during Molotov’s visit to London in May
1942, explaining that his “difficulties” stemmed from the fact that he needed “to take 
account of our own and American opinion.” 120 Molotov, his quest for promises of a 
second front made all the more urgent by serious Soviet setbacks along the Eastern 
Front in the two days prior to the visit, eventually signed an Anglo-Soviet treaty that 
contained no reference to the issue of borders.121
It was evident, however, that Soviet territorial demands were not going to go away, and 
it is equally evident in hindsight that Western resolve on the issue of Baltic self- 
determination was weakening. By March 1943, Roosevelt told Eden at a meeting in 
Washington that “he did not intend to try to force Russia to give up the Baltic states, 
although he still hoped for a plebiscite.” 122 Eden, who had just met with Maisky in 
London, believed that Stalin would reject the plebiscite proposal; Roosevelt reportedly 
replied that it might be necessary for the United States and Britain to agree to such an 
absorption, but, if so, that it should be used as a bargaining chip.123 Over the summer of
1943, Hull softened on the issue as well, suggesting that a the US might accept a quid 
pro quo of Soviet agreement to go along with “our ideas on the general post-war plan;” 
presidential advisor Harry Hopkins casually informed Eden that Roosevelt had said as 
much to Litvinov and Molotov.124
In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Allied military strategy during the war 
was not formulated with any intention of preventing a Soviet reoccupation of the Baltic 
region. The Baltic states do not appear to have featured in Churchill’s frustrated efforts 
to devise a plan of campaign that would win not only the war but the peace.125 However, 
the Baltic issue had already received discussion in Washington, where the Territorial 
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy had “specifically 
agreed” in 1942 that the US would not oppose by force the acquisition by the Soviet 
Union of territory up to the pre-BARBAROSSA borders.126 American unwillingness to 
commit troops or incur casualties in Europe beyond those deemed necessary for the
119 Gardner 1994: 56.
120 Churchill 1954, vol.4:301.
121 Feis 1957: 63; Wilmot 1952: 711; Kirby 1978: 171. Churchill was careful to present Molotov with an 
aide-memoire stressing that that due to problems of supply no promise of a second front could be 
extended, and indeed was sufficiently anxious about Soviet reactions to the failure of the front to 
materialize that he flew to Moscow to explain the situation to Stalin in person (Churchill 1956, vol. 4: 
305, 409). When no second front had materialized by 1943, Stalin demonstrated his displeasure by 
recalling his ambassadors from London and Washington (Wilmot 1952: 710).
122 Gardner 1994: 66.
123 Feis 1957: 122.
124 Gardner 1994: 66.
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only bring military success, but would consolidate the position of the democratic powers on the 
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126 Davis 1974: 77. The Advisory Committee was a body made up of State Department officials and 
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defeat of Hitler, or to permit Anglo-American military strategy to be determined by the
longer-term political concerns expressed by Churchill, stymied Churchill’s proposal,
presented at the meeting of the Anglo-American High command in May 1943, for a
push up through the Balkans. The rejection of this plan, which might have blocked the
Red Army’s eventual western advances, was a stance that effectively doomed the Baltic
republics to their eventual reoccupation by Soviet forces. The launching of the Red
Army drive westward in 1943 proved decisive; by late 1943 Soviet forces had already
crossed the Dneiper, and “[t]he Soviet government was no longer so anxious to obtain
128recognition of frontiers the Red Army was about to man.”
If eventual Soviet reoccupation was made possible by Allied military strategy, the 
Teheran Conference of 28 November-1 December 1943 provided the political seal of 
approval. Roosevelt and Churchill believed that military necessity required continued 
Soviet cooperation against the Germans; furthermore, Roosevelt was anxious to make 
certain of Russian participation in the war against Japan and the establishment of the 
United Nations.129 Nor was either leader willing to relinquish American and British 
spheres of influence in Western Europe and in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, 
Latin America, and East Asia.130 At Teheran, there was no discussion of post-war 
boundaries during the plenary sessions; when Churchill raised the issue one evening 
over dinner, Stalin answered that “[tjhere is no need to speak now about Soviet desires, 
but when the time comes we will speak.” Rather, Stalin worked to create a strategic 
situation that would enable him to enforce the Soviet Union’s territorial claims, whether 
other countries liked them or not. In particular, it was apparent to Churchill at least that 
Stalin did not want any Anglo-American forces in the areas he was bent upon 
“liberating”—hence his requests for assurances that the amphibious resources in the 
Mediterranean would be used in Southern France, and not in the Balkans.132 He met no 
strong opposition to these demands, making it almost certain that post-war Soviet 
influence would extend deep into Central Europe and the Balkans. As Chester Wilmot 
writes: “Pushed by the Russians and pulled by the Americans, the overall strategy of the 
Western powers had been diverted away from the area of Soviet aspirations...[T]he 
Teheran Conference not only determined the military strategy for 1944, but adjusted the 
political balance of post-War Europe in favour of the Soviet Union.”1 j3
Meanwhile, in private discussions with Stalin, Roosevelt overtly renounced the Baltic 
states. He explained that his political difficulties about recognizing the incorporation of 
the Baltic states into the Soviet Union stemmed from his concern for the opinion of the 
millions of Americans of Baltic extraction. Still, he said, he did “not intend to go to war 
with the Soviet Union on this point;” all he desired was some sort of referendum or 
plebiscite.134 Stalin, according to some sources, commented only that there were 
sufficient opportunities under the Soviet constitution for the expression of public will;
127 Wilmot 1952: 130
128 Kirby 1978: 171. Soviet forces might have reoccupied the Baltic states by 1944 had Hitler taken the 
advice of his generals in January to move westward and concentrate on holding the most direct line 
between the Black and Baltic Seas. However, Hitler feared that abandoning the Baltic states would 
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according to other reports, he responded with a casual “You want a plebiscite? Of 
course!” and admitted that some propaganda work would indeed be necessary.13? At 
any rate, Vice President Henry Wallace noted in his diary on 18 December 1943 that 
during a lengthy monologue on the subject of the Teheran conference, Roosevelt had 
expressed enthusiasm over the results of the conference and his new relationship with 
Stalin, and that “the President defended Stalin’s attitude with regard to Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania.” 136
Given this leadup, from the point of view of the future of the Baltic states the infamous 
Yalta Conference of 4-11 February 1945 was actually something of an anti-climax. 
Soviet forces had reoccupied all three Baltic states by January 1945; at the conference, 
they were not discussed by name. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt offered to extend 
recognition to the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states, but both agreed to accept the 
Soviet Union’s pre-BARBAROSSA borders in practice. On only one point involving 
the Baltic states did Stalin back down. He had previously demanded that all 16 
republics of the USSR be represented in the General Assembly of the proposed United 
Nations. 137 But by the time the conference started, he had already retreated to three: 
Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania, because these three “had made great sacrifices in 
the war; they were the first to be invaded, and had suffered greatly.” 138 Although 
Churchill supported the first two, the issue of Lithuanian representation faded from the 
agenda.139 “Although it was not stated at the conference,” writes Adam Ulam, “her case 
was really too embarrassing.”140
For the next forty years, British and American policy between 1939 and 1945 seemed to 
have been an unmitigated catastrophe for the cause of Baltic self-determination. Once 
again, good relations with the Soviet Union had taken priority in Western capitals over 
international law, the principle of national self-determination, or the specific issue of 
Baltic sovereignty.141 The doctrine of non-recognition of forcible seizure of territory, 
which was enshrined in Article 10 o f the Covenant of the League of Nations and the 
Treaty of Paris and enunciated in US policy in what has been called the “Stimson 
Doctrine,” found manifestation in the restoration of independence to Albania, 
Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland after the conclusion of World War II and the entry 
of the principle into customary international law as well as Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter.142 Nevertheless, the section of the State Department Manual of 
December 1945 dealing with the Baltic states read: “In as much as the Soviet 
government continues to insist that these states were duly incorporated into the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and in view of the position we took in 1940 with regard to 
this matter, we have endeavored to steer a course which would prevent our different
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attitudes from disturbing American-Soviet relations.”143 It appeared to matter little 
whether Churchill and Roosevelt’s policies were the result of a ruthless pursuit of 
national self-interest at the expense of principle or of a regretful collapse of idealism in 
the face of overwhelming military realities. The outcome for the Baltic states appeared 
to be unarguable: the only members of the League of Nations whose sovereignty was 
not fully restored after the war, they disappeared from the world’s maps and most of the 
world’s attention. It was not until the late 1980s that the importance of one seemingly 
cheap and impotent gesture—the failure, in 1940, of most Western governments to 
extend de jure recognition to the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states—would begin 
to become fully evident, as the next section will begin to detail.
1985-1991
In March 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), only a congenital optimist would have 
argued that Western leaderships were likely to strengthen their commitment to the 
principle of Baltic self-determination. True, Baltic legations continued to operate in the 
United States; US diplomats based in Moscow even avoided travelling to the Baltic 
republics, as the process of seeking the mandatory permission for such travel from the 
Soviet authorities could be read as accepting Soviet sovereignty over these territories.144 
But other than such seemingly cosmetic measures, the recent history of Soviet-Western 
relations seemed to offer little hope that Western governments would ever seriously 
pressure Moscow over Baltic self-determination. In 1975, Western and Warsaw Pact 
governments had signed in Helsinki a Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that made no mention of the Baltic states.143 Despite 
Western assurances to Baltic emigres that their policy of non-recognition remained 
unchanged, the Soviet leadership took the agreement by signatories of the Final Act to 
respect one another’s frontiers and territorial integrity as representing tacit acceptance 
of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states.14A The US position at Helsinki proved 
particularly disappointing to Baltic groups; despite promises on the eve of the 
conference, the US delegation failed to voice support for Baltic independence at the 
conference. The US retreat was seen by many as proof that Western leaders were no 
more likely to prioritize Baltic self-determination over detente with the Soviet Union 
than Roosevelt might have been.147
But in fact, since 1945 three factors had emerged in the formulation of Western and 
particularly American Baltic policy that were to have important implications for the 
Baltic states once Soviet power began to wane. First (as already intimated in 
Roosevelt’s self-justifications to Stalin), particularly for American leaders, maintaining 
the good opinion of citizens of Baltic origin was increasingly important. Wilson had 
faced little public input on his Baltic policy; Roosevelt was already facing greater 
pressure after Baltic emigration rose in the 1920s and 1930s. But during and after 
World War II, over 200,000 Baltic citizens fled their states to resettle in the West, with
143 Cited in Davis 1974: 254-254.
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the majority resettling in the United States.148 Many of these emigres refused to consider 
their nations’ situations as anything but temporary; national committees of Estonian-, 
Latvian-, and Lithuanian-Americans and worldwide emigre organizations such as the 
Baltic World Council worked hard to keep the issue of Baltic self-determination on the 
agenda in the United States and internationally. Crucially, Baltic lobbyists were 
successful in winning advocates, particularly among conservative Republicans, in both 
houses of the United States Congress, multiplying their impact on US presidential 
decisions.149
The cause of these Baltic lobbyists had been aided by two other factors. First, by the 
time of Gorbachev’s rise to power, Western governments had nearly five decades of 
rhetoric to live up to. Concepts that were still relatively malleable at the end of the war 
had by now been elaborated by individual Western governments and in the charters of 
Western organizations such as the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO); principles had been stated and restated in these contexts to the 
point where they were difficult to sidestep in the name of political expediency. Second, 
this rhetoric was being heard more frequently. This was in part thanks to the 
proliferation in the post-war years of Western international and intergovernmental 
institutions dedicated to the promotion of democratization and human rights, such as the 
Council of Europe.150 But also, despite the shortcomings (from the Baltic point o f view) 
of the Helsinki Final Act, from 1975 on Western governments took on the stance of 
defenders of human rights in the Soviet Union at the CSCE, a position that Baltic 
activists were quick to exploit in the interest of their cause. Despite the disappointing 
results overall, Baltic representatives were still met by American State Department 
officials at the first CSCE session in Helsinki, and French President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing presented the Baltic case in the assembly.151 Western delegations continued to 
stress their support for Baltic sovereignty in subsequent meetings.1'̂ 2 During the Reagan 
administration, the US had backed away from the conciliatory stance of the period of 
detente, with American diplomats openly attacking Soviet Baltic policy at for instance, 
the CSCE meeting on human rights in Ottawa in 1985.1:53
CSCE meetings also gave Baltic delegations a chance to make their cases themselves, 
albeit from the sidelines. While Western leaders were unwilling to jeopardize the 
outcomes of the meetings through offense to Soviet delegations and as a consequence 
did not support Baltic representatives attending meetings as state representatives,
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delegates from the Baltic World Council attended some meetings as representatives of a 
non-governmental organization (NGOs).154 As a consequence, over the next decade, 
Baltic groups continued to lobby CSCE delegates, joining the “counterconferences” of 
other emigre groups and human rights organizations during CSCE meetings in 
Belgrade, Madrid, and Vienna.1''*5 CSCE-related events such as the 10th Anniversary of 
the signing of the Final Act became opportunities for Baltic emigre organizations to 
conduct protests designed to draw attention to Baltic issues.156 Helsinki monitoring 
committees made up of private citizens were formed in Lithuania and Latvia; the trial 
and imprisonment of many of their members only served to keep their fates on the 
agenda at CSCE meetings.157
The arrival on the scene of Gorbachev, however, portended momentous changes in the 
Soviet Union’s international posture. By October 1986, US President Ronald Reagan 
and Gorbachev had endorsed at their summit in Reykjavik the idea of eliminating all 
offensive strategic arms within 10 years. In December 1987 Gorbachev came to 
Washington to sign a treaty banning intermediate range nuclear forces. By the time of 
George Bush’s inauguration as US President in January 1989, Soviet forces had been 
withdrawn from Afghanistan; Eastern European communist parties had been granted 
substantial autonomy from the CPSU in their running of their countries’ domestic 
affairs; Gorbachev had told the world at the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 1988 that he believed that the “use or threat of force” could no longer be an 
instrument of foreign policy, and had pledged to shift the Soviet Union’s military 
doctrine to purely defensive stance. The end of the Cold War appeared imminent.
Meanwhile, equally momentous changes had been occurring within the USSR, with far- 
reaching implications for the Baltic republics. From the outset, Gorbachev had made it 
clear that his first priority was to reinvigorate the Union’s stagnant economy. The cause 
of perestroika (restructuring) was one that Baltic republic leaderships rapidly seized on, 
taking Gorbachev’s general principles—of khozraschet (cost-accounting), for 
instance—and developing them to suit local interests. Gorbachev viewed these 
development favorably; he hoped that the already relatively economically advanced 
Baltic republics, once given free rein in the economic sphere, would demonstrate to the 
rest of the Soviet Union that the great experiment of economic reform could indeed 
bring a better life for the citizenry.159 The formation in the Baltic republics of grass­
roots Popular Fronts for the support of perestroika between April and October 1988 
seemed on the face of it to bode well for cooperation between Gorbachev and his 
fellow-reformers in Moscow on the one hand and the populations of the three Baltic 
republics on the other.
In fact, however, the pace of political developments in the Baltic republics had long 
since outstripped the potential of the centre to keep up. By mid-1987, Baltic 
intellectuals had begun to take advantage of the new “openness” (glasnosf) not only to 
criticize existing Soviet policies (for instance in the area of environmental policy, an 
area of great discontent in all three Baltic republics) but also to call for more honest 
descriptions of the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states and the filling in of “blank spots”
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in Baltic histories, such as those surrounding the mass deportations that accompanied 
incorporation.160 The Baltic Popular Fronts themselves rapidly metamorphosed from 
forces of loyal opposition into powerful nationalist movements levying detailed 
demands for a fundamental change in the existing relationship between Moscow and the 
non-Russian republics.161 Local Communist Parties were unable (and frequently 
unwilling) to stem the nationalist tide. In November 1988 the Estonian Supreme Soviet 
passed a “Declaration of Sovereignty” giving the republic the right to veto laws issued 
from Moscow; Lithuania followed suit in May 1989 and Latvia in July 1989. In August 
1989, the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact sparked major protests: the 
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared the Pact “illegal and invalid,” and on the fatal date, 
almost two million Baltic citizens formed a human chain stretching 600 kilometers from 
Tallinn to Vilnius. Baltic nationalists buttressed their condemnations of the illegal 
character of Baltic annexation into the Soviet Union with invocations of their right 
under the USSR constitution (reconfirmed in the course of constitutional amendments in 
1936 and 1977) of union republics to “free exit” from the USSR.163 The growing 
strength of nationalist movements elsewhere in the Union, especially in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan; the intensifying conflict between Armenian and Azeri forces over Nagorno- 
Karabakh; and the emergence in the RSFSR of a competitor for Gorbachev’s popularity, 
former Moscow party boss Boris Yeltsin, all suggested rocky times ahead for central 
control over all the Union’s republics, the Baltic republics most of all.
Indeed, it was increasingly evident to Western observers that developments in the Baltic 
republics had important international implications. On the one hand, for the first time in 
forty years, it was becoming possible to imagine a restoration of the Baltic sovereignty 
to which Western leaders had lent so much rhetorical support. While Gorbachev clearly 
remained committed to keeping the Union together, he and his Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze had repeatedly stressed the reformists’ commitment to dealing with 
secessionist movements by non-violent means.164 Gorbachev’s senior advisor 
Aleksandr Yakovlev even held a press conference in August 1989 in which he 
“unequivocally condemned” the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, although he continued to 
insist that secession was out of the question.165 Western pressure had more than once 
given Gorbachev the excuse to take policy steps opposed by more conservative party 
figures. However, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had also made it clear that 
international meddling in Baltic politics was not appreciated; they were, they intimated, 
already doing their best.166 Furthermore, Gorbachev was already beginning to feel 
political repercussions from the unexpected centrifugal effects of his reforms. The 
potential for a showdown between Gorbachev’s reformers and members of the Central 
Committee and the military who were committed to tight central political and economic 
control over the republics, many of whom were also opposed to broadening economic or 
military reform, was becoming evident. The chances of a reactionary backlash in 
Moscow that would endanger not only Baltic freedoms but also growing Soviet- 
Western cooperation left Western leaders grappling with a simple question: how far was 
it safe to rock Gorbachev’s boat?
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In the opinion of most Western leaders, the answer was “not very far.” Gorbachev’s 
political survival was deemed by most Western governments to be more important to 
international peace and stability, and to by extension to Western interests, than Baltic 
independence, although they were happy to extend such moral support as was unlikely 
to derail reforms in Moscow. The US and German governments, with their overriding 
interest in German reunification, were particularly concerned to reassure Gorbachev that 
the Soviet Union would not be isolated or humiliated, and that its security interests 
would not be impaired.167 At the Malta summit meeting of 2-3 December 1989, as 
Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott tell it, Bush offered Gorbachev his personal 
assurances of non-interference in Baltic affairs:
Speaking with great care...Bush reminded Gorbachev that in forty-nine 
years, the US had never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltics. Nor 
had it relinquished its desire for Baltic independence. Still, he was ready to 
‘respond to the generosity of your position’—that is, Gorbachev’s repeated 
promise not to use force against the Baltics. Bush said that if the central 
Soviet authorities caused an outbreak of violence in the Baltics, it would 
‘create a firestorm’ of anti-Soviet feeling in the United States. But if 
Gorbachev kept his word and avoided violence, the US government would 
reciprocate with restraint in what it said on the subject, because, as Bush put 
it, ‘we don’t want to create big problems for you.’168
Indeed, when in mid-December 1989 the Lithuanian Communist Party severed its links 
with the CPSU, Bush was insistent that he wanted official rhetoric to “stay cool;” his 
spokesman informed the press that although the United States had never recognized 
Baltic annexation, “[w]e don’t want to take any positions that are not helpful to either 
side.” After the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared independence on 11 March 1990, 
Bush was carefully non-committal, saying that “[wie rejoice in this concept of self- 
determination. ..beyond that, we think that it’s very important that whatever happens 
should be peaceful;” the United States did not offer to extend recognition. After 
Gorbachev imposed economic sanctions on Lithuania, US leaders expressed “concern,” 
but Bush ordered administration officials to avoid escalating rhetoric. At the same time, 
at various points Bush indirectly warned Baltic leaders about “the realities of life:” they 
should not appeal to the US to fight their battles for them, but instead should attempt to 
work out the best deal they could with Gorbachev. Furthermore, the administration 
made clear its preference for Baltic leaders who supported a gradualist approach toward 
independence, with the moderate Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimera Prunskiene 
receiving an invitation to the White House in May 1990 while letters to Bush by the 
outspoken Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis received no answer.169
This American response was fairly representative of the Western response overall.170 
Even leaders such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who described herself 
as strongly committed to Baltic independence, agreed that it would be unwise to push 
Gorbachev too hard in public. Indeed, some European leaders advocated going much 
farther toward renouncing Baltic self-determination to ensure political stability in
167 Pond 1993: 164.
168 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 163.
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Moscow, but their proposals were generally shot down. For instance, Thatcher recalled 
that at the October 1990 European Council meeting in Rome, European Community 
Commission President Jacques Delors “proposed that the Council should issue a 
statement saying that the outer border of the Soviet Union must remain intact”—a 
proposal that Thatcher, French President Francis Mitterand, and German Chancellor
1 79Helmut Kohl successfully opposed.
This cautious public stance angered many supporters of Baltic self-determination. In 
the United States, Baltic-Americans lobbied the President directly and through members 
of Congress, many of whom were stinging in their denunciations.173 Congress resolved 
in May 1990 to withhold US trade benefits from the Soviet Union until Soviet economic 
sanctions on Lithuania were lifted and negotiations had begun with Vilnius.174 In the 
Baltic republics, leaders complained to the press that the Balts were being “sold out” 
and that the world was witness to “another Munich”—an analogy that was deeply 
resented by Bush.173 A 1989 proposal by Henry Kissinger that had called for a more 
explicit and broad-ranging adoption of the policy that Bush was pursuing in private—a 
promise by the United States not to accelerate change in the Soviet bloc in return for 
limits on what steps Moscow could take to preserve its interests—had already been 
dubbed “Yalta II” by the State Department.17 Many feared that the United States was 
unwilling to in any way disrupt the status quo in the Soviet Union and would once again 
unhesitatingly abandon the Baltic republics to their fate: that Western policy was 
turning out to be, in Yogi Berra’s famous phrase, “dejä vu all over again.”177
If anyone had real reason to complain that he lacked the Western world’s goodwill 
during this period, however, it was Boris Yeltsin. Appointed by Gorbachev to head the 
Moscow city CPSU organization in December 1985, Yeltsin had rapidly earned wild 
popularity among Muscovites through his aggressive pursuit of reforms. However, his 
resignation from the CPSU Politburo in October 1987 cast him into direct opposition to 
Gorbachev, who he effectively accused of having produced little for Soviet citizens 
through perestroika except words.178 Removed from his Moscow position three weeks 
later in a traumatic session, Yeltsin spent the next 15 months in political Siberia.179 
However, his opportunity for a political resurrection came in March 1989, when 
elections were held for delegates to the Soviet Union’s first substantially democratic 
legislative body, the Congress of People’s Deputies. Rather than run for a relatively 
safe seat—he had been offered candidacy in around two hundred districts—he chose to
172 Thatcher 1993: 767.
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175 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 196, 205-206.
170 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 15, 45-46. The British government had strongly opposed the Kissinger 
proposal (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 46).
n7 Bush, on the other hand, was worried about a different Berra-ism; when pondering the prospect of  
inadvertently setting back the progress that had been made in Eastern Europe, he said, he often feared 
that he might “make the wrong mistakes” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 205). In particular, he was 
keenly aware of the analogy to the Hungarian uprising o f 1956: he did not want US rhetoric to 
encourage Baltic leaders to adopt uncompromising positions that would lead to bloodshed, or to be “a 
president who gives subject peoples the false impression that if they rebel, they are going to get help” 
(Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 200).
178 Morrison 1991: 61.
1 9 His new post was as First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Construction (Morrison 1991: 
71).
180 The Congress could not be called fully democratic, as a proportion of its seats were reserved for 
delegates from Party organizations.
38
stand for National Territorial District 1: the unified Moscow seat, the country’s largest 
and most important, with a constituency of more than six million inhabitants. His 
victory, claimed with a dazzling 89.6% of the vote, was the election’s most powerful 
blow not only to the old guard of the Party, but also to the new. Opponents of 
Gorbachev’s reforms had suffered an enormous setback, but the Moscow elections had 
also revealed the extent of popular discontent with Gorbachev’s limited concepts of 
reform.181 The Party’s efforts to block Yeltsin from the Supreme Soviet, a smaller body 
elected from deputies to the Congress that would serve as the permanent parliament, 
only resulted in more high drama when a successful candidate from Siberia announced 
that he would hand over his place. Yeltsin no longer belonged just to Muscovites; he 
was on his way to becoming the political face of the entire Russian republic.
Unfortunately, Yeltsin’s face was not one that was particularly welcome in many 
Western corridors of power. Western governments, unwilling to encourage any political 
competition that might lead hardliners to unseat Gorbachev and bring his reform 
program to an end, were at least as anxious about extending public recognition to 
Yeltsin as they were about fostering Baltic separatists.182 For example, when Yeltsin 
visited the United States in September 1989 on a privately-sponsored lecture tour, Bush 
was worried about meeting him.18j But a compromise was reached: Yeltsin would be 
received by Brent Scowcroft, but Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle would “just drop 
by.”184 Bush, during his quick visit, made a point of stressing his “very positive 
relationship” with Gorbachev.18'’ After the meetings, Yeltsin was keen to make the visit 
look as substantive as possible, but this approach only earned him more resentment in 
the White House, where officials complained that he was grandstanding in an effort to 
compete with Gorbachev. But by mid-1990, his position was unassailable: in March, 
he had been elected to the Russian republic Congress of People’s Deputies from his 
home town of Sverdlovsk with 84% of the vote, and in May, after frantic but ultimately 
counterproductive efforts by Gorbachev to block him, he was elected Chairman of the
-j 07  . . .  •
republic’s Supreme Soviet. Whether or not Western leaders liked it, his battle with 
Gorbachev over the future of economic and political reform was now on in earnest.
In January 1991, the crisis in Soviet-Baltic relations came to a head. The three republics 
had in 1990 declared either their independence (Lithuania on March 11) or transition to 
independence (Estonia on March 30 and Latvia on May 4); no blandishments or threats 
appeared sufficient to dissuade them from their course, and the crisis of laws was
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growing. On 13 and 20 January 1991, Soviet Ministry of the Interior special forces went 
on the offensive, killing 15 in Vilnius and six in Riga. 188 The incident provoked rather 
different reactions from the leaders of the major Western powers than it did from 
Western intergovernmental organizations. The Western stake in Gorbachev’s safety 
from Soviet conservatives had grown after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990: 
the US administration in particular was more anxious than ever to avoid doing anything 
that could either help to unseat Gorbachev or cause the latter to withdraw Soviet support 
for the UN coalition.189 At the bilateral level, therefore, the response of the major 
Western powers was weak. For example, after the first attack on 13 January, in Vilnius, 
Bush expressed his fears that the violence could “set back or perhaps even reverse the 
process of reform” in the USSR but failed to criticize Gorbachev directly. After the 
second attack in Riga a week later, the administration reluctantly cancelled a planned 
summit meeting between Bush and Gorbachev; however, in his State of the Union 
address on 29 January 1991, Bush told his audience that “our objective is to help the 
Baltic people achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union.”190 Although 
resolutions supporting Baltic independence passed Congress by wide margins, the 
administration did not change its line.191 Meanwhile, the responses from European 
responses were not significantly stronger.
Thanks to the voices of smaller states, however, Western intergovernmental 
organizations responded much more indignantly. At the CSCE, seven states called for a 
special session to assess the events, although the proposal had to be abandoned due to a 
Soviet veto. The moment was a turning point for Baltic attendance at CSCE, which 
up to then had been blocked; at the June 1991 CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers 
meeting, Baltic representatives were permitted to participate in the public sessions as 
official guests of the Scandinavian delegations. 193 NATO issued a demarche, and 
member states discussed invoking CSCE prescriptions against “unusual military 
activity” in relation to Soviet troops movements in the Baltic republics.194 The attacks 
similarly sparked anger at the Council of Europe, where in May 1990 the Parliamentary 
Assembly had already called on the Soviet and Baltic governments “carefully to 
negotiate the restoration of the latters’ independence in conformity with the principles 
of mutual security and cooperation in the spirit of the CSCE process.” 195 Now the
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Council’s Committee of Ministers adopted a declaration warning that failure to end 
violence would “bring into question the very basis of the co-operation which has been 
established between the Council of Europe and the Soviet Union.,196 The Parliamentary 
Assembly similarly condemned the situation.197 After a parliamentary delegation visit to 
Moscow and the Baltic republics in February 1991, the parliamentary Bureau of 
Assembly concluded that while it could not grant special guest status to the Baltic 
republics prior to a restoration of full independence, it should express “constant 
international concern” for the future of the Baltic republics and take pragmatic and 
practical steps to strengthen relations between the republics and the Council.198 Baltic 
presidents were invited to attend a hearing on Baltic issues at the Parliamentary 
Assembly on 27 June 1991, and called for member countries’ help in regaining
J  • • 199independence, as well as for economic assistance.
Such cordial treatment was not being handed out to the RSFSR or its leader, despite 
(among other things) the latter’s strong condemnation of the January attacks. Although 
Yeltsin was received at the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in April 1991, 
he was harangued by a minor French Socialist politician who accused him of 
demagoguery and irresponsibility in his opposition to Gorbachev.200 General Secretary 
Catherine Lalumiere noted that “[i]n the near future, at the very least, it is impossible 
for us to establish direct ties with Russia, as only the Soviet Union is recognized in the 
international arena.”201 Although the RSFSR had begun participating in CSCE 
meetings, it was due to a deal having been worked out with the all-Union government, 
not with the CSCE.202 Nor was Yeltsin’s welcome in Western capitals any warmer.
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When in early 1991 Yeltsin wanted to visit Washington again— this time on the 
condition that he would be “properly received” by Bush—the administration felt that the 
“time was not right,” even though other republic leaders were visiting the White 
House.203 When US Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Moscow in mid-March, 
he refused to meet Yeitsin at the Russian parliament building, instead suggesting a 
meeting before or after a dinner he was hosting at the American Ambassador’s 
residence for a range of republic leaders and intellectuals.204 It was not until the 
Republic and Democratic party leaders of the Senate invited Yeltsin to Washington in 
April that Baker and Scowcroft told the American Ambassador in Moscow to extend an 
invitation to the White House— but to inform the Soviet government first. When 
RSFSR Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev travelled to Washington to prepare for 
Yeltsin’s visit, he was privately warned that if Yeltsin attempted to create the 
impression that the Bush administration was undermining the Soviet president, “[i]t 
won’t be a great visit;” ’ when the visit eventually took place in June, Bush in his 
welcoming speech in the Rose Garden concentrated on praising Gorbachev. Yeltsin 
commented afterwards “that Bush still seemed to be ‘under the illusion’ that everything
70Adepended on his personal relationship to Gorbachev.”
The attempted putsch by Soviet hardliners of 18-21 August 1991, its collapse in the 
face of resistance from Yeltsin and his supporters, and its aftermath marked the lowest 
point in the US approach toward both Baltic self-determination and the Russian 
democratic opposition to Gorbachev. The administration’s hesitant and cautious 
response to the coup— Bush initially referred to it only as “extraconstitutional” and 
issued no stinging condemnation— was in many ways understandable; as Scowcroft 
warned, “we may have to deal with these guys.” 07 The US reluctance to recognize the 
three Baltic declarations of independence, issued on 20-21 August, before the coup had 
definitively collapsed was also understandable; precipitous action could have led to 
another, bloodier crackdown. But after the coup plotters had been jailed or committed 
suicide, after the Russian republic had recognized the independence of all three Baltic 
republics on 24 August,208 after the full European Community had extended recognition 
on 27 August, the United States was still politely waiting for the Soviet Union to pass 
through the door first. Bush had undertaken in late August to hold off on recognizing 
the Baltic states until the Soviet government had extended recognition; Gorbachev 
promised recognition by 30 August, but then called to ask for more time. On 31 August,
alarming voices that destroyed the cozy picture of an emerging new international order with the 
participation of a restructured Soviet Union and its nice leader. Furthermore, they sometimes issued 
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2Cb Scowcroft told his aides: “Yeltsin can come here, but we don’t want any White House fingerprints on 
his visit...W e’re not going to do anything that looks like we’re casting our lot with Yeltsin against 
Gorbachev” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 347).
204 Yeltsin boycotted the dinner, sending in his place the chairman of the parliament’s foreign relations 
committee, Vladimir Lukin (Beschloss and Talbott: 353).
205 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 361; 392. Bush said: “Let’s not forget that it was President Gorbachev’s 
courageous policies of glasnost’ and perestroika that were the pivotal factors enabling us to end the 
Cold War and make Europe whole and free.” Yeltsin took the hint, saying “I shall seek to develop this 
achievement together with President Gorbachev” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 392). Bush went so far 
as to place a call to Gorbachev during his meeting with Yeltsin in the Oval Office; the call could not 
go through, but Bush spent 40 minutes the next day briefing Gorbachev on the results o f the visit 
(Morrison 1991: 26).
206 He compared Bush to gullible Russians who had fallen under the influence of a popular television faith 
healer, Anatoliy Kashpirovskiy (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 399).
207 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 429.
208 In fact, the RSFSR had recognized Lithuanian declaration of independence with the signing of a 
Russian-Lithuanian interstate treaty on 29 July 1991.
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Bush telephone Landsbergis and promised that US recognition was imminent; but two 
days later, still Gorbachev had not moved. Unable to wait any longer, the Bush 
administration finally extended recognition to all three Baltic states on 2 September.209
International organizations held out their arms to the Baltic states as well. The CSCE, 
extended full membership to all three states at a meeting of the Conference on the 
Human Dimension on 10 September 1991—a meeting that, appropriately enough, was 
held in Moscow. At the Council of Europe, a special meeting of the Committee of 
Ministers welcomed the restoration of Baltic “sovereignty and independence...which 
will enable these states, after more than fifty years, to resume their rightful place in the 
family of the democratic nations of Europe.” 10 The Parliamentary Assembly similarly 
welcomed the restoration of independent statehood in the Baltic republics; the 
Assembly recommendation also expressed concern, however, “about the proliferation of 
ethnic and other tensions in the area and insists that high standards of minority rights 
protection are necessary to prevent and resolve such conflicts.” Nevertheless, the 
Parliamentary Assembly immediately approved special guest status for all three Baltic 
states. 212 The North Atlantic Assembly, an assembly of parliamentarians from NATO 
member states and selected guests, also admitted the three Baltic states as associate
9 1 ^members in October 1991.
Meanwhile, Yeltsin’s courageous stand during the putsch had led to a thaw in Western 
rhetoric. Once again, it was international organizations that were in the forefront of 
those offering their praise. For example, the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers congratulated “those [Soviet] leaders who, with the President of Russia, in 
these difficult and tragic hours, bravely defended the rule of law and the policy of 
democratic reform and the promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights.”214 
The Council’s Parliamentary Assembly on 19 September further paid tribute to “the 
Parliament and the President of Russia, and to the courage of the citizens who risked 
their lives to preserve democratic principles and the rule of law.” 215 Meanwhile, 
European leaders were extending to Yeltsin the personal touch. British Prime Minister 
John Major met with Yeltsin and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Minister Ivan 
Silayev during a visit to Moscow in early September, expressing admiration for the 
courage displayed by the “defenders of freedom and democracy.” The German and 
Italian Foreign Ministers as well as the President of the European Community Council
209 Bush said publicly, “When history is written, no one will remember that we took forty-eight hours 
more than Iceland or whoever else it is” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 443-444). The USSR State 
Council finally recognized the Baltic states on 6 September, and all three became members of the 
United Nations on 17 September. The Bush administration went some way towards making amends 
by granting the leaders of all three Baltic Supreme Soviets a ninety-minute meeting in mid-September 
(TASS, 17 September 1991 (BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, USSR/Former USSR (henceforth 
SWE), 19 September 1991: A2/1».
210 “Declaration on the Baltic States.” Special meeting of the ministers’ deputies, Council o f Ministers, 30 
August 1991.
211 PACE Recommendation 1161 (1991), 19 September 1991.
212 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 245; PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 684. After the breakup of the 
Union, the Russian Federation was the only former republic to be granted special guest status 
automatically.
213 Radio Vilnius, 23 October 1991 (SWB, 29 October 1991: A2/5). While Assembly leaders described 
themselves as favoring associated membership for the Russian republic, the Soviet Union was 
dissolved before a decision was reached; however, Russian representatives attended as observers 
(Russian Television, 28 October 1991 {SWB, 30 October 1991: Al/3)).
214 “Declaration on events in the Soviet Union.” Special meeting of the ministers’ deputies, Council of 
Ministers, 22 August 1991.
215 PACE Recommendation 1161 (1991), 19 September 1991.
216 Radio Rossii, 1 September 1991 (SWB, 3 September 1991: C3/3).
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of Ministers similarly met with Yeltsin and/or Silayev in early September. Meanwhile, 
Baker failed to meet with Yeltsin on a trip in mid-September that involved a swing 
through the three Baltic states and Kazakhstan, although he did had a conversation with 
St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak during a stopover there.217 In Washington, Bush 
and Scowcroft were unable to conceal their anxiety about Yeltsin. Scowcroft told CNN 
that it was “not clear exactly to what end” Yeltsin would use his power; anonymous 
administration sources told the Washington Post that Yeltsin had an instinct toward the 
demagogic. The new US Ambassador, Robert Strauss, complained from Moscow that 
“this Yeltsin-bashing is really stupid!”218
Soon, however, the waning of the central Soviet government’s power was increasingly 
evident through the growing foreign policy impact of the RSFSR, which became more 
obvious by the day. Russian representatives were soon routinely included in Soviet 
delegations to major international organizations, and on their own terms. Describing the 
RSFSR approach to the Conference on the Human Dimension held in Moscow in 
September 1991, after the failure of the coup, Kozyrev said that “ [we] formulated a line 
of supporting the conference and participating in the Union delegation only on condition 
that the forum is not used for general reassuring speeches, but for critical analysis of the 
urgent problems that exist in the USSR.” 219 In practice, this meant prominent Russian 
reformer and long-time human rights activist Sergei Kovalyev, as co-head of the Soviet 
delegation to the 1991 Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
presenting proposals to use the CSCE and Western human rights organizations to 
monitor observance of human rights commitments through the period of disintegration 
of the Soviet Union.220 While the Soviet Union continued to occupy the Council of 
Europe’s guest seat, during a trip to Moscow, the Council’s Secretary General Catherine 
Lalumiere met with Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and the acting chairman of the Russian 
parliament’s foreign affairs committee Yevgeniy Ambartsumov; reporting on the trip to 
the Parliamentary Assembly, she said Russian leaders had indicated their desire to be 
the Council’s “partner.”221 Meanwhile, Russian representatives continued to make 
frequent visits to European capitals. By October Kozyrev had lined up an official visit 
to France for Yeltsin in early 1992. Yeltsin’s visit to Germany in November 1991, his 
first official visit since his election to the position of President, was described by 
Kozyrev as a “breakthrough” that would “turn the final page of this difficult history.”223 
Kozyrev was finally invited to visit Washington DC in November; to his welcome by a 
wide range of administration and Congressional figures and the assistance proffered, he 
responded warmly that “we did not expect less from the American democracy.”224
Within a fortnight of Kozyrev’s Washington visit, of course, everything had changed at 
home. On 8 December, Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, and Chairman of 
the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Stanislav Shushkevich announced in Minsk the 
formation of a new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and declared that “the 
USSR, as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality, [had ceased] to
217 TASS, 13 September 1991 {SWB, 16 September 1991: Al/2).
218 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 444. Bush eventually accorded Yeltsin a ten-minute phone call in late 
September to discuss centre-republic relations (TASS, 26 September 1991 {SWB, 27 September 1991: 
Al/3)).
219 Komsomolskaya Pravda, 5 September 1991: 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-173, 6 September 1991: 75).
220 “The plan,” Heather Hurlburt writes, “was rejected by Western states as too grandiose. But the 
proposal was typical of the Russian approach” (Hurlburt 1995: 11).
221 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 250.
222 TASS, 13 October 1991 {SWB, 16 October 1991: Al/3).
223 Moscow World Service, 20 November 1991 {SWB, 22 November 1991: Al/2).
224 TASS, 26 November 1991 {SWB, 28 November 1991: Al/3).
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exist.5' “ On 21 December, eight of the other nine remaining Union republics 
announced their intention to join them. The responses from Western capitals were once 
again cautious: US officials, for instance, indicated their intention to continue contact 
with Gorbachev and the central authorities.226 But when Baker visited Moscow a few 
days later, met with Kozyrev and Yeltsin before Gorbachev.227 Kozyrev stressed in their 
meeting that “Russia is now acting as an independent state and aspires to have that 
status recognized.”228
After the final announcement of the Soviet Union’s dissolution on 25 December 1991, 
the Russian Federation replaced the USSR in all international organizations. The 
Russian republic had already on 19 December taken over control of the USSR foreign 
ministry and all its property, including embassies and missions abroad.229 On 21 
December, a resolution passed in Alma Ata by the 11 heads of state of the new CIS 
declared that “the commonwealth states support Russia in continuing [note: not 
“succeeding to”] the USSR’s membership of the United Nations, including its 
permanent membership of the Security Council and of other international 
organizations.” As a result of this “continuer state” status, Russia acceded to special 
guest status in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and a CSCE nameplate 
without needing to apply. Indeed, Russian Federation officials were already 
participating in CSCE meetings by 8 January 1992; the subject of the meeting was “the 
eventual CSCE participation of the former Soviet republics.”232 Russian representatives 
aiso joined their Baltic counterparts in the newly-formed North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC), an institution bringing together the foreign ministers of the NATO 
and Warsaw Pact countries, plus Albania and that was designed to “break down the 
suspicions and stereotypes of the cold war.”
It turned out that Western governments had not served the cause of Baltic sovereignty 
badly during the last years of the USSR, although that fact was not obvious at the time 
to those outside their highest levels. In fact, American and British officials had applied 
much more pressure on their Soviet counterparts in private than they did in public.234 In 
meetings with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Shevardnadze’s successor Aleksandr 
Bessmertnykh, Bush and Baker reiterated American support for Baltic independence; 
both reminded their interlocutors that continued American public tact depended on 
Moscow’s pursuit of a non-violent course of action. Although frequently painting 
themselves as hostage to public and Congressional opinion, administration officials 
nevertheless warned Soviet officials that pressure on the Baltic republics would
225 TASS, 8 December 1991 (.SWB, 10 December 1991: Cl/1).
226 Radio Mayak, 10 December 1991 {SWB, 11 December 1991: Al/1).
227 Moscow World Service, 16 December 1991 (SWB, 18 December 1991: A 1/3).
228 Moscow World Service, 15 December 1991 (SWB, 17 December 1991: A 1/2).
229 TASS, 19 December (SWB, 21 December 1991: i).
230 TASS, 21 December 1991 (SWB, 23 December 1991: Cl/7).
231 PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 684. The USSR had been granted special guest status at the 
Parliamentary Assembly in mid-1989.
23~ 5th Committee o f Senior Officials (CSO) meeting, Prague, 8-10 January 1992 (5CSO/J3, annex 3). 
According to Hurlburt, “Russia tried repeatedly to represent the other former Soviet republics in the 
period just after the dissolution of the USSR...The Russian delegation, then and subsequently, 
attempted to represent absent delegations from the various republics, and from time to time sent 
Russian delegation members to occupy their seats” (Hurlburt 1995: 11).
233 Talbott 2002: 94.
2,4 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 201; Thatcher 1993: 801.
235 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 110, 163, 201, 202,208, 322. Baker attempted to sell Shevardnadze on the 
benefits o f Baltic independence, argued to Shevardnadze that the worst thing could happen was that 
the USSR would have “three new little Finlands” on its border (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 110).
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endanger American-Soviet negotiations at a range of levels and on a range of issues.236 
For example, in a private letter to Gorbachev after the attacks in Vilnius and Riga, Bush 
threatened to cut off all economic assistance to the Soviet Union if the violence did not 
cease. In the final analysis, the cautious pressure exerted by Western governments in 
the last years of the Soviet Union did not serve the Baltic republics badly. According to 
Bessmertnykh, Gorbachev was “extremely relieved” by Bush’s promise at Malta not to 
“trap” or “undermine” him in his dealings with the Baltic republics. Bessmertnykh’s 
conclusion two years later was that “ [without] Malta, the Soviet Union would never 
have so smoothly surrendered its control of Eastern Europe and the Baltics.” 238 
Furthermore, the Western policy, which had often seemed so inconsequential, of non­
recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR turned out to be the 
linchpin of eventual Baltic self-determination. The lack of recognized Soviet legal 
sovereignty over the Baltic states made their alienation from the Union a simple legal 
matter; the legal ability of the new Baltic governments to “restore,” rather than establish 
de novo, their independence made international recognition easy to secure.
Conclusion
With the end of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States and the Russian Federation faced 
their Western interlocutors with renewed hope. Both sides desperately needed economic 
assistance; for this, they needed political good will. For Boris Yeltsin, the challenge was 
to move Western governments away from nostalgia for Gorbachev and the certainties of 
a divided world and towards cooperation with the new Russian Federation. To this end, 
Yeltsin had already begun wooing the West during the last days of the Union with 
proposals of even more radical cuts in strategic weapons than Gorbachev was willing to 
contemplate.239 Meanwhile, the task of Baltic leaders was to separate their states from 
the “Russian question” for once and for all: to play on the high-mindedness, the hard­
mindedness, the sympathy, and if necessary the guilt of Western policymakers to ensure 
that Baltic self-determination would not again be abandoned by the West for the sake of 
good relations with Moscow.
But the cause extended beyond continued sovereign existence. The Baltic cry of “No 
more Yaltas!” was more than an expression of a desire for sovereignty: it represented a 
rejection of a particular approach to world and European order that, in the minds of 
Baltic activists, the tripartite conference represented. To Baltic activists, Yalta stood for 
a world where the strong could apportion the weak amongst themselves without 
compunction. 240 Furthermore, it stood for a gulf that, in their minds, Western 
policymakers had already permitted to emerge by the time of the conference between a 
“core” and a “peripheral” Europe; as much as it was the cause of a divided Europe, it 
was also its result.241
236 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 204, 209, 319. Meanwhile, Gorbachev did not hesitate to use the 
domestic card himself; after Bush warned during the May 1990 Washington summit that he would not 
send a trade treaty to Congress or grant the Soviet Union Most Favored Nation status until the 
blockade on Lithuania was lifted, “Gorbachev pleaded with him not to link the agreement to 
Lithuania; that would make him appear weak and subject to outside pressure in the eyes of hard-liners 
at home. With great reluctance, Bush agreed to this request” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 223).
23 Beschloss and Talbott 1993:319.
238 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 165.
239 TASS, 8 October 1991 (SWB, 10 October 1991: i).
240 None of the three leaders was terribly anxious to hide their disdain for the role o f the smaller powers in 
conducting world affairs (Heller and Feher 1990: 7). Indeed, at the first dinner of the conference, 
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskiy had declared that “the Soviet Union would never 
agree to the right of the small nations to judge the acts of the great powers” (Chamberlin 1972: 87-88).
241 Heller and Feher 1990: 16.
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With these goals in mind, Baltic and Russian representatives approached the challenge 
of rebuilding relations with the West. But at the same time, they faced significant 
problems in their relations with each other. It is to these problems, and to the way in 
which these problems and relations with the West became intertwined, that the next 
chapter turns its attention.
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Chapter Two: Men Behaving Badly
As the previous chapter has indicated, across the course of the twentieth century the 
Baltic states’ eastern neighbor, in its various political permutations—the tsarist empire, 
the Soviet one—had shown itself the greatest threat to Baltic self-determination. 
However, by December of 1991, the Russian threat appeared to be receding rapidly. The 
president of the newly independent Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was no stranger 
to Baltic soil: most famously, he had made a lightning visit to Tallinn after attacks by 
Soviet troops on civilians in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, condemning Soviet 
brutality and pledging Russian support for Baltic sovereignty. His support for Baltic 
independence, and the conclusion of “interstate” treaties between the three Baltic 
republics on the one hand and the RSFSR on the other, appeared to bode well for 
Russian-Baltic neighborly relations.
How and why Russian-Baltic relations moved from this seemingly auspicious 
beginning to the acrimony that dominated relations by the end of 1992 is the subject of 
this chapter. The chapter opens with an overview history of relations between Baltic and 
Russian reformers through the end of the Soviet period. It goes on to discuss the 
bilateral and multilateral irritants that rapidly emerged in Baltic-Russian relations after 
the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 and attempts by the Russian and Baltic 
governments to address these issues among themselves. However, it also opens the 
discussion of efforts by both Baltic and Russian representatives to “internationalize” 
their disputes, particularly in three European institutions: the CSCE, the Council of 
Europe, and NATO.
Soviet era relations
Russian reformers had been looking to the Baltic republics for inspiration for almost as 
long as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been under Soviet control. Even to the 
staunchest opponents of political reform, the Baltic republics were an economic and 
cultural inspiration. To some degree, this advanced state was a product of initial 
advantages. The Baltic republics (as Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev himself publicly 
pointed out) were hardly “backwards provinces” when they entered the Soviet Union.1 2
In 1938, average workers in each of the Baltic states earned considerably higher real 
wages than their Soviet counterparts, and at the time of incorporation in 1940, Baltic 
literacy rates were 98% for Estonia, 93% for Latvia, and 86% for Lithuania, as 
compared with 87% for the USSR as a whole. Estonia’s Hanseatic-era Tartu University 
was a highly respected academic institution; Vilnius was a historic centre of Jewish 
scholarship. But Soviet-era Baltic economic administrators also showed an impressive 
degree of innovation and flexibility in the implementation of central plans. The rate of 
industrial growth in the Baltic republics was higher than the Soviet average in the
1 Vardys 1975: 34.
2 Vardys 1975: 36; Rung 1980: 44. These figures are largely consistent with those of the imperial period,
when Estonia and Latvia constituted the most economically developed parts of the Tsarist empire. In 
1897, for example, Estonia’s overall rate of literacy was 95% and Latvia’s was 92%, compared to St. 
Petersburg’s 62%, Lithuania’s 54%, and the Moscow guberniya's 49% (Vardys 1975: 35-36). Even 
during the imperial period, the Baltic region had been a testing ground for reform; for instance, 
Alexander I used the provinces of Livonia in 1804 and Estonia and Courland in 1816 for experiments 
in emancipation of serfs (Christian 1994: 82).
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postwar period, with a heavy move out of agricultural labour.3 4By 1970, despite the 
depredations of the war, the Baltic republics led the Union in per capita income. At the 
same time, the “Soviet West,” as many half-jokingly called the Baltic republics, enjoyed 
an enviable reputation for intellectual sophistication.5 Baltic literary publications were 
highly regarded among the Soviet intelligentsia, and the Baltic arts scenes were 
considered to be among the Union’s most sophisticated.6 To observers not anxious to 
challenge the political status quo, the Baltic republics could thus be cited as an 
indication of the potential of the Soviet Union overall.
But interest among those interested in undermining the Soviet system was high as well. 
Baltic and Russian dissidents had cooperated in the struggle for the observance of 
human rights and the democratization of the USSR since the 1960s. Baltic deportees 
had an impact on Russian dissident thinkers through shared time in the camps. For 
example, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn spoke of his conversations in the gulag with Arnold 
Susi, a former member of the Estonian government: “To understand the Revolution, I 
had long since required nothing beyond Marxism...and now fate brought me together 
with Susi. He breathed a completely different sort of air... I listened to the principles of 
the Estonian Constitution, which had been borrowed from the best of European 
experience, and to how the hundred-member one-house Parliament had worked. And, 
though the why of it was not clear, I began to like it all and store it all away in my 
experience.”7 89And in return, democratically minded Russians “made the cause of Baltic 
independence a part of their own program for democratic change in the USSR as a 
whole." For example, Sergei Kovalev, later to become a critic of Estonian and Latvian 
citizenship policies, was tried in December 1975 in Vilnius for “dissemination of the 
Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church via the Chronicle o f Current Events and 
other means.”0 Later, the Moscow and Lithuanian Helsinki Groups worked in close co­
operation.10 Indeed, Andrei Sakharov was one of the signatories of a “Statement of 
Russian Democrats” which stated: “Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have been annexed 
into the Soviet Union., .essentially as a result of the occupation of the Baltic States by 
the Red Army.”11
As already touched upon in the previous chapter, once Mikhail Gorbachev began to 
suggest the possibility of economic and political reform, Baltic republic leaderships 
rapidly took up the challenge. Gorbachev’s proposals for reform were intended to 
revitalize the unitary Soviet Union, not to splinter it. By the beginning of 1989, 
however, the Baltic republics were at the forefront of a push for greater republic-level 
political and economic freedoms. The Estonian legislature in November 1988 passed a 
declaration that gave the republic legislature the right to veto laws from Moscow; 
Lithuania and Latvia followed suit in May and July 1989. The Baltic popular fronts, 
brought together under the umbrella “Baltic Council” in May 1989, rejected an
3 Vardys 1975: 37.
4 Vardys 1975:38.
5 Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997: 75
6 In part, this cosmopolitan quality stemmed from broader exposure to Western and Eastern European
sources of information: for instance, Estonians in Tallinn and adjacent coastal areas could tune into 
Finnish TV, and Polish television signals could be received in some parts of Lithuania, which had not 
only a sizeable Polish minority but also a number of ethnic Lithuanian Polish-speakers ( Vardys 1983: 
21- 22).
7 Cited in Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 128.
8 For a detailed description of Baltic-Russian dissident cooperation, see Shtromas 1994: 106-108.
9 Shtromas 1994: 107.
10 Shtromas 1994: 107; Muiznieks 1997: 191.
11 Cited in Krickus 1993b: 169 (no date given for the statement).
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economic autonomy scheme proposed by the central government in March 1989 and 
instead called for the Baltic republics to be given virtually total control of their 
economies by early 1990.12 After the USSR Supreme Soviet rejected in April 1989 calls 
led by Baltic representatives for a new union treaty that would have provided for a fresh 
basis for relations between the center and the republics, Baltic legislatures passed a 
series of resolutions asserting control over their economies and allowing for, among 
other things, private ownership of land.13 By the time the USSR Supreme Soviet finally 
passed a proposal initially put forward by Baltic deputies for a degree of economic 
autonomy, it was a case of too little, too late. The resolutions of the September 1989 
CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the nationalities question similarly fell on deaf 
Baltic ears. In December 1989 the Lithuanian Communist Party declared itself 
independent from the CPSU, and the Lithuanian legislature abolished the republican 
constitutional clause giving the Communist Party a monopoly on power. And in March 
1990, Lithuania declared independence, a step that was met with an oil blockade by 
Gorbachev. By early 1990, therefore, the Baltic republics had become “the focus of the 
struggle between those who wished to preserve the Union and those who wished to 
emancipate themselves from it.”14
These moves were not lost on Russian reformers seeking to push back the level of 
central control. Russian and Baltic reformers were already cooperating at the level of 
all-Union structures. Baltic and Russian deputies were the driving force behind the 
formation of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies formed during the First Congress of 
People’s Deputies May 1989, “in effect a pro-democracy faction within the USSR 
congress.”15 Estonian academician Viktor Pal’m was voted one of five cochairmen of 
the group, along with Yeltsin, Sakharov, Yuriy Afanasyev, and Gavriil Popov.16 By the 
Second Congress Baltic deputies had changed their status to that of “foreign observers,” 
but continued to consult with Russian and other democratic forces. Russian reformers 
also followed the Baltic example with efforts to form an all-republic Russian Popular 
Front, whose founding congress was finally held in October 1989. The Front’s 
“specifically ‘liberal’ nationalist agenda was confirmed in such proposals as the need 
for all nationalities within the RSFSR to be given equal rights and in its support for the 
mixed economy and the extension of democratic freedoms.”18
By mid-1990, Yeltsin and other Russian reformers had made a choice. Real power was 
clearly shifting to the republics; an opposition movement that claimed to represent the 
entire USSR risked being torn apart.19 It was time to transfer the struggle to the RSFSR. 
In May 1990, when Yeltsin was elected chairman of the RSFSR legislature by a narrow 
margin, he was at the forefront of voices within the Russian republic that were 
expressing concern that the RSFSR could fall behind the non-Russian republics in the 
ongoing “war of laws” with the central government. Accordingly, on 12 June 1990, the 
RSFSR legislature passed its own declaration of sovereignty. From this point on, the 
RSFSR was solidly behind the Baltic republics in their struggle with the center.
12 Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 323.
13 Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 321.
14 Hosking 1992:473.
15 Dunlop 1993: 81.
16 Dunlop 1993: 83.
17 Kaplan 1993: 216.
18 Flenley 1996: 239.
19 Hosking 1992:491.
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Even in the eyes of emigre community scholars, Yeltsin was not just anti-center: he was 
“fundamentally pro-Baltic.”20 Unquestionably, he hoped that the USSR leadership 
would be able to offer a compromise that would satisfy Baltic demands for greater 
sovereignty within the Union context. In early 1990, for example, he called for the 
central government to preserve “only some small sector of strategic planning with a 
minimal apparat. ..The republics should decide everything else.” Under such 
conditions, he suggested to an Estonian newspaper, “[w]hy not try such independence, 
but within the USSR?” Still, he firmly stated that “[I]f everything that has not been 
promised only remains on paper...then it is fully permissible for the republics to leave 
the USSR.”21 As he said in mid-1990, speaking of the blockade against Lithuania: “If a 
people strives for independence, you cannot restrain them by force. And the more 
pressure the authorities exert, the stronger the people’s resistance will be.”22 Later, at an 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet session discussing the drafting of a bilateral treaty with 
Ukraine, he elaborated: “History has taught us that a people who hold sway over other 
peoples cannot be happy. This leads not to prosperity, but to decline. We are 
categorically opposed to a unitary state.”23
Of course, not all Russians were so impressed with developments in the Baltic 
republics. Many Russians resented the anti-Russian sentiments that appeared to 
motivate national movements in the Baltic as well as the other non-Russian republics, 
feeling that they were being unjustly blamed for the mistakes of the Soviet system. In 
reply to Baltic deputies at the June 1989 Congress of People’s Deputies, Russian 
nationalist writer Valentin Rasputin burst out: “Believe me when I say that we are tired 
of being scapegoats, of enduring the slurs and the treachery...The blame for your 
misfortunes lies not with Russia, but with that common burden of the administrative- 
industrial machine, which has turned out to be more terrible to all of us than the Mongol 
yoke, and which has humiliated and plundered Russia as well.”24 In all three Baltic 
republics (as well as in Moldavia), “international fronts” or “international movements” 
sprang up between mid-1988 and early 1989. These organizations, whose membership 
was largely ethnic Russian or Russophone, decried Baltic sovereignty drives and called 
for a restoration of central control. Their tone was openly confrontational: at its first 
congress in March 1989, for instance, the Estonian Intermovement adopted a resolution 
calling for the formation of a Russian autonomous region in northeast Estonia, with
c
Tallinn as its capital. These fronts and movements, as John Dunlop has noted, were 
“energetically supported and aided by the directors of the large Union plants, by the 
KGB, and by conservative elements in the military and the military-industrial 
complex.”26
Enjoying such a warm welcome from Russian reformers, and faced with threats from 
both the center and local Russian hardliners, Baltic politicians and populations had 
every reason to be well-disposed towards Yeltsin. Estonian deputy Mikk Titma, asked 
by an interviewer “What does Yeltsin’s coming to power in Russia do for other 
republics, for Estonia? Have the republics been given hope that their problems— 
sovereignty and independence— will be solved?” answered “Undoubtedly...! believe
20 Kionka 1991: 2.
21 Sovetskaya Estonia, 20 February 1990: 4 (FBIS-SOV-90-050, 14 March 1990: 77).
22 Komsomolskaya Pravda, 8 August 1990: 1-2 (FBIS-SOV090-155, 10 August 1990: 61).
22 Moscow Domestic Service, 20 November 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-225, 21 November 1990: 72).
24 Flenley 1996: 238.
25 Dunlop 1993: 137. Delegates also appealed to the USSR Procurator for criminal proceedings to be
instituted against the president and Prime Minister of Estonia and leading officials o f the Estonian 
Communist Party for “contemptuous” treatment of the state flag (Dunlop 1993: 137).
26 Dunlop 1993: 136.
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that as a pragmatist Yelstin is going to build his relations with the republics in a 
completely different manner.”27 Estonian parliamentary deputy (and later Prime 
Minister) Marju Lauristin, who participated in Estonian-Russian talks in October 1990, 
said “I would assess them as something quite new...It has been, in fact, a meeting of 
equal representatives. We did not have any sense of disdain or attempts to apply any 
kind of pressure, or that it was some kind of great-power approach on Russia’s 
part...this was a meeting with the new Russia, with the Russia of the future.”28 These 
feelings did not diminish with the course of 1991. Lithuanian President Vytautas 
Landsbergis described talks with Yeltsin in June 1991 as “very good, amicable, friendly 
and specific;” he said that it had always been “very easy” to hold talks with Yeltsin.29
Baltic approval of Yeltsin and the Russian reformers was only strengthened by the 
RSFSR response to the attacks by Soviet Internal Ministry forces on civilians on 13 and 
20 January 1991 that killed 15 in Vilnius and six in Riga.30 The Presidium of the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet denounced the killings, and Yeltsin issued an impassioned plea 
to Russian soldiers not to use force against civilians of other nationalities/1 Yeltsin 
further travelled to Estonia to express his disapproval over the use of force by the 
central government, which he described having implications for the survival of 
democracy in the RSFSR as well as in other republics. Although he did not explicitly 
discuss the issue of possible independence, while in Tallinn, he and the chairmen of the 
three republics’ Supreme Soviets signed a joint declaration asserting the four sides’ 
recognition of each other’s sovereignty.In March 1991 an Estonian literary prize (the 
Eduard Vilde prize) was conferred on Yeltsin’s Confessions on a Pre-Set Theme, not for 
its literary merits but for its “mission;” the prize was described as an expression of 
gratitude to Yeltsin for having helped to reduce tension in Tallinn during his January 
visit.34 The government of independent Lithuania further awarded Yeltsin a medal in 
January 1992 for his “bravery and efforts to defend Lithuanian independence” in 
January 1991.35 (Activists of the “Democratic Russia” voting bloc later announced their 
intention to put before the RSFSR Supreme Soviet the question of the occupation of the 
Baltic states by the Soviet Union in 1940, although the proposal came to naught.36)
Yeltsin’s January visit to Tallinn was the occasion for the formalization of a concrete 
expression of mutual support: a Russian-Estonian treaty. One of Yeltsin’s priorities had 
been to build up formal bilateral ties among the Union republics in order to circumvent 
the authority of the central government. On holiday in Latvia in July-August 1990, he 
had discussed the question of bilateral treaties with the leaders of all three Baltic 
states. Consequently, negotiations had begun between Baltic and Russian legislative 
delegations on what were referred to even then as “interstate” treaties, to create a 
framework for political and economic relations between republics. The Estonian- 
Russian treaty resulting from these negotiations was signed during Yeltsin’s visit to
27 Sovetskaya Estonia, 2 June 1990: 3 (FBIS-SOV-90-128, 3 July 1990: 73).
28 Sovetskaya Estonia, 5 October 1990: 1 (FBIS-SOV-90-206, 24 October 1990: 88).
29 ITAR-TASS, 5 June 1991; Baltfax, 8 June 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-111,9 June 1991:24).
30 Lieven 1994: 429.
31 Moscow Domestic Service, 13 January 1991 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (henceforth SWB),
15 January 1991: B15); Riga Domestic Service, 13 January 1991 (SWB, 15 January 1991: B18.)
32 Moscow Domestic Service, 15 January 1991 (SWB, 17 January 1991: B26).
33 Moscow Domestic Service, 14 January 1991 (SWB, 16 January 1991: B17). Actually, Vytautas 
Landsbergis was stuck inside the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet building in Vilnius at the time, so the 
document was signed by a designated representative.
34 TASS, 5 March 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-044, 6 March 1991: 49).
35 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 January 1992: 1.
36 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 July 1991: 3.
3' Komsomolskaya Pravda, 8 August 1990: 1-2 (FBIS-SOV-90-155, 10 August 1990: 61).
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Tallinn; treaties with Latvia and Lithuania were signed later in January and in July of 
the same year respectively. The opening articles of all three treaties declared the two 
sides to recognize each other as sovereign states and entities under international law; the 
treaties with Estonia and Latvia further contained the provision that each side 
recognized the other’s right to realize state sovereignty in whatever form it chose, while 
the Lithuanian treaty described recognition as extended in accordance with the two 
sides’ “state status,” which in the Lithuanian case was described as following from the 
Lithuanian declaration of independence of 11 March 1990.38 This phrasing extended 
implicit Russian recognition for the Estonian and Latvian announcements of 30 March 
and 4 May 1990 of the beginning of transition periods which would eventually lead— 
with no date set—to the restoration of fully independent republics, and of the Lithuanian 
declaration of independence of 11 March 199 0.39 These treaties provided Baltic 
governments with something very close to a guarantee that the RSFSR government, at 
least under Yeltsin, would not oppose their drives for independence. As Yeltsin 
described the Latvia treaty; “The agreement will be the basis for our mutual relations, 
no matter how Latvia's relations with the center develop and independently of the 
Latvia participation in the Union Treaty.”40 During discussion of upcoming CSCE 
events held between Baltic and Russian deputy foreign ministers in February and March 
1991, the two sides even discussed questions of diplomatic recognition for the Baltic 
republics.41
Confirmation that the Russian government would not stand in the way of Baltic 
independence came after the failed coup attempt in August 1991. The Russian-Baltic 
bilateral treaties had not yet been ratified by the Russian parliament by the summer of 
1991, although Democratic Russia deputies promised Estonian Popular Front 
representatives in July 1991 that they would be taking steps to secure ratification as 
soon as possible.42 But their phrasing enabled now-President Yeltsin (a position to 
which he had been elected in June 1991 by an overwhelming majority) to announce on 
August 24, immediately after the collapse of the attempted coup in Moscow, that the 
Russian Republic recognized the full independence of the three Baltic states. (Indeed, 
the Russian government tied for third place in recognising the Baltic states, neck and 
neck with Hungary and Denmark, and only beaten out by Iceland.)
Then Yeltsin, and the Baltic governments, went off to attend to immediate business. 
Yeltsin was attempting to strip the central Soviet government and Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev of most of their powers while at the same time attempting to avert a 
collapse of the Union, or at least of Russian cooperation with Ukraine. The Baltic 
governments were attempting to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops from their 
territories, as well as to consolidate, though new domestic institutions and laws and new 
international relations, their newly achieved state sovereignty. Neither side appeared to 
feel excessive concern about the future of relations; as Lennart Meri, in his first press 
conference in Tallinn as Foreign Minister of an independent Estonia, said: “We have the 
most friendly relations with the Russian Federation.”43
38 “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Estonian Republic”,
12 January 1991; “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the 
Latvian Republic,” 13 January 1991; “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between 
the RSFSR and the Lithuanian Republic,” 29 July 1991 ( Vneshnaya Politika Rossii: 29, 35, 58.)
39 Bungs 1993.
40 TASS 1 August 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-149, 2 August 1990: 65).
41 Riga Domestic Service, 21 March 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-056, 22 March 1991: 53); Ekho Litvy 22 March
1991: 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-069, 10 April 1991:48).
4‘ The Baltic Independent, 5-11 July 1991: 2.
43 The Baltic Independent, 30 August-5 September 1991: 4.
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Issues straining relations
Within weeks, however, of the announcement on 8 December 1991 in Minsk by 
Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian leaders of the formation of a new Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and the decision on 21 December by eight of the other nine 
remaining Union republics to join them and to declare the Soviet Union defunct, 
relations between the Baltic states and the newly independent Russian Federation were 
already strained. There were three issues that had created, and were to continue to 
create, serious problems; and as it happened, the Western non-recognition policy of the 
post-war era was at least marginally implicated in two of these.
Troop withdrawals
The first bone of contention was the problem of former Soviet troops stationed on Baltic 
soil. These troops comprised naval, air force, and army troops belonging to the Soviet 
military’s Northwest Group of Forces (the successor to the former Baltic Military 
District). The Group had its headquarters in Riga; Tallinn was the headquarters for the 
Northern Group of the Baltic Fleet, and the large phased-array radar installation at 
Skrunda, in Latvia, was an important part of the Soviet ballistic missile warning system. 
Figures for these troops were notably difficult to obtain in both the Soviet and post- 
Soviet periods.44 However, unofficial estimates put their total number in the region at 
600,000 in 1990—100,000 in Lithuania, 200,000 in Estonia, and 300,000 in Latvia. 4 ~
Immediately after the restoration of Baltic independence in August 1991, Baltic leaders 
decided to make the withdrawal of Soviet forces, which they feared might launch a 
revanchist strike, their major foreign policy goal. Despite disagreements about how best 
to approach the issue, a Baltic Council meeting in October 1991 ultimately issued a 
resolution calling for a swift and complete withdrawal of all troops from the Baltic 
capital cities, as well as of assault troops and paratroopers elsewhere on the three states’ 
territories.46 Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov had concluded 
agreements with the three Baltic governments acknowledging the Soviet Union’s 
responsibility for withdrawing troops in autumn 1991, but had stalled on withdrawal 
timetables.47 Nevertheless, withdrawals began in October 1991,48 with the result that by 
late January 1992, Baltic and Western analysts conservatively estimated the total 
number of troops remaining in the Baltic states at 128,000, including 28,000 officers, of 
which 43,000 were stationed in Lithuania, 60,000 in Latvia, and 25,000 in Estonia.49
After the Russian government assumed jurisdiction over the forces on 28 January 1992, 
citing concerns about the difficulty of establishing a joint CIS command structure, 
Baltic governments continued to demand an immediate withdrawal of forces. Calling 
the continued presence of forces “a violation of sovereignty,” Baltic leaders, 
parliamentarians, and diplomats, individually or together at regional associations such
44 See Bungs 1992a for a discussion of the difficulty of obtaining precise figures.
45 Bungs 1992a: 19.
46 Girnius 1992a: 29. Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman Vytautas Landsbergis favored a maximalist
approach, insisting that a withdrawal should not be a question for negotiation and that all military 
personnel should leave the Baltic capitals by 1 November and all three states by the end of the year. 
Latvian and Estonian leaders considered his proposed deadlines unrealistic, and according to some 
reports “heated discussions almost prevented a consensus from being reached” (Girnius 1992a: 29).
47 The Baltic Independent, 11-17 October 1991: 2.
48 The Baltic Independent, 4-10 October 1991: 1.
44 The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 1; Bungs 1992a: 19. As noted, these were conservative 
estimates; some analysts put the figures substantially lower, at 34,000 for Lithuania, 48,000 for 
Latvia, and 23,000 for Estonia (Bungs 1992a: 19).
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as the Baltic Council or the Baltic Assembly (an interparliamentary advisory group), 
demanded an immediate withdrawal, beginning with the Baltic capitals.30 They further 
proposed that the troops leave behind military hardware that could be used to set up new 
Baltic defence forces, “taking into account the military property of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania seized in 1940.”31 But above all else, they stressed that a withdrawal had to be 
complete, orderly, and immediate.
The Russian Federation political leadership, for their part, indicated clearly early on that 
they considered a withdrawal to be inevitable. Immediately after the 8 December 1991 
Minsk meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had told the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet that it was the government’s aim to withdraw Russian forces from the 
territory of the other newly independent states, and Yeltsin in late December told 
journalists that troops would leave the Baltic states.52 But the military had for some time 
been voicing its opposition to a speedy pullout, citing the lack of housing for returning 
troops.53 Furthermore, Russian negotiators had made it clear that the military hoped to 
retain limited basing rights in the region, particularly at the Paldiski naval station in 
Estonia, which was an important submarine training base, and the Skrunda radar 
installation in Latvia.54 Soon the Russian side was making it clear that although the 
concept of a withdrawal was unqualified, its speed, timing and conditions were not.5'
Citizenship rights
Second was the problem of citizenship rights and social guarantees for Russophones 
living in the Baltic states, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. This issue arose due to the 
extreme demographic changes that had taken place in the Baltic republics since 
incorporation. Baltic population losses after August 1940 had been terrible. Western 
estimates put the population losses of the three Baltic states between 1940 and 1945 
(during which period the republics were under Soviet, Nazi and again Soviet rule) at 
20% of their populations. Nor did Baltic population losses halt in the post-war years: 
after 1945, Estonia lost about 100,000 citizens due to deportations, executions, and 
guerrilla warfare; Latvia, at least 150,000; and Lithuania (where guerrilla activity was 
more widespread), about 450,000.56 Furthermore, the Soviet government had 
encouraged substantial immigration to the Baltic republics, particularly to Estonia and 
Latvia; for example, total net immigration to Latvia from 1945 to 1990 was 941,000.57 
As a consequence, while in 1989 ethnic Lithuanians still made up approximately 80% of 
their republic’s population, ethnic Latvians accounted for only 52% of their republic’s 
population, and ethnic Estonians only 62% of theirs. Meanwhile, ethnic Russians, most 
of whom had moved to the republics after 1940, now made up 30.3% of the Estonian 
and 34% of the Latvian populations; when Russian-speaking Slavs were added, the 
percentage rose to 34.9% in Estonia and 42% in Latvia.
As the Gorbachev period had progressed, Baltic resentment of Russophone residents— 
many of whom were recent arrivals, and who were often indifferent to or even
50 The Baltic Independent, 31 January-6 February 1992: 1.
51 The Baltic Independent, 9-15 January 1992: 1.
32 Russian Television Network, 12 December 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-239, 12 December 1991: 36); TASS 
21 December 1991 (StVB, 23 December 1991: A 1/3).
53 See, for instance, a statement by representatives of officers’ assemblies (TASS, 2 November 1991 
(.SWB, 4 November 1991: A2/1).
54 Bungs 1992a: 24.
55 Russian Television Network, 26 February 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-041,2 March 1992: 37-38).
56 Clemens 1991: 56.
57 Latvian Academy of Sciences, cited in Krickus 1993a: 3.
58 Lieven 1994: 433-434.
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contemptuous of local cultures—and the Russification they represented had received 
increasing public expression. The more radical elements of the three Popular Fronts 
made no secret of the fact that they would be happy to see most Russophone residents 
leave, although the latter were not for the most part under physical threat.59 Indeed, the 
rise of the interfronts described above was due to some degree to the growing fears of 
local Russophones, who were particularly alarmed by laws passed in the three republics 
in 1988-1989 making the titular nationality languages the official languages of the 
republics (all three laws mandated a specific period within in which all government 
officials and sales personnel were required to become proficient in the official language) 
and stipulating residence requirements for those wishing to stand for elected office. 60 
The growth of the interfronts, however, only increased Baltic resentment and concerns 
about the possibility that Russophones were a potential “fifth column” for the centre. In 
fact, many local Russophones supported the Baltic independence drives. For example, 
when the three Baltic republics conducted referendums between 9 February and 3 
March 1991 on the desirability of independence (while boycotting the 17 March all- 
Union referendum on the future of the Union), survey data suggested that about 30% of 
non-Estonians voted for the restoration of independence of the Republic of Estonia.61 
Even in many heavily Russophone areas of the three republics, 50% or more of the 
population voted for independence.62 But the radical language of some Baltic 
nationalists on the one hand and the interfronts on the other heightened fears on both 
sides that accommodation was impossible.
As detailed above, Yeltsin and other Russian reformers were aware of the situation 
facing Russophones in the Baltic, and the strong feelings that the issue raised among 
Russian nationalists. At a December 1990 RSFSR Supreme Soviet session on the future 
of the Union Treaty, Yeltsin had been explicit: “We are in favor of any problem being 
tackled with the maximum of democracy and glasnost’, in the spirit of interethnic 
accord and trust in one another...The Russian leadership will not be taking the stand of 
outside observer in these matters. We are not indifferent to the fate of the peoples of the 
republic, wherever they may live, be it the Russian population or other peoples without 
any national formation or existence outside its borders.”63 By 1990, the Russian republic 
government had already begun to bring up its concerns about the status of Russophones 
with Baltic governments, which were discussed by the Russian side under the rubric of 
“human rights.”64 In fact, Russian reformers viewed empire-saving elements of the 
Baltic Russophone population with disapproval; Yeltsin, asked immediately after the 
attacks in Vilnius of January 1991 about the attitude of the Russian republic leadership 
towards Russophones in the Baltic republics, answered: “We must express our position 
very frankly and say that we support democratically-oriented forces, including those 
among the Russian population.”63 But in a personal appeal a few days later, he appealed 
to Baltic populations as well to display maximum restraint, strength of spirit, and 
tolerance in warding off inter-ethnic conflict, and said that the Russian Federation’s 
opposition to “any form of discrimination in interethnic relations” was “clear and
59 Sheehy 1993: 7
60 Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 325; Lieven 1994: 192. A counter-effort by the USSR Supreme Soviet
in November 1989 to pass a language law enshrining Russian as the official language of the Soviet 
Union by virtue of its status as “the language of inter-ethnic communication” was strongly opposed by 
Baltic and Georgian deputies, who decried the step as “colonial” (Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 343).
61 Taagepera 1993: 194. The same survey data suggests that around 40% opposed independence and
about 30% failed to participate in the referendum, possibly indicating indifference or neutrality.
62 Brady and Kaplan 1994: 193-194.
6j Moscow Domestic Service, 11 December 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-238, 1 1 December 1990: 66).
64 TASS, 28 August 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-167, 28 August 1990: 45).
65 Moscow Television Service, 14 January 1991 (SWB, 16 January 1991: B18).
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unambiguous."66 The Russian government’s concern was motivated at least in part by 
worries about a possible flow of Russophones from the Baltic states to the Russian 
republic; Russian officials had already suggested that a republic migration service be set 
up to handle refugees from interethnic conflicts that had reached a violent stage 
elsewhere in the Union.67 (Yeltsin actually had indicated in September 1990 that the 
RSFSR would welcome back any compatriots who wished to return to Russia, although 
he emphasized that he was not urging them to return.68)
Yeltsin and his supporters had anticipated that the status of Russophones would be 
adequately covered in the bilateral treaties under discussion between the Baltic and 
Russian governments.69 These treaties were, after all, intended to be “all-embracing,” 
covering the political, economic and social spheres, with sections on interethnic 
relations.70 However, as Kozyrev later said: “Immediately after my being appointed 
Russian foreign minister, the guns were sent to Vilnius, so our immediate concern was 
to save the independence and democracy movement in those states against the Soviet 
crackdown. So we were in confrontation with Moscow much more than with the 
nationalists in those republics for the protection of human rights.”71 As a consequence, 
the treaties did contain some ambiguous language (as detailed below) designed to make 
rapid agreement possible. Indeed, some members of the Russophone community in 
Estonia voiced concern that the treaty did not go far enough to protect the rights of 
minorities in the future, which they attributed to the fact that the treaty had been drawn 
up without the input of the small Russophone faction in the Estonian legislature or other 
representatives of the Russophone community in Estonia. However, the Russian 
government reacted stiffly to these criticisms, with Yeltsin telling the press in Tallinn 
that the Russian-Estonian treaty was neither a retreat nor a betrayal, but was legal 
protection for the Russophone population. The Russian government also called into 
doubt the depth of Russophone opposition to the treaty in Estonia: Yeltsin's deputy in 
the legislature, Ruslan Khasbulatov, told a radio interviewer that when the Estonian 
parliament voted on 15 January to ratify the treaty, only 10 of nearly 70 Russian- 
speaking deputies had voted against ratification.
In September and October 1991, the Estonian and Latvian legislatures began 
considering laws or resolutions on citizenship. In each case, the legal continuity of 
once-again-independent states with the interwar Estonian and Latvian states— a position 
cemented by the Western non-recognition policy— was the animating principle behind 
the new legislation. A Latvian resolution (not yet finalized in the form of a citizenship 
law) limiting automatic citizenship to residents of the interwar Latvian republic and 
their descendents was passed on 15 October 1991; the Estonian parliament, rather than 
draft a new citizenship law, on 6 November 1991 reinstated the citizenship law of 
193 8.74 The Estonian citizenship law and the draft Latvian citizenship legislation 
stipulated that residents who did not qualify for automatic citizenship (which in both 
cases was limited to residents of the Soviet-era republics who were citizens of, or 
descended from citizens of, the interwar Republics) would have to meet a series of 
requirements (including residency and language requirements) and go through a
66 Vilnius Domestic Service, 19 January 1991 (SWB, 21 January 1991: B25).
67 TASS, 26 April 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-088, 7 May 1990: 71).
68 Moldova Suverana, 29 September 1990: 4 (FBIS-SOV-90-206, 24 October 1990: 96).
6q See, for example, interview with Boris Yeltsin, Moscow News, no. 23, 17-24 June 1990: 7.
70 Komsomolskaya Pravda, 8 August 1990: 1-2 (FBIS-SOV-90-155, 10 August 1990: 61).
71 Kozyrev 1994: 41.
72 Radio Rossii, 16 January 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-012, 17 January 1991: 79).
73 Radio Rossii, 16 January 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-012, 17 January 1991: 82).
74 The Estonian law came into force on 26 February 1992 (Sheehy 1993: 8).
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potentially cumbersome application process.7? Length of residence in Estonia or Latvia 
during the Soviet period was considered to be irrelevant.76 Persons deemed to be a 
threat to Estonian or Latvian security—in particular those who had served in the Soviet 
security apparatus—were ineligible to become citizens. Under these conditions, 
approximately 475,000 Russophones living in Estonia and 734,000 Russophones living 
in Latvia were abruptly rendered stateless for a period of at least three years.77 When 
other groups were taken into account, the Estonian government ended up 
disenfranchising nearly 30% of the country’s potential voters, and the Latvian 
government over 40%.78 Significantly, citizenship was more than an issue of the right to 
vote: it also served as the basis for the allocation of economic and employment rights.
Unsurprisingly, the Russian government protested that Estonian and Latvian citizenship 
policies were discriminatory against Russophones. Russian representatives argued that 
the Estonian and Latvian laws violated the terms of the January 1991 Russian-Estonian 
and Russian-Latvian treaties, which were obviously intended to calm local 
Russophones’ fears about their long-term status in the republic and which the Russian 
government believed had established a “zero variant” option on citizenship. In 
particular, Article III of each of the treaties agreed that all those living on territory of 
each republic at the time of signing of the agreement should have “the right to maintain 
or achieve citizenship in the RSFSR or the Republic of Estonia/Latvia according to their 
expression of free will.”7g The Estonian and Latvian governments, of course, argued 
that they were sticking by the letter of the treaty; any resident of the Soviet-era republic 
(except for members of the security services), regardless of ethnicity, who wished to 
could achieve citizenship in time, provided that they met the language requirement and 
passed the civics examination. Nevertheless, the Russian Supreme Soviet, although it 
had already ratified the Russian-Estonian treaty on 26 December 1991, called on the 
Russian Foreign Ministry in January 1992 to prepare within two months a draft bilateral 
agreement on questions of citizenship and ownership; to proceed in their relations with 
the Estonian government “on the premise that in the sphere of human rights and 
freedoms, including the rights of national minorities, the norms of international law
75 For example, residents of Soviet Estonia who wished to acquire Estonian citizenship could apply after
residing on Estonian territory for two years, starting from 30 March 1990; applications would then be 
subject to a one-year waiting period, with the result that the earliest a resident could acquire 
citizenship would be 30 March 1993. Candidates for citizenship also had to pass an Estonian 
language test and an examination, conducted in Estonian, of their knowledge of the Estonian 
constitution (Torniidd 1994: 74). The laws thus “created a formidable set of practical and 
psychological hurdles” for Russophones to negotiate if they were to become equal members of 
Estonian and Latvian society (Melvin 1998: 43).
76 In Estonia, for instance, 78% of the Russophone population in 1991 had lived in the republic for 21
years or more; about 90% had lived in the republic for at least 10 years (Forced Migrations Project 
1998:20).
77 Chinn and Kaiser 1996: 113. The earliest date by which an Estonian resident could be naturalized was
30 March 1993. A Latvian citizenship law was not passed until 22 June 1994; it called for a ten-year 
residency requirement, a drop from the sixteen-year requirement stipulated by the Supreme Council 
resolution on citizenship of 15 October 1991 that served in its place until that time. Under 
amendments to this law (already revised in August 1994) passed in March 1995, the residency 
requirement was dropped to a five-year period beginning no earlier than 4 May 1990 (Girnius 1994: 
31; Orentlicher 1998: 301-302).
78 Bungs, Girnius, and Kionka 1992: 1-2; Bungs 1992c: 3. When the Estonian government held a 
referendum on the new Estonian constitution on 24 June 1992 that included the question of whether 
non-citizens should be permitted to vote, 53.9% of Estonians rejected the proposition (Brady and 
Kaplan 1994: 193).
79 “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Estonian Republic”,
12 January 1991; “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the 
Latvian Republic,” 13 January 1991 ( Vneshnaya Politika Rossii: 29, 35).
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have priority over national legislation for all states belonging to the CSCE;” and to 
proceed “from the premise that the Russian Federation intends to offer protection to its 
citizens living on the territory of the Estonian Republic.”80 Many prominent Russian 
politicians, military figures, and other citizens soon appeared convinced that as a 
consequence of Baltic citizenship policies, Russophones in Estonia and Latvia faced 
hardship ranging from loss of human and civil rights to mass expulsion.
Status of the 1920 treaties, legality o f incorporation, and accompanying border issues 
and compensation claims
A third problem could be found in the complex of issues surrounding the status of the 
1920 Soviet-Baltic peace treaties. After the restoration of independence, the Estonian 
and Latvian governments in particular stepped up calls for the Russian government to 
accept the 1920 treaties as the legal basis for bilateral relations. These treaties were of 
high symbolic significance to the Baltic states: as the first international agreements to 
have been signed by the three independent Baltic governments, they had served as the 
“birth certificates” for the interwar Baltic states. 82 Their recognition as valid, Baltic 
representatives argued, would be the final proof that these states (thanks in large degree 
to the Western non-recognition policy) had now truly been legally reanimated.
From the Russian perspective, however, legal reanimation of the interwar Baltic states 
had already shown a disagreeable side in the ability of the Baltic states to reinstate 
existing citizenship laws rather than pass new ones. Furthermore, recognition of the 
1920 treaties had the potential to put legal flesh back on an even more unwelcome 
skeleton, that of Soviet Russia. By virtue of the Russian Federation’s status as a 
continuer (rather than successor) state of the USSR, the Russian government was 
already flirting dangerously with the possibility that a degree of legal identity could be 
discovered between Russia and the Soviet Union; if the Russian government now 
recognized the 1920 treaties as still valid, claims of legal identity with Soviet Russia 
would be hard to avoid. And this would mean—as Baltic representatives themselves had 
made quite clear—claims for compensation for damages inflicted by the Soviet 
government between 1940 and 1991, as well as continuing damage by former Soviet 
military forces still on Baltic territory. (The Lithuanian government, to give an idea, 
calculated the worth of damages at US$150 billion. ) Nor was there any logical reason 
why the Baltic states should be the only ones to raise claims. The Yeltsin administration 
thus faced a possible compensation nightmare should the 1920 treaties be found to be 
still valid.
Even more dramatic was the question of boundaries. The three treaties delineated 
borders between their Baltic signatories and Soviet Russia; under their terms, Soviet 
Russia renounced “voluntarily and forever all rights of sovereignty held by Russia” over 
Baltic territories and their populations.84 However, after the recapture of Estonian and 
Latvian territory from German forces in 1944, the Soviet government transferred about
80 Rossiskaya Gazeta, 11 January 1992: 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-009, 14 January 1992: 52). The RSFSR and
Estonia had already signed a protocol in October 1991 on the start of negotiations on drawing up 
agreements on protection and consular services for citizens o f each side residing on the other’s 
territory (TASS, 24 October 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-208, 28 October 1991: 70)).
81 TASS 13 September 1991 (SWB, 16 September 1991: A2/2).
82 The “birth certificate” metaphor was that of Estonian President Lennart Meri; see, for instance, PACE
ORD, 25 April 1995:323.
82 The Baltic Independent, 19-25 June 1992: 3. The Lithuanian side also requested that Vilnius be 
compensated for weapons and military hardware confiscated by the Soviet Army in 1940 ( The Baltic 
Independent, 21 December 1991-8 January 1992: 1).
84 Bungs 1994.
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2,300 square kilometers (about 5%) of the territory of the interwar Estonian Republic 
and about 1,400 square kilometers (about 2%) of the territory of the interwar Latvian 
Republic to the RSFSR, adding some parts to Leningrad Oblast" and combining others 
with existing RSFSR territory to form a new RSFSR administrative unit, Pskov 
Oblast’. An additional 700 square kilometers of Estonia was transferred in 1953, and 
the town of Ivangorod (Jaanilinn in Estonian—traditionally considered by Estonians to 
be part of the Estonian city of Narva, although it lies across the Narva River) was 
transferred in 1954.86 To many Estonians and Latvians, the idea of “restoring” the 
interwar states without the full complement of their interwar territories was like the idea 
of reincarnation minus a limb: it not only constituted, in their eyes, a historical injustice, 
but called into question the project of recreating a past state.
While the possibility of compensation claims against the Russian Federation, as 
opposed to the central government, had only arisen since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the salience of the territorial issue had been evident to the RSFSR since well 
before. As a consequence, in late 1990 and early 1991 the RSFSR government had been 
extremely wary of making any mention of the Tartu or Riga Peace Treaties in the 
Russian-Estonian or Russian-Latvian interstate treaties. Ultimately, in these treaties the 
two sides based their claims to sovereignty (and hence to the right to enter into treaties) 
on declarations made by currently existing state entities—in the Russian case, the June 
1990 declaration of sovereignty, in the Estonian case the March 1990 declaration of 
transition to independence and an August 1990 resolution setting guidelines for 
independence talks with the USSR, and in the Latvian case the May 1990 declaration of 
the restoration of independence. As the Russian declaration of sovereignty made no 
mention of Soviet Russia, neither side thereby committed themselves to a stance that 
could imperil their legal claims to the transferred territories.87 This ambiguous situation 
persisted through the last days of the Soviet Union. After the August 1991 attempted 
coup in Moscow, Yeltsin’s office issued a statement: “The Russian Federation casts no 
doubts on the right of every state and people to self-determination. However, the 
problem of borders still exists. It may be left unresolved and is only tolerable as such if 
there exists a relationship of alliance which is registered in a relevant treaty. In the event 
that such a relationship ceases, the RSFSR reserves the right to revise borders. This 
applies to all contiguous republics, with the exception of the Baltic republics of Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia, whose independence has already been recognized by Russia, 
confirming that the territorial problem in bilateral relations is solvable.” But Baltic 
governments begged to differ, reminding the Russian government that the border issue 
was still open; after the restoration of independence, the Estonian government in 
particular took immediate steps to annul all Soviet-era decrees on borders in order to 
clear the way for territorial readjustments. At a press conference on the occasion of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Estonia, Kozyrev and his
85 Bungs 1994: 27; The Baltic Independent, 29 November-5 December 1991: 2.
86 Bungs 1994: 28.
87 In the Lithuanian case, where no potential territorial dispute existed, no reference was made to any
legal basis for sovereignty, the two sides instead stating their certainty that the “elimination of the 
sovereignty-violating consequences of the Soviet Union’s annexation of Lithuania in 1940” would 
create additional conditions for trust between the contracting sides and their peoples (“Agreement on 
the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Estonian Republic”, 12 January 
1991; “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Latvian 
Republic,” 13 January 1991; “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the 
RSFSR and the Lithuanian Republic,” 29 July 1991 ( Vneshnaya Politika Rossii: 29, 35, 58); Kionka 
1991: 1).
88 TASS 26 August 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-166, 27 August 1991: 71).
89 TASS, 13 September 1991 (SWB, 16 September 1991: A2/2).
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Estonian interlocutors were forced to skirt the issue by emphasizing that until the issue 
of borders was settled by treaty, both republics would “proceed on the basis of the status 
quo,”90
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of borders resurged. On the Baltic side, 
some Estonian and Latvian politicians began to speak of the possibility of seeing 
territory returned.91 The Latvian government approved in early 1992 the printing of 
maps that showed the disputed territories as part of Latvia.92 Furthermore, the new 
constitution approved by Estonian voters in July 1992 made reference to Estonia’s pre­
war borders.93 Meanwhile, for its part, the Russian government unsurprisingly wanted 
the border issue dropped. The Russian Supreme Soviet had already shown itself highly 
sensitive on the issue, ratifying the Russian-Estonian treaty on 26 December 1991 but 
calling on the Foreign Ministry to hold off on any talks about border changes until the 
question had been examined by the legislature.94 A Russian Foreign Ministry statement 
issued in April 1992 stressed that Russia would “strongly oppose” any efforts to regain 
territory.95 Furthermore, the Russian government dug in its heels on the broader 
question of the continued validity of the 1920 treaties. Russian officials argued that the 
treaties had been invalidated by the course of history; as a consequence, Russian 
delegations simply refused to entertain any possibility of recognizing the validity of the 
treaties or of using them as starting points for negotiations.
All of these issues were emotive ones for those involved.96 The general political climate 
in early 1992 all four states was already highly emotionally charged. In the Baltic states, 
pride over the restoration of independence competed with what Vamik Volkan 
described a few years later as “generalized anxiety.” anxiety over the fate of their 
independence; anxiety over their economic futures; and anxiety about creating (or re­
creating) “pure” Baltic identities (particularly in Estonia and Latvia, where demographic 
pressures put additional strains on projects such as the resuscitation of national 
languages). In this context, the issues of troop withdrawals and border restoration took 
on emotional significance beyond their immediate practical implications. Meanwhile, 
Russians both within and outside the Baltic states were experiencing the shock of 
redefinition, from being “locals” to being “occupiers.” Indignation on the part of 
Russian national-patriots at Baltic “ingratitude” for liberation from Nazi control and 
infrastructure laid down during the Soviet period merged with indignation from Russian 
reformers over Baltic “ingratitude” for Russian support during the Baltic struggle for
90 TASS, 24 October 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-208, 28 October 1992: 70). Following the failure of the coup,
the RSFSR claimed for itself the right to establish diplomatic relations in parallel with the all-Union 
Foreign Ministry.
91 For example, Estonian parliamentary speaker Arnold Rüütel, visiting Moscow the day after the CIS
was formed, told Yeltsin that Estonia wanted to correct “to a certain extent” its borders with Russia, as 
there was “no logic at all” in the borders established by the Soviet government— although he felt the 
problem should be addressed through negotiations (TASS, 9 December 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-237, 10 
December 1991: 53); Estonian Radio, 9 December 1991 (SWB, 12 December 1991: A2/4)).
92 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 April 1992: 1.
93 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 July 1992: 7.
94 Rossiskaya Gazeta, 11 January 1992: 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-009, 14 January 1992: 52).
95 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 April 1992: 9.
96 See Forced Migration Projects 1997; Haas 1996; Hanson 1993; Krickus 1993a; Ott, Kirch and Kirch
1996; Volkan 1997.
97 Volkan 1997: 146.
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independence.98 In this atmosphere, the prospective humiliation of a hasty withdrawal 
of “occupying” troops or of ceding territory made such steps even less palatable to 
Russian representatives.
Attempts to address questions bilaterally
Both sides initially attempted to deal with these issues at the bilateral level. Both sides 
moved quickly to signal good will through high-level visits. Kozyrev made a quick trip 
to Estonia, the first former Soviet republic that he visited after the collapse of the Union, 
on 14 January 1992. 99 Lithuanian president Vytautas Landsbergis met with Yeltsin in 
Moscow on 17 January 1992, with the two sides announcing imminent bilateral talks on 
troop withdrawals.100 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev 
further visited all three Baltic states in May, professing the Russian government’s desire 
for good relations with all three states.101
Unsurprisingly, the issue of a troop withdrawal rapidly became the top item on the two 
sides’ agenda. Talks addressing the issue did not start up as quickly after the collapse of 
the USSR as the Baltic leaderships would have liked, due to confusion about how the 
newly formed CIS intended to deal with jurisdictional issues. At a Baltic Council 
meeting on 5 January 1992, the Baltic presidents issued a joint appeal to the now- 
independent former Soviet republics to recall their citizens serving in the forces 
stationed in the Baltic states. The appeal stated that “the former USSR’s armed forces 
are still illegally located on the territory of the independent states of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, regardless of the repeated demands of the Baltic States to withdraw these 
troops from their territories. This situation cannot be combined with international rights; 
it is a violation of the state sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and does not 
promote the strengthening of our confidence in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States.”'03 Finally, with little progress occurring on the formation of a CIS joint 
command structure, on 28 January the Russian government declared legal authority over 
all former Soviet forces deployed outside the CIS. Within a fortnight of the Russian 
government’s assumption of jurisdiction over former Soviet forces, a Russian 
delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai visited all three Baltic states, 
signing communiques with Latvia and Lithuania stating that withdrawals would begin 
by March and February respectively; withdrawals were already underway from 
Estonia.104
98As State Secretary Gennadiy Burbulis told researchers, “We marched arm in arm with [Baltic leaders] to 
ensure that their independence would be peacefully attained, and then as soon as they were 
independent they became nationalists and began discriminating against the Russian-speaking 
population. They betrayed their friends.” Similar sentiments were expressed by parliamentarians 
Sergei Stankevich, Evgeniy Ambartsumov and others (Guroff and Guroff 1994: 93). On the subject of 
“ingratitude” for liberation from Nazi control, Vamik Volkan provides a fascinating description of a 
meeting, at which he was an observer, between Latvian officials and Russian diplomats in 1993. 
During heated exchanges, a Latvian official— a key figure in drafting the country’s new citizenship 
laws— married to a Russian asserted that his children were pure Latvian, that they were not 
“contaminated” by his wife’s Russian blood; the first secretary of the Russian Embassy, who had 
expressed pride at the Soviet Union’s role in defeating the Nazis, ended up shouting at him “I saved 
you!” (Volkan 1997: 146-147)
99 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 January 1992: 2.
100 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 January 1992: 1.
101 The Baltic Independent, 8-14 May 1992: 1.
102 Baltfax, 17 March 1992 (FB1S-SOV-92-052, 17 March 1992: 13); The Baltic Independent, 20-26 
March 1992: 1.
103 The Baltic Independent, 9-15 January 1992: 1.
104 The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 1-2.
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By mid-1992, however, it was evident that withdrawal negotiations were unlikely to be 
completed soon. Although Russian politicians insisted that a withdrawal was inevitable, 
the Russian side soon became adamant that a withdrawal could not take place 
immediately. In late December 1991, Yeltsin had told the press in Rome that due to the 
housing crisis provoked by the need to repatriate troops from Eastern Europe as well as 
the Baltic states, a withdrawal could take up to three years, the same time allotted to the 
troop withdrawal from Germany.105 During his trip to Estonia in January, Kozyrev had 
said that a withdrawal would be gradual and would take two to three years, although he 
emphasized that Russia would not “purposefully delay” the withdrawal.106 Shakhrai, 
when asked during his visit if the Russian army would be gone from Estonia by 1994, 
had responded “Yes, I am convinced of that, and I hope it could happen even sooner.”107 
But the commander of the North West Group of Forces, Colonel-General Valeriy 
Mironov, had told reporters before Shakhrai’s visit that “ [w]e have already encountered 
problems generated by the rashness with which troops were moved out of East 
European countries. We cannot allow a situation where officers and men live in tents in 
the open field.” By a few weeks later Shakhrai had qualified his estimates, saying that 
“ft]he Russian delegation does not wish to repeat the lamentable experience the Soviet 
Union had with Hungary, Czechoslovakia,. Germany, and Poland.” 109 Indeed, some 
Russian representatives began to suggest that a withdrawal could not begin until former 
Soviet troops had left Germany and Poland in 1994.110 By mid-1992, although Yeltsin 
had offered substantial withdrawals in 1992 and 1993, the best final withdrawal dates 
proposed by the Russian side were 1997 for Estonia and 1999 for Latvia.* 111 Nor were 
the Russians the only ones complicating negotiations: for example, Russian-Estonian 
talks were called to temporary halt by Estonian side in late May in protest over a 
Russian non-paper describing Estonia as part of the “near abroad” and the two sides’ 
inability to agree on legal point of departure (the 1920 treaty or the Estonian declaration 
of independence of 20 August 1991).112 In August, however, Kozyrev at a meeting with 
Baltic foreign ministers in Moscow produced a proposal to withdraw forces by 1994. 
The proposal, however, came with a list of nine conditions; unsurprisingly, Baltic 
representatives rejected them indignantly.113
Meanwhile, the Russian side similarly was trying to achieve bilateral accord on the legal 
status of Baltic Russophones. Faced with crises not only in the Baltic region but also in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Russian government had moved to assume a high 
level of responsibility for the fate of Russophones even before the collapse of the 
USSR. At the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies convened after the August 1991 
coup attempt, Yeltsin told the assembled delegates that while the Union structure as a 
whole needed to provide strict guarantees of human rights throughout the whole 
territory of the country, “Russia affirms adherence to its contractual obligations in this
105 TASS, 21 December 1991 (SWB, 23 December 1991: Al/3).
106 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 January 1992: 2.
10' The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 2.
108 TASS, 4 February 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-024, 5 February 1992: 18).
I1Q Russian Television Network, 26 February 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-041,2 March 1992: 37-38).
110 Girnius 1992a: 29.
111 Bungs 1992a: 26; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 May 1992: 3; Radio Rossii 28 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92- 
105, 1 June 1992: 17).
1,2 Kionka 1992b.
113 Bungs 1992a: 27. The conditions included the granting o f legal status to troops so as to ensure their 
normal functioning during the transition period; dropping compensation claims; guarantees of social 
security and civil rights for Soviet officers who had retired in the Baltic states and their families; 
alteration of laws infringing on the political and economic rights of Russophones; and dropping 
territorial claims.
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matter and will defend the interests of the Russian people beyond the borders of the 
republic.”114 Now, during his February 1992 visit, Kozyrev passed to the Estonian side 
draft treaties on the defense of national minorities, citizenship, legal assistance, and 
consular issues worked out in accordance with the Russian-Estonian interstate treaty of 
January 1991.115 He also met with Russophone representatives, promising that Russia 
would defend their rights.116 At the April 1992 round of Latvian-Russian troop 
withdrawal talks, the two sides agreed to form a subgroup to discuss humanitarian 
issues; a similar move was proposed by Russian side during talks with Lithuanian 
representatives in May.117 Meanwhile, Shelov-Kovedyayev assured Baltic governments 
during his visit in May that Russia would act “according to international norms” in its 
efforts to defend the interests of local Russophones.118
In pursuing their aims, both sides resorted to pressure tactics. Baltic governments 
employed, or profited from, three basic strategies. The first was logistical pressure. For 
instance, the Latvian government in January 1992 banned all military maneuvers by 
former Soviet troops on Latvian soil and made troop movements subject to 
parliamentary approval.119 The Estonian government, blaming Russian non-delivery of 
flour and cereals, announced in January 1992 that it would stop provisioning former 
Soviet troops. Similarly, the Tallinn city council passed a resolution, effective 10 July 
1992, which declared the city of Tallinn off-limits to recruits and junior officers of 
Russian border guard and army units, as well as to military transports between 4 PM 
and 9 AM. “ Krasnaya Zvezda, the military newspaper, reported in August 1992 that 
Latvia had banned Russian troops from using three training grounds and that in 
Lithuania servicemen were having difficulty getting food, as they could not use local 
stores. “What is the point,” the reporter asked, “of the decision...instructing Russian 
servicemen not to move outside their unit except in groups of at least ten men 
accompanied by an officer who has appropriate permission from the Estonian 
administration?” Similar bans were also in place on vehicular and ship movement in all 
three states.122
The second Baltic pressure tactic was demonstrations of the strength of domestic public 
opinion. In the Latvian and Estonian cases, these took the primary form of 
parliamentary or other public resolutions; for example, the Latvian parliament adopted a 
resolution in January 1992 denouncing as illegal the 1940 annexation.123 Meanwhile, in 
Lithuania, a public referendum on the desirability of a troop withdrawal was held on 14 
June 1992. The referendum drew a 76% voter turnout; of these, 90.8% agreed with the 
necessity for a complete and unconditional withdrawal by the end of 1992, as well as for 
compensation for damages accumulated since 1940.124
114 Moscow Central Television, 3 September 1991 (SWB, 5 September 1991: Cl/4). Yeltsin’s next 
sentence after this statement, however, was: “Russia will build relations with sovereign states on 
foundations of equality, good neighborliness, mutual benefit, and non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs.”
1,5 Izvestiya, 2 April 1992: 5.
116 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 January 1992: 2.
117 Bungs 1992a: 24; Bungs 1993: 51; Girnius 1992a: 31.
118 The Baltic Independent, 8-14 May 1992: 1.
119 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 January 1992: 5.
120 “Obviously,” the Estonian official commented, “Russia does not want to feed its soldiers”(77?e Baltic 
Independent, 9-15 January 1992: 1).
121 Estonian Review, 29 June-5 July 1992, http://www.vm.ee/ring/1992/92er2905.06e
122 Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 August 1992: 1, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-153, 7 August 1992: 17).
1-3 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 April 1992: 1, 9.
124 Girnius 1992a: 32; The Baltic Independent, 19-25 June 1992: 3; Girnius 1992b: 2.
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The third pressure tactic, which cropped up most frequently in Estonia and which did 
not always involve direct government action, was armed attacks on military 
installations. Various reports indicated that attacks against installations and servicemen 
took place across the first half of 1992. One report noted that between May and July, ten 
cases of “unlawful action against Russian servicemen;” another calculated that between 
in the two months to 14 August 1992, nine incidents took place involving an exchange 
of fire between Russian and Estonia soldiers, and there were four more “near misses.”125 
A further story reported more than forty armed attacks on military subunits between 
June and August, including the seizure of a military airfield.126 These exchanges 
frequently involved not regular Estonian military forces, but members of volunteer 
paramilitary groupings. For example, on 5 July 1992, the all-volunteer “Kaitseliit” 
paramilitary division, a civil militia division of the Defense Ministry, carried out an 
attack on military installation in village of Ritsi and stole military vehicles; on 27 July 
they attacked the Baltic fleet compound, resulting in the capture of 24 Estonians.127 An 
Estonian commission investigating the latter episode found all responsibility on Russian 
side, implying that latter should issue an official apology. As the state minister heading 
the commission wrote, the “[ljegally unfounded engagement of Russian troops in the 
capital of a sovereign state ought to be qualified as a disregard of the sovereignty of 
Estonia and a blatant violation of international law.” 128 While attacks on installations 
were averted in Latvia and Lithuania, tensions were still high; for example, Lithuanian 
soldiers in May 1992 shot out the tires of Russian military vehicles that failed to stop
I 9 Qfor checkpoints.
Unsurprisingly, these attacks provoked a firm response from the Russian government 
Kozyrev told reporters in July that “[s]o far we are acting in a civilized fashion [in 
response to attacks on military installations in the Baltic states]. However, we may be 
compelled to use force...This would be pure self-defense and we could not be accused 
of anything.” 150 After the attack on the Baltic fleet compound, an Estonian Deputy 
Foreign Minister conveyed the Estonian government’s regret to the Russian embassy in 
Tallinn, saying that that the actions, and the Estonian Defense Forces’ participation in 
them, were recognized by the Estonian government as mistakes. On 10 August the 
Estonian government ordered that any armed actions by defense forces, including civil 
militia units, be coordinated with the Defense Forces General Headquarters and occur 
only by order of the government. Prime Minister Tiit Vahi told the media that armed 
attacks not sanctioned by the Defense Forces or government would be considered 
“provocative acts,” and noted that “Estonia will only be able to count on confidence in 
military issues on the part of other countries if its own armed forces are under 
control.” 133
125 Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 July 1992: 1; Kionka 1992c: 34.
126 Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 August 1992: 1,3 (FB1S-SOV-92-153, 7 August 1992: 17).
127 Kionka 1992c: 34. The Estonians were released after negotiations, but not before the Russians 
stripped them and gave them a beating (Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 July 1992: 1; Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
29 July 1992: 1 (Joint Publications Research Service, Soviet Union/Central Eurasia (henceforth JPRS 
USR) JPRS-USR-92-100, 7 August 1992: 9)).
128 Baltfax 10 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-155, 1 1 August 1992: 69).
129 Girnius 1992a: 32.
130 However, he also argued for the need to come to some agreement with Baltic governments over the 
legal status of forces stationed in the Baltic states, acknowledging that as long as they had no legal 
status, they could enjoy no legal protection (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9 June 1992: 3 (FBIS-SOV-92- 
111,9 June 1992: 12).
131 Komsomolskaya Pravda, 29 July 1992: 1 (JPRS-USR-92-100, 7 August 1992: 9).
132 Baltfax, 10 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-155, 11 August 1992: 70).
133 Baltfax, 12 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-157, 13 August 1992: 72).
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Meanwhile, the Russian side was not above a little arm-twisting of its own, although the 
Russian Foreign Ministry was able to let the far more nationalist Supreme Soviet do 
much of the dirty work. That body issued on a string of statements on Baltic issues, 
culminating in July 1992 with a statement on the rights of Russians in the Baltic; on the 
same day, legislators passed a resolution calling on Russian government to consider the 
settlement of citizenship issues to be its first task in negotiations and to prepare to 
impose temporary economic sanctions against Estonia if it continued to practice “brutal 
violations of human rights against the Russian-speaking population.5,1 4 They further 
appealed to the United Nations to take up the issue, and called for the legislature’s 
foreign affairs committee to draft by 20 September an additional resolution suspending 
the January 1991 Russian-Estonian interstate treaty.135 The Foreign Ministry and the 
Russian government successfully fought against or stalled these harsh measures, 
permitting Kozyrev and Yeltsin to lay claim to the moderate position while profiting 
from the threats of others.
But the Russian side had another big card up its sleeve: the possibility of linking 
citizenship issues to a troop withdrawal. Russian reformers consistently baulked at the 
idea of sending troops to intervene on the behalf of Russians living outside the Russian 
Federation. Kozyrev had argued in April that “[w]hen it comes to defending Russians’ 
rights, yes, we will defend them...but not sending groups of armed people. Any 
violation of international law will rebound against the Russians there, and in most cases 
this simply spells defeat.”136 However, the government was coming under substantial 
pressure, and not just from the “red-brown” opposition communist and national- 
patriotic forces, to help Russians outside the Russian Federation. State Counselor Sergei 
Stankevich, for instance, argued that Kozyrev was setting up a simplistic opposition of 
“occupying the territory of a republic and imposing a grim regime of terror” to “solving 
everything in a civilized manner,” while refusing to discuss measures such as unilateral 
sanctions. “It is 18 months,” he wrote, “since Russia signed treaties with Estonia and 
Latvia in which, in particular, the sides guaranteed civic equality of all ethnic groups. 
The Latvian and Estonian parliaments grossly violated these treaties...But Russia has 
not hitherto insisted on the inclusion of this item on the agenda for bilateral talks with 
the Baltic republics’ delegations. Where do ‘civilized methods’ take priority here? How 
many years are we going to spend trying to get people to heed us and take account of 
our pain?” Meanwhile, members of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s right-wing Liberal 
Democratic Russian Democratic Party's political council were disseminating statements 
demanding that the RF government apply “decisive and effective measures” in
I T O  ,
connection with Baltic “infringements upon legitimate human rights.” Kozyrev in 
April had warned that the Russian government would not be above “strong-arm 
methods” if necessary; and indeed, low-profile efforts to establish the legitimacy of 
linkage began to emerge in Russian-Baltic talks. 139 In August 1992, however, the 
Russian political leadership began to talk openly about linking withdrawal timetable to 
Baltic laws on citizenship and willingness to grant residence permits to immigrants.140
134 Rossiskaya Gazeta, 24 July 1992: 2 (JPRS-USR-92-101, 10 August 1992: 2).
135 Rossiskaya Gazeta, 24 July 1992: 2 (JPRS-USR-92-101, 10 August 1992: 3); Kionka 1992c: 36.
136 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 April 1992: 1,3 (FBIS-SOV-92-064, 2 April 1992: 20). Yeltsin had similarly 
argued to Russian servicemen during the events of January 1991 that violence in the Baltic republics 
would endanger the position of local Russians (Riga Domestic Service, 13 January (SWB, 15 January 
1991: 19).
137 Izvestiya, 8 July 1992: 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-133, 10 July 1992: 36).
138 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 August 1992: 2 (JPRS-USR-92-104, 15 August 1992: 2).
139 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 April 1992: 1,3 (FBIS-SOV-92-064, 2 April 1992: 20); Bungs 1992a: 24.
140 Lange 1994: 242.
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Internationalization
But both sides had a further potential source of pressure, into which both sought to tap: 
both sides turned rapidly to the international community for sympathy and support for 
their positions. The Baltic governments were much quicker off the mark and more 
explicit about what they were doing.141 This was partly due to the fact that Balts already 
had a history, both of the strategy of internationalization and with the institutions in 
question. For example, during the Council of Europe parliamentary delegation visit in 
February 1991, Baltic governments stressed their determination to “internationalize” the 
Baltic issue, hoping that the outside world would give practical recognition of the 
republics’ independence.142 At a Baltic hearing of the Parliamentary Assembly in 
Helsinki in June 1991, Baltic representatives had stressed that the Baltic issue was “an 
international question.” Baltic determination to internationalize their approach to 
relations with Russia appears to have solidified at a Baltic Council meeting of March 
1992, at which representatives of the three countries issued their stiffest and broadest- 
ranging criticism of the continued presence of troops and of the Russian government’s 
approach to the problem to date.143 But it did not take long for the Russian government 
to take up the strategy as well. Galina Starovoyteva, Yeltsin’s adviser on interethnic 
affairs, said in May 1992: “We are bringing more pressure on the leaders of republics 
where the rights of Russians are being infringed on through international 
organizations—the CSCE, the European Parliament, and others.”144 And Kozyrev told 
the press a few days later that “all European countries and institutions” should be 
engaged in the process of finding solutions for the problem of “mass and systemic 
violation of human rights” in Latvia and Estonia.I4:>
“Internationalization” took many forms. First, both sides, but particularly the Baltic 
governments, approached individual Western governments for support for their 
positions. These appeals were particularly aimed at neighbors and at leading states such 
as the United States and Great Britain; for example, in September 1991, Baltic leaders 
had urged Bush to pressure the USSR into pulling its troops out of the Baltic states.146 
Second, both sides appealed to groups of powerful states or aid donors, such as the 
Group of 7 (G-7) or a 64-country conference on aid to the former Soviet Union held in 
Lisbon in May 1992.147 Prior to the July 1992 G-7 meeting in Munich at which aid to 
Russia was to be discussed, the Baltic Council issued an appeal for pressure for a troop 
withdrawal, requesting that the G-7 make economic aid directly dependent on “the plan 
and graphs of the Army's withdrawal from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia submitted by 
the Russian Federation and coordinated with the Baltic states and on real steps towards 
unconditionally withdrawing the entire army.” They further proposed that the G-7 
allocate funds to finance the troop withdrawal.148 Third, particularly the Baltic states 
appealed to groups of neighbor states, including the Nordic Council and the Baltic 
Assembly. Fourth, both sides approached international institutions outside the European
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143 The Baltic Independent, 20-16 March 1992: 1.
144 “But,” she noted, “it should not be forgotten that Russia's capabilities are restricted by international 
legal norms and the sovereignty of states” (Smena, 6 May 1992: 1 (JPRS-USR-92-065, 3 June 1992: 
16).
145 Radio Mayak, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 16).
146 The Baltic Independent, 20-26 September 1991: 7.
147 The Baltic Independent, 29 May-4 June 1992: 1,3.
148 Radio Vilnius, 27 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-126, 30 June 1992: 9).
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context, such as the United Nations. For instance, the three Baltic delegations to the 
United Nations requested that a point entitled “The complete withdrawal of foreign 
armed forces from the territory of the Baltic states” be included on the agenda of the UN 
General Assembly session in September 1992; leaders of all three Baltic states 
addressed the session, calling for a troop withdrawal and, in the case of Latvian 
President Anatolijs Gorbunovs, voluntary repatriation of ethnic Russians from the Baltic 
to Russia.149 (In this arena, Baltic representatives for the most part had access only to 
the General Assembly; but Russian representatives were able to address the Security 
Council as well.1' 0) Fifth, political actors within and outside of government, particularly 
in the Baltic states, appealed to the international academic and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) community for support. For instance, the Estonian Greens asked 
Greenpeace and other international environmental organizations to join them in 
protesting the continued presence and closed status of Paldiski naval base.151
Finally, Baltic and Russian representatives approached three European institutions: the 
CSCE; the Council of Europe; and NATO. 52 As early as January 1992, Estonian 
Foreign Minster Lennart Meri complained to the Prague meeting of CSCE foreign 
ministers that renaming the Baltic Military District to the Northwest Group of Forces 
was the only change that had occurred in the status of Soviet forces since the restoration 
of Baltic independence and called for CSCE monitors to oversee a withdrawal.1' 3 These 
became the most persistent and comprehensive campaigns for help. Baltic and Russian 
representatives increasingly raised issues of concern; by mid-1992, they were speaking 
up at virtually every session of these three institutions. At the CSCE, one or both sides 
raised issues at the Councils of Foreign Ministers in March 1992; 154 the preparatory 
meeting in March 1992 for the July Helsinki CSCE heads of state and government 
summit;155 follow-up meetings between March and July 1992; 136 Committee of Senior 
Officials (CSO) meetings in Helsinki in early and mid-May 1992; 137 and the summit in 
July.158 At the Council of Europe, Baltic and Russian representatives spoke at the 
February and May sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) and at the PACE Political Commission.139 At NATO, Baltic and Russian 
delegates spoke at a NATO conferences on security in the Baltic states in December 
1991-January 1992 and April 1992 and at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) meeting in June 1992.160 In many cases, Baltic or Russian representatives 
issued appeals to all these organizations at once. For instance, after Yeltsin announced a 
suspension of troop withdrawals on 29 October 1992, Baltic leaders at a meeting of the
149 Izvestiya, 21 August 1992: 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-165, 25 August 1992: 5); The Baltic Independent, 2-8 
October 1992: 3
150 Russian Television Network, 13 February 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-030, 13 February 1992: 64).
151 The Baltic Independent, 22-28 May 1992: 3.
132 As noted earlier, the CSCE became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 
December 1994 and the NACC became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in July 1997.
153 The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 2.
154 The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 2; Statement, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, 
opening session, CSCE Ministerial meeting, Helsinki, 24 March 1992.
155 Statement to the Helsinki Preparatory Meeting, 24 March 1992.
156 Statement, Russian delegation member I. Shichanina, meeting of Working Group Three, Helsinki 
Follow-up Meeting, Helsinki 9 April 1992.
157 10th CSO Meeting, Helsinki, 29 April-1 May 1992 (10CSO/J); The Baltic Independent, 22-28 May 
1992:3.
158 See, for instance, address by Latvian Supreme Council Chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs, CSCE Summit 
Meeting, Helsinki, 9 July 1992.
159 PACE ORD, 6 February 1992, 5 May 1992; ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FB1S-SOV-92-090, 8 May 
1992: 16).
160 The Baltic Independent, 27 December 1991-8 January 1992: 1; The Baltic Independent, 1-7 May 1992: 
3.
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Baltic Council appealed to the Council of Europe, the European Community, the CSCE, 
the UN Secretary General, and NATO for support.161
In these appeals, Baltic delegations showed themselves better organized and better 
coordinated, possibly a legacy of cooperation against the Soviet leadership. Baltic 
speakers— for instance, the three chairmen of the three Baltic legislatures in their 
presentations to the July 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting— showed a strong 
consistency of themes, whether or not their statements had been formally 
coordinated. The Baltic delegations were also adept at proposing coordinated 
language, for instance for the Declaration to be issued at the Helsinki Summit Meeting 
of the CSCE in July 1992.163 Baltic delegations to the PACE held trilateral meetings to 
further cooperation both at the PACE and in Political Affairs Committee meetings.164 
Russian delegations similarly sometimes showed coordination in themes, although 
frequently among delegates of roughly similar political persuasions.16' However, 
Russian delegations often seemed to have failed to coordinate issues among themselves, 
let alone with other delegations; for example, the Russian delegation to the PACE 
frequently showed itself divided on the issue of Baltic membership. 66
Many of these appeals, of course, were picked up by the press. As Chapter Three will 
discuss in further detail, Baltic governments in particular were sensitive to the need to 
play to an international public audience; and major meetings, which were of more likely 
to attract media attention, were seen as prime venues for appeals. For example, Baltic 
representatives considered the July 1992 Helsinki Summit Meeting of heads of state and 
governments, which was supposed to mark the final end of the Cold War, as a 
particularly good venue to try to internationalize the issue of a troop withdrawal. (In 
fact, Baltic and Russian diplomats engaged in nearly four months of negotiations and 
lobbying over the language of the Final Declaration, which was widely distributed to the 
press. ) Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to discuss these efforts as purely media- 
driven, as appeals emerged as persistently in camera as they did in public venues. At the 
public meeting of the Helsinki preparatory meeting in March 1992, for instance, Latvian 
Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans spoke of the need to draw international attention to the 
issue of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states.169 But meanwhile, in 
closed sessions of working groups, Baltic delegations were arguing that “only through 
an internationalized discussion of this issue can a rational and reasonable solution [to 
the troop withdrawal issue] be found.”
161 Some Baltic diplomats opined that these sweeping statements were not particularly effective. “These 
appeals go straight into the recipients’ filing cabinets,” one reportedly said, adding that “it would be 
more useful in the foreign ministers would communicate on the phone more regularly” (The Baltic 
Independent, 13-19 November 1992: 3).
16“ Address, Latvian Supreme Council Chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs, 9 July 1992; Address, Estonian 
Supreme Council Chairman Arnold Rüütel, 9 July 1992; Statement, Lithuanian Supreme Council 
President Vytautas Landsbergis, 10 July 1992.
163 Proposed text, paragraph 15, Helsinki Summit Meeting declarations, delegations of Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia, 7 May 1992.
164 Radio Riga 18 June 1993 (FBIS- SOV-93-119, 23 June 1993: 1).
165 See, for example, similar emphasis by Russian delegates to the Council o f Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly Ivan Rybkin and Sergei Baburin on the dangers of applying “double standards” for 
membership (PACE ORD , 5 October 1992: 452; PACE ORD, 6 October 1992: 499).
166 BNS, 18 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-094, 18 May 1993: 1); The Baltic Independent, 21-27 May 1993: 
1.
167Interfax, 5 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-110, 8 June 1992: 9).
168 The Baltic Independent, 10-16 July 1992: 1,6.
lbQ Janis Jurkans, statement at Helsinki Preparatory Meeting, 24 March 1992.
170 Estonian delegation statement to the opening session of Working Group II, Helsinki Follow-up 
Meeting, Helsinki, 31 March 1992.
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What were they asking for?
Both sides appealed for practical support, particularly from the CSCE, the organization 
to which all sides already belonged. Baltic representatives called for three specific 
measures. The first, was the involvement of CSCE representatives in Russian-Baltic 
bilateral talks. The second was the deployment of CSCE observers to monitor the troop 
withdrawal, which was first raised at the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers in January 
1992.171 The third was the proposal, raised for instance at the CSCE Committee of 
Senior Officials meeting in Helsinki in May 1992, that the CSCE take the withdrawal of 
troops under its control. (The Estonian government requested that the CSCE appoint 
a special representative to mediate juridical debate over the implementation of the 1920 
treaty.173) Meanwhile, the Russian side supported existing proposals for the creation of a 
High Commissioner on National Minorities, a post that Kozyrev had also suggested 
might be created within the Baltic Council.174 The Russian side also called in early 1992 
for the CSCE’s Office on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to send a mission 
of experts to Estonia. As regulations stood, such missions required an invitation from 
the country they were to visit; however, Kozyrev told the CSCE meeting of foreign 
ministers in March 1992 that as far as he was concerned, “[ijssues relating to human 
rights and, accordingly, to national minority rights should not...be limited by the 
principle of non-interference. We support the consensus-minus-one formula.” On 
back-to-back visits to NATO headquarters in May 1992, both Russian State Secretary 
Gennadiy Burbulis and the three Baltic foreign ministers also made pleas for NATO 
assistance: Burbulis told the press that Russia sought NATO’s financial and technical 
aid in organizing the Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic states, while Baltic 
foreign ministers appealed for NATO oversight of the withdrawal and for the alliance to
1 77take a tougher stance on the issue.
Both sides, but particularly the Russian side, were particularly interested in securing 
financial assistance for a withdrawal; Russian negotiators had indeed intimated that 
assistance with housing for returning troops might hasten a withdrawal.178 While 
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev indicated in May 1992 that an optimal time for 
a pullout to begin would be late 1994, after all troops had been withdrawn from Poland 
and Germany, he suggested that “[t]he withdrawal could be accelerated only if the 
Baltic states give us financial assistance or practical assistance in building houses and 
barracks.”179 Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi similarly suggested that a proposed 
withdrawal period of 1995-2000 could be speeded up “if these countries were to agree 
to reciprocal actions (that is, we leave garrison installations and housing facilities in the 
Baltic countries, and the Baltic countries build garrison installations and housing
171 The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 2.
I7~ The Baltic Independent, 22-28 May 1992: 3. For instance, head o f the Lithuanian delegation 
Valdemaras Katkus rather optimistically proposed that a timetable, to be laid down by the Baltic 
states, should be included in the final document of the July CSCE heads of state and government 
summit, with Russia required to follow it “unconditionally” (Baltfax, 22 June 1992 (FB1S-SOV-92- 
122, 24 June 1992: 85); Baltfax, 24 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-124, 26 June 1992: 20).
173 The Baltic Independent, 26 February-4 March 1993: 3.
174 Statement, opening session, CSCE Ministerial meeting, Helsinki, 24 March 1992.
175 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3. The mission was eventually sent in December 1992.
176 Statement, opening session, CSCE Ministerial meeting, Helsinki, 24 March 1992.
177 Russian Television Network 8 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-091, 11 May 1992: 13); The Baltic 
Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3.
178 At a NATO-sponsored conference on stability in the Baltic region held in Tallinn in October 1992, the 
Russian delegation said that housing was required for 34,211 officers, with an estimated cost of over 
47 billion rubles {The Baltic Independent, 30 October-5 November 1992: 14).
179 Radio Moscow, 29 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992: 17).
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facilities in Russia for the troops being withdrawn) . ” 180 This was a possibility that some 
Baltic figures, including Estonian parliamentary speaker Arnold Rüütel and deputy 
chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Ceslovas Stankevicius, had already considered, 
although they stressed that Baltic support would be dependent on receiving financial aid 
from Western capitals. 181 All stressed, like Stankevicius, that Baltic governments did 
not feel that they had “moral obligations to help solve social problems of the departing 
military.” 182 But at the donor conference in May, for instance, Lithuanian Prime 
Minister Gediminas Vagnorius suggested that the West provide aid to the Baltics to 
rehouse the troops in Russia, which he suggested would be “one of the most effective 
ways” of speeding up the departure. Estonian and Latvian delegates supported the idea 
as well, although Latvian representatives suggested their support could depend on 
Latvian enterprises winning the construction contracts. Vagnorius further noted that the 
Baltic populations would find it difficult to understand other aid being given to Russia 
unless this aid was directly linked to a withdrawal. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
told the conference that an international program under CSCE auspices for military-civil 
conversion would also help to speed the troops’ return to Russian soil.
To secure such practical support, however, Russian and Baltic representatives had first 
to win the sympathy of Western audiences. And indeed, confirmation of sympathy, in 
the simple form of condemnation of their opponents, was a major Baltic and Russian 
goal in itself. As much as they sought practical support, Russian and Baltic 
representatives sought the inclusion of their concerns, in clear and condemnatory 
language, on the list of concerns of European organizations, as exemplified by (for 
instance) communiques or documents emerging from important meetings. But on what 
grounds was such condemnation to be based?
180 Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 May 1992: 1,2 (FBIS-SOV-92-107, 3 June 1992: 40).
181 TASS, 9 December 1991 (FB1S-SOV-91-237, 10 December 1991: 53).
I8“ The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 1. As Velio Saatpalu, chairman of the Estonian 
parliament’s foreign affairs committee, complained: “We can’t help them. Why should we? It’s their 
problem. In 1940 when they came in they found places to stay in one day” (The Baltic Independent, 
30 October-5 November 1992: 14).
183 The Baltic Independent, 29 May-4 June 1992: 3.
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Chapter Three: Identity Diplomacy, Part One
As the previous chapter has indicated, Baltic and Russian diplomats had specific, 
practical causes for which they wanted international, and particularly Western, support; 
furthermore, they wished to undercut support for the causes of their opponents. Support 
in the form of practical assistance was of course welcome. It is the argument of this 
chapter, however, that just as importantly, Baltic and Russian representatives sought 
condemnation of their opponents by international audiences, in particular Western 
governments and European international organizations.
There are many ways to invoke condemnation of an opponent’s behavior. One way is to 
invoke legal norms of behavior against which one’s opponent can be said to transgress. 
And indeed, at the most basic level, Russian and Baltic representatives based their 
arguments for the unholy quality of their opponents’ actions, and the virtue of their own 
cause, on legal arguments. Both Baltic and Russian representatives argued to European 
audiences that their opposite numbers’ actions violated international law or were in 
breach of commitments made to the European organizations in which both sides held 
membership. Thus, at the 13 April 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting; Russian 
representatives issued a statement asserting that Estonian citizenship legislation 
contradicted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the 
Vienna Concluding Document, the Charter of Paris, and Chapter 4 of the Copenhagen 
meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE.1 A Russian 
memorandum circulated at the May 1992 session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) similarly denounced Baltic citizenship policies as breaching 
CSCE commitments.2 In late 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin in a letter to United 
Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali further accused Latvian and Estonian 
policy of violating the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Pact on Civil and Political Rights, the Conventions on Employment Policy and 
Discrimination in Labour and Employment, and the Declaration of Social Progress and 
Development. 3 Meanwhile, Baltic representatives had consistently stressed the illegal 
nature of the presence of Soviet troops on Baltic soil, a theme that was rapidly renewed 
after the collapse of the USSR and the transfer of former Soviet troops to Russian 
control.4 Indeed, Baltic statements stressed that the injunction against the unwanted 
presence of foreign troops violated by continued Russian deployments was neither 
obscure nor precious, but was among the most basic principles of international law.5
But those seeking condemnation of their opponents often will also evoke less formal, 
social norms of behavior, for instance characterizing their opponent’s behavior as 
“threatening.” In these cases, actors will often broaden their claims to include 
assessments of an opponent’s nature or character. This is because (as for example 
Thomas Risse-Kappen’s work on the democratic peace has observed) a conception of 
the basic nature or character of interlocutors plays a fundamental role in how actors
Statement, “On discriminatory measures in Estonia against the Russian-speaking population,” 
delegation of the Russian Federation, Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, Helsinki, 13 April 1992.
2 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3.
3 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 23-24, 15-31 December 1992: 56 (JPRS-USR-93-004-L, 24 March 1993: 1).
4 See, for example, the statement by the Baltic Council of 5 January 1992. The Baltic Independent, 9-15
January 1992: 1.
5 Statement, Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council Anatolijs Gorbunovs, CSCE summit meeting,
Helsinki, 10 July 1992.
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assess their interlocutors’ material attributes or behavior: a democratic state in 
possession of nuclear weapons, for instance, is not perceived by other democratic states 
as being as threatening as a non-democratic nuclear state.6 Consequently, at the same 
time as—indeed, often in the process of—making legal claims, Russian and Baltic 
representatives were also in the process of making broader claims about their 
opponents, and about themselves. At the most abstract level, one might say that they 
were attempting to achieve a degree of international consensus on the fundamental 
natures—the identities, so to speak—not just of their states, but of those of their 
opponents. In so doing, they sought to win their audiences over not only to their 
explanations of the present, but also to their predictions of the future.
This chapter, and the next, attempt not only to describe Baltic and Russian rhetorical 
campaigns of the early 1990s, but also to place this behavior within the spectrum of 
diplomatic practice. This chapter opens with a brief overview of the four major subjects 
of diplomatic negotiation: action, rules, values, and identities. It goes on to discuss 
Baltic and Russian efforts to characterize each other’s practices and natures. It argues 
that though the two sides hurled different epithets, the purpose of both sides was the 
same: to discredit their opponents as threatening, not just to their neighbors but to 
Europe itself. Chapter Four continues the discussion, outlining not only the progress of 
the debates—and of the issues driving them—but also the emotional implications for 
diplomats of participation in these battles over representation.
Diplomatic functions
There are as many definitions of the functions of diplomacy as there are diplomats and 
scholars. At a minimum, most practitioners and scholars cite the tasks outlined in the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, which include representing the 
sending state in the receiving state; protecting in the receiving state the interests of the 
sending state and of its nationals, within the limits given by international law; 
negotiating with the Government of the receiving state; ascertaining by all lawful means 
conditions and developments in the receiving state, and reporting thereon to the 
Government of the sending state; promoting friendly relations between the sending state 
and the receiving state, and developing their economic, scientific, and cultural 
relations.7 Many scholars have expanded on these tasks to provide more comprehensive 
definitions. For example, R. P. Barston, in what appears to be the broadest-ranging 
statement in the Anglophone diplomatic studies literature, breaks the everyday tasks of 
diplomacy down into five broad areas. These are: representation, especially substantive 
representation, or the explanation and defence of national policy; advice on trends in the 
host country, and ‘laying the groundwork’ for new policies or initiatives; “reducing 
friction or oiling the wheels of bilateral or multilateral relations;” contributing to order 
and orderly change, as well as to the resolution or continuation of a dispute or conflict; 
and the creation, drafting and amendment of “international rules of a normative and 
regulatory kind that provide structure in the international system.”8 When the definition 
of “diplomacy” is broadened, as the Introduction has suggested, to include the activities 
of all individuals authorized to speak and act in the name of a particular state or 
intergovernmental organization—not only traditional “diplomats” (individuals 
accredited to another state) but also heads of state, ministers, government officials,
6 Risse-Kappen 1995.
Http://www.ediplomat.com/main/vienna.convention.htm, accessed 13 October 2000. These functions 
are listed as “inter alia. ”
s Barston 1988: 2-3.
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parliamentarians, or different specialists representing their state, either abroad or at 
home in exchanges with foreign delegations—the list of practical functions can seem 
endless. However, Alan James has argued that all of these everyday functions—and 
exceptional functions as well, such as negotiation of crises—can be boiled down to the 
simple principle of communication, whether this involves talking at someone, or talking 
with them.9
But what are representatives communicating? On what topics are they holding forth, 
conducting conversations, debating, negotiating? This dissertation proceeds from the 
assumption that diplomatic exchanges provide the opportunity for the discussion or 
negotiation of at least four broad topics: action, rules, values, and identities.
Action
A first, core topic of diplomacy is action. Diplomatists, in their exchanges, achieve 
agreement on what the bodies they represent are going to do. Alliances, trade 
agreements; agreements on exchanges of consulates, Presidential visits, tactics for the 
war on drugs, financing development projects, strategies to combat climate change— 
these are the “business,” “relations,” or “affairs” to which most classical scholars of 
diplomacy refer in their definitions of diplomacy. Indeed, much diplomatic history 
focuses on little other than the negotiation of action; with Chapter Two and its 
description of Baltic and Russian calls for action behind us, we will not devote more 
attention to this topic now.
Rules
Another subject of negotiation in diplomatic exchanges is the rules governing the 
actions of states outside, and sometimes inside, their borders. 10 This function lifts 
diplomacy, in Brian White’s terms, from the “micro” perspective of states and other 
international actors to the “macro” level of world politics as a whole. * 11 In other words, 
diplomatists do not merely communicate narrow national demands; at the same time, 
they participate in the creation, drafting, elaboration, amendment, and enforcement of 
“international rules of a normative and regulatory kind that provide structure in the 
international system.” These rules—discussed under the rubric of “regimes” in some
parts of the International Relations literature—provide, in Hedley Bull’s view, “the 
means whereby international society moves from the vague perception of a common 
interest to a clear conception of the kind of conduct it requires.” 13 They include 
international law, formal international agreements, and informal international 
agreements, such as those that evolved among the European powers in the nineteenth 
century establishing principles for non-interference in each other’s colonial 
administration. 14 This ongoing process of the negotiation of the rules of international 
society between its member states, according to Adam Watson, “is one of the great 
constructive achievements of diplomacy.” 13 Indeed, it is due to diplomacy’s role in the
9 James 1980: 942; James 1993a: 95.
10 Koh 1997: 2635-2641. The term “rule” has been very broadly employed by some writers, for example
Hedley Bull, to cover law, morality, custom or etiquette, or simply operating principles— “the rules of 
the game” (Bull 1977: 54); it will be used here in the restricted sense outlined above. For further 
discussion, see Bull 1977: 67-74; Kratochwil 1989; Lipson 1991.
11 White 1997: 250.
12 Barston 1988: 2-3.
13 Bull 1977: 71; on regimes, see Krasner 1983 and most of the chapters of Rittberger 1993.
14 Puchalaand Hopkins 1983: 72.
15 Watson 1982: 40, 42. Elsewhere, however, Watson notes: “Even where states locked into international
systems do no constitute what we have called society, they evolve regulator rules and institutions and 
formulate them in capitulatory agreements because they cannot manage without. No system has
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negotiation of international law—“the most essential evidence of the existence of an 
international society”—that Martin Wight calls diplomacy “the master-institution of 
international relations.” 16 However, even the rules of diplomacy itself, Watson argues, 
are under continual negotiation: “[a]s the context of international relations changes, so 
the rules and institutions elaborated by the diplomatic dialogue to enable international 
society to function also change.” 17
Values
An interest in rules leads the eye naturally to a third topic under discussion in 
diplomatic exchanges: the normative frameworks that underpin rules. In some cases, 
these frameworks apply as much to the domestic affairs of states as they do to the 
international environment in which states operate, such as the debates over the merits of 
differing social systems that animated the Cold War. In other cases, these frameworks 
apply primarily to standards of behaviour adopted by states in the international 
environment, and the moral and ethical principles underlying them. As Watson writes, 
“[t]he diplomatic dialogue must not only determine the regulatory mechanisms of the 
society...it must also undertake the modification of the principles and the standards
I o
which underlie the specific rules.” David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla refer to this type 
of diplomacy as “noopolitik,” a practice dedicated to the spread of ethical values and 
norms; Stanley Hoffman uses the more elegant “idealpolitik.” 19 In engaging in this type 
of debate, governments are guided in their actions not merely by their notions of self- 
interest or their legal commitments, but also by a sense of appropriate behaviour, 
defined by morals, ethics, or the demands of propriety. Diplomatists may seek to justify 
their states’ actions on their own moral, ethical, or ethological grounds, and to attempt 
to persuade others to accept their conceptions of appropriate behaviour. More 
importantly, however, their governments often-although not always—accord sufficient 
respect to other individual states, groupings of states, or the collectivity of states 
assembled into an international society to be willing to consider changing their own 
conceptions of appropriate behaviour, and of the normative guidelines that underlie it.20 
Diplomacy not only permits this furthering of consensus on normative principles, it 
depends on it; for, as Sasson Sofer has written, “[djiplomacy’s fate is bound up with the 
acceptance of political norms and rules of behaviour that make international society a 
meaningful reality.” 21
Identities
A final topic of diplomacy that has received increasing attention over the last decade is 
that of identities in the international realm. Authors focusing on this topic of diplomacy 
explicitly or implicitly approach in new ways the concepts of diplomatic 
“representation" and “recognition,” demonstrating how diplomatists consciously or
existed without rules and conventions of some kind, and it is hard to see how one could” (Watson 
1992: 312).
16 Wight 1978: 107, 113.
17 Watson 1982: 223.
18 Watson 1982:42.
19 Ronfeldt and Arquilla 1999; Hoffman 2001: 142.
20 For examples of studies focusing on this aspect of diplomatic exchanges, see, for instance, Jackson
1993; most chapters in Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995; Legro 1997; Lose 1998; Risse 1997, 1998.
21 Sofer 1988: 207. Some would argue that the salience of this function grew steadily across the course of 
the twentieth century. For example, Herbert Butterfield wrote in 1966: “Recent years have seen an 
important development of the role of what might be called the ‘moral factor’ in international 
relations... an imponderable factor has acquired unusual importance. It is this which is altering (or 
which ought to alter) the character of twentieth-century diplomacy more than anything else” 
(Butterfield 1966: 190).
76
unconsciously participate in international debates about the existence and nature not 
only of specific political units, but also of the very concepts on which diplomatic 
practices base themselves: “the state,” “international society,” “diplomacy” itself. At 
the same time that these analyses expose the contestable nature of such concepts, they 
demonstrate how moments of consensus, forced or voluntary, fix temporary outlines of 
these concepts in the minds of diplomatic participants, at least until the next debate 
emerges. The debates surveyed by these authors encompass a variety of questions, 
including ontological questions (“What is a state?” “What is a great power?”), 
normative questions (“What is a legitimate state?” “What is a responsible great 
power?”), taxonomic questions (“Is Russia European?” “Is Russia a great power?”), and 
essentialist/descriptive questions (“What is Russia’s true nature?” “What is the character 
of the Russian regime?”).
The identities championed by diplomatists may emerge in the form of narratives or in 
scattered images; the debates surrounding them may be explicit or implicit.22 Some of 
these debates, particularly ontological ones, are so submerged in daily diplomatic 
practice—at least that between and concerning established states—that their outlines are 
barely discernible. For instance, the question “What is a state?” rarely receives 
discussion in daily diplomatic life; yet the reigning answer, as we have seen in the 
Introduction to this dissertation, is inextricably linked to diplomacy, and is reiterated in 
every aspect of diplomatic practice between established states. Participation in 
diplomatic communication with other states is a marker of statehood; it is in fact 
mandatory for a “real” state, because, as James Der Derian writes, it is a “formal means 
by which the self-identity of the sovereign state is constituted and articulated through 
external relations with other states.” Indeed, in situations of governmental and 
infrastructural breakdown accompanying civil strife or foreign invasion, sometimes 
participation in the interstate diplomatic system is one of the few visible markers of 
sovereignty, and hence “statehood,” left to a government.24 As a consequence, the need 
to debate the essential nature of statehood arises relatively infrequently in daily 
diplomatic practice between established states, a context in which participants find a 
ready answer to the question “What is a state? in the entity they represent. In a similar 
way, the fact that diplomacy is both a symptom of, and a prerequisite for, the existence 
of some kind of international community of established states permits deflection of 
debate over the exact nature of that “international society.” As Alan James points out, a 
sense of society between states could not exist without a communications system like 
diplomacy: “[a]ny group of persons can only behave and be envisaged as a collectivity 
if its members are able to communicate with each other.” 23 The emergence of a 
communications system in turn serves as proof that some form of international 
community exists, if only thanks to the contact provided by diplomacy.26 Indeed, the 
diplomatic profession may be, as Bull calls it, “a custodian of the idea of international 
society.” 27
In debates over normative identities, diplomacy frequently plays a more obvious role.
For example, the debate over what constitutes a legitimate established state is one that
28occurs in many situations where international intervention is under consideration.
22 For a good discussion of the narrative bases of identity formation, see Somers 1994.
23 Der Derian 1993: 244; italics mine.
24 Stern 1995: 79-80; Jackson 1990: 74-78.
25 James 1993a: 100, 95.
26 Halliday 1994: 100-101.
27 Bull 1977: 183.
28 Weber 1992a, 1992b.
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Diplomatists attempting to justify normative frameworks do not base their arguments 
solely on the merits of their point alone; they have to ground them in higher-order 
claims. As Finnemore writes, “[njormative claims become powerful or prevail by being 
persuasive; being persuasive means grounding claims in existing norms in a way that 
emphasises normative congruence and coherence.” 29 In some cases, these higher-order 
norms related to precepts for action; in other cases, however, as Christian Reus-Smit 
observes, actors draw on “deep-rooted, collectively shared ideas that define what
i n
constitutes a legitimate social actor.” The concept of “sovereignty,” as Cynthia Weber 
observes, in its essence refers to what an entity must do in order to be recognised by 
other states as one of them; when other states, for whatever reason, wish to act in a way 
that violates the rights of non-intervention conventionally assigned to sovereign states, 
the legitimacy of the “sovereignty” of the target entity is the first thing to come under 
attack.31 In some cases, this may consist of denying the entity’s right to a separate 
sovereign existence in the first place, as in the Iraqi government’s characterization of 
Kuwait as an Iraqi “province” gone wrong. In many cases, however, the issue under 
debate has been whether an entity’s domestic authority is authorised to speak for its 
polity in international affairs.32 For example, as Weber has documented, when the 
United States intervened in the Mexican Revolution in 1914, Mexico’s right to a 
continued existence as a state was not under question. However, the Wilson 
administration successfully argued that the Mexican military dictatorship did not enjoy 
the support of the wellspring of its sovereign authority, namely its population, and 
hence could legitimately be overthrown by another government claiming to act in the 
name of the Mexican people.33 In these cases, diplomatists fall back on many of the 
themes that animate the third layer of diplomatic practice: questions of the normative 
standing of differing systems of social and economic organization, questions of whether 
an entity’s behaviour in the international arena can be said to be in accordance with 
international normative consensus.
However, a number of authors have observed that diplomacy plays one of its most 
visible roles in international discussion and debate over the characteristics of political 
and social collectives in the international system, ranging from the nation to the state to 
interstate groupings to non-state actors.34 These debates play a vital part in the ongoing 
complex of debates aimed at achieving at least momentarily stable consensus on the 
nature and character of these entities.35 Although often ostensibly purely 
essentialist/descriptive, these debates cannot fail to possess a normative character as 
well, with judgement implicit in description; this normative character is part of what 
lends them their emotional power.36
Of the authors who have examined these types of debates, some have focused on efforts 
by state representatives to “sell” coherent images of their own nations (or “self’), both
29 Finnemore 1996b: 141.
30 Reus-Smit 1999: 28.
31 Weber 1992a: 200.
32 Weber 1992a: 200.
33 Weber 1992b: 322-323.
34 See Razuvayev 1994 for a parallel discussion of many of the points that follow.
35 Although this discussion focuses on the building of interstate consensus on identities, a vital function of
resident diplomats is o f course to characterize, in their reports back to their capitals, the governments 
and states to which they are accredited. See, for instance, George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” on the 
nature of the Soviet state, which was essentially aimed at answering, in a fashion that would lead to 
consensus among US policymakers, the question “What is the true nature of the Soviet species?” 
(Stephanson 1989: 51).
36 See Calhoun 1994, Somers 1994.
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overseas and in some cases domestically. For example, Reus-Smit has discussed the 
“oratorical diplomacy” of the Renaissance Italian representatives, which was oriented 
towards conveying “carefully orchestrated images of their city states.” 38 Closer to home, 
Susan Jeffords has outlined the way in which US diplomatists have promoted an image 
of the United States as a selfless hero acting in the name of victimized populations, 
while David Campbell has discussed geopolitical representational practices as central to 
the domestic as well as international constitution of the United States.39 Others have 
examined efforts by diplomatists to characterize different states (or “others”); for 
example, Giulio Gallarotti has noted the repertoire of epithets marshalled during the 
Cold War against the United States and its allies by the Soviet Union, while Charles 
Nathanson has catalogued the analogous rhetoric emanating from the United States.40 
And some have discussed the use, through favourable or unfavorable comparison, of 
characterizations of the “other” in creating characterizations of “selves,” both singular 
and collective.41 Most of the cases studied have involved a process of drawing dividing 
lines; for example, Iver Neumann has discussed the use of Russia as a constituting 
“other” by Central European diplomatists.42 However, at the same time that groups 
establish boundaries, they also reach out to others to create collective identities, as 
Jennifer Milliken’s work on the way in which interventions in Korea and the Balkans 
have helped in the ongoing construction of “the West” demonstrates.4 ' In some cases, 
this process even involves the denial of the possibility of divisions between self and 
other, as revealed in Neumann’s examination of American characterizations of the 
United States as a “microcosm of the world”—a description that negates any basis for 
understanding diplomacy as a dialogue across cultural dividing lines.44
This identity-negotiating function of diplomacy may be thought of as diplomatic 
“representation” in its most literal form. Diplomats have been said to act as 
“representatives” in many ways. Hans Morgenthau suggests that diplomats are not only 
the symbolic representatives of their countries, but also the legal representatives of their 
governments, as well as the “itinerant incarnations” of foreign offices: “[w]hile the 
foreign office is the brains of foreign policy, the diplomatic representatives are its eyes, 
ears and mouth, its fingertips. . . ” 45 Professional diplomats in particular, but also ad hoc 
diplomatists, have historically been held to represent their polities due to their status as 
embodiments of their sovereigns, who in turn embody their polities.46 Paul Sharp notes 
that the composition of a nation’s diplomatic corps has also been held to embody its 
cultural identity, a conception that has underpinned moves by many foreign ministries 
to make their diplomatic corps representative of their nations’ cultural mix.47 However, 
the identity-negotiating function of diplomacy also means that diplomatists are actively 
involved in presenting and re-presenting images of their states; hence Der Derian’s 
observation that diplomacy is “the formal means by which the self-identity of the 
sovereign state is constituted and articulated through external relations with other
37 Smyth 1995: 234; Richter 1996: 70.
38 Reus-Smit 1999: 79-81.
’9 Jeffords 1994, Campbell 1990. See also, for example, Dalby 1998.
40 Gallarotti 1991; Nathanson 1988. See also Weber 1992b, Campbell 1996, Hill 1996, Weldes and Saco
1996, Dalby 1998.
41 Watson cites Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “The body politic is forced to look outside itself to know 
itself...’’(Watson 1982: 14).
42 Neumann 1999: 143-160; see also, for example, Neumann and Welch 1991.
43 Neumann 1999: 36, Milliken 1996.
44 Neumann 2001b: 6-7.
45 Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 566-567.
46 Sharp 1997: 612.
47 Sharp 1997: 613. Sharp notes that this practice has been referred to in the Canadian case as “identity 
diplomacy.”
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states.’' As Erik Ringmar has observed, it follows that “recognition” can similarly be 
conceived in broad terms, not only in terms of legal status, but also in terms of 
acceptance of self-characterizations. As Ringmar writes, “we ask our audiences to 
recognize us as the kinds of persons that our stories identify. Only if they affirm the 
validity of the description have we survived the test: only as recognized can we 
conclusively come to establish a certain identity.” 49
For continuing evidence of these practices, one has to look no farther than the daily 
newspapers, where US President George Bush has invoked both historical and 
contemporary analogies in his characterizations of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq: 
“[Ojur alliance of freedom is being tested again by new and terrible dangers. Like the 
Nazis and the Communists before them, the terrorists seek to end lives and control all 
life. And like the Nazis and the Communists before them, they will be opposed by free 
nations, and the terrorists will be defeated.”50 Or, for an example of state representatives 
debating the nature of actors outside the state system, consider the case of Chechnya: 
the Russian government has consistently insisted that it is fighting “terrorists” and 
“bandits” in Chechnya, not political separatists. The Chechen example indeed provides 
an excellent example of the intertextual quality, if one likes, of the process of 
characterization—the way in which diplomatists draw on the rhetoric of others to build 
consensus on both individual and collective identities. As Igor Torbakov notes, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin has mimicked US diplomatic rhetoric on al-Qaeda in its 
statements on the Chechnya (stressing that the war is financed, armed and increasingly 
fought by Islamic militants from abroad) and US rhetoric on Iraq in its statements on 
Georgia (presenting the “Pankisi story” as an integral part of the global struggle against 
state support for international terrorism).51 After the hostage crisis in Moscow in 
October 2002, Putin launched a further rhetorical offensive, this time against other 
governments: in line with the Bush administration’s approach to doubters of the wisdom 
of a war against Iraq, governments expressing qualms about a military solution to the 
Chechen conflict were accused of “abetting terrorism.” For example, when Akhmed 
Zakayev was released in Denmark in December 2002, Russian officials said that 
Denmark was not taking the fight against terrorism seriously and that “the Danish 
authorities probably have their own interpretation of terrorism... which differs from the
• • . c ainternational view.”
Interestingly, of all the four topics of diplomatic debate, the negotiation of identities is 
the one with which many scholars, and many diplomats, seem the most uncomfortable. 
This may be partly due to the fact that diplomacy has historically been associated with 
confidentiality, while identity debates frequently are played out in view of the public.54 
There are in fact two areas of intergovernmental communication whose natural habitat 
is assumed to be the media spotlight; one is so-called “public diplomacy,” and the other 
is propaganda. In each case, the intended audience is thought to be foreign publics, 
rather than (rarely in addition to) foreign governments. The practice of public
48 DerDerian 1993:244.
49 Ringmar 1996: 81.
50 “Bush, in Eastern Europe, evokes past threats.” Washington Post, 24 November 2002 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31797-2002Nov23.html, accessed 25 November 
2002) .
51 “Russia recasts bog in Caucasus as war on terror.” New York Times, 5 October 2002 
(http://www.nytimes.com, accessed 5 October 2002); Torbakov 2002.
52 Bransten 2002.
53 Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller retorted that “Denmark is upfront when it comes to fighting
terrorism” (Associated Press, 3 December 2002 (Johnson’s Russia List 6585, 4 December 2002)).
54 Tuch 1990: 3.
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diplomacy is generally associated with the cultivation of sympathy, approval, or 
understanding in a fashion not explicitly threatening to the host government (what 
Thucydides discussed as eunoia). 53 Meanwhile, propaganda is associated with the 
fomenting of disloyalty or the assassination of reputation, usually through falsehood and 
in a fashion devoid of moral sense.36 Both, however, are assumed to be at some distance 
from “real” diplomacy; and indeed, diplomats who engage in public identity debates, as 
we shall see, frequently face accusations of engaging in “propaganda.” However, in fact 
identity debates, as is the case with all the topics we have mentioned, permeate all 
aspects of diplomatic discourse; they occur in camera as well as in front of the cameras, 
and to treat them as the province of only one arm of a diplomatic service is to fail to 
appreciate their impact and currency among other representatives.
Of course, as mentioned earlier, all of these four topics are in practice heavily 
interlinked, and negotiation of one is frequently linked to the negotiation of another. For 
instance, in attempting to address the policy question “Should State X be admitted to the 
Council of Europe?” state representatives will be required to debate the taxonomic 
question of whether State X is an appropriate candidate for Council membership. This 
question in turn has the potential to lead to debate over whether State X is 
geographically European; whether State X is culturally European; whether State X 
violates particular Council of Europe regulations; whether State X violates principles 
not codified in Council regulations but that members hold dear; whether the Council 
should bend regulations, or members relax their principles, for State X; whether the 
Council should pass additional regulations to which State X can be forced to adhere 
before its membership can be considered; or whether the Council should provide 
financial or logistical assistance to help State X meet Council standards. 37 Indeed, as 
Ringmar has observed, these elements will often come together into entire narratives, 
creating a presence not only for entities, but for entire relationships across space and 
time.58 In the end, all form part of the efforts of representatives to encourage their 
interlocutors, as a former US ambassador has put it, “to do what we want them to do 
and be what we want them to be.” 59
Identity diplomacy
With the previous discussion in mind, we can now move to Russian and Baltic 
contributions to the international debate over the nature and characters, not only of their
55 Wight 1977: 68.
56 For discussions o f both public diplomacy and propaganda, see for example Nicolson 1969: 169-170;
Thayer 1959: 190-192; Tuch 1990: 3-9; Wright 1955: 287. A few scholars— for instance, Hans 
Morgenthau (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 352-359), and Harold Lasswell (McDougal 1984: 
117-149)— discuss “propaganda” as encompassing both of these practices. This position is perfectly in 
keeping with the original meaning of the term (the dissemination of ideas and information), but is 
relatively unusual in the context of the IR/diplomatic studies literature (Tuch 1990: 9).
57 As any lawyer knows, the definition of a situation, including the definition of the identities of its
players, is vital in the determination of whether or not actors have broken rules; at the same time, the 
determination of whether or not an actor is breaking rules plays a vital part in how others define it. See 
Barbara Tuchman’s discussion of British protests to the Dutch over their tolerance for the sale to the 
rebellious American colonists o f military supplies: “Because the Colonies were not a recognized state, 
they had in the British view no belligerent rights and thus their sea captains had no valid commissions, 
which explains why the British were so free with the term ‘pirates.’ ” Meanwhile, Dutch 
administrators invoked the principle of “free ships, free trade” to argue that the American colonies, 
regardless of their legal status, had the right to engage in trade, making their captains, by definition, 
not pirates (Tuchman 1989: 20, 23).
58 Ringmar 1996: 76.
59 Ambassador Theodore Russell, personal interview, October 2001.
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own states, but of their opponents as well60 A few basic themes were visible 
throughout, although received different amounts of attention at different times.
Peaceful versus aggressive
One of the most basic and important themes on which Russian and Baltic 
representatives focused, and clashed, was the question of whether their states, and 
particularly Russia, were innately peaceful or aggressive. Russian leaders and 
diplomats, in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, were anxious to disassociate 
themselves, and the newly independent Russian Federation, from the belligerent 
reputation of the former USSR to the greatest degree possible. Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin, addressing the Russian diplomatic corps in Moscow in February 1992, summed 
up his administration’s public position concisely: “As it emerges into the world, Russia 
intends to carry out an honest, open, and moral policy that is not subordinate to any 
ideological diktat. Our chief priority is the interests of the Russian nation, which values 
peace no less, and possibly even more, than others. Our nation, like all other nations, 
wants prosperity and stability, and has a self-interest in the precise guarantees of the 
rights and freedoms of the citizen and of man in conformity with international rules.” 61 
Yeltsin had already laid out this non-aggressive position at the United Nations in late 
January: “We are ready to actively participate in the preparation and formation of an all- 
European collective security system...Russia sees the United States, the West, and the 
countries of the East not as mere partners, but as allies. This is a most important 
prerequisite for, I would say, a revolution in peaceful cooperation among the states of 
the civilized world.”62 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had already stressed 
the Russian Federation’s new approach towards even the USSR’s historic antagonist, 
NATO: “We do not see NATO as an enemy... [but] as one of the buttresses of stability 
and security in the world.”
One of the points on which Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and other liberal reformers in the new 
Russian government were particularly insistent was that the Russian Federation 
harbored no resentment over the breakup of the Soviet Union, and no aggressive 
intentions towards its newly independent neighbors. As Yeltsin told the Russian 
diplomatic corps: “A strong democratic Russia, and this is precisely the kind of Russia 
that our citizens want to see, will never again become an empire. On the contrary, our 
goal is to join with the other countries of the world in the process of confirming in the 
human community the ideals of humanitarianism, freedom and democracy.”64 This 
position was not new. Describing to delegates to the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies after the failed coup of August 1991 the Russian republic’s commitment to 
defending the interests of Russians living outside the republic, Yeltsin nevertheless said 
that “the Russian state, having chosen democracy and freedom, will never be an empire 
or an older or younger brother. It will be an equal among equals.”65 Kozyrev had been 
promoting this line even longer; he told reporters in December 1990 that “[w]hat has 
traditionally been considered domestic policy will be one of the main directions for
b0 Russian representatives at least were not unaware of the task before them. As State Secretary Gennadiy 
Burbulis said: “[i]f you are talking about foreign relations, they always presuppose a clear 
understanding between us and those with whom relations are being established. We are trying to 
create a Russian state, in the full sense of the word...This is the most fundamental interest o f Russia’s 
foreign policy today” (Russian Television Network, 3 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992: 
23)).
61 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 4-5, 29 Feb-15 March 1992: 77-79.
6” Rossiskaya Gazeta, 3 February 1992: 1,3 (FBIS-SOV-92-022, 3 February 1992: 20).
63 TASS, 14 November 1991 {SWB, 16 November 1991: A 1 /1).
64 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 4-5, 29 Feb-15 March 1992: 77-79 (emphasis in the original).
65 Moscow Central Television, 3 September 1991 {SWB, 5 September 1991: Cl/5).
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Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am talking about establishing new, non-imperial 
and non-totalitarian relations with the sovereign republics. The relationship between 
Russia and the other republics should be based on universal norms of international law, 
first of all the norms of human rights. This is the key to solving many inter-republican 
interethnic problems in a civilized way instead of the means traditional for the 
totalitarian regime—spetznaz, OMON, and cheremukha, which only aggravate the 
situation.'’66
Meanwhile, representatives of the three Baltic republics were equally engaged in efforts 
to see their nations recognized as essentially peaceloving. “The Baltic states,’’ 
Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis told the CSCE Helsinki Summit, “...use 
peaceful diplomatic means to fight for the withdrawal of foreign troops from their land, 
for the termination of willful behaviour of foreign forces, for the elimination of threat 
and for the respect of principle.”67 Baltic representatives pointed out that the three Baltic 
states were coming out of a lengthy period of victimization. As Estonian representative 
Tunne Kelam told the PACE, “For fifty years the three Baltic states have been...kept as 
prisoners, victims of terror and genocide, being deprived of all human and political 
rights, and pushed to the verge of losing their identity and culture.”68 Now, Baltic 
representatives emphasized, all three states were happy to resume their place among 
what they considered to be the peaceloving nations of Europe.
On the subject of Russia, however, Baltic representatives were far less sanguine. By 
early 1992, Baltic leaders and diplomats were openly expressing their fear that Russia 
retained an aggressive, indeed imperialist streak. As Lithuanian Defense Minister 
Audrius Butkevicius put it, “Russia has never rejected its claims of control over the 
Baltics...The Russian leadership hasn't intended to release the Baltic countries for even 
an instant. More precisely, it was forced to soften its position for an instant, but now it 
has hardened it once again....their national self-consciousness is oriented on empire....In 
a couple of years Russia will rise to its feet, and it will become a threat to us once 
again.”69 Estonian delegate to the PACE Marju Lauristin similarly argued that Russia 
had ambitions to restore hegemony in the Baltic region: “We can again see in Russian 
policy the strains of imperialist chauvinism.”70
These Baltic accusations provoked indignant cries from Russian representatives. The 
most common counter-argument was that voiced, for example, by Sergei Stepashin, 
chairman of the Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee: “It was exactly 
Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who actually saved democracy in Lithuania in the tragic days of 
January. Russia was the first to raise the issue of independence for Lithuania after the 
August events.” Yeltsin told a joint session of the US Congress in June 1992 that “[i]t 
is Russia that has put an end to imperial policies and was the first to recognize the
77independence of the Baltic states.”
06 Komsomolskaya Pravda, 26 December 1990: 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-001, 2 January 1991: 73). Spetznaz 
refers to special military forces; OMON, to special Interior Ministry forces; cheremukha, to riot 
control gas.
67 Statement, Lithuanian President of the Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis, CSCE Helsinki 
Summit, 10 July 1992.
68 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1062.
69 Letuvos Ritas, 22-29 May 1992: 1-2 (JPRS-USR-92-075, 19 June 1992: 118-119).
70 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 1,3.
71ITAR-TASS 15 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-115, 15 June 1992: 73).
72 Moscow Russian Television, 17 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-118, 18 June 1992: 12).
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Some Baltic speakers indeed made occasional attempts to differentiate within the 
Russian political spectrum. Then-Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri, in an address 
in Stockholm in February 1992, was careful to refer to “imperialistically-minded circles 
in Moscow” rather than the Russian government, and said “[manipulators can be found 
in Russia: the strongest structure is still the Red Army, who are being threatened with 
the loss of their privileges.”73 The Baltic Council, in a statement of March 1992, 
referred to Russian troops (which they accused of “behaving like conquerors” and 
inflicting significant damage) as showing “a lack of clear subordination to the Russian 
government.”74 But ultimately these fine distinctions broke down. As an Estonian 
Foreign Ministry statement accusing Russia of trying to reestablish control over Baltic 
states said, “[h]owever much we may wish to support the democratic forces in Russia, 
we can realistically do so only if the Russian democrats respect all of Russia’s 
international commitments.”
Democratic/human-rights-oriented versus authoritarian
Another key disagreement that emerged in Russian and Baltic rhetoric centered on the 
question of whether these states were fundamentally democratic and human-rights- 
oriented, or whether they were authoritarian. Again, the Russian government strongly 
argued that the newly independent Russia was a democratic and rights-regarding state. 
Well before the Soviet Union’s collapse, Kozyrev described the Russian republic as by 
itself aspiring to join the “chain of highly developed democratic countries with market 
economies.”76 On the eve of the Union’s dissolution, he proclaimed that “Russia’s 
foreign policy will be based on values common to all mankind and above all on the 
protection of human rights.”77 At the 48th UN Human Rights Commission meeting in 
February 1992, he argued: “Now, following the victory of democracy over 
totalitarianism, international standards in the area of human rights are becoming 
identical to the internal interests and tasks of Russia's democratic change, in the full 
meaning of the term. It is on their basis that we want to build a new system with 
democratic institutions which, from its very start, would be consistent with existing 
international standards.” Russian representatives indeed argued that the new Russian 
state was particularly sensitive to minority rights. Russian representative to the PACE 
Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, for instance, stated: “The policy we are now implementing is 
based on guaranteeing human rights throughout Russia, protecting minorities and 
combating xenophobia and racism. I know of not a single case of anybody being 
persecuted for reasons of nationality or race...”79
At the same time, Russian representatives portrayed Estonia and Latvia as possessing 
only questionable democratic credentials, precisely because (Russian representatives 
argued) they violated minority rights. Russian delegate to the PACE Ivan Rybkin asked 
the assembly if, as in the case of Estonia, it was possible to disenfranchise 40% of the 
total population without jeopardizing democracy.80 Kozyrev, speaking of Estonia before 
the World Human Rights Conference in June 1993, said: “A democracy cannot be 
recognized as genuine if it is created only for the ‘indigenous’ population while
77 In the same speech he said of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy that “Hitler too was elected State Chancellor by a 
people manipulated to the point of desperation” (The Baltic Independent, 13-19 March 1992: 2).
74 The Baltic Independent, 20-26 March 1992: 1.
75 The Baltic Independent, 9-15 April 1993: 3.
76 TASS, 19 September 1991 (SfVB, 21 September 1991: Al/3).
77 Central Television First Program Network, 25 December 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-249, 27 December
1991:40).
8 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 4/5, 29 February-15 March 1992: 59-60.
79 PACE ORD, 3 February 1993: 734.
80 PACE ORD, 5 October 1992: 452.
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representatives of ethnic minorities are either forced out of the country or placed in the 
position of outcasts.” 81 Indeed, Russian representatives painted Estonian and Latvian 
nationalists as ethnocrats. A Russian memorandum circulated at the Council of Europe 
in May 1992 described Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws as “paving the way for 
intolerance, aggressive nationalism and xenophobia.” A Supreme Soviet statement on 
the rights of Russians in the Baltic states circulated by Russian representatives at 
various European forums argued that “[i]n the political circles of Latvia and Estonia, a 
program of constructing monoethnic societies is being openly proclaimed.”83 Russian 
representatives at the PACE accused the Estonians and Latvians of trying to create 
ethnically pure regions.84 A letter from Yeltsin to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali 
of November 1992 read: “The existence in Europe of conditions for flagrant 
discrimination against a considerable part of the population of a state, and the
Of
emergence of new hotbeds of tensions and conflicts, is inadmissible.”
Baltic representatives countered by pointing out that the Estonian and Latvian 
citizenship laws were in keeping with those of countries held up as models of 
democracy. They further noted that the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws made no 
mention of ethnicity, but instead were based exclusively on whether an individual or 
their ancestors had held citizenship in the interwar Estonian and Latvian states. 
Especially in the Latvian case, a sizeable number of ethnic Russians were thus eligible 
for automatic citizenship.
Going on the offensive, Baltic representatives further argued that the Russian state was 
not as committed to minority rights as its officials claimed. A Baltic Council appeal to 
the CSCE in September 1992 expressed concern over Russian “disrespect for human 
rights and the rights of ethnic minorities.”86 The Estonian government was particularly 
active in expressing concern for the Finno-Ugric Setu minority. Estonian delegates 
brought the issue to the attention of the Helsinki Follow-up meeting, at which Russia 
was accused of pursuing a “hostile policy” towards its minorities.87 Estonian President 
Lennart Meri further urged his Hungarian counterpart Joszef Antall to join forces with 
forces in Estonia to protect Finno-Ugric minorities living in the Russian Federation
• O Q“who are on the brink of extinction due to aggressive Russian oil exploitation.” 
However, the Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs also expressed to the UN 
Human Rights Commission his “deeply [concern] with the fate of Latvians in Russia.”89
Indeed, Baltic representatives fundamentally questioned the democratic credentials of 
the new Russian state. As Meri argued at the PACE: “We know that democracy and the 
protection of human rights are not static qualities but constitute a dynamic process. We 
must fight for those freedoms every day, because when democracy is taken for granted 
or worse, is ignored, or still worse, is staged in the best traditions of Potemkin and of 
the Soviet Intourist, democracy can become weakened to a point beyond return.”90 
Indeed, Baltic representatives stressed, good relations between the Baltic states and 
Russia depended on the development of “democratic forces and traditions” in Russia—a
81 Moskovskie Novosti, 25, 20 June 1993: 7 (FBIS-SOV-93-115, 17 June 1993: 12).
82 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3.
83Rossiskaya Gazeta 24 July 1992: 2 (JPRS-USR-92-101, 10 August 1992: 2).
84 PACE ÖRD, 7 October 1992: 599.
85 The Baltic Independent, 13-19 November 1992: 1.
86 Baltfax, 16 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-182, 18 September 1992: 5).
87 Interfax (Diplomatic Panorama), 2 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992: 10).
88 The Baltic Independent, 5-11 February 1993: 3.
89 The Baltic Independent, 26 February-4 March 1993: 3.
90 PACE ORD, 25 April 1995:317.
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stance that left no doubt in their interlocutors’ minds as to whether those forces and 
traditions could already be said to exist.91 As Kelam told the PACE, “I do not need to 
convince this audience that Estonia, having suffered on various occasions in our history 
as a result of Russia’s expansionism, will feel secure only when Estonia’s eastern 
neighbor has firmly established a system of democracy and the rule of law.”
Degree o f separation from the USSR
A further question that was vital to answering both of the questions posed above was the 
degree to which the Baltic states and Russia could be said to be distanced from their 
“predecessor” of sorts, the USSR. Michael Urban has spoken of “two mutually 
reinforcing moments” through which national communities recreate themselves: one 
involving the “positive expression of nation...and the recovery of those identity 
markers...that had been suspended and suppressed during the communist epoch...the 
other... negative, [involving] purging the nation of...markers associated with the period 
of communist rule.” 93 Baltic rhetoric celebrated both these moments; the extent to 
which the second had been embraced in Russia was, however, a topic of heated 
disagreement for Baltic and Russian representatives.
Baltic representatives of course held strongly to their position that to talk about the 
“post-Soviet” Baltic states was a fallacy, as the Baltic states were never legally part of 
the USSR.94 As Landsbergis reiterated at Chatham House in January 1992, the Baltic 
states were not constituent republics of the Soviet Union and hence were not successor 
states. 92 Baltic representatives forcefully pointed out that the Baltic states had re­
established , rather than established, diplomatic relations with other countries, including 
the USSR.96 If the Baltic states had never been part of the USSR, they could not be held 
responsible for its iniquities. “Lithuania,” Landsbergis proclaimed at Chatham House, 
“did not attack Afghanistan, Lithuania did not build submarines, did not finance 
putsches and uprisings in Africa and Latin America, did not create aggressive space 
programs and did not bug the US Embassy in Moscow.”97 Nor, as the Baltic Council 
argued in a statement in March 1992, were they responsible for the USSR’s spendthrift 
ways: “The Baltic states are not the successors of the former USSR, and therefore 
cannot be held responsible for the settlement and repayment of the former USSR’s 
foreign debt.” (It was partly to underscore this issue of separateness that Baltic
91 Baltic representatives had held this position since before the collapse of the USSR; see, for instance,
Estonian Supreme Soviet Chairman Arnold Riiiitel’s inaugural address to the United Nations General 
Assembly in September 1991 (Estonian Radio, 14 September 1991 (SWB, 19 September 1991: A2/2).
92 PACE ORD, 25 January 1996: 241.
93 Urban 1994: 733.
94 This dissertation unfortunately lacks the resources for a proper discussion of the battle between Russian
and Baltic representatives and historians over whether the Baltic states joined the Soviet Union 
voluntarily; for a brief overview, see Forced Migration Projects (1997).
95 The Baltic Independent, 31 January-6 February 1992: 1.
% The Baltic Independent, 9-15 January 1992: 5. Then-Estonian Ambassador to Finland Lennart Meri 
reportedly even turned down a Finnish offer of an impressive building in central Helsinki as Estonia’s 
new embassy on the grounds that it was not Estonia’s pre-war embassy and that strict continuity was 
more important that a central location— a position that reportedly left the Finns unimpressed (The 
Baltic Independent, 8-14 May 1992: 2).
9 The Baltic Independent, 31 January-6 February 1992: 1.
98 The Baltic Independent, 20-26 March 1992: 1. This issue had already been encountered in early 1992 
by British Foreign Office representatives, who called for Baltic “flexibility” on the issue of  
responsibility for Soviet debt (The Baltic Independent, 31 January-6 February 1992: 1, 5).
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representatives were so insistent on the illegal quality of Baltic incorporation into the 
USSR 99)
The Russian government, on the other hand, ran a rather more complicated line. As 
Urban has noted, the disassociation from communism practiced by the bulk of the 
former Soviet republics and satellites was facilitated by a “background understanding” 
that communism was never “our” doing in the first place, but belonged to “another 
nation, Russia.”100 This strategy was a luxury that the Russian nation did not enjoy. As 
Urban has observed, many Russian liberal-democratic reformers sought to overcome the 
identity crisis induced by the collapse of the USSR by reexamining Russia’s (false) 
identification with empire and building a (true) identity for itself “in consonance with 
the precepts followed by any—here the stock phrases—‘normal,’ ‘civilized’ 
country.”1 1 Yet the Russian government’s approach to the issue of legal succession did 
not help the process of disassociation. The Russian Federation assumed the legal status 
of the Soviet Union’s continuer state, not successor; the chain of legal continuity was 
not clearly severed. Nor did Russian representatives attempt to disassociate the new 
Russian Federation completely from its predecessor: as Kozyrev told the press after the 
dissolution of the Union in December 1991, Russia must now identify its “normal state 
and normal national interests, which consist partly of the heritage of what was good in 
the past, and mind you, such heritage is not only that of the Soviet, but also of the 
Russian period.”102
Russian representatives certainly tried to argue that the fact that Russia had assumed 
continuer-state status did not make it responsible for past Soviet activities, in particular 
the stationing of troops in the Baltic states. Kozyrev argued strongly at the Council of 
Europe in May 1992 that “Russia’s democratic leadership did not send troops to the 
Baltics.”103 At the July 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting, Kozyrev responded to a 
speech by Landsbergis calling the troops “Russian” by saying “Essentially, these are the 
former USSR’s troops, Russia did not put them there.”10 The same line was put 
forward by Yeltsin at the July 1992 G-7 summit in Munich: “These are the troops of the 
former Soviet Union that have been and are stationed there but that have been
99 The Soviet government had never conceded on this issue; despite the best efforts of Baltic 
representatives to see a reference to the “illegal actions” o f the Soviet leadership in 1939-1940, the 
State Council declarations recognizing Baltic independence in September 1991 simply spoke of the 
need to take into account “the specific historical and political situation” that “preceded the entry” of 
the Baltic states into the USSR (Radio Vilnius, 4 September 1991 (SWB, 6 September 1991: Cl/3); 
TASS, 6 September 1991 {SWB, 9 September 1991: B/15).
100 Urban 1994: 733. Urban argues that the effect of this impossibility of constructing “some other nation 
onto which might be loaded the negative moment in the recreation of a national community” was 
responsible for the transposition onto domestic conflicts of “the Manichean logic of unqualified 
nationalism.” This analysis, Urban argues, helps to explain why Russian political players actually 
attacked each other far more viciously than most o f them ever attacked foreign antagonists, as “the 
aggressive, blame-laying edge of this discourse [was] perforce...turned inwards.” (Urban 1994: 733- 
734, 748).
101 Urban 1994: 741.
102 Central Television, First All-Union Program, 28 December 1991 (SWB, 30 December 1991: A 1/1).
103 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3. An Estonian Foreign Ministry spokesman responded 
tartly that if the troops actually were not there at Russia’s behest, then international observers or 
mediators clearly were needed immediately.
104 “And,” Kozyrev added, “it seems to me that in general the fledgling Baltic states, which obtained their 
independence first and foremost thanks to the democratic forces in Russia, ought to recognize their 
moral obligations and not repay the Russian democrats by posing the question incorrectly and 
violating human rights.” Komsomolskaya Pravda, 11 July 1992: 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-135, 14 July 1992: 
8).
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transferred to Russian jurisdiction because they cannot just belong to no one.”105 
Kozyrev told journalists from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that “[tjhere is a lot of 
confusion about this, and that is why sometimes, for instance in the Baltic states, they 
speak of the ‘return’ of Russian troops, but that is entirely misleading terminology 
because the Russian Federation never sent those troops there in the first place. Those 
were the troops of the Soviet Union that we inherited...When people who have no 
[extensive knowledge] of the situation say this, I understand it. But when people who 
know every step, every minute of this struggle— when they start speaking of Russian 
imperialism and saying that we have to withdraw those troops we never sent there, that 
is something totally immoral.” 106 Nor, Russian representatives argued, should Russia be 
held responsible for compensation for damages. As the head of the Russian delegation 
for negotiations with Lithuania Viktor Isakov argued in an interview with the Baltic 
News Service, “[t]he Soviet Army was common to all the republics of the Union. Why, 
therefore, should the damage connected with its stay on the territory of Lithuania— 
which, by the way, was also a Union republic— be imposed on Russia alone?”107
At the same time, Russian representatives emphasized that while certain legal 
continuities existed between the former USSR and the Russian Federation, they were 
accompanied by a fundamental change in content. As Russian State Secretary Gennadiy 
Burbulis put it: “[w]e are trying to be recognized as a new state which, at the same 
time, is basing itself on Russia's centuries-long history, with the continuity with regard 
to those international achievements which we have inherited from the Soviet Union, but 
with substantially changed inner content of its foreign policy...This is the most 
fundamental interest of Russia’s foreign policy today.”108 As a consequence, Russian 
representatives argued, Russian policy, and the Russian Federation itself, should be 
assessed de novo.
Baltic representatives found this line of argument deeply unconvincing, arguing that the 
Russian government was trying to have its cake and eat it too. “The Russian 
Federation,” an Estonian representative argued, “is a successor state to the Soviet 
Union; the Soviet Union was a successor state to Soviet Russia; therefore Russia is 
successor state to the state that occupied the Baltics in 1940 and 1944.” 109 Landsbergis 
stated at the July 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting that “[t]oday Russia is the 
inheritor of the Soviet Union’s rights and responsibilities. It is, no doubt, also an 
inheritor of the afore-mentioned Soviet Union’s violations of legal agreements.”110 
Baltic representatives were particularly cross that the Russian Federation refused to 
recognize their legal continuity with the interwar states, but insisted on its own 
succession rights. Russia, an Estonian representative complained, “wants to achieve 
something new in international law— a partial succession, referring only to rights and
105 Indeed, Yeltsin argued, Russia was doing the former Soviet republics, including the Baltic states, a 
favour: “[These troops] ought to fall under someone’s jurisdiction, so that they are financed 
accordingly” (Bungs 1992a: 26).
106 Kozyrev 1994: 39, 42. Russian representatives were quick to cite Western validation of this position; 
thus, for example, a Russian delegate to the PACE stated that “[w]e obviously agree with Doc. 6680, 
which describes these troops as belonging to the former Soviet Union” (PACE ORD, 6 October 1992: 
503).
107 Girnius 1992a: 33.
l08Russian Television Network, 3 June; SOV-92-109, 5 June p. 23
109 Statement, Estonian delegation head, plenary of the CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki, 6 May 1992.
110 Statement, President of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis, CSCE Helsinki 
summit meeting, 10 July 1992.
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not to responsibilities.” “So,” he asked the Russian delegation, “is the Russian 
Federation a full successor, thus accepting the validity of the Tartu Treaty?”111
Historical and contemporary analogies
To Baltic representatives, the inability of Russian representatives to make their minds 
on the extent of continuity between the USSR and the Russian Federation was 
symptomatic of a continuity of nature between the two entities, one that would lead 
eventually to the Russian Federation replicating the errors and possibly the crimes of its 
predecessor. History, Baltic representatives feared, was already repeating itself in the 
Baltic states, and was likely to repeat itself further. Consequently, Baltic representatives 
drew extensively on historical analogies to characterize Russian behaviour and nature.
The most obvious analogy, as the foregoing has suggested, was to the former USSR.
For a start, Baltic representatives suggested that little change had occurred in the former 
Soviet mindset. For example, Kelam stated: “[The Russian representative’s] claims that 
the Russians were invited to the Baltic states by the Baltic leaders reminded me of the 
group of still unspecified Czech comrades who, according to Moscow, sent an invitation 
for the Soviet army to come and oppress the fledgling Prague Spring. I am worried 
about the continued imperialist-style thinking and wording.” A Latvian delegate to 
the PACE deplored having to “deal with such unpleasant attitudes that are associated 
with the former totalitarian regime.”113 And Meri later told the PACE that 
“unfortunately, a great number of Russians are... a special kind of people. In theoretical 
literature we call them homo sovieticus.”u4 As a consequence, comparisons between 
Russian proposals, position papers etc. and the darkest moments of the Soviet era, in 
particular the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, were frequent. 113 Even the structure of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) evoked suspicion; as Landsbergis said, 
if the CIS had one border guard, one army, and one currency, it might “pose a threat to 
Lithuania just as the Soviet Union did.”116
However, Baltic representatives also advanced analogies to other historical moments 
that were likely to carry especially negative connotations for their Western interlocutors. 
One of the most frequently invoked was the Nazi era. Comparisons were on occasion 
drawn between individuals; for instance, Meri called Liberal Democratic Party leader 
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy the “Russian Hitler.” But more general comparisons were 
drawn between policies as well. For instance, an Estonian delegation member statement 
at a CSCE followup meeting, describing Russian statements on Moscow’s intention to 
defend the rights of ethnic Russians abroad, argued that only Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany propagated policies where the ethnic interests of one nation were put above 
the sovereignty of states, resulting in World War II and genocide. Commenting on a
111 Statement, Estonian delegation head, 11th CSO meeting, Helsinki, 18 May 1992. The Russian charge 
in Tallinn, Oleg Popovich, had a sharp reply to this line of argument: “If we accepted Estonian logic 
[about the continuing existence of the pre-war state], then we could claim another 19 years in Paldiski 
[submarine base, due to the defense and mutual assistance pacts signed with the Soviet Union in 
September and October 1939, under duress but before the introduction of Soviet troops]” (The Baltic 
Independent, 19-25 June 1992: 3; Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 15).
112 PACE ORD, 30 June 1993: 1246-1247.
113 PACE ORD, 28 June 1995: 617.
114 PACE ORD, 25 April 1995: 320.
1,5 See, for example, The Baltic Independent, 12-18 June 1992: 1.
116 Radio Vilnius, 24 December 1991 (SfVB, 30 December 1991: A2/1).
117 The Baltic Independent, 1-7 May 1992: 4.
118 Statement, Estonian delegation member, Working Group III, CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki, 29 
May 1992.
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Russian memo to the Council of Europe on the situation of Russians in the Baltic, 
Lauristin commented: “Russia is blowing on the embers in the northeast of Estonia so 
that it can point the finger at us on the international stage. The situation is strangely 
reminiscent of Germany and the Sudetenland.5,119 Indeed, in Baltic rhetoric, the two 
regimes most hated in much of the Western world, the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, were 
often painted as two sides of the same coin, which currently bore the stamp of the 
Russian mint. For example, Landsbergis told radio journalists in May 1992 that “recent 
statements by Russian high officer and other officials invited comparisons to 1932— 
1940, when totally similarly-based expansionist claims (special security interests, 
interests of a Russophone population) were spread from Berlin and Moscow.” 120
Meanwhile, Russian representatives were not shy in drawing unflattering historical and 
current comparisons of their own. Some of these were mirror images of Baltic rhetoric. 
For instance, Russian as well as Baltic officials invoked comparisons with Nazi as well 
as Stalinist policy. For example, Sergei Kovalyev, chairman of the Russian Supreme 
Soviet Committee on human rights and erstwhile supporter of Baltic independence, and 
Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on foreign 
relations, wrote a stiff letter in February 1992 to Council of Europe General Secretary 
Catherine Lalumiere on the subject of Estonia’s citizenship laws: “The illegal character 
of this law, which lowers human worth, can be noted through its exceptions. 
Allowances can be made for those who have rendered exceptional services to Estonia. 
Does this not remind you, dear Mrs. Lalumiere, of the privileges for a few distinguished 
Jews during the Third Reich? Or the allowances for those especially distinguished 
representatives of peoples driven by Stalin from their lands?” Another analogy drawn 
by Russian representatives was to the apartheid policy of the formerly white-dominated 
South Africa. In the same letter, for example, Kovalev and Lukin wrote: “If you really 
believe, as was written in Izvestiya, that The extension of the right to vote to all 
Russians could endanger the identity of Estonians,’ then to an even larger degree this 
could be said of the white South Africans, or let’s say, the Belgian Walloons....This 
kind of division is translated as ‘apartheid’ in a whole series of European languages.” 122 
Yeltsin similarly described Estonian legal changes in mid-1993 as being “the 
introduction of an Estonian version of apartheid.”123
But historical analogies were not the only ones that the two sides drew upon. Among 
current situations, Bosnia was the one that elicited the most comparisons. The Russian 
Foreign Ministry, for instance, issued a statement in response to the Estonian Law on 
Aliens calling it an example of “aggressive nationalism”—the language used by the 
Ministry to describe the Balkan phenomenon.124 Speaking on issues of concern in 
Russian foreign policy, Kozyrev similarly observed that “ ‘[ejthnic cleansing’ is also 
carried out in ‘white gloves,’ so to speak. It is impossible to recognize as full-fledged 
the democracy being created solely for the ‘indigenous’ population, while the 
representatives of ethnic minorities are either being ousted from the country [sic].”125
119 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3.
120 Radio Vilnius, 22 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-120, 22 June 1992: 99).
121 Izvestiya, 25 February 1992: 3.
122 Izvestiya, 25 February 1992: 3.
123 ITAR-TASS, 25 June 1993 {SWB, 28 June 1993: A2/1).
'“4 The Baltic Independent, 25 June-1 July 1993: 1.
125 Moscow News, no. 25, 18 June 1993: 4. This kind of language was not exclusive to Russian 
representatives attempting to win Western support; for some time, it had been part of servicemen’s 
appeals to the Russian authorities for a slowing of the troop withdrawal and a guarantee of  
servicemen’s rights. For example, a letter to the Russian Supreme Soviet from the Latvian Union for 
the Protection of Veterans’ Rights and officers’ unions of the NWGF of October 1992 argued that
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Estonian le^al changes were similarly described by Yeltsin as “the practice of ethnic 
cleansing.”1 6 Meanwhile, Baltic representatives were drawing on the Bosnia analogy 
freely as well. For instance, an Estonian delegation head at a CSCE follow-up meeting 
argued that Soviet forces were as much a threat as the forces of the Yugoslav National 
Army (JNA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.127 Landsbergis similarly asked delegates to the 
PACE: “Who is the minority in Latvia? Which half of the population should be the 
object of international concern? Which is the suffering minority in Bosnia? I would ask 
the Assembly to think about the rights of individuals and nations, not of minorities. That 
is particularly important when a great power uses the minority issue against a small 
neighbor.”128
Baltic Russophones
As the last quote suggests, the legal and moral character of another group was at issue 
here as well, that of what (as the introduction has indicated) we will for the sake of 
simplicity call Baltic Russophones. As noted earlier, the Russian government’s initial 
primary concern had been to avert a mass migration of Russophones from the territory 
of the former Soviet Union, rather than to build political links to members of these 
groups resident outside Russia. However, to a significant degree in response to the 
situation of ethnic Russians and Russophones in Estonia and Latvia, the issue of the 
Russian state’s relationship to Russophone communities steadily developed broader 
salience in Russian politics. In December 1991, Kozyrev was already stressing that 
“[i jt is necessary to protect the interests and rights of our compatriots both abroad and in 
the republics of the former Soviet Union.” 30 By the end of 1992, policy towards 
Russophone communities on the territory of the former Soviet Union had become a key 
issue in a broader debate over the nature of the new, post-imperial Russian state and its 
place in the world. As even the Westernizing elements of the new Russian political elite 
came to believe that the Russian state was organically linked to Russophone 
communities and bore responsibility for their well-being, the status of these 
communities gradually coalesced into that of a “Russian diaspora.”131 The development 
of the concept of the diaspora “served to help to cement a new ruling elite; it provided a 
common sense of identity and purpose, and justified the assertion that Russia had a 
leading role to play in the post-communist world.” Meanwhile, the Estonian and 
Latvian populations and leaderships in particular often showed a tendency to use their 
resident Russophone populations as embodiments of the old system in their societies 
against which new, “true” Estonian and Latvian society could be contrasted.133
“[a]fter the Russian troop withdrawal... the last restraining force in the way of the national racists and 
their desire to ‘cleanse’ the Baltic race will be removed” (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 27 October 1992: 3 
(FB1S-SOV-92-210, 29 October 1992: 8)).
126 ITAR-TASS, 25 June 1993 (SfVB, 28 June 1993: A2/1).
127 Statement, Estonian delegation head, plenary of the CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki, 6 May 1992.
128 PACEORD, 1 July 1993: 131 1.
129 Melvin 1998: 27.
130 Interfax 25 December 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-249, 25 December 1991:40).
131 Melvin 1998: 36-37. By autumn 1994, the term “compatriot” (sootechestvennik) had emerged as the 
standard official term to describe members of the diaspora, although ambiguous, it had a variety of 
pragmatic and political advantages over other terms such as “ethnic citizens o f Russia” (etnicheskie 
rossiiane) (Melvin 1998: 38-39).
132 Melvin 1998: 41. It also provided the Russian military with an additional sense of mission: defense of 
the rights and interests of Russians “and those identifying ethnically and culturally as Russian” was 
listed as a particularly important task in the Russian General Staffs draft military doctrine of late 
1992 (Lough 1993a: 22).
133 Lieven 1994.
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While, like all the themes mentioned thus far, the debate over the character of Baltic 
Russophones played itself out in all available forums, Baltic and Russian representatives 
pursued it particularly vigorously at the Council of Europe, which from early 1992 was 
caught up in the political nightmare of attempting to define what constituted a “national 
minority.” Russian representatives, unsurprisingly, argued that Baltic Russophones 
constituted a legitimate example of this politically sensitive category. As one Russian 
delegate to the PACE put it: “Why draw an artificial distinction between various types 
of minorities? What is a historical minority? Did history stop after 1940?” 134 As a 
consequence, they argued, Russophones in the Baltic were merely trying to regain their 
legitimate rights: citizenship in their state of residence and the ability to vote. The 
failure of the Estonian and Latvian governments to extend these rights as automatically 
as they had to other residents—and many non-residents—of their states constituted 
discrimination, as a White Book circulated by the Russian delegation at the July 1992 
CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting argued. Indeed,  a Russian representative to the 
PACE insisted, it was a “strange idea” to hold “Russian-speaking workers and Russians 
in general responsible for the 1940 occupation, whereas they also suffered occupation 
by a totalitarian system.”136 Furthermore, as Kovalev told a UN High Commission on 
Human Rights meeting, Russia certainly did not want to Russophones in the Baltic 
states into an embryonic “fifth column;” on the contrary, he argued, the Russian 
government wanted them to be integrated into and play a useful part in Baltic 
societies.137
Baltic representatives, meanwhile, varied between two descriptions of Russophones. 
The first was “colonizers.” Estonian parliamentary speaker Ülo Nugis, back from a 
PACE conference, told the media that members of the Council were “gradually coming 
to understand” that Russians in the Baltic were not traditional ethnic minorities, but
• • 1 4 8citizens of the former USSR: “What is going on...is a process of decolonization.” 
Lauristin, at the PACE, agreed: the Baltic Russophone problem was a political, rather 
than an ethnic one, related to the “more general problem of settlement of territories that 
are under foreign occupation.”139 The second was “migrants.” Andrejevs at the PACE 
called Russophones in Latvia “immigrants;” Meri, at a meeting of ten Baltic nations, 
specified that they were “illegal immigrants.”140 Meanwhile, Estonian delegates to the 
CSCE suggested that their status was in essence comparable to that of migrant workers 
in Western Europe.141 Properly speaking, Baltic representatives argued, Baltic 
Russophones were citizens of the Russian Federation, not the states where they were 
resident.142 Estonian Foreign Minister Jan Manitski told the United Nations General
134 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1064.
135 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 July 1992: 7.
136 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1064.
137 ITAR-TASS, 7 February 1994 {SWB, 10 February 1994: B/5).
138 The Baltic Independent, 6-12 March 1992: 5.
139 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3. Lennart Meri later took a pitying tone at the PACE 
towards ethnic Russians who had not yet decided to apply for citizenship: “We must understand that it 
is psychologically very difficult for someone who was born in the Soviet Union and has never thought 
that other nations have rights” (PACE ORD, 25 April 1995: 321).
140 PACE ORD, 6 October 1992: 502; The Baltic Independent, 13-19 March 1992: 5.
141 Statement, Estonian delegation member, Working Group III, CSCE Followup meeting, Helsinki, 5 
June 1992.
142 The Russian Federation’s citizenship law, passed on 6 February 1992, ultimately extended the right to 
Russian citizenship to any resident o f any republic of the former USSR who did not have citizenship 
of another successor state; individuals initially had until 6 February 1995 to apply, but the deadline 
was extended several times (Kolsto 2000: 90). The prohibition on dual citizenship was lifted in June 
1993 (see Barrington 1995: 739-740 for an explanation of the legal loophole in which Baltic Russians
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Assembly that “[bjecause Russia is the self-styled successor state to the Soviet Union, 
Estonia considers citizens of the former Soviet Union who currently reside in Estonia as 
a result of Soviet occupation to be Russian citizens, unless they have become citizens of 
another country.”143 The Latvian delegation to a CSCE meeting concurred: “Latvia did 
not appear as a result of the breakdown of the USSR...Since non-citizens of Latvia have 
the right to acquire Russian Federation citizenship until 1 February 1995, they cannot be 
considered stateless: the Russian Federation, not Latvia, is a successor state of the 
USSR.” 144
A point on which Baltic representatives were unanimous was that Russophones in the 
Baltic were not deserving of Western sympathy. These were not the world’s 
downtrodden, Baltic representatives argued; rather, they were members of a formerly 
privileged group who were anxious about losing their favored status. A Latvian delegate 
told the PACE: “Russians are worried about losing their dominating position and 
privileges in the Baltic states, which they have regarded as their property for 280 
years.”145 An Estonian delegate put the same case: “[I]f colonising foreigners are in one 
sense or another socially or politically privileged, tension is created in society, and it 
cannot be said that such tension is unreasonable. For example, it is impossible in the 
Baltic states to say ‘Let the retired KGB officers retain their privileges because it is 
disputable from the human rights point of view to rob them of their privileges’...any 
kind of unsubstantiated privilege creates substantiated discontent and gives birth to the 
ideology of revenge.”146
Anxious though Baltic Russophones might be about their privileges, Baltic 
representatives further argued, they were not anxious to be naturalized. As a Lithuanian 
delegate to the PACE put it, “[w]e think that there is a difference between ethnic 
minorities which have naturally and freely settled in one or other territory or have a 
historical past, and minorities which have been artificially displaced into occupied and 
annexed territories and do not show any wish to naturalize.”147 This issue sometimes put 
Baltic delegates, otherwise strongly disposed towards the causes of underdogs and the 
dispossessed, on the conservative side of the house. For instance, a Latvian delegate to 
the PACE, participating in a debate over a broad-scale report on the fight against 
racism, xenophobia, and intolerance in Europe, noted: “Incoming people often—as in 
Latvia—do not ask permission or say ‘thank you’ or other nice things, but decimate us 
and practice genocide. They immediately disregard local customs and conditions. I am 
not talking about spitting where no one else used to spit. Is it discrimination to ask 
people not to spit or should we change over and ask them to accept us into their society
148and start learning to spit?”
The underlying purpose of the debate over the legal and moral character of Baltic 
Russophones, of course, was to establish the nature of the Estonian and Latvian states 
and of Russian intervention on Russophones’ behalf. If Western audiences agreed to a 
characterization of Baltic Russophones as legitimate national minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia, this outcome would support the Russian government’s dim view of Estonian and 
Latvian citizenship and social security laws. If, however, Baltic Russophones came to
were, in the eyes of some officials, momentarily trapped, but from which they were definitively freed 
in June 1993).
143 The Baltic Independent, 2-8 October 1992: 3.
144 Statement, Latvian delegation to the Committee of Senior Officials-Vienna Group, 9 September 1992.
145 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1068.
PACE ORD, 29 September 1993: 1514.
147 PACE ORD, 30 June 1993: 1239.
148 PACE ORD, 28 June 1995: 617.
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be generally thought o f as colonial holdovers, Estonian and Latvian legal practice would 
be vindicated. But even more importantly, such a conclusion would support the Baltic 
view that Russian interest in the fate of Baltic Russophones was at best inappropriate, 
and at worst positively sinister.
3|C 5|C 3|C 5|C
And indeed this was the ultimate thrust of all Russian and Baltic characterizations, from 
those about the nature of Russophones to those about the nature of the Russian and 
Baltic states: to convince Western audiences, not just that the situation was bad (in 
exactly what way, of course, depended on who was speaking), but that worse was to 
come. In the Baltic case, this sense of menace focused around a military threat, not only 
to the current sovereignty (in the sense of the right to free one’s territory from unwanted 
foreign troops), but also to the future integrity and possibly the future independence of 
the three Baltic states. For example, at a North Atlantic Assembly conference on 
security in the Baltic states held in Vilnius in December 1991, delegates ranging from 
Landsbergis to Latvian Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis asked for NATO assistance in 
securing the withdrawal of troops, characterizing the troop presence as a threat to Baltic 
sovereignty.149 Andrejevs at a UN Human Rights Committee meeting openly accused 
Russian conservative forces (at that time seemingly growing in strength) of wanting to 
re-annex Latvia (“They want Latvia back...because it’s an approach to the sea— it’s 
very simple”) and Jundzis was quoted by an indignant Russian Foreign Ministry 
spokesman as telling foreign audiences that the Russians had “everything ready to 
reoccupy Riga.” 150 Indeed, Baltic representatives described the threat to the Baltic states 
as ultimately emanating not just from the Russian military, but from the political 
character of the Russian state. As a Lithuanian representative at the PACE put it: “The 
realization of [Baltic security] will depend entirely on the success of the process of 
democratization in the former USSR.”151
In the Russian case, the main potential victims of Baltic aggression were Baltic 
Russophones. Kozyrev, speaking of Estonia before the World Human Rights 
Conference in June 1993, said: “In Estonia...a discriminatory law on local self- 
government was adopted while the Tallinn authorities are getting ready to forcibly evict 
thousands of people from their apartments with the help of police.” Kozyrev stated 
the case most concisely at the World Human Rights Conference in June 1993: “A 
democracy cannot be recognized as genuine if it is created only for the ‘indigenous’ 
population while representatives of ethnic minorities are either forced out of the country 
or placed in the position o f outcasts. This is happening, for instance, in Estonia... 
where on the following day after its admission to the Council of Europe, a 
discriminatory law on local self-government was adopted while the Tallinn authorities 
are getting ready to forcibly evict thousands of people from their apartments with the 
help of police.” 53 But threats to Russophones carried a broader menace as well; as a 
Russian Foreign Ministry statement responding to changes in Estonian citizenship laws 
put it, “Estonia’s line for confrontation is fraught with serious consequences, not only 
for our two states but the whole Baltic region.” 154
14’ The Baltic Independent, 27 December 1991-8 January 1992: 1.
150 The Baltic Independent, 12-18 March 1993: 9; Baltfax, 2 March 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-039, 2 March 
1993: 16).
151 PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 701.
152 Moskovskie Novosti, 25, 20 June 1993: 7 (FBIS-SOV-93-115, 17 June 1993: 12).
153 Moskovskie Novosti, 25, 20 June 1993: 7 (FBIS-SOV-93-115, 17 June 1993: 12).
154 The Baltic Independent, 25 June-1 July 1993: 1.
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But the Baltic states and Baltic Russophones were not the only ones portrayed by the 
two sides as being at risk: also in danger was Europe itself. This menace was to some 
degree described as tangible. In the case of the Baltic states, Russian representatives 
described Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws as threatening to unleash another 
Balkan crisis. A Russian memorandum “The violation of human rights in the Baltic 
countries,” circulated at the May 1992 session of the PACE (which Kozyrev as well as 
Baltic delegates addressed) stated that Baltic citizenship policies increased “the 
likelihood of organized anti-discrimination action (strikes etc.) by the Russian-speaking 
population that could destabilize the situation in these countries and Europe as a 
whole.”155 Yeltsin in his letter to Boutros-Ghali of late 1992 wrote: “Europe must not 
become the site of conditions fostering outrageous discrimination against a substantial 
segment of the population of these states and the creation of new seats of tension and 
conflict.”156 A Russian Foreign Ministry statement on a draft Latvian law on elections 
argued that it was necessary to take action before it was too late to prevent “aggressive 
nationalism from flourishing in the Baltics—a danger for Europe about which Russia 
has frequently warned the world.”157 In the case of Russia, Baltic representatives argued 
that, as Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council Anatolijs Gorbunovs put it at the July 
1992 CSCE Summit Meeting in Helsinki, the presence of Russian troops was “not only 
a domestic problem of the Baltic states, but a threat to overall European security.”158 
Andrejevs used similar language at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe in February 1992: “The Baltic military district forces must be withdrawn and 
their units dismantled...If we want to ensure the security of the whole of Europe, we 
must start from today.”159
But equally importantly, Russian and Baltic representatives were keen to describe their 
antagonists’ actions and nature as a threat to European values. In the same letter cited 
above, for example, Kovalev and Lukin wrote: “[If apartheid] is becoming quite 
intolerable in South Africa, it is incomprehensible how it can be justified in the system 
of European democracy.” 160 Speaking in 1993 on issues of concern in Russian foreign 
policy, Kozyrev opined that “[i]nattention to the rights of ethnic minorities threatens to 
damage the Baltic region and really turn Europe into a zone of special, yet not supreme 
but minimized and double standards.”161 Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste 
meanwhile argued that the Bosnian situation holds an “important message for the West 
regarding Baltic security:” “If the New Europe is to succeed, all who belong to the New 
Europe must be seen as relevant, and Western democracies must be willing to stand by 
the principles upon which those states and societies are based. We in Estonia believe 
they will. We must believe that, because we share these ideals, and these ideals 
necessarily are a cornerstone to our security.”162 As Meri later put it in Stuttgart: “If 
Europe is unable to find an adequate resolution to the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict and 
to Russia’s regrettable Monroe doctrine, Europe will bleed to death, both morally and 
physically. A thousand little jabs, which each on its own seems painless and 
insignificant, can bring about a fatal result: the destruction of Europe’s basic values, and
155 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3.
156 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 23-24, 15-31 December 1992: 56 (JPRS-USR-93-004-L, 24 March 1993: 
1 ).
157 ITAR-TASS, 23 December 1993 (SWB, 1 January 1994: E/2).
158 Address, CSCE Summit Meeting, Helsinki, 9 July 1992.
159 PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 692.
160 Izvestiya, 25 February 1992: 3.
Ihl Moscow News, no. 25, 18 June 1993: 4.
162 Speech at the NUPI-CSIS Conference on Baltic and Nordic Security, Oslo, 21 September 1992 
(http://www.vm.ee/speeches/1993/93sept21 .html).
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thus its peaceful and democratic future.”163 In the final analysis, Meri told an audience 
at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, “[t]he Baltic states are serving 
as a test case for world peace, because the Moscow conservatives are using the Baltic 
states to see...how strong is West Europe’s commitment to international law.”164
In lieu of a conclusion
All of these rhetorical campaigns, particularly the Baltic campaign, were strikingly 
well-organized and well-coordinated. After all, as Landsbergis told reporters in August 
1992, Russian initiatives were an effort to put the Baltic states on the back foot: they 
had to respond.16'7 After Yeltsin attacked Latvian “ethnic cleansing” in April 1992, 
Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar told reporters that the three Baltic Prime Ministers 
had already discussed countering the Russian propaganda effort, and that Estonia 
“would not let Latvia be singled out in a Kremlin attack.”166 According to one Russian 
press report, representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia intended to meet in 
August 1992 in order to discuss a program of action against Russian claims of human 
rights abuses. The report quoted the chairman of the Latvian parliamentary legal 
commission as saying that “Baltic politicians must work to fight back disinformation 
about human rights abuses in their countries.”167
Of the three Baltic governments, the Estonian government’s response was particularly 
professional. In August 1992, a conference on information policy brought together 
representatives of the State Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry, and the Estonian media. 
The conference discussed ways to influence foreign opinion; it also discussed strategies 
for countering “propaganda hostile to Estonia.” A Foreign Ministry representative was 
quoted by reporters as saying that the Ministry’s Information Department had decided to 
set up a “counter-propaganda team,” with press attaches to be posted to major embassies 
abroad. (The Foreign Ministry had already set up in April 1992 a three-person human 
rights bureau responsible for compiling and distributing information on the treatment of 
Estonia’s Russophones.169) A press release by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued in January 1994 gives some idea of the department’s level of organization and 
rhetorical skill. Entitled “Rough ideas and themes to help formulate letters to the editor, 
comments etc. on Kozyrev’s statements (concerning a continued Russian military 
presence on the territory of the former Soviet Union),” the release opens with the 
disclaimer that “[tjhese are not necessarily Estonian Foreign Ministry positions.” It then 
goes on to suggest themes for concerned citizens: “Big bully terrorizing smaller, weaker 
neighbors; Russia...views Baltic independence as a temporary annoyance; Kozyrev 
turns out to be Zhirinovskiy.” On the subject of “concepts such as ‘near abroad,’ 
‘historic sphere of interests’,” it suggests: “When Hitler announced his plans, the world 
powers did not take him seriously at first. The West set out on a path of 
appeasement...A bite of the Baltics will not fill the bear’s stomach; it will merely whet 
his appetite.” It suggests as a closing line: “Will we now hear demands for the
163 The Baltic Independent, 14-20 May 1993: 3.
164 Postimees, 2 April 1993: 2 (JPRS-USR-93-069, 4 June 1993: 72).
165 Radio Vilnius, 7 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-154, 10 August 1992: 74).
166 The Baltic Independent, 30 April-6 May 1993: 1.
167 Izvestiya, 6 July 1992: 4.
168 Radio Tallinn, 7 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-154, 10 August 1992: 72). 
167 The Baltic Independent, 4-10 December 1992: 3.
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resignation of some or all of the Baltic leaders to be replaced by individuals more 
‘friendly’ to Russia? Where have we heard things like this before?”1 0
But all three Baltic governments worked well together to coordinate their lines of 
argument. Coordination was particularly evident at the PACE, where the Lithuanian and 
Estonian delegations met prior to sessions to agree on lines of attack.171 Baltic delegates 
frequently used almost identical language to drive their points home. Thus Landsbergis 
told the PACE that the war in Chechnya was “[a] dirty, nineteenth-century-type colonial 
war for subjugation (waged) by one side, and a twentieth-century war for liberation 
(fought) by the other,” while Kelam called it “a colonial war against a national minority 
that is a hangover from the nineteenth century.”172
Some coordination was also evident among Russian representatives and within Russian 
delegations, although most frequently between representatives from the same general 
end of the political spectrum. For example, Rybkin and Sergei Baburin used strikingly 
similar language in their presentations on Estonia at the PACE in October 1992: Rybkin 
cautioned against “the tendency to adopt double standards,” noting that the challenge 
facing the Council of Europe was to successfully implement its many resolutions on 
human rights in Yugoslavia and Estonia, while Baburin urged against allowing “double 
standards, for example towards Yugoslavia and Estonia.”173 However, sharp 
disagreements also emerged among Russian delegations, for instance to the PACE, 
where Zhirinovskiy was consistently more extreme in his statements that his fellow 
delegation members. One incident is revealing: shortly after one particularly rabid rant 
by Zhirinovskiy, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas made a speech at the PACE 
in which he condemned extremist statements by “some Russian politicians.” In question 
time, a member of the Russian delegation “thanked the President for his detailed 
statement with its peaceful connotations. He appreciated the words which had been 
spoken with regard to certain extremists, and noted approvingly that one of these had 
been disappointed during his visit to Strasbourg, as his comments had fallen on deaf 
ears.”174
This chapter has introduced the basic themes and aims of Russian and Baltic rhetoric, 
and has attempted to place them within the spectrum of diplomatic practice. But how 
much support did Baltic and Russian representatives succeed in attracting to their 
causes? How did Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns change over time? And what
170 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, 18 January 1994. This kind of organization paid 
off, at least in the eyes of the media. As an editorial in the Tallinn-based English-language newspaper 
The Baltic Independent stated: “Estonia’s public relations leave Latvia and Lithuania standing. In 
most cases, officials are available, and the reaction is determinedly persistent. Every serious piece of 
Russian defamation meets with a due response. Admittedly, not every Foreign Ministry statement 
makes the international press, but it shows policy-makers and diplomats in the West and in Russia that 
Tallinn is awake and articulate.” The paper later praised the Estonian Foreign Ministry for its ability 
to dispatch “crisp, useful statements by fax and e-mail within hours of an issue becoming topical.” By 
contrast, the paper complained, “the Lithuanian government does not even use e-mail, and statements 
tend to be bureaucratically worded and late...And there is nothing to stop the President or Prime 
Minister from taking the initiative in the propaganda war— if Mart Laar can write for The 
International Herald Tribune, why can’t Mr. Slezevicius?” (The Baltic Independent, 25 February -3  
March 1994: 6; The Baltic Independent, 8-14 July 1994: 6).
171 The Baltic Independent, 21-27 January 1994: 2.
172 PACE ORD, 2 February 1995: 244; PACE ORD, 23 January 1996: 118.
173 PACE ORD, 5 October 1992: 452; PACE ORD, 6 October 1992: 499.
174 PACE ORD, 14 April 1994: 416. Needless to say, Zhirinovskiy’s inclusion in the Russian delegation 
to the PACE was a godsend to the Baltic rhetorical campaign. As Estonian delegate Tunne Kelam 
politely said: “I would like to thank Mr. Zhirinovskiy for his utterances because, against that 
backdrop, [our] case... is even more convincing” (PACE ORD, 31 January 1995: 51).
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kind of emotional impact may these battles have carried? These questions are the 
subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Four: Identity Diplomacy, Part Two.
The last chapter has introduced the basic themes and aims of Russian and Baltic rhetoric 
that emerged in 1992. This chapter outlines the course of events of the next few years. It 
sketches out the amount and kind of support that Baltic and Russian representatives 
succeeded in attracting to their causes, as well as the way in which the Russian and 
Baltic governments responded to outside pressure. It details the ways in which the 
Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns changed over time. And it attempts to outline 
the emotional implications for diplomats of participation in these battles for their 
nations’ honors.
The ripping yarn continues
As described in the previous chapter, by early 1992 it had become evident that bilateral 
efforts to reach agreement on a troop withdrawal or citizenship issues were going to be 
fractious affairs. As a consequence, by the middle of 1992, Baltic and Russian 
representatives were routinely reaching out to European organizations for support. 
During the early months of 1992, relatively few strong statements of support for either 
side emerged from any of these organizations. From March on, the CSCE was caught up 
in preparatory meetings for the July Helsinki Summit Meeting, with few major 
statements being issued in the interim. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Manfred 
Wömer told Baltic politicians that NATO did not consider it possible to exert economic 
or political pressure on Russia to speed up a withdrawal, although the issue could be a 
topic of discussion for the NACC.1 NATO sources said that the alliance was unwilling 
to get involved in the dispute: one NATO official told Reuters that “[fjirstly, we don’t 
have the money, and secondly, we don’t want to see NATO getting involved in rows 
like this.” However, he and other NATO sources suggested that the alliance would 
extend “moral support” to the Baltic states. 2 3The PACE was similarly cautious about 
coming down in favour of either side on troop withdrawal or legal issues/
By mid-1992, however, the Baltic states had received support for their position on troop 
withdrawals from two organizations: NATO and the CSCE. The Final Communique of 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC, the council of NATO foreign ministers) meeting in 
June, while it expressed the ministers’ sympathy for the “practical problems for Russia 
connected with such withdrawals,” nevertheless affirmed the ministers’ understanding 
for Baltic concerns about the lack of progress in negotiations. Affirming the “basic 
principle of international law that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a 
sovereign state requires the explicit consent of that state,” the ministers called on “the 
states concerned to conclude agreements soon, establishing firm timetables for the early 
withdrawal of former Soviet forces.”4
1 The Baltic Independent, 20-26 March 1992: 1.
2 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3.
3 This caution continued over the following years: motions for resolutions condemning the slow pace of
the Russian troop withdrawal (24 September 1992, Doc. 6680; 17 September 1993, Doc. 6919), 
Russian recalcitrance in returning embassies belonging to the interwar Baltic states (6 September
1994, Doc. 7119), and Russian minority nationality policy toward the Finnic Setu people (7 February
1995, Doc. 7235) were tabled at various points, but lacked the parliamentary support to be passed.
4 Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Oslo, 4 June 1992. This
call was echoed at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) meeting the next day, but with 
somewhat weaker language (“Military forces should be stationed on the territory of a foreign state 
only with the consent of that state. We recognize the importance of establishing soon, in the 
negotiations underway, a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states”)— a
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A month later, the final document of the July CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting, while 
diplomatic in its language, also came down solidly on the side of the Baltic states. 
Baltic, Russian, and other CSCE representatives had been engaged in intensive 
negotiations since preparatory meetings started in March as to whether the issue of a 
troop withdrawal should be included in the final document. Russian representatives 
made strong objections, arguing that the issue should be regarded as purely bilateral, 
and demanding that there be no reference to international law, as well as no explicit 
mention of Russia as the culprit. Meanwhile, the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, had 
threatened to veto the summit declaration if their concerns were not met.* 5 As a 
compromise, the Helsinki Summit document included the statement: “Even where 
violence has been contained, the sovereignty and independence of some States still 
needs to be upheld. We express support for efforts by CSCE participating States to 
remove, in a peaceful manner and through negotiations, the problems that remain from 
the past, like the stationing of foreign armed forces on the territories of the Baltic States 
without the required consent of those countries. Therefore, in line with basic principles 
of international law and in order to prevent any possible conflict, we call on the 
participating States concerned to conclude, without delay, appropriate bilateral 
agreements, including timetables, for the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of 
such foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic States.”6 This language was 
virtually identical to that proposed by the combined Baltic delegations a few days 
earlier; reportedly as a compromise with Russian representatives, Russia’s name was 
not mentioned, and references to “violations” of international law were dropped.7
But concern was also mounting at the CSCE and elsewhere for Russophones in Estonia 
and Latvia. The responses of teams sent by the Council of Europe in late 1991 and early 
1992 to assess the human rights situation in Estonia and Latvia respectively were 
indicative of the response of many European observers: while neither team found that 
Estonian or Latvian policy violated international law, they both nevertheless expressed 
concern that the policies in practice excluded large number of residents from 
citizenship, certainly in the short term.8 While the citizenship law passed by the
change that reportedly resulted from Russian pressure (Statement, Meeting o f the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council, Oslo, 5 June 1992; The Baltic Independent, 12-18 June 1992: 10). These 
sentiments were reaffirmed at the December 1992 NAC/NACC ministerial, with an appeal from the 
NACC to both sides to “exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations to resolve remaining 
problems, including those of a social and material nature.” However, both communiques added that
the withdrawal should not be linked to other issues. The Russian delegation succeed in altering into 
the NACC communique language slightly to read “This withdrawal should not be—and is not— linked 
to other issues” (Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels (M-
NAC-2 (92)106, 17 December 1992); Final Communique, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council, Brussels (M-NACC-2(92)109, 18 December 1992)).
5 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 July 1992: 1. Indeed, one meeting of the Baltic Council threatened to
refrain from signing Helsinki document if no agreement was reached on specific timetable (Radio 
Riga, 26 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-126, 30 June 1992: 9)).
6 “The Challenges of Change,” CSCE Helsinki Document, 10 July 1992. A week earlier, the CSCE
Parliamentary Assembly had called for a troop withdrawal in their final declaration, attached to which 
was also a special statement, “On the presence of Soviet troops in the Baltic countries.” The statement 
called for a Russian withdrawal “as soon as possible,” but also acknowledged the existence of  
practical difficulties accompanying a withdrawal, including housing shortages, and called on CSCE 
states to provide financial assistance to aid the withdrawal (Declaration, CSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly, Budapest, 5 July 1992).
The Baltic Independent, 17-23 July 1992: 1. Further CSCE declarations in 1992 were largely consistent 
with the line taken at Helsinki; for example, the Stockholm Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 
December 1992 expressed “concern” that the withdrawal was not yet complete (“Decisions on 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” (3STOCK92.e, 15 December 1992)).
8 Orentlicher 1998: 304.
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Estonian parliament in February 1992 had established only a two-year residency 
requirement (plus language and civics tests), the earliest that a resident not granted 
automatic citizenship could apply for naturalization was 30 March 1993; furthermore, 
non-citizens were not permitted to vote in national elections or to stand for national- 
level elected offices. As a consequence, of a total population of 1.6 million, the number 
of registered voters at the time of the June 1992 referendum on the constitution was 
only 660,000; only about a sixth of the non-Estonian population was eligible to vote on 
the constitution (which of course enshrined the citizenship law) or in the elections for 
the first post-Soviet parliament in September 1992.9 As a consequence, the Estonian 
parliament elected in September 1992 contained not a single Russian-speaker.10 
Meanwhile, Latvian Russophones were in limbo, with their legal status uncertain and 
the establishment of formal procedures for naturalization on hold.* 11 In December 1992, 
a CSCE team requested by the Russians and invited by the Estonian government 
assessed Estonia’s citizenship laws and compared their elaboration and implementation 
with international human rights standards (the lack of established legislation made such 
a visit to Latvia pointless). The mission’s report, which was distributed confidentially 
through the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), determined that the Estonian 
constitution and citizenship laws met “international standards for the enjoyment of 
human rights” and that steps to overcome shortcomings of existing legislation were 
underway. Furthermore, it concluded that “[njeither under Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights nor under any of the CSCE documents is Estonia 
obligated to grant its citizenship to all residents without any preconditions.” However, 
the report noted the potentially negative psychological impact of the existing legal 
situation on non-citizen Russophone population and made extensive 
recommendations.12
In considering further action, the CSCE relied for further action on the opinions and 
advice of two groups: its High Commissioner on National Minorities and its in-country 
missions. The CSCE had emphasized protection of minority rights as a particular 
concern in the final documents of the November 1990 Paris summit and the September- 
October 1991 Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE. 13 As a consequence, the Office of High Commissioner on National Minorities 
was established in July 1992 at the Helsinki Summit Meeting; former Minister of State 
of the Netherlands Max van der Stoel was appointed as Commissioner in December 
1992. Van der Stoel inaugurated his tenure—and the function of the new position—with
9 Chinn and Truex 1996: 136-137.
10 Torniidd 1994: 74. For example, residents of Soviet Estonia who wished to acquire Estonian citizenship
could apply after residing on Estonian territory for two years, starting from 30 March 1990; 
applications would then be subject to a one-year waiting period, with the result that the earliest a 
resident could acquire citizenship would be 30 March 1993. Candidates for citizenship also had to 
pass an Estonian language test requiring a mastery o f 1,500 words and an examination, conducted in 
Estonian, of their knowledge of the Estonian constitution (Torniidd 1994: 74; Vares 1994: 122).
11 The power to pass a new citizenship law was delegated to a new Latvian parliament, whose election—
in which non-citizens were barred from voting— was delayed until June 1993 (Girnius 1994: 30). 
Thus, as Lowell Barrington observes, “while Latvia lacked a citizenship law, it had a citizenship 
policy” (Barrington 1995: 738).
12 “Report of the CSCE ODIHR mission on the study of Estonian legislation (invited by the Republic of
Estonia)”, 3 February 1993. An United Nations fact-finding team that visited Latvia in October 1992 
reached essentially identical conclusions about the situation there (Rudensky 1994: 70-71).
13 “Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,” 4
October 1991. The term “national minority” had been used in the CSCE process since the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act (article 7), but was not defined in the High Commissioner’s mandate (“Fact sheet 
on the High Commissioner on National Minorities,” http://www.osceprag.cz/inst/hcnm/hcnm3.htm, 
accessed 10 June 1997).
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a tour of the Baltic states in January 1993 to assess the situation first-hand, and returned 
in March, sending recommendations to the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian Foreign 
Ministers in letters of 5 March (Lithuania) and 6 April (Estonia and Latvia) 1993.14 
Meanwhile, a November 1992 CSO meeting in Prague secured agreement for the 
Chairman in Office to appoint a personal representative to explore the possibility of a 
CSCE mission to Estonia; a decision was reached to appoint the mission at the 
December 1992 CSO meeting in Stockholm, and the mission’s terms of reference were 
approved at the February 1993 CSO meeting in Prague.15
Many European governments, however, were reluctant to extend too sympathetic a hand 
to Baltic Russophones, at least partly because some were not anxious to see precedents 
set that might increase pressure to naturalize guest workers in their own countries.16 The 
Council of Europe, for example, acknowledged indirectly the problems facing Baltic 
Russophones.17 Nevertheless, the Council’s exclusion in early 1993 of Baltic 
Russophones from the category of “national minority” and their effective redefinition as 
“migrants” was an important moment for the Baltic campaign. In February 1993, after 
much negotiation, the PACE recommended in February 1993 the adoption of an 
additional protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, to concern persons belonging to national minorities. This 
Recommendation defined a “national minority” as a group of persons in a state who 
“reside on the territory of a state and are citizens thereof’—thereby effectively 
sidestepping the issue of Russophones who had not yet attained Estonian or Latvian 
citizenship.18 However, an extensive debate was already underway over a PACE 
resolution on population movements on the territory of the former Soviet Union. On 4 
February 1993, major changes occurred during parliamentary debate to paragraph 3 of 
the draft Document 6739. The document initially read “Twenty-five million Russian- 
speaking people living in the Baltic states, Moldova, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the 
republics of Central Asia are becoming increasingly concerned for their safety and their 
rights in response to indigenous nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist pressure and 
prejudice.” After debate, the paragraph was changed to read “Twenty-five million 
Russian-speaking people...are becoming increasingly concerned by changes in their
14 CSCE Communication 124, 23 April 1993.
15 17th CSO meeting, 5-6 November 1992, Prague (17CSO/J2); 18th CSO meeting, Stockholm, 13-15 
December 1992, (18CSO/J3, annex 2); 19th CSO meeting, Prague, 2-4 February 1993 (19CSO/J2, 
annex 1). The terms of reference of Estonian mission were to: establish contacts with competent 
authorities; collect information and provide technical assistance and advice on the states o f  
communities in Estonia; facilitate the re-creation of a civic society, in particular through the 
promotion of local mechanisms to facilitate dialogue and understanding; prepare for the transfer of the 
Mission’s responsibilities to local representative institutions. For a useful overview of the Mission’s 
activities in Estonia, see Sousa Freire 2001.
16 Personal interviews, Council of Europe, June 1998.
17 As part of its Demosthenes project, starting in 1992 the Council proposed, approved and administered
in the three Baltic states and Russia (as well as elsewhere in the former Eastern bloc) a series of 
programs o f cooperation and assistance designed to facilitate the creation and consolidation of  
democratic state institutions, ranging from advice on legal reform to programs designed to strengthen 
local institutions. While limited in scope and budget, the programs targeted both indigenous and 
Russophone non-governmental entities in its efforts to build both state and non-state capacity (Manas 
1996: 114-118). See Activities o f the Council o f Europe, the Council’s annual report, from 1992 
forward for details of cooperation activities in specific countries.
18 As well as that of guest workers (PACE Recommendation 1201, 1 February 1993). This definition
drew upon an earlier PACE recommendation, in which the PACE had defined national minorities as 
“separate or distinct groups, well-defined and established on the territory of a state, the members of  
which are nationals of that state and have certain religious, linguistic, cultural or other characteristics 
which distinguish them from the majority o f the population” (PACE Recommendation 1134, 1 
October 1990).
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political and economic positions, including losing their privileges, and for their 
rights...” 19 As a rapporteur for the Council’s Political Affairs Committee later put it: 
“We must therefore always draw an important distinction between ‘national minorities’ 
(which are historical or indigenous) and a massive influx of nationals of an occupying 
state.”20 The ruling was an important factor in removing barriers to Estonia’s admission 
to the Council of Europe, which eventually occurred in May 1993 (and which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter).
Shortly after Estonia’s admission to the Council, major controversy broke out in 
Russian-Estonian relations over two new laws on the status of non-citizen Russophones. 
On 19 May the Estonian parliament passed a law on local elections that allowed all 
residents to vote but barred non-citizens from running as candidates. Furthermore, on 21 
June, the Estonian parliament adopted a law that declared all non-citizens as “aliens.” 
The purpose of the law was to regularize the position of non-citizens, who for the most 
part had applied neither for Estonian citizenship (which they would only have been 
eligible to do since 30 March) or Russian citizenship, and who as a consequence were 
residing in Estonia on the basis of their Soviet-era propiski (residency registration 
papers). Aliens had two years in which to apply for residence and work permits, as well 
as to decide which citizenship they wished to take out. Since the law gave aliens no 
guarantee that they would receive residence or work permits, which in any case were 
only valid for five years, many Russophones feared that the law was tantamount to an 
expulsion order.21 The move came at a dangerous time, as Russophones were already 
planning to hold referenda on local autonomy in the heavily Russophone-dominated 
cities of Narva and Sillimae in Estonia’s northeast in late July. Unsurprisingly, the two 
laws provoked a firestorm of Russian official criticism, with Russian Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev and President Boris Yeltsin freely invoking images of “apartheid” and 
“ethnic cleansing.” A Russian Foreign Ministry statement responding to the law 
argued: “Those foreign partners of Estonia who now close their eyes to its aggressive 
nationalism and who unreservedly support Tallinn’s dangerous course will also be 
affected.”23
The Estonian law on aliens in particular (as well as to a lesser degree that on local 
elections) provoked concerns in Western institutions and capitals. The CSCE CSO 
meeting of June/July 1993 noted “with concern” developments in the situation of the 
Russian-speaking population in Estonia and in relations between Estonia and Russia, 
and urged both sides to demonstrate their commitment to the CSCE principles of 
dialogue, specifically calling on the Estonian government to take into consideration 
recommendations by the High Commissioner on National Minorities.24 Indeed, before 
signing the legislation into law, Estonian President Lennart Meri submitted to it to the 
CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Council of Europe for 
comments. While both found the law entirely acceptable with regard to non-residents 
of Estonia who might seek to live and work there, both had concerns about its 
application to those already resident, especially those whose residence was long­
standing. Van der Stoel’s comments focused on the “political and ‘mass psychology’
19 PACE Resolution 996, 4 February 1993; debate in PACE ORD, 4 February 1993: 834-851.
20 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1057.
21 Sheehy 1993: 8-9.
22 ITAR-TASS, 23 June 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-122, 28 June 1993: 8); Sheehy 1993: 9.
23 The Baltic Independent, 25 June-1 July 1993: 1.
24 22nd CSO meeting, Prague, 30 June-1 July 1993 (22CSO/J2, annex 2).
25 Van der Stoel had already been heavily involved in making recommendations to both Estonia and
Latvia. For a detailed discussion of HCNM activities in Estonia and Latvia, see Foundation on Inter- 
Ethnic Relations 1997: 52-56, 65-68.
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aspects" of the contemplated law, while the Council of Europe’s more legalistic 
approach resulted in a series of recommendations designed to remove ambiguities that 
might be open to arbitrary interpretation by authorities.26 In response to these 
comments, Meri recommended changes, approved by the Estonian parliament on 8 July, 
that won praise from the OSCE mission in Estonia and Van der Stoel himself.27
Meanwhile, despite the lack of formal agreements, troop withdrawals were in fact 
proceeding steadily. After the Helsinki Summit Meeting in July 1992, Russian 
representatives expressed commitment to the withdrawal process and predicted major 
breakthroughs at a meeting of Baltic and Russian foreign ministers in August. However, 
Baltic representatives found the proposals put forward by the Russians at that meeting 
unacceptable.28 Moreover, Yeltsin issued a directive on 29 October suspending troop 
withdrawals from the Baltic states, a move which provoked enormous alarm in Baltic 
capitals and an expression of “concern" from the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers 
meeting in Stockholm in December 1992.29 Nevertheless, the directive did not appear to 
slow withdrawals significantly, and troop strengths were down to about 10,000 in 
Lithuania in January 1993, about 6,500-7,000 in Estonia in May 1993, and about 23,000 
in Latvia in April 1993.30
Furthermore, significant progress was occurring towards a complete withdrawal of 
troops from Lithuania. On 8 September 1992, the Lithuanian and Russian defense 
ministers had signed a preliminary agreement that provided for the departure of former 
Soviet troops no later than 31 August 1993; although a Russian Foreign Ministry 
official told the press that Yeltsin’s directive of 29 October suspending the withdrawal 
had voided this agreement, Yeltsin later assured Lithuanian President Vytautas 
Landsbergis that this was not the c a se /1 Kozyrev, defending during a visit to Vilnius a 
differentiated Russian policy towards the three Baltic states (which some had described
20 Huber 1994: 8; Sheehy 1993: 9. The CSCE Chairman In Office, Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha 
af Ugglas, particularly emphasized the importance of Van der Stoel’s advice in a letter to Meri of 8 
July (Huber 1994: 10).
2' In particular, residence and work permits were guaranteed to any alien who had been registered as a 
resident prior to 1 July 1990; the stipulation that permanent residence and work permits were to be 
renewed every five years was also dropped (Sheehy 1993: 9). These changes largely met the Council 
of Europe’s concerns. However, not all of Van der Stoel’s recommendations were accepted. Van der 
Stoel continued to play an important role in defusing tensions surrounding the referenda on autonomy 
in Narva and Sillamae, the postponement of which he had unsuccessfully urged (Kand 1994: 94). Van 
der Stoel engaged in active consultations with all parties, including the Russian government; for 
example, en route to Estonia on 25 June, he met with Kozyrev, whose carefully worded endorsement 
of the High Commissioner’s activities avoided compromising Van der Stoel’s mission (Huber 1994: 
10) .
' 8 The Russian side demanded that the three Baltic states: 1) grants legal status to the armed forces in the 
interim to ensure their normal functioning; 2) accept Russian control over the strategic installations of 
Paldiski naval base and Skrunda radar station for the near future; drop compensation claims for 
damage inflicted by the USSR from 1940 to 1991; 4) help construct housing in Russia for the 
returning trooops; guarantee transit rights for military transport going to Kaliningrad; 6) provide 
compensation for the land and property vacated by the troops; 7) guarantee social security (including 
pensions) and human rights for retired Soviet officers and their families; 8) alter laws that infringed on 
the rights of Russophone non-citizens; and 9) drop territorial claims (Bungs 1993: 52).
29 “Decisions on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” (3STOCK92.e, 15 December 1992). Western 
officials— for example, the defense ministers of the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Iceland, and Canada—also made individual statements (Rudensky 1994: 75). The final declaration of 
the July 1993 Parliamentary Assembly meeting reaffirmed that group’s concern that the withdrawal 
was not yet complete (“Final Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly,” 9 July 
1993).
30 Bungs 1993: 53, 55, 56.
31 Bungs 1993: 53.
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as an effort to divide and conquer), said: “Of course there’s a difference, but in our 
view, it is a difference that is in Lithuania’s favor...we certainly take [different Baltic 
policies such as citizenship policies] into account in developing our contacts and 
relations...[the approach of the Lithuanian government,] not only in matters of human 
rights but in many other issues, such as dealing with the military....is somewhat 
significantly quieter and more civilized.” By mid-1993, while no political agreement 
had been reached, the Lithuanian side was confident that essential problems had been 
solved, and that troops would be indeed out by 31 August.33 And in fact, the last of the 
troops were withdrawn on schedule, despite last-minute footdragging by Russian 
negotiators.34
All three Baltic governments, while welcoming the withdrawal, stressed that it was only 
the first step in a total withdrawal from the Baltic states, and that hence there was no 
cause for complacency.35 This position was for the most part that taken by European 
organizations and governments as well. 36 The communique of the December 1993 
NACC ministerial meeting reiterated the language of the June communique, again 
“stressing” the need for “an expeditious withdrawal” for the sake of regional and
T *7 • • • •
European security. The December 1993 Rome CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers
• ”3 Q
meeting also again expressed “concern” that the withdrawal was not yet complete. 
The CSCE weighed in again in early 1994, with the March CSO meeting recalling “the 
commitments undertaken under paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration 1992, 
in the Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting and in the Decisions 
of the Rome Council Meeting, the Committee of Senior Officials,” and urging “all 
parties to promptly conclude appropriate agreements, including timetables, through a 
speedy and continuous negotiating process for the early, complete and orderly 
withdrawal of the remaining Russian troops from the territories of the Baltic States.” 
However, the meeting also welcomed the progress towards an agreement between 
Latvia and Russia on Skrunda. The Estonian delegation to the meeting entered into the
32 Lithuanian Radio, 15 March 1993 (SWB, 20 March 1993: A2/1).
33 Bungs 1993: 54.
34 Girnius 1994: 30.
For example, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys pointed out that, despite the pullout from 
Lithuanian soil, Lithuanians would not feel safe as long as troops remained in the other two Baltic 
states (he also mentioned Kaliningrad) (Latvian Radio, 27 October 1993 (SWB, 29 October 1993: 
E/2)).
35 On only two occasions did Western organizations fail to offer rhetorical support to the Baltic position.
One of these was the Council of Europe’s summit of heads of state and government in Vienna in 
October 1993, at which the Council had promised to consider a Baltic proposal for a declaration on 
troop withdrawal that would call for detailed instructions for the withdrawal and request economic 
assistance to speed the pullout. However, in the event the heads of state and governments issued a 
declaration on the events in Moscow of September-early October, deploring “the heavy loss of life 
that resulted from the resort to violence, provoked by the opponents of reform” and affirming their 
solidarity with “the supporters of reform under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin.” Also, no 
mention was made of troop withdrawal issue in the January 1994 NAC ministerial communique, 
because of the focus on the announcement of the establishment of the Partnership for Peace (The 
Baltic Independent, 8-14 October 1992: 3; “Declaration on Russia,” Meeting of Heads of State and 
Government, Vienna, 8 October 1993; Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council, Brussels (M-l(94)3, 11 January 1994)).
37 Statement, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Brussels (M-NACC-2(93)71, 3 
December 1993). The June 1993 NAC meeting communique had skirted the issue of the troop 
withdrawal, but the NACC ministerial communique had been stiffer, “stressing” that “an expeditious 
completion of the withdrawal” was important for regional and European security (Final Communique, 
Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Athens (M-NAC-1 (93)38, 10 June 1993); 
Statement, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Athens (M-NACC-1(93)39, 11 June 
1993)).
38 “CSCE and the New Europe: Our Security is Indivisible,” CSCE Rome Document, 1 December 1993.
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record an interpretative statement, in which it characterized the Russian backing off of 
the agreed final date as “unilateral” and protested the linkage by the Russian delegation 
of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia to “issues of a different nature.”39 
Furthermore, all Western organizations made it clear that linkage between the troop 
withdrawal and citizenship issues would not meet with their support.40
However, the status of Russophones in Estonia and Latvia was still high on the list of 
Russian concerns. In early 1994, the Russian government approved a draft program on 
“The main directions of the state policy of the Russian Federation towards compatriots 
living abroad,” which indicated that “[questions of financial, economic, social, and 
military-political cooperation between Russia and the individual states will be linked to 
the concrete policy they pursue regarding the rights and interests of Russians 
(rossiyane) living on their territory.”41 Furthermore, the problems of Russophones in 
Latvia, who were still in legal limbo, had been growing. The Latvian parliament had 
been considering since late 1993 a citizenship law that set a sixteen-year residency 
requirement for people who wished to be naturalized, as well as setting yearly 
naturalization quotas.42 Non-citizens born in Latvia would be eligible to apply for 
naturalization from 1 January 1995; those not born in Latvia would have to wait until 
2000, at which point 2000 per year would be permitted to apply. The estimated figure 
for Latvian-born non-citizens being 230,000, this meant that in 2000 there would still 
have been around 500,000 non-citizens, whose naturalization would have taken 250 
years. 43 Unsurprisingly, European organizations had reacted unfavorably. The 9 
September 1993 CSCE CSO-Vienna Group meeting appointed a CIO personal 
representative to Latvia; a monitoring mission was approved at the 21-23 September 
1993 CSO meeting, and the terms of reference were approved at the 7 October 1993 
CSO-Vienna Group meeting.44 Meanwhile, the Council of Europe had reported 
critically on the bill, and Council representatives had indicated that passage of the law 
would prevent Latvian admission.45 The Latvian parliament had already twice 
considered recommendations by the Council and the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities for changes, but had voted them down each time.46 But now the parliament 
passed a final version on 21 June 1994. Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis, however, 
refused to sign the law; acting on his recommendations, the parliament amended the law
39 25th CSO meeting, 2-4 March, Prague (25CSO/J3).
40 Girnius 1994: 31.
41 But harsh measures against delinquent states “will be executed only after a serious situational analysis,
taking into consideration the interests of the people they are intended to defend” (Kolsto 2000: 93). 
Estonian Foreign Minister Jiiri Luik commented that “[t]he draft program sounds to us very much like 
Hitler’s program of protecting the so-called Volksdeutsche living outside the boundaries that then 
constituted Germany. As we all know, Hitler’s program was a justification for the invasion and 
annexation of the Sudetenland. Because the program refers to ethnic Russians, one is forced to wonder 
whether the Russian Foreign Ministry also intends to carry out its program in, say, Brighton Beach?” 
(address at the Swedish Institute o f International Affairs, 2 March 1994 
(http://www.vm.ee/speeches/1994/94mar2.html)).
42 Girnius 1994: 31; Ortenlicher 1998: 301-302.
43 The Baltic Independent, 24-30 June 1994: 1.
44 2 8th CSO-Vienna Group (CSO-VG) meeting, Vienna, 9 September 1993 (VG/J28); 23rd CSO meeting,
Prague, 21-23 September 1993 (23CSO/J3, annex 3); 31st CSO-VG meeting, Vienna, 7 October 1993 
(VG/J31, annex 1). The terms of reference of Latvian mission included: provision of advice to Latvian 
government authorities and to non-governmental institutions and individuals on citizenship issues and 
related matters; gathering information; and reporting on developments (19th CSO meeting, Prague, 
19CSO/J2, Annex 1, 3 February 1993; 31st CSO-Vienna Group meeting, Vienna, VG/J31, Annex 1, 7 
October 1993).
45 Latvian Radio, 21 February 1994 (SWB, 2 March 1994: E/3); The Baltic Independent, 24-30 June 1994:
1.
46 Girnius 1994: 31.
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on 22 July to remove the quota system and dropped the residency requirement to five
47years.
Meanwhile, the troop withdrawal from Latvia and Estonia moving into its final phase. 
In November 1993, a breakthrough had occurred in Russian-Latvian talks when Russian 
representatives suggested Russian forces could be withdrawn by 31 August 1994 if the 
Russian military were allowed to retain Skrunda for six years and if military pensioners 
were given social guarantees. On 30 April 1994, reportedly after heavy pressure on the 
Latvian side by the United States, Yeltsin and Ulmanis signed a final agreement: while 
troops were to be out by 31 August, Skrunda was to remain in Russian hands for four 
more years, with an additional 18 months for dismantling. 48 Furthermore, the Latvian 
government undertook to provide social protection for the withdrawal of troops and 
social guarantees for pensioners who had retired before 28 January 1992.49
However, although Russian forces continued to withdraw from Estonia, handing over 
bases as they went, Russian-Estonian negotiations had reached an impasse. In 
November 1993, Russian representatives had proposed a deadline of 31 August 1994; 
however, negotiations in early March 1994 came to halt when Russian negotiators 
called the deadline into question, demanding additional financial assistance for the 
construction of housing in Russia for the withdrawing troops and permanent residence 
permits for all retired officers.50 The Russian move provoked concern in European 
organizations and Western capitals. The communiques of the NAC and NACC 
ministerial in June 1994 mentioned that the members “expected” an Estonian-Russian 
agreement to match that signed with Latvia; the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 
1994 added its support.51 US President Bill Clinton, who had pushed hard for Yeltsin’s 
inclusion as a full participant at the 10 July G-7 summit in Naples, privately warned 
Yeltsin that he expected a withdrawal from Estonia in return.Furthermore, on 13 July
4i Ulmanis signed the law on 11 August; minor amendments were passed in March 1995 (Girnius 1994: 
31; Ortenlicher 1998: 302). Ulmanis told the press that the US, UK, French and German governments 
had also sent letters criticizing the law (Latvian Radio, 28 July 1994 (SWB, 30 July 1994: E/1)).
48 Girnius 1994: 32.
49 Girnius 1994: 31.
50 “Information report on honoring of commitments entered into by new member states,” addendum to the
Progress Report of the Bureau of the Assembly and the Standing Committee, 31 May 1994 (Doc. 
7080, addendum iv).
51 Final Communique, Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul (M-NAC-1(94)46, 9
June 1994); Statement, Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Istanbul (M- 
NAC-1 (94)48, 10 June 1994); “Vienna Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly”, Vienna, 8 
July 1994 (PA(94)7).
52 According to Clinton advisor and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s words were: 
“Boris, don’t screw this up. You’ve got to get out of Estonia. Everyone is watching. You’ll either 
confirm the worst that a lot of people think about Russia or you’ll confirm the best I’ve been saying 
about you” (Talbott 2002: 127; see Talbott 2002: 124-129 for an informative overview of the course 
of negotiations). Clinton’s ability to take such a forthright stance stemmed at least in part from the 
sympathy that he had expressed for Russian concerns about the status of Baltic Russophones. A joint 
statement issued by Yeltsin and Clinton at their meeting in Vancouver in April 1993 had stated that: 
“Admitting that violation of rights of minorities and ethnic communities has been an increasingly 
important source of international instability, both parties have emphasized the importance of full 
protection of human rights, including the rights of ethnic Russians and other minorities on the territory 
of the former USSR. The presidents reaffirmed their commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts in 
that region on the basis of respect for independence, territorial integrity, and security interests of all 
states” (quoted in Rudensky 1994: 75). Clinton also promised to increase assistance for construction 
of housing for troops being withdrawn from the Baltic states (Talbott 2002: 63). At the US-Russian 
summit in Moscow in January 1994, Clinton also told the press that he had agreed to “press strongly 
[with the leaders of the Baltic states] the proposition that the Russian-speaking people in those 
republics must be respected” (Lynch 1994: 17).
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the US Senate passed an amendment to the foreign aid bill blocking aid to Russia if 
troops were not out by 31 August.53 And indeed, after much to-ing and fro-ing, on 26 
July Yeltsin and Meri finally signed two agreements, one on a withdrawal by 31 
August, one guaranteeing social protection, if not necessarily citizenship, for military 
pensioners.54 On 31 August 1994 the last Russian troops withdrew from Latvia and 
Estonia, an event that local leaders, reportedly heeding hints from Moscow, declined to 
turn into a celebration.55
It might have seemed, then, that two of the three major issues plaguing Russian-Baltic 
relations had been effectively resolved by the end of August 1994. First, the troop 
withdrawal was complete; and indeed, in the course of 1992-1994 the three Baltic states 
had considerably consolidated their security vis-ä-vis their larger neighbor. For instance, 
although economic issues are outside the scope of this dissertation, it is worth noting 
that throughout this period the Baltic states showed themselves substantially immune to 
Russian economic pressure.56 In principle, the Baltic states were potentially vulnerable: 
as late as 1996, Russia remained Latvia’s and Lithuania’s most important trade partner 
and Estonia’s most important export partner, as well as the three republics’ only source 
for gas and main supplier of oil.57 The Russian legislature had repeatedly called for 
economic sanctions against Estonia and Latvia, a call to which the Russian government
c o
occasionally succumbed. For example, in July 1994 the Russian government placed all 
the Baltic states in the highest tariff category for agricultural imports.59 But Baltic 
governments had successfully fought back most efforts at pressure through 
diversification or simply quick thinking. For instance, when Yeltsin in November 1992 
announced that the Baltic states were to be required to pay hard currency for their
53 As Talbott complained, “[t]he Republicans were positioning themselves so that when the deadline
passed and Russian troops were still in the Baltics, they could declare the beginning of Russia’s return 
to an imperialistic footing and the failure of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy” (Talbott 
2002: 128). This was not the first time that the Senate had weighed in on this issue. In July 1992 and 
again in October 1993, the Senate had voted to tie US aid to the troop withdrawal: unless the White 
House could certify in a year’s time that Russia had made “significant progress” towards a troop 
withdrawal and ending military activities in the region, US aid would be restricted to humanitarian aid 
(The Baltic Independent, 10-16 July 1992: 3; Interfax 29 September 1993 (SWB, 8 October 1993: 
C/2)).
54 Talbott later heard from the Estonian side that Meri had made an emotional plea directly to Yeltsin,
saying that “Yeltsin had heroically broken Russia free from its own history and given it hope of a 
better future...[and] had been a defender of Estonia’s freedom in the last days of the Soviet Union. 
But now he seemed to be behaving like Stalin.” In response, Yeltsin asked plaintively why Meri had 
not been willing to talk to him directly: why had he “turned his friends in the West against him, 
particularly Bill Clinton?” (Talbott 2002: 129). The agreement on pensioners contained the provision 
that the Estonian authorities could deny citizenship to individuals who they felt posed a security risk, 
provided that a CSCE representative was included on the examining commission to ensure fair play 
(Girnius 1994: 32).
55 Estonian Radio, 25 August 1994 (SWB, 27 August 1994: E/1). Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar, for
instance, told the press that “all Estonian political forces and the whole nation should forget hatred 
and resentment and make a new beginning,” and that no major festivities would be organized (ibid.). 
The three Baltic presidents issued a joint statement calling the 31st “a significant day” and saying that 
the withdrawal would give the Baltic states better opportunities to strengthen their democratic 
institutions and raise the standard of living of “the Baltic people” (Latvian Radio, 31 August 1994 
(SWB, 2 September 1994: E/2)). The three Baltic foreign ministers also issued a statement celebrating 
the fact that that “fifty-five years after the beginning of World War II, the Baltic states [are now] free 
of any foreign occupying troops” (BNS, 31 August 1994 (SWB, 5 September 1994: E/1).
50 For details, see Drezner 1997, Girnius 1995.
57 Girnius 1996b: 19.
58 Only occasionally; for example, the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution in July 1993 demanding that
economic sanctions be imposed on Estonia within two weeks, a call that the government sidestepped 
(Rossiskaya Gazeta, 7 July 1993: 1 (SWB, 9 July 1993: A2/2).
59 Drezner 1997: 108.
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energy deliveries due to their differing economic and political policies, the Latvian 
government shut down deliveries through the oil pipeline running from the Russian 
border to the port of Ventspils—a move that while it cost the Latvian authorities $10 
million a month in lost transit and port fees, cost Russian oil suppliers $70 million a 
month in unfilled contracts.60 Similarly, when the Russian gas supplier Gazprom raised 
its prices after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvijas Gaze immediately responded 
with price hikes to customers, keeping its debt down to a manageable amount.61 
Furthermore, although threatening statements sometimes emerged from the Communist- 
dominated Duma, popular support for any kind of revanchist military action seemed 
low.62 In sum, the security and future of the Baltic states seemed, if not assured, 
nevertheless substantially strengthened.
Second, the legal situation of Russophones in Latvia and Estonia had largely stabilized. 
Although many Baltic Russophones were unhappy with their marginalized status, few 
appeared to consider themselves in any physical danger. Indeed, relatively few had felt 
it necessary to leave the Baltic states. Between 1989 and 1993, a total of around 141,000 
people had moved to Russia from the Baltic region (39,248 from Lithuania; 59,130 
from Latvia; and 42,604 from Estonia), with a substantial proportion in each case 
having left before the collapse of the USSR and the large majority having left in 1992. 
By the end of 1993, emigration from all three states had slowed dramatically.63 The vast 
majority of those left were under no threat of expulsion; almost all enjoyed social 
guarantees close to, if not equal to, those of Baltic citizens. Indeed, few had felt it 
necessary to apply for Russian citizenship (a point that had the potential to calm Baltic 
fears of a fifth column as well); as of 1 July 1994, only 42,000 Russophones living in 
Estonia, 25,000 living in Latvia, and 15,000 living in Lithuania had taken out Russian 
citizenship.64 And in fact, although sometimes with some misgivings, Western experts 
had judged Estonian and Latvian laws to be in line with international law and European 
practice.65 The OSCE missions to Estonia and Latvia stayed in place, and the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities continued to make occasional recommendations 
on measure to make naturalization easier, particularly as regarded the language tests.66
60 Drezner 1997: 106.
01 Drezner 1997: 108. A number of analysts (see, for instance, Girnius 1994) have noted that the Russian 
government’s attempts to impose economic costs on the Baltic states hurt Russophones as much as 
anyone else, arguing that this point raises questions about the seriousness of Russian government 
concern for their plight.
62 For instance, in March 1996 the Duma passed a ‘non-binding’ resolution that branded as “illegal” the
Belovezhskaya agreement that abolished the USSR. Yet “a broad survey taken by Russian state radio 
less than a month after the Duma vote found that only 14% of those polled saw the restoration of the 
USSR as ‘an important task.’ Meanwhile, over 46% considered that it was impossible to ‘restore’ the 
USSR” (Buck 1997: 8).
63 Chinn and Kaiser 1996: 95; Haas 1996: 58.
64 Girnius 1994: 33. While the number of residents taking out Russian citizenship tapered off sharply in
Lithuania, it continued to rise in Estonia and Latvia; 120,000 Estonian residents had taken out Russian 
citizenship by spring 1997 (Kolsto 2000: 90.)
65 Orentlicher 1998; Chinn and Truex 1996 (see the latter for a comparison o f the Estonian and Latvian
citizenship policies with those of other major European states.) Meanwhile, US Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger had advised Estonian leaders in September 1992 that the United States had no 
problems with Tallinn’s handling of citizenship and human rights issues (Park 1994: 83); Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott similarly told the Latvian government that the US administration did 
not believe that “violations of human rights” were occurring in Latvia, although he felt that “political 
problems” existed (Latvian Radio, 16 September 1993 (SW B , 24 September 1993: E/3)).
66 Lack of citizenship, although it no longer led automatically to the threat of expulsion from either
Estonia or Latvia, nevertheless still left many Russophones in fear for their futures. In the Estonian 
case, for instance, the Estonian Law on Aliens contained provisions permitting the expulsion of aliens 
who were unemployed for more than nine months. Citizenship was also necessary for individuals to 
be members of trade union leaderships, a restriction that Andersen argues seriously impeded non-
109
The Council of Europe also continued to recommend steps that Estonia and Latvia 
could take to promote naturalization of non-citizens. In this substantially changed 
environment, one might have expected Russian and Baltic representatives to take a 
breather.
Even more clearly, Western interest in and patience with further calls for action were 
running out. The Council of Europe extended membership, its ultimate imprimatur of 
approval, to Estonia as well as Lithuania in May 1993 (Latvia, due to its lack of a 
codified citizenship law, had to wait until January 1995), a judgment with which no 
major European government or organization disagreed. Furthermore, the PACE 
explicitly upheld its earlier definition of a national minority in a January 1995 
recommendation on the protection of rights of national minorities.67 Consequently, if 
Russian representatives still felt concern (despite the cheering assessment of European 
observers) for Baltic Russophones, it seemed unlikely that they were going to find
z o
European audiences supportive. Furthermore, Western governments had made it 
abundantly clear that Estonian and Latvian calls for border revision would receive no 
support. Indeed, even the Lithuanian government broke ranks with its neighbors, 
insisting on the inviolability of post-World War II borders, as a return to pre-war 
borders would mean giving up a substantial amount of territory (including the national 
capital of Vilnius and the important port of Klaipeda), seized by the Soviets from 
Poland under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, that had been transferred to Lithuania by 
the Soviet government in 1939.69
The campaigns continue
Any optimism that a lull might emerge, however, was soon dashed. On the Baltic side, 
some representatives extended to the Russian government some slight credit for finally 
having effected a complete troop withdrawal. The Estonian and Latvian Prime Ministers 
Mart Laar and Valdis Birkavs, in a statement on the withdrawals from their countries,
citizen Russophones’ possibilities for defending their economic and social interests during 
privatization. Non-citizens were also disadvantaged in the purchase of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, with the result that non-citizen Russophones were less able to participate in an area of the 
economy with dynamic development possibilities (Andersen 1997: 309-314). Meanwhile, non-citizens 
were barred from direct ownership of land in Latvia (Gooch 1998).
67 PACE Recommendation 1255, 31 January 1995. The failure of Russophones to act with alacrity to take
up citizenship in Estonia (where the majority of non-citizen residents were eligible to apply for 
citizenship immediately after 30 March 1993, although of course they still had to pass the language 
and civics exams) or in Latvia (where those born in Latvia became eligible to apply in 1997, and those 
born outside Latvia in 1998, after amendments to a law that would originally have required them to 
wait until 2000) has prevented the emergence of what the Council would define as a substantia! 
Russophone national minority in either state. For instance, of the 120,000 individuals in Latvia whose 
“window” had opened by autumn 1998, fewer than 10,000 had received citizenship (Kolsto 2000: 
118, 121).
68 Indeed, not all Russians were supportive: Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gorbachev’s former advisor and deputy
director of the new Gorbachev Foundation, told the press during a visit to Estonia that he was 
convinced that the stories of the hardships facing Russophones in Estonia were “largely exaggerated” 
and expressed amazement that one could live somewhere for twenty or thirty years and not learn the 
local language (Estonian Radio, 11 January 1993 (SIVB, 15 January 1993: A2/1).
6QBorder clarification issues with Kaliningrad were, however, addressed by a joint Lithuanian-Russian 
committee in early 1992 (Izvestiya, 20 January 1992: 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-015, 23 January 1992: 28); 
Lieven 1994: 79). Poland actually transferred Klaipeda/Memel to German control prior to the signing 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, in March 1939 (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 16). For an admirably 
clear summary of the interwar Lithuanian-Polish territorial dispute, see Miniotaite 2001: 9.
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said: “The continuation of democratic processes in Russia, a distinctive mark of which 
is the departure of the Russian troops from the soil of the Baltic states, gives all of us 
a better feeling of security and takes away unnecessary fears and worries.” 70 
Furthermore, a joint statement by the three Baltic presidents (Meri, Ulmanis, and 
Algirdas Brazauskas) circulated at the CSCE after the withdrawal noted that “[w]ith the 
completion of the withdrawal of its forces from our countries, Russia now moves closer 
to the accepted norms of international behaviour.” And indeed, some Russians 
appeared prepared to acknowledge, at least in retrospect, the anxiety that the presence of 
troops had caused. Presidential spokesman Vyacheslav Kostikov, for instance, when 
asked if Russian troops had been withdrawn from Germany too soon, answered: “If 
Russian troops had stayed any longer, we could have got ourselves into a situation 
where Russia would have been rejected both morally and physically. We overstayed in 
certain places in the Baltic region and are now considered there to be occupiers. If we 
had wished to avoid this in the Baltics, we should have done what we have done now 
[i.e. withdraw] . ” 72
Nevertheless, trouble soon started up again. Within days Baltic representatives were
*7 0
expressing criticism of the way in which the withdrawal was handled. Furthermore, 
Baltic representatives soon were arguing that the troop withdrawal was, as Estonian 
Foreign Minister Jüri Luik described it, only the “first step towards Baltic security.” 74 
(While Estonian representatives were the most actively involved in the continuing 
campaign, and Lithuanian representatives—with the notable exception of soon-to-be- 
former-President Landsbergis—the least, the continued campaign was not the exclusive 
province of any one Baltic government.) Nor, for their part, did Russian representatives 
show any signs of softening their jaundiced view of the Estonian and Latvian 
governments in particular. As Kozyrev argued in early September, the issue of human 
rights in the Baltic states had been overshadowed by the continuing presence of former
7 SSoviet troops; now that the troops were gone, it was “our neighbor’s turn to act.”
To some degree, familiar themes reasserted themselves in these new Baltic and Russian 
rhetorical campaigns. Any shadow of military forces in the Baltic region continued to 
provoke Baltic condemnation; for instance, in the opinion of Estonian Deputy Speaker 
Arnold Rüütel, the Russian government’s unwillingness to mandatorily repatriate retired 
military officers from the Baltic states was evidence of a Russian “colonial mindset,” 
and the transit of Russian military cargo destined for Kaliningrad through Lithuania was 
“the most serious threat to the security of the Baltic states.” 76 Russian reforms continued 
to be treated with the greatest skepticism, with Meri summing up Russia as “a Potemkin 
democracy.” 77 Nor were Russophones in the Baltic region experiencing rehabilitation: 
Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas, for instance, commented that Russians in the
70 Statement of the Prime Ministers of the Republic o f Estonia and the Republic of Latvia, 31 Auugst
1994 (circulated at the CSCE, no date or document number given).
71 Joint Statement of the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 31 August 1994 (circulated at the
CSCE, no date or document number given).
72 Radio Russia, 3 September 1994 (SWB, 6 September 1994: Sl/3).
73 The Estonian Foreign Ministry, for instance, issued a statement on 2 September complaining that some
servicemen had been illegally demobilized and must be repatriated; that bases had not been handed 
over properly; and that the military had caused extensive environmental damage in the process of the 
pullout as well as during their tenancy (ETA, 2 September 1994 {SWB, 9 September 1994: E/2).
74 Opening remarks, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual Ambassadorial conference, 11 
September 1994 (http://www.vm.ee/speeches/1994/94septll.html).
75 Interfax, 14 September 1994 (SWB, 16 September 1994: B/5).
76 The Baltic Independent, 28 April-4 May 1995: 2; Estonian Radio, 5 October 1994 (SWB, 8 October
1994: E/1).
77 The Baltic Independent, 28 April-4 May 1995: 1.
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Baltic were “worth their weight in gold” as a fifth column for “the Kremlin’s
• • • • 7 8  w  #imperialistic plans.” For the Russian part, Baltic citizenship policies continued to be 
described in grim terms. For instance, a Foreign Ministry statement on amendments to 
the Estonian citizenship law that established a six-year residency requirement for 
naturalization, instead of the previous three, described the legislation as “another 
regrettable step designed to legitimize the policy of discriminating against the country’s 
Russian-speakers and trampling on their basic rights.”79 The Foreign Ministry further 
continued to characterize Estonian policy as one of “step-by-step ‘soft’ ejection of non- 
Estonians,” with Russian representatives telling the PACE that if Estonian (and later 
Latvian citizenship laws) were permitted to stand, “Russians may end up as refugees.”80
But some new themes emerged as well.81 For their part, to demonstrate that Russia still 
posed a tangible threat to Baltic security, Baltic representatives focused on three issues: 
the Russian concept of the “near abroad” and accompanying concerns about an 
emerging “sphere of influence;” Russian peacekeeping aspirations; and the situation in 
Chechnya. The first two of these concerns emerged in Baltic rhetoric most clearly 
between 1992 and early 1994; however, they continued to inform Baltic thinking after 
the troop withdrawal was complete. The last, however, emerged after the withdrawal 
was complete.
The first of these concerns related to a phrase initially used relatively innocently by 
Kozyrev in January 1992: “What is taking shape around us is something that could 
probably be called the ‘near’ abroad. The ‘former’ fraternal republics, who are tired of 
totalitarian oppression, have chosen, just like Russia, the path of independent 
development. This is a gratifying process that reassures us and is a guarantee of new 
friendship.”82 Baltic representatives, however, took strong objections to the term: as a 
Latvian delegation to the CSCE complained, “ [o]ne also often hears offending 
formulations by our Russian colleagues: near abroad, post-Soviet space, territory of the 
former USSR.” Baltic objections stemmed from a fear that this and other terms 
carried sinister implications. First, Baltic representatives feared that application of this 
term to the entire territory of the former Union would blur the very distinction that they 
were so anxious to draw between the Baltic states and the other former republics of the 
Soviet Union: that the Baltic states had never been a true part of the Union, and 
therefore should not be considered to share in other Union-mates’ problems, or the 
solutions that Russia offered to those problems. Second, Baltic representatives feared 
that the Russia solution to “common” problems was in fact to establish a sphere of 
influence on the territory of the former Union that would leave them open to meddling 
in their internal affairs. For instance, in June 1992 Estonian negotiator Endel Lipmaa 
leaked a Russian “position paper” of undisclosed provenance that referred to the Baltic
78 CTK News Agency, 3 April 1996 (SWB, 5 April 1996: E/1).
79 Interfax, 24 January 1995 (SWB, 26 January 1995: B/9).
80 Interfax, 25 March 1995 (SWB, 29 March 1995: B/9); PACE ORD, 14 April 1994: 404.
81 This chapter only deals with issues o f relative significance for the broader European community. For
glimpses of the tedious Russian-Estonian exchange over the status of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
Estonia or Russian and Baltic foreign ministr y claims and rejoinders regarding the putative presence 
of white-stockinged female Baltic snipers in Chechnya, see, for instance, Estonian Radio, 6 December 
1994 (SWB, 9 December 1994: E/1); “Russia” TV, 18 January 1995 (SWB, 24 January 1995: E/3); 
ITAR-TASS, 10 December 1995 (SWB, 12 December 1995: B/l 1); BNS, 17 January 1995 (SWB, 25 
January 1995: E/3).
8“ Izvestiya, 2 January 1992 (SWB, 4 January 1992: A 1/1).
83 Statement, Latvian delegation to the Committee of Senior Officials-Vienna Group, 9 September 1992.
84 Baltic governments were not mollified by the fact that the Russian Foreign Ministry had assigned them
to its Second European Department, along with northern and western European countries, and not to 
the CIS department (The Baltic Independent, 19-25 June 1992: 3).
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countries as part of a “near abroad” described as “ours” and advocated Estonia paying 
for Russian military “protection” and participating in a joint army. In Lipmaa’s 
assessment, “[t]his draft agreement would mean a Russian protectorate in Estonia that in 
no way differs from Germany’s rights in the Czech republic during the last war.”85 Meri 
in 1993 blasted a new foreign policy concept advocating “the maximum integration of 
the former Soviet republics in all areas of life” and renewed concentration on Eastern 
Europe as a zone “historically in our sphere of influence,” saying “[t]his change in 
Russia’s foreign policy places the democratic world before a choice, which has a great 
deal in common with the fateful pre-Munich days. I recall for example the use of armed 
forces beyond internationally recognized boundaries under the pretext of ‘protecting’ 
the human rights of the Sudeten Germans.”86 Luik later said that relations with Russia 
largely depended on whether Moscow “had the courage” to renounce the “near-abroad 
doctrine,” which he said reflected “neo-imperialist” thinking.87 Even the relatively soft- 
spoken Brazauskas told Polish reporters that statements by Russian representatives 
about Russian “special interests” in the Baltic region were “unacceptable, absolutely 
inadmissible in today’s world. And they cannot be put into effect, either. If they cannot 
be implemented, why say such things? In order to frighten someone? Who needs 
this?”*
The second issue, which was closely related, was that of Russian peacekeeping efforts. 
The Russian Foreign Ministry “concept” of Russian foreign policy published at the end 
of 1992 optimistically stated that “[tjhe leading democratic states of the world have an 
interest in ensuring stability in the geopolitical space of the former USSR and recognize 
the role of Russia and its policy in the support of such stability; moreover, they are
OQ
conscious of the need to strengthen this role.” Kozyrev had proposed in mid-1992 that 
Russian forces involved in conflict situations in the CSI operate under CSCE or UN 
sanction, a call that Russian representatives repeated throughout 1993 and 1994.90 (For 
instance, in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1993, Yeltsin 
suggested that international organizations such as the United Nations and the CSCE 
should not only respect Russia’s status as the chief peacekeeper on the territory of the 
former USSR, but should also help Russia bear the costs of the task.91) Baltic leaders 
had strongly condemned these ideas from the start. For example, a Baltic Council 
statement of June 1992 expressed the concern of Baltic leaders that “Russian state 
representatives and military authorities are speaking more and more of the possible use 
of Russian military might on the territories of other sovereign states, allegedly to defend 
Russians and Russian interests in those countries. [These] statements violate UN 
regulations and Helsinki Final act and create atmosphere of tension and imaginary 
conflict....[They] can be regarded only as propaganda and a psychological preparation 
for actions which would violate the norms of international law and mutual relations of 
countries participating in the CSCE meeting.”92 In the end, neither the UN nor the 
CSCE were willing to extend their sanction to Russian forces, a position strongly 
supported by Baltic representatives. For instance, Landsbergis described the Russian
85 The Baltic Independent, 12-18 June 1992: 1.
86 The Baltic Independent, 14-20 May 1993: 3.
87 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 February 1994: 1 (SWB, 23 February 1994: E/2).
88 Rzeczpospolita, 21 April 1994: 1, 18 {SWB, 23 April 1994: E/3).
89 Lough 1993b: 8.
90 Crow 1992b: 39; Lough 1993a: 22. (Crow 1992b: 38).
91 ITAR-TASS, 28 September 1993 {SWB, 30 September 1993: B/3); Crow 1993: 1. Kozyrev also 
suggested that organizations such as the UN and the CSCE could help with training Russian 
peacekeepers, who he suggested were apt to act in emergencies “according to their revolutionary self- 
awareness” {Rossiskaya Gazeta, 30 October 1993: 1 ,7  (SWB, 3 November 1993: B/9)).
92 Radio Vilnius, 27 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-126, 30 June 1992: 10).
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proposal that the UN grant Moscow a mandate to guarantee peace and stability on the 
territory of the former USSR as constituting a request to interfere in the affairs of its 
neighbors, in an effort to make Russia “the gendarme of Europe.” 93
The issue that attracted the most Baltic attention, however, was that of Chechnya. The 
issue was one that engaged a broad segment of the population in all three Baltic 
republics, with the three Baltic parliaments setting up Chechnya support groups and 
demonstrations outside Russian embassies cropping up frequently.94 This concern was 
to a large degree the legacy of Baltic suffering under Soviet rule and consequent support 
for the principle of self-determination. As Rüütel told the Baltic Assembly: “At the end 
of the day, this does not concern Chechnya alone, but is an issue for small nations in 
general.” 95 Baltic representatives frequently expressed a sense o f responsibility to 
extend to others the support that had been extended to them; as Estonian Premier 
Andres Tarand said, Estonia might not be able to wield substantial influence in world 
politics, but “we were aided by world public opinion in our own fight for 
independence.” 96 As a consequence, Baltic representatives were among the world’s 
most vociferous in condemning Russian actions in Chechnya. Baltic representatives 
were not the only ones to declare the Chechen conflict indicative of the character of the 
Russian state. But to an unusual degree, they drew on the situation to predict what 
their own states could face from political and military figures in Russia for whom, in the 
words of an Estonian Foreign Ministry statement calling on the countries of the world to 
condemn events in Chechnya, “the use of force has become a means of imposing their 
will on others.” 98
Statements by Baltic representatives about Chechnya focused on a few basic points. 
Most Baltic representatives described the conflict in Chechnya as a war of 
decolonization. For example, a Latvian delegate to the PACE argued: “The bloody 
events in Chechnya were, and should be viewed as, a glaring violation of human rights, 
which also include a nation’s right to self-determination. The suppression of the 
freedom movement of the Chechen nation, which not so long ago had been ‘punished’ 
by the Soviet Union with whole-scale deportations to Asia and with the killing of over 
one fifth of the population, has not ended.” 99 Landsbergis similarly argued that the war 
in Chechnya was a “colonial” one that would have to be brought to the attention of the 
CSCE and the Council of Europe. 100 In this line of analysis, not only Russian military 
actions in Chechnya, but by extension also the unwillingness of the Russian government 
to contemplate independence for the region showed the Russian government’s true 
disregard not only for human rights, but also for minority rights. 101 Furthermore, they
93 Lithuanian Radio, 3 March 1993 (SWB, 6 March 1993: B/l).
94 See, for instance, Estonian Radio, 13 December 1994 (SWB, 15 December 1994: E/1); Estonian Radio,
14 December 1994 (SWB, 17 December 1994: E/1); Latvian Radio, 15 December 1994 (SWB, 17 
December 1994: E/2); Radio Vilnius, 18 January 1995 (SWB, 26 January 1995: E/1); Latvian Radio, 
17 October 1994 (SWB, 19 October 1994: E/3); Lithuanian Radio, 29 November 1994 (SWB, 2 
December 1994: E/3); Estonian Radio, 13 December 1994 (SWB, 15 December 1994: E/1).
95 Estonian Television, 22 April 1995 (SWB, 25 April 1995: E/1).
96 Interfax, 29 November 1994 (SWB, 2 December 1994: E/2).
9 For a range of responses to the events in Chechnya, see the PACE parliamentary debate on the subject 
and its relation to Russia’s application for membership in the Council of Europe (PACE ORD, 2 
February 1995, 221-253).
98 Estonian Radio, 10 January 1995 (SWB, 12 January 1995: E/2).
99 PA CE ORD, 26 September 1995:821.
100 Radio Vilnius, 19 December 1994 (SWB, 22 December 1994: E/3).
101 See, for example, Estonian Television, 22 April 1995 (SWB, 25 April 1995: E/1). Baltic 
representatives at the PACE, were also quick to bring up a United Nations Human Rights Commission
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indicated the Russian state’s imperialist character. As Estonian representative Tunne 
Kelam told the PACE: “Conducting war against the majority of the population can only 
be called genocide...We see here the classic elements of a colonial war...I am not 
caught by surprise by the Russian action—one should remember the extreme reluctance 
of the Russian government to withdraw its troops from the Baltic states, which was 
accompanied by the ever-present veiled threats to use force if Moscow’s wishes would 
not be met. Such an attitude, always including an element of intimidation, has logically 
led to [the current violence].” And this character, Baltic representatives insisted, 
boded ill for the Baltic states. As a Lithuanian representative at the PACE put it: “The 
events taking place in Chechnya cause great anxiety throughout Europe, and especially 
in the states that border Russia...[D]o the events that are taking place in Russia allow 
one to assert that democracy is being established and human rights respected? [Chechen 
events are linked to] political forces which incite restoration of the former Soviet 
Union.”103 Landsbergis put it more crisply in relation to the issue of transit of Russian 
military goods through Lithuania to the enclave of Kaliningrad: “Events in Chechnya 
remind the Lithuanian people what kind of a force is demanding permanent legal transit 
through our land.”104
For their part, Russian representatives kept up their emphasis on the rights-abusing 
nature of the Estonian and Latvian governments, and the dangers of their policies. 
Russian representatives for the most part simply refused to accept characterizations of 
Baltic citizenship policy as in line with international law, and continued to issue claims 
that human and civic rights of Russophones were being abused.103 As the Executive 
Secretary of the Russian Foreign Ministry had argued earlier, the fact that CSCE and 
other European missions had given Baltic citizenship laws their seal of approval did not 
mean that they were fairly applied in practice: “The laws and declarations make little 
different—Stalin’s constitution was also considered progressive. What is important is 
how they are interpreted.”106 But Russian representatives also stepped up accusations 
that the Estonian and Latvian governments in particular were highly untrustworthy. The 
latter theme, implicit in earlier Russian complaints that Baltic nationalists had turned 
their backs on Russia and had broken legal and moral commitments to Russia and 
others, emerged strongly in June 1993 after the passage of the Estonian Law on Aliens, 
which Russian representatives felt broke Tallinn’s commitments to the Council of 
Europe. In particular, Russian representatives extrapolated from Estonian actions to 
potential Latvian actions. Drawing together a number of themes, Deputy Speaker of the 
Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly Ramazan Abdulatipov, in an open 
letter to Van der Stoel, wrote in relation to potential Latvian membership in the Council 
of Europe that “[m]any [Russian-speakers resident in Latvia] actively supported the 
nationalist movement in Latvia...They weren’t the only ones who were fooled [by the 
democratic positions and slogans of the movement]... Thus thought, and acted, Boris 
Yeltsin and democratic circles in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, upon
report which expressed “concerns about human rights violations towards persons belonging to 
minority groups in the Caucasian region” (PACE ORD, 23 January 1996: 1 18).
102 PACE ORD, 2 February 1995: 241.
103 He went on to say that: “[t] he Russian mass media, in reporting events in Chenchnya, has stepped up 
propaganda against the Baltic states, [alleging that] Lithuania’s special services send spies to Russia, 
that more than a hundred Lithuanian mercenaries are fighting [in Chechnya] and that snipers from the 
Baltic republics are killing Russian soldiers...It is not difficult to guess [this propaganda’s] 
purpose...it is useful to some Russian political forces to incite Russian citizens against the 
independence of Lithuania”(/MC£ ORD, 2 February 1995: 230).
104 Lithuanian Radio, 12 December 1994 (SWB, 17 December 1994: E/3).
105 Forced Migration Projects 1998: 12.
,06 Moskovskie Novosti, no. 21,23 May 1993: A7 (FBIS-SOV-93-097, 21 May 1993: 13).
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taking power, yesterday’s Latvian democrats quickly transformed themselves into harsh 
nationalist-ethnocrats...[If Latvia is admitted to the Council of Europe] this will be 
taken in Latvia as approval on the part of the West for the conducting of national-radical 
policies of ethnic ‘cleansing’ and will weaken the position of those favoring a more 
considered course of action.”107 The Russian Foreign Ministry also counter-attacked on 
Chechnya, suggesting that Baltic support for Chechnya not only was interference in 
Russian internal affairs, but indicated Baltic support for “international terrorism.”108
In the final analysis, the conclusions that the two sides drew, and attempted to win 
others over to, were much the same as those outlined in the previous chapter. To 
Russian representatives, the Estonian and Latvian governments in particular were made 
up of rights-abusing ethnocrats. To Baltic representatives, Russia was a colonialist, 
potentially expansionist power.109 And the actions of both, in the characterizations of 
their accusers, were not only a danger to their own populations and to bilateral or 
regional relations, but also to Europe. As Kallas (not yet Estonian Foreign Minister) told 
the press in January 1995, “Russia can never be a friend to the Western world.”110
The “war of words”
Baltic and Russian attempts to address these characterizations of their nations by their 
opponents generally fell into two categories.* 111 In the first place, Russian and 
particularly Baltic representatives simply attempted to refute their opponents’ claims. 
Russian representatives tended to issue broad denials, often invoking past Russian 
support for the Baltic cause. For example, a Foreign Ministry statement of August 
1992 stated: “Finally, we cannot keep silence on attempts to ascribe to Russia power 
diplomacy. Now that the anniversary celebrations marking the August triumph of 
democracy in our country are held, it will be appropriate to recall that it was precisely 
the position of democratic Russia that paved the way to independence of Baltic states 
and that, inherently and on principle, it provides for renouncing the threat of use of 
force and any forms of pressure.”113 Meanwhile, Baltic representatives offered more 
factually detailed counterarguments: for instance, Chairman of the Latvian parliament 
Ivars Godmanis emphasized to the Canadian ambassador in 1992 that, Russian claims to
107 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 October 1994: 2.
108 Girnius 1996b: 17. The Liberal Democratic Party also made the interesting argument in an official 
statement condemning Estonian support for Chechnya that Estonian intervention on this issue showed 
that “the idea of the inseparable destiny o f Estonia and Russia survives in the consciousness of 
Estonian statesmen despite the solemn declarations of freedom and other fine words” (Interfax, 13 
February 1995 (SWB, 15 February 1995: B/6)).
I0Q On both sides, the smallest issues could result in the invocation of the direst imagery. For instance, 
Meri complained of the fact that the pre-incorporation Estonian presidential insignia, looted by the 
Red Army at the time of occupation, was still held in the Kremlin despite Estonian requests that it be 
returned, “as though Stalin’s regime still persists in some parts” (Estonian Radio, 24 February 1995 
(SWB, 2 March 1995: E/1)).
110 Estonian Television, 8 January 1995 (SWB, 10 January 1995: E/1).
111 Neither of which included admitting that the other side might have a point. A rare exception was 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin, who told the press that he did not consider it 
“expedient” to use the term “near abroad” in official statements and documents because its use had 
caused “misunderstandings, and a negative reaction has come from some former USSR union republic 
capitals.” In his opinion, “the Baltic countries [should] in no way be included in the ‘near abroad’ 
because those countries left the USSR even before it disintegrated and [were] not likely to seek 
membership in the CIS.” At the same time, he stressed that the term should not be interpreted as a 
threat, but as an analytic concept (Estonian Radio, 27 January 1994 (SWB, 29 January 1994: E/1)).
112 See, for example, the bald denials—“Russia has no imperialist ambitions”— issued by Russian 
Federation Council speaker Yegor Stroyev at an Interparliamentary Union conference in Istanbul 
(ITAR-TASS, 16 April 1996 (SWB, 18 April 1996: B/16)).
1,3 ITAR-TASS 24 August 1992 (FBIS- SOV-92-166, 26 August 1992: 9).
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the contrary, “only 17,000 people left Latvia this year, compared to hundreds of 
thousands of refugees from Central Asia..”114 Baltic representatives leaned heavily on 
the fact that Baltic citizenship laws and practices had been subjected to extensive 
international scrutiny. For example, Kallas (now Foreign Minister) argued: “To picture 
Estonia as a problem country only because Russian leaders sometimes express their 
dissatisfaction means not to respect reality. The fact that about twenty observer missions 
have visited Estonia and have generally agreed that the rights of the Russian minority in 
Estonia are not violated testifies that this is not only the Estonian government’s 
view.”115 Indeed, Baltic officials stressed their nations’ willingness, in fact eagerness, to 
undergo international scrutiny of their human rights practices. A Baltic Council meeting 
in July 1991 announced that “[t]he leaders of the republics...intend to send a letter to 
the US national committee on human rights requesting the dispatch of a committee of 
experts, which would be tasked with determining whether it is true, as one often hears, 
that contradictions are noticeable in the Baltic [states] between the observation of 
human rights and the aspirations of the republics’ leaderships to establish state 
independence.”116 At the May 1992 CSCE Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) 
meeting in Helsinki, speeches by Estonian and Latvian delegates invited CSCE experts 
to come to the Baltic states to examine the living conditions of Russians there to prevent 
“defense of the Russian-speaking minority” from being used as a pretext to delay a 
troop withdrawal.117 As Kelam sarcastically remarked to the PACE in June 1993, “[w]e 
are keen to be monitored further on what is happening in our country, even after at least 
fifteen various European commissions have testified to developments in Estonia.”118
But both Russian and Baltic representatives also went on the offensive against their 
opponents’ very methods, often characterizing them as “propaganda” or “smear 
campaigns.”119 For instance, Latvian representatives told a CSCE meeting in May 1992 
that the Russian government had launched a “comprehensive, wide-scale propaganda 
war” against the Baltic states, accusing Kozyrev of disseminating “totally inaccurate” 
figures and an “unrealistic” picture of Latvia in his statement at the Council of Europe 
about human rights violations.120 In the same vein, the Estonian Foreign Ministry told 
the press in early 1994 that the Estonian Ambassador to Moscow had been assigned the 
task of “protesting in connection with the continued Russian campaign of statements 
that fabricate and distort reality.”121 Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Sergei Yastrzhembskiy told the press in May 1992 that Latvian Ambassador to Moscow 
Janis Peters had given a “distorted picture” of Latvian-Russian relations at a CSCE 
meeting in Helsinki; he said that Peters’ comments, which he called “purposeful 
misinformation,” did not “correspond to universal norms [of diplomatic behaviour].”122 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin similarly complained that 
statements by Estonian Ambassador to Russia Mart Helme went “beyond...accepted 
diplomatic norms.”123
114 Radio Riga, 26 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-168, 28 August 1992: 59).
115 CTK News Agency, 3 April 1996 (SWB, 5 April 1996: E/1).
116 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 July 1991: 3.
117 The Baltic Independent, 22-28 May 1992: 3.
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Helsinki, 13 May 1992.
121 Estonian Radio, 9 February 1994 (SWB, 12 February 1994: E/1).
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Neither side hesitated to describe the campaigns as showing off their opponents’ worst 
characteristics, or to draw comparisons to Soviet practice. For example, Landsbergis 
opined that Russian allegations against Estonia “very much remind us of the propaganda 
war the leadership of the former Soviet Union waged against Lithuania a few years 
ago.”124 Latvian delegate to the PACE similarly noted that when Russian delegates 
accuse the Baltic states of discrimination, “[w]e should object to that and understand 
that it is also xenophobia. We must deal with such unpleasant attitudes that are 
associated with the former totalitarian regime.” Meanwhile, Yastrzhembskiy 
described comments by Estonian ambassador to Germany Tiit Matsulevits as being “in 
the best style of the cold war period.” 126
Some Baltic representatives saw Russian rhetorical campaigns as an effort to ratchet up 
tension to provide an excuse for Russian intervention in the Baltic states. Landsbergis, 
for instance, told radio journalists in May 1992 that a special campaign was being 
waged by Moscow to increase tension and pressure, which “must evoke international 
concern.” Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs opined that the “constant 
blustering accusations” against the Baltics made by Russian representatives before the 
international community were meant to keep the Balts off-balance and to justify a 
continued Russian military presence in the region: “One must be absolutely blind not to 
follow this, not trying to analyse why.” The Russian campaign was also interpreted 
by Baltic representatives as an effort to divide and conquer. For example, Landsbergis 
speculated that the Russian rhetorical campaign against Latvia was an effort to weaken 
the strategic unity of the Baltic states: “Having failed to subordinate the entire region, 
Russia is making efforts first to split it by becoming firmly established in Latvia and 
later perhaps even to annex it.”129
Both Russian and Baltic representatives, however, were more likely to describe this 
“propaganda war” as aimed first and foremost at the West. As a Lithuanian 
representative to the PACE put it, “some political forces in Russia, and even state 
officials, are trying to convince democratic states in Europe and elsewhere that 
permanent violations of the Russian-speaking population are taking place in 
Lithuania.”'30 In the same vein, the Estonian Foreign Ministry told the press in early 
1994 that the Estonian Ambassador to Moscow had been assigned the task of protesting 
in connection with the continued Russian campaign of “slanderous” statements directed 
at world public opinion that were designed to isolate Estonia.131 Karasin complained 
after Baltic representatives accused Kozyrev of revanchist thinking that “[o]ur Baltic 
partners have lifted individual quotations out of context in order to attract [Western] 
attention yet again.”
propaganda war in Chechnya, as “Dudayev has created the impression that a proud Chechnya is 
struggling for freedom against a totalitarian empire”(Interfax, 29 May 1995 {SWB, 31 May 1995: 
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Indeed, isolation of the Baltic states from Europe was the main goal that Baltic 
representatives imputed to the Russian campaign. Landsbergis, back from the UN 
General Assembly, saw what he described as Russian Foreign Ministry efforts to 
develop “anti-Baltism” in the West as a “new Cold War” intended to hinder the 
integration of the Baltic states into the Western community in order to maintain Russian 
influence in the region. But as late as 1998, the head of the Estonian Foreign Ministry 
Central and Eastern Europe Dept was complaining that the Russian campaign was 
making Estonia and Latvia less attractive as potential members of Western multilateral 
structures: “In the OSCE and the UN, it is harder and harder to convince people that we 
are not eating Russian children.”134
Russian representatives, for their part, similarly saw Baltic efforts as attempts, as 
Yastrzhembskiy put it, as attempts “to set the West against Russia.” Furthermore, 
Russian representatives described the Baltic rhetorical campaigns as designed to conceal 
their own sins and to further Baltic campaigns for integration into NATO. Karasin, for 
instance, described Baltic representatives as attempting to “whip up an artificial 
hullabaloo” to distract attention from the plight of Russophones. 36 But Baltic 
campaigns were also, to Russian representatives, attempts to hide their own sins in order 
to further their goal of integration into European structures. Karasin, for instance, 
accused Kallas, through allegations during a trip to Germany of Moscow’s “revanchist 
psychology” and annexationist plans, of trying “to scare Europe with an alleged ‘Russia 
threat’ in order to implement its ambitious plans to integrate into Europe’s military 
organizations and conceal its discriminatory policy towards ethnic Russians.”137 And 
Russian representatives described some Baltic campaigns as simply exhibitionist. For 
example, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement responding to a Baltic Assembly 
resolution calling for the demilitarization of Kaliningrad as a “necessary part of the 
Central European and European security process” acidly stated: “Having lost their sense 
of moderation and reality, Baltic parliamentarians are trying to make the future of 
Kaliningrad a problem for all of Europe...The Baltic parliamentarians’ anti-Russian 
complex is evident from the fact that they have proposed restoring the previous names 
of localities in Kaliningrad Region. The absurdity of this proposal is clear. Why, in that 
case, not start with the restoration of all [historic] names in the Baltic countries— 
Memel, Wilno, Kovno, Reval...The resolution of the Baltic Assembly is a graphic 
example of irresponsible intrigue, of a desire to attract the attention of the world at any 
price, so as to compensate for what they see as a certain lack of attention since the
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completion of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries.”
In fact, many Baltic and Russian representatives feared that their opponents’ campaigns 
were indeed hurting their nation’s image abroad. Baltic concern was partly for world 
public opinion; as Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste said, “A small nation like 
Estonia doesn’t have the resources to compete with a huge nation’s propaganda
133 The Baltic Independent, 9-15 October 1992: 1.
134 Forced Migration Projects 1998: 12.
135 ITAR-TASS, 5 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-lOO, 8 June 1992: 22).
136“In our view,” Karasin opined, “the West too should be concentrating attention on these problems 
rather than criticizing a Russian minister, in the way that an official spokesman of the US State 
Department allowed himself to do”(ITAR-TASS, 20 January 1994 (SWB, 22 January 1994: B/6)).
137 ITAR-TASS, 23 April 1996 (SWB, 26 April 1996: B/18).
138 Lithuanian Radio, 14 November 1994 (SWB, 18 November 1994: B/9); ITAR-TASS, 16 November 
1994 (SWB, 18 November 1994: B/9). Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas later went on to 
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inclusion in Russia or to sow doubts concerning Lithuania’s present borders with Russia, Poland, and 
Belarus” (ITAR-TASS, 29 November 1994 (SWB, 2 December 1994: E/5).
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machine. It’s no surprise: the front page of the New York Times is not automatically 
open to us.”139 But Baltic representatives were also anxious about Russian successes in 
particular settings, for example the Council of Europe. An Estonian delegate to the 
PACE Marju Lauristin told reporters in late 1992 that “Russia’s psychological attack 
against Estonia has proved successful” in Strasbourg: “Only two months ago everyone 
was positive about the idea of Estonia becoming a full member of the Council of Europe 
from next January or February. They were just waiting for the outcome of our 
elections.”140 Latvian representatives similarly noted ruefully that “[t]he Russians have 
played the citizenship card very well.”141 Meanwhile, members of the Russian guest 
delegation to the PACE expressed concern that Estonia’s abrasive tone towards Russia 
in meetings with Western officials was adversely affecting their country’s international 
image.142
The response of many Baltic representatives in particular to these setbacks was to vow 
to work harder. As Estonian Foreign Minster Toomas Henrik lives said, “[o]ur 
responsibility is to promote Estonia’s general trustworthiness as a state as well as a 
partner.”143 Luik opined that “[a]s part of our new and broader world view, we need to 
pay more attention to explaining what is happening at home, and to campaign for 
similar protection of human and civil rights abroad.”144 Some representatives also 
cautioned against handing their opponents public relations plums. As Ulmanis 
complained when returning the Latvian citizenship bill to the parliament for changes 
after it encountered serious international criticism: “Our mistake, our unsuccessful week 
was used by Russia to consolidate its diplomatic authority. And Latvia lost much of its 
political baggage [sic—“capital”?] abroad because of the law adopted by mistake.”145 
And indeed, Baltic efforts were vindicated by, for instance, the Council of Europe’s 
decision to deny Russophones the definitional status of “national minority,” opening the 
way to Council membership for Estonia; the Estonian Foreign Minister later announced 
that at the level of Western governments, Estonia had “won” the propaganda battle 
about the rights of the Russian minority.146
Russian representatives in many instances attempted to simply shrug off Baltic rhetoric. 
For example, an unnamed Russian diplomat told the press that “arguing with 
Landsbergis is as pointless as arguing with Zhirinovskiy...[Landsbergis’s “escapades”] 
have become so biased and subjective that they can hardly be taken seriously.”147 But 
the campaigns were clearly taking a toll on bilateral relations. For instance, Luik 
expressed concern over the impact on Estonian-Russian relations of the deteriorating 
“verbal war” with Russia (which he said was caused by the “neo-imperialist statements 
of some Russian politicians). Kallas suggested that relations with Moscow were 
unlikely to improve as long as Russian representatives contined to describe Estonia as 
“an unstable country where human rights are violated on a mass scale.”149 Andrejevs 
expressed similar concerns, adding that “repetition of untrue accusations [about human
139 The Baltic Independent, 11-17 December 1992: 8.
140 The Baltic Independent, 9-15 October 1992: 3.
141 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 January 1993: 8.
142 The Baltic Independent, 4-10 February 1994: 1.
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rights abuses in Latvia] did not promote democracy in Russia either.”1"0 Meanwhile, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry called in Estonian diplomats in Moscow to complain that “the 
biased character” of a speech delivered by Meri in Hamburg (in which, the Ministry 
observed, he made “anti-Russian” statements about Russia’s alleged progress down an 
imperialistic path) “lends proof to the opinion that the Estonian leadership is using 
every opportunity to add rigidity to its position in relations with Russia;” the Ministry 
expressed the hope that Estonia “would find the strength to stop shifting towards 
confrontation with Moscow.”151 Indeed, Sergei Prikhodko, chief of the Baltic division 
of the Second European Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, specifically 
attributed what he called particularly bad relations with Estonia to the fact that “[o]ur 
Estonian counterparts often pull propaganda stunts attracting the world community.”152
In the midst of the fray, some voices were urging moderation. Some European 
diplomats, aware of the effect that Baltic rhetoric was having on Russian reformers, 
were advising Baltic representatives to “choose a psychologically prudent language” in 
their relations with Moscow.15'1 Meanwhile, Lithuanian representatives were 
increasingly willing to distance themselves from some of the more extreme statements 
being issued by other Baltic representatives as reflecting a “preconceived negative 
attitude.” 154 Brazauskas, for instance, complained publicly about the content and tone of 
a Baltic Assembly resolution on Kaliningrad, saying that “statements made by the three 
Baltic states are heard by other states, especially by the politicians of neighboring 
states” and that the Baltic Assembly was not actually authorized to make statements on 
foreign policy of individual states.155 When Landsbergis at a Baltic Assembly session in 
1996 proposed a resolution condemning the outcome of the Russian State Duma 
elections as bringing closer to power groups representing “militant chauvinism, 
revanchism and the desire to restore imperial forces,” a spokesman for the Latvian 
delegation said that much of what Landsbergis had said “was undiplomatic and might 
be seen by some forces in Moscow as interference in Russia’s internal affairs.”156
Indeed, tempers appeared to be running high, particularly on the Russian side. 
Kozyrev’s response to Landsbergis speech at the CSCE Helsinki meeting in July 1992 
(which compared the Russian Federation with the USSR of the 1940s) was that the 
Baltic states “ought to recognize their moral obligations and not repay the Russian 
democrats [who supported their independence] by posing the question incorrectly.”157 
In early 1993, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman called speeches delivered abroad 
by Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs and Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis (in 
which Andrejevs accused Russia of de facto colonization and Jundzis said that Russia 
“has everything ready to reoccupy Riga”) “unfriendly and irresponsible.”158 Kozyrev, 
after another round of Latvian accusations of imminent Russian intervention in the 
former Soviet republics, snapped: “If the Baltic states want to be civilized states, 
perhaps Latvia, rather than raising this artificial and absolutely unfounded screaming 
should concentrate on drawing up agreements on the conditions for withdrawal.”
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Yastrzhembskiy described Matsulevits’ comparison between Russian policy and Soviet 
imperialism as “discourteous,” and sarcastically noted that “[d]espite all its ringing 
tone,” the statement was not backed up by fact, but was simply an example of an 
“unseemly political game.” 160 Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin, 
blasting a Baltic Assembly meeting at which delegates issued an appeal to the Council 
of Europe to demand that Russia openly renounce expansionist doctrines before being 
considered by the Council for membership, complained that Baltic Assembly meetings 
“invariably pass documents that have a practically undisguised context of confrontation 
with Russia.” 161 After Meri’s homo sovieticus speech at the PACE, Russian delegates 
said that the aim of Meri’s statement was to “pick a fight with Russia.” As one delegate 
put it, “[h]is speech led one to think Russia has lost its national identity and territorial 
integrity.” 162
Many Baltic representatives dismissed Russian anger as fleeting, unreasonable, or 
domestically oriented. For example, Landsbergis brushed off the Russian response to a 
Baltic Assembly resolution on Kaliningrad as containing “more anger than common 
sense.” 163 Kelam, although admitting that the Russian delegation was “clearly upset” at 
Meri’s homo sovieticus speech at the PACE, he called the Russian response “more an 
outburst of anger than a serious argument,” and attributed Russian indignation to the 
fact that “Russia is continuing to experience difficulties in adapting to a situation in 
which its words do not automatically count.” 164 Laar responded to Russian indignation 
over Estonia’s acceptance to the Council of Europe by saying “I understand that internal 
problems of Russian politics necessitate it to beat up on Baltic governments, and this 
secures success internally.”16̂ Others, however, saw it as a sign of something much 
more sinister. Laar, discussing the Russian Foreign Ministry statement blasting the 
Estonian law on aliens, commented that the release of the statement on the first 
anniversary of the kroon (the new Estonian currency) “shows that our success is not
the Baltic states, which they fear Kozyrev may damage. This is even more comic if one recalls that it 
was Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev who presented representatives of the three republics with a 
presidential degree recognizing their sovereignty [in August 1991]. Speaking about their sovereignty 
and independence that they are so carefully protecting from my statements, they address the United 
States in a public statement. It seems they are seeking to get into another dependency” (ITAR-TASS, 
19 January 1994 (SWB, 21 January 1994: S2/1)).
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play to the home audience; for example, a Foreign Ministry spokesman attributed “unfriendly and 
irresponsible” speeches delivered abroad by Andrejevs to the coming Latvian parliamentary elections 
and the bad state of the country’s economy (Baltfax 2 March 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-039, 2 March 
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liked by Russia.”166 Kallas similarly opined: “Many Russian political circles see Estonia 
as the country from which the collapse of the Soviet Union began...and the country [of 
all the former republics] which has most clearly turned itself to the west. This results in 
a psychological revenge moment and the desire to smother Estonia at any cost.”167
Hard feelings: Take One
It is a curious thing that the notion of state representatives standing outside emotion 
should still persist in popular thinking as well as much scholarly writing. The ideal of 
the dispassionate diplomat is certainly one that has been perpetuated by generations of 
diplomatic handbooks. One of the “essential” qualities of a diplomat listed by Harold 
Nicolson is “the quality of calm.” 168 Jules Cambon, in his treatise on “the diplomatist,” 
similarly opines that “what really distinguishes the diplomatist from the common herd is 
his apparent indifference to its emotions.”169 A deep distaste for moments of negative 
emotion pervades classical diplomatic texts. As Nicolson recounted in appall: “The 
occasions on which diplomatists have lost their tempers are remembered with horror by 
generations of their successors. Napoleon lost his temper with Metternich in the 
Marcolini Palace at Dresden on June 26, 1813, and flung his hat upon the carpet, with 
the most unfortunate results. Sir Charles Euan Smith lost his temper with the Sultan of 
Morocco and tore up a treaty in the imperial presence. Count Tattenbach lost his temper 
at the Algeciras Conference and exposed his country to a grave diplomatic humiliation.
170Herr Stinnes lost his temper at Spa.”
But Cambon’s word “apparent,” and Nicolson’s catalogue, reveal the underlying 
message: what classical theorists of diplomacy were advocating was the ability not to 
eradicate, but to repress emotion, particularly the negative emotions. Nicolson, 
surveying fifteen and sixteenth century diplomatic manuals, noted their insistence that 
an ambassador must be “imperturbable, able to receive bad news without manifesting 
displeasure, or to hear himself maligned and misquoted without the slightest twinge of 
irritation.”171 The diplomatist, Cambon opined, “must beware of being carried away by 
his feelings.”172 As Nicolson wrote of the ideal diplomat: “In the first place, he should 
be good-tempered, or at least he should be able to keep his ill-temper under perfect 
control.” 173
If diplomats are, in the classical tradition, expected to keep their own feelings under 
control, they are at the same time expected to have a keen appreciation of the feelings of 
others. A successful negotiator, Abraham de Wiquefort observed in 1679, must be able 
to play on the emotions of others: “Ministers are but men and as such have their 
weakness, that is to say, their passions and their interests, which the Ambassador ought 
to know if he wished to do honor to himself and his Master.”174 Three hundred years
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later, former British Ambassador Peter Marshall concurred: “Diplomacy must rank as 
one of the higher forms of persuasion. People may be persuaded by reason or by feeling, 
or in all probability by a combination of both. They may be convinced, cajoled, 
flattered, inspired.” 175 But even more importantly, diplomats are expected to be 
considerate of others’ feelings. Sir Ernest Satow’s famous formulation—“Diplomacy is 
the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the 
governments of independent states”— sums up the emphasis that classical diplomatic 
theorists placed on letting sleeping emotions lie.
But let us return for an instant to Nicolson’s phrase: “able to receive bad news...or to 
hear himself maligned...” The first half of the phrase identifies outcomes in international 
politics as the source of emotion; the second identifies language. European diplomacy 
in fact evolved an entire series of linguistic conventions to permit diplomats and 
ministers, as Nicolson describes the “guarded understatement” of diplomatic language, 
“to say sharp things to each other without becoming provocative or impolite.” 177 Indeed, 
one of the reasons that classical theorists of diplomacy have damned much of the public 
diplomacy of the 20th century as “propaganda” appears to be that the language involved 
has been designed to rile up, rather than soothe, the negative emotions. To thinkers of 
this complexion, the sight of heated slanging matches at the UN General Assembly was 
dismaying. “It would be wrong,” Nicolson opined, “to take as an example of modern 
diplomatic method the discussions that are conducted in the Security Council or the 
Assembly of the United Nations...[these meetings] are exercises in forensic 
propaganda...it is not diplomacy by loud-speaker or diplomacy by insult that we need to 
consider." The deliberate stirring up of bad feeling was not in this view, just bad 
form; it had dangerous consequences. “Can it be claimed,” exclaimed Neville Bland, 
“that the airing of national dislikes and prejudices in uncontrolled language...is less 
likely to lead to international friction? [Indeed,] can these practices rightly be called 
diplomacy?” 174
Implicit in these concerns, of course, is the assumption that the feelings o f state 
representatives are subject to be riled, not only by unfavorable international political 
outcomes, but by exchanges of slurs about their nations. Nor should this be surprising: 
state representatives, by virtue of their ability to speak in the name of states, serve as 
embodiments of some of the most highly emotionally charged political entities in the
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modern world. State representatives are for the most part self-selecting; most have 
chosen to take on a role that permits them to speak in the name, and to some degree 
serve as an embodiment, of a nation. Indeed, while the advice o f classical theorists of 
diplomacy for representatives to control their emotions may be good negotiating 
strategy, a degree of emotional identification with the nation may be a necessary part of 
being an effective representative. First, representatives who are emotionally unengaged
175 Marshall 1997: 154.
176 Satow 1957: 1.
177 Nicolson 1969: 122.
178 Nicolson 1954: 90-91.
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considered and rash retort” (Thayer 1959: 236).
180 All the major models of nationalism— pre-modern (ethnic), modern (socio-economic), and post­
modern (cultural)— acknowledge nationalism’s emotive qualities: see, for example, Anderson 1991: 
141, Gellner 1996: 123-124, Smith 1991: 16-17. For a clear and succinct overview of the major 
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with the entity they represent will be less concerned with its fortunes, and may be less 
vigorous in pursuing its “interests.” Second, for a representative of an entity, 
particularly one as potentially highly emotionally charged as a nation/state, not to be 
emotionally engaged with its fortunes would call into question in the eyes of others that 
entity’s ability to inspire loyalty. As a consequence, a genuinely emotionally detached 
state representative would have the potential to be more of a liability, both in practical 
and in public relations terms, than an asset. And indeed, diplomatic memoirs reveal 
ample evidence of diplomats’ emotional engagement with the fortunes of their 
nations.181 As Cambon himself noted, commenting on a diplomat’s need to put himself 
in the shoes of the representatives with whom he is negotiating: “This is by no means an 
easy matter sometimes, when one’ sympathies are involved.”1 2
Of course, sociologists of emotion, as noted in this dissertation’s Introduction, would 
find nothing surprising in the idea that diplomatic exchanges, as examples of dense 
social interaction, would have the potential to be pervaded with feeling. Indeed, such 
scholars might well point to a central focus of this chapter and of Chapter Three, the 
issue of social recognition of self-characterizations, as a key area of emotional 
engagement. 183 This issue of struggles for recognition is one that has received some of 
its most extensive discussion in the IR literature in a few of the works of Erik 
Ringmar.184 In these pieces, which focus in part on the “selling” to the world (by force if 
necessary) of constitutive narratives of state identity, Ringmar has argued that 
particularly at “formative moments”—moments when individuals and groups are telling 
new stories about themselves—the tellers of constitutive narratives look to audiences
i o  r
for confirmation of their self-presentations. While Ringmar’s work does not deal 
explicitly with issues of feeling, extrapolating from the literature of the sociology of 
emotion, it is possible to argue that for story-tellers as with individuals, the degree to 
which these self-characterizations are accepted, and the types of characterizations that 
others advance—and in particular, discontinuities between self-characterizations and
r  . . .  1 8 Acharacterizations by others—have the potential to bring hard feelings to the surface.
Obviously, exchanges of what one or both sides consider to be insults indicate a basic 
level of discontinuity between self-characterization and characterizations by others that 
carries an emotional punch. 187 For example, then-US Ambassador to Moscow George 
Kennan’s recorded in his diary in mid-1963 the strain of living through an unusually 
vitriolic anti-US Soviet propaganda campaign, which he found “foul, malicious and 
insulting.”188 One common source of insult is the unflattering comparison, an art form 
the dangers of which are well known. For instance, People’s Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs Georgii Chicherin wrote in early 1927 to Nikolai Bukharin, then leader of the 
Comintern: “Would you please stop equating Chiang Kai-shek with Kemalism. This is
181 See any of the following: Dobrynin 1996; Grew 1944; Harsono 1977; Henderson 1997; Hsieh 1993; 
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182 Cambon 1931: 22.
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absolutely ridiculous and spoils our relationship with Turkey. Isn’t spoiling our 
relationship with Germany enough for you?...Now you are definitely spoiling our 
relations with Turkey!’' 189 (Kennan was himself declared persona non grata by the 
Soviet government in September 1963 for having irritably compared the complete social 
isolation to which diplomats were subjected in Moscow to the conditions of the 
internment he had experienced in Germany in 1941-1942, a comment that the Soviet 
government called a “slanderous attack hostile to the Soviet Union in a rude violation of 
generally recognized norms of international law.” l90)
Much of the tension surrounding the Baltic and Russian “identity diplomacy” 
campaigns indeed appeared to stem from the fundamental disagreements over self­
characterization outlined in this chapter and in Chapter Three. These disagreements did 
not need to involve exchanges of insults. A key worry of Baltic representatives, for 
instance, was simply that the world, and Russian policymakers in particular, could not 
accept the very concept of the restoration of Baltic sovereignty. As an official Estonian 
statement said in June 1992, “[t]he Russian side refuses to see Estonia as a country that 
was illegally occupied.”191 In Baltic eyes, Russian policymakers were starting from a 
position of disadvantage: as Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste said, 
“[Russians] never understood that Estonia was not a constituent part of the Soviet 
Union. They have been so badly indoctrinated that they honestly believe that they 
liberated us—this is total nonsense.”192 As a consequence, however, Baltic 
representatives feared that the Russian government and the Western world, rejecting 
Baltic self-characterizations as having broken definitively with everything to do with 
the former Soviet Union, saw the Baltic states as a potential part of a Russian “sphere of 
influence.” Anxiety over this point underlay the obsessive legalism of Baltic campaigns 
over the issues of legal reanimation, borders, and even histories of incorporation, as well 
as Baltic opposition to the “offending formulations” by Russian colleagues such as 
“near abroad, post-Soviet space, [or] territory of the former USSR.”193
This is not to say that characterizations perceived by both sides as insults helped 
matters. As Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry Second European Department, 
Aleksandr Udaltsov, complained to reporters: “our country has always been confused 
[by the Baltic states] with the Soviet Union of the Stalin era. No effort has been spared 
to blame it...Russia’s partners in the Baltic region have failed to overcome the 
syndrome of historical insults.”194 Kallas complained that “Russia should give up 
describing Estonia as an unstable country where human rights are violated on a mass 
scale.”195 Baltic resentment of Russian characterization of the Estonian and Latvian 
polities as ethnocratic, Russian resentment of Baltic characterizations of the Russian 
government as proto-imperialist, both sides’ resentment of the other’s characterizations 
of their governments as undemocratic were heightened by the fact that both sides
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historically, to define the Baltic states as newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union [as 
they] never lost their independence de jure" (PACE ORD, 3 February 1993: 729).
192 The Baltic Independent, 11-17 December 1992: 8.
193 The Baltic Independent, 12-18 June 1992: 10; Statement, Latvian delegation to the Committee of 
Senior Officials-Vienna Group, 9 September 1992.
194 Interfax, 5 May 1995 (SWB, 8 May 1995: B/8).
195 Interfax, 21 December 1995 (FBIS-SOV-95-246, 21 December 1995 (electronic)).
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considered these to be undesirable qualities. Furthermore, both sides were anxious that 
others might believe their opponents’ unflattering characterizations over their own, 
competing self-characterizations. Hence, for instance, Meri’s “visible anger” that US 
President Bill Clinton had not contradicted a statement by Yeltsin at the April 1993 
Vancouver summit that human rights were being abused in the Baltic states.196
Conclusion
This chapter, and the last, have attempted not only to describe Baltic and Russian 
rhetorical campaigns of the early 1990s, but also to place this behavior within the 
spectrum of diplomatic practice. It is the argument of this chapter that in the process of 
diplomatic exchanges, state representatives discuss at least four major themes: action, 
rules, norms, and identities. Indeed, in the context of the last category, representatives 
engage in claims and counter-claims about the qualities, not only of their own states, but 
also of other states and other entities, be they friend or foe. This chapter has detailed 
Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns and counter-campaigns, arguing that their 
purpose was to gain a degree of international consensus on some aspects of the 
fundamental natures—aggressive versus non-aggressive, democratic versus non- 
democratic, Soviet versus post-Soviet—of both their states and those of their opponents. 
It suggests that through establishing consensus on these identities, Russian and Baltic 
representatives further hoped to see their opponents’ behavior considered and 
condemned as threatening while legitimating their own behavior, outcomes that would 
increase pressure on their opponents to change their behavior while lessening pressure 
on their own governments to change theirs. It has identified some of the outcomes of 
these rhetorical battles that Russian and Baltic representatives might have found more or 
less satisfactory. But it also has argued that battles over self-representation and the 
representation of others in themselves have the potential to generate hard feelings 
among participants.
In discussing Russian and Baltic efforts to characterize each other’s practices and 
natures, this chapter has argued that though the two sides hurled different epithets, the 
purpose of both sides was the same: to discredit their opponents as threatening, not just 
to their own populations and their neighbors but potentially to Europe itself. But why 
did Russian and Baltic representatives they spend so much time warning European 
audiences of the threat that Europe faced, when Europeans themselves seemed far less 
alarmed? Why, indeed, were Baltic and Russian representatives so insistent on 
promulgating these characterizations in European forums?
Ringmar, in his analysis of constitutive narratives of identity, notes that state 
representatives do not tell stories to just anyone: they tell stories to audiences who they 
feel count, whose confirmation will matter. These audiences are what Ringmar calls 
“circles of recognition:” other story-telling entities that an actor recognizes and respects 
as being a kind to itself. “Ultimately,” Ringmar suggests, “only those people have the 
power to bestow a certain identity upon us who already are what we would like to 
become.”197 But who, or what, did Russian and Baltic representatives wish to become? 
It is to this question that Chapter Five will turn.
196 “You know as well as I do that President Yeltsin was lying!” Meri snapped to reporters (The Baltic 
Independent, 31 March-5 April 1993: 1).
197 Ringmar 1996: 81.
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Chapter Five: The Importance of Being European
As the previous chapter has sought to demonstrate, Russian and Baltic representatives 
waged a protracted rhetorical battle after the collapse of the Soviet Union designed to 
convince Western audiences that their opponents, by nature as well as by behavior, were 
in important respects aggressive, undemocratic, and threatening, not just to their 
neighbors, but to European security or values. This chapter seeks to link these debates to 
a second feature of “identity diplomacy,” namely the negotiation of collective identities. 
Specifically, it argues that Baltic and Russian representatives sought, through exchanges 
in European institutions, not only to establish consensus among European audiences on 
the characters of their nations and of their opponents, but also to establish the 
relationship between these nations and the collective entity of “Europe.” First, they 
sought to establish that by virtue either of their nature (geography, history, culture and 
political traditions) or of their behavior, their nations were legitimate candidates for 
inclusion in “Europe;” second, they sought to establish that by nature or behaviour, their 
opponents’ nations were not.
In approaching these questions, Russian and Baltic representatives were not debating 
geographical location. Rather, as Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has written of 
the Russian case, Russian and Baltic social and political thought “understood the 
concept of ‘Europe’ not only in a geographic sense, but also as encompassing a specific 
culture and civilization...Europe has often been synonymous with a certain set of 
political and economic principles, a certain set of moral values, and a certain cultural 
space.”1 For both Russian and Baltic representatives, as Inga Pavlovaite has written, 
“Europe” has functioned as a “discursive nodal point knitting together more general 
discourses of how ‘we’ should develop, of where ‘we’ should go and where this will 
take ‘us’.”2
It is not surprising that many Baltic and Russian interventions into these debates took 
place within forums of the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO. In the aftermath 
of the collapse first of the Soviet bloc and then of the USSR itself, these three 
organizations, plus the European Union (EU), were at the institutional forefront of a 
broader complex of European debates over where to draw the theoretical as well as 
practical boundaries of the new, post-War “Europe.”3 These debates had first blossomed 
after the conclusion of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987 and 
the new detente: it was widely assumed that “these processes would somehow lead to a 
‘Europeanization’ of Europe,” with “Europeanization” referring not to a specific 
development, but “to an empty space to be filled.”4 Flowever, the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union cemented a general 
assumption that any “Europeanization” of Europe would consist of adoption by the 
states of the Soviet bloc of the political, economic and social standards of the nations of 
Western Europe. Implicit in this assumption, which was widespread on both sides of the 
former Iron Curtain, was the idea that the states and nations of Western Europe had 
served during the Cold War as a repository of “true Europeanness” into which the states 
of the Soviet bloc would eventually choose to tap. Although notions among Western 
European policymakers and thinkers of “Europe’s” proper extent and content varied 
widely, nevertheless it was clear to all that the badge of “Europeanness” was in the
1 Ivanov 2002: 92.
2 Pavlovaite 2000: 19.
3Judt 1992.
4 Waever 1992: 2
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process of being extended toward the east, and would continue to be so.5 In this period 
of definitional flux, the four institutions mentioned—the CSCE/OSCE, the Council of 
Europe, the EU, and NATO—served as markers of Europe’s boundaries: membership in 
European organisations, especially those with high symbolic content such as the 
Council of Europe, became as good a measure as any of whether a country could be 
considered, or consider itself, to be part of “Europe.”
This chapter, after a brief discussion of the subset of the IR literature that examines 
region construction, goes on to examine Russian and Baltic reasons for wanting to be 
included in the region known as “Europe.” It suggests that Baltic and Russian 
representatives approached “Europe” in at least four ways, three of which are discussed 
here: as a locus of security, as a locus of prosperity, and as a locus of identity. The 
chapter details the arguments advanced by Russian and Baltic diplomats for their 
inclusion in one quintessential^ European institution, the Council of Europe; it also 
details the arguments they advanced to secure their opponents’ exclusion. It describes 
the response of the Council to these arguments, and closes with a discussion of the 
emotional impact of these debates and their outcomes.
Imagined proximities
The Russian-Baltic debate over Europeanness reflects many of the themes raised in the 
growing subset of the IR literature dealing with region construction—the conjuring up 
of, in Amitav Acharya’s term, “imagined proximities.” 6 As Greg Fry has written, 
“[naturalization of the idea that the world is divided up into entities larger than states, 
called ‘regions,’ has evolved over time in association with the expansion of European 
interests throughout the globe.” 7 This idea has facilitated the tendency to generalize 
about conditions or peoples or customs within “regional” boundaries. However, the 
political and intellectual project of the identification of regions has come under 
increasing scrutiny in recent years, often inspired by Benedict Anderson’s work on 
“nation-building.” 8 Furthermore, this scrutiny is taking place at a time when many argue 
that regions are playing an increasingly important role in world politics.9 Proponents of 
a region-centric picture of world politics point to the strengthening of existing regional 
institutions and the creation of new regional organizations; to increasing demands being 
placed by the United Nations and the United States on regional organizations to play 
significant security-management and economic roles since the end of the Cold War; and 
to changes in the international environment such as the emergence of a “unipolar 
moment” in world politics. 10 As a consequence, interest in regions and their 
construction is high.
Scholarly understandings of how regions are defined have changed over the last two 
decades. Many classic studies of regions relied heavily on the notion of geographical 
proximity combined with other criteria such as cultural, economic, linguistic or political 
ties. Iver Neumann has observed two lines of argumentation in classic analyses of
5 Waever 1990b; Rupnik 1994.
6 Acharya 1999. Sidaway (2002) uses the rather less elegant but more precise “imagined regional
communities.”
7 Fry 2000: 123.
8 Anderson’s most-cited work (entitled Imagined Communities) focused on the constructed quality of
modern national polities, motivated by the observation that “all communities larger than primordial 
villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined...[and are to be distinguished] 
by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 1991: 6).
Q Hurrell 1995b: 1; Mansfield and Milner 1999: 589
10 Fry 2000: 119-120.
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regional composition: inside-out and outside-in. The first line of analysis typically 
postulates a “center, a core area where the internal defining traits are more similar, and 
interaction more intense, than in the regional periphery.” The second line of analysis 
typically focuses on systemic factors, states, and “natural geopolitical strategic 
landmarks such as mountain ranges, rivers, and bodies of water.” In each case the 
existence of a region has been taken as given. 11 However, attempts to define and 
delineate regions “scientifically” have produced few clear results. 12 More recent 
scholarship thus has tended to emphasize non-geographic criteria, in particular what 
Acharya has described as “shared perceptions of the regional subsystem as a distinctive 
theatre of operations.” 13 Social constructivists have described the latter quality in terms 
of “identity,” arguing that countries sharing a communal identity can be thought of as a 
region regardless of their location. 14 This observation leads on logically to the argument 
that regions, as socially constructed entities, are by their nature politically contested, 
with processes of political contestation moving through various stages and involving 
various actors within and outside a region. 15 “As with nations,” Andrew Hurrell writes, 
“so regions can be seen as imagined communities which rest on mental maps whose 
lines highlight some features whilst ignoring others.” 16
As a consequence, IR scholars have become increasingly interested in a number of 
regional processes. One is what Neumann has called “region-building:” the process by 
which political actors decide what political ties, cultural similarities, economic 
transactional processes, spatial and chronological markers etc. will be made relevant to
. . . 1 7 .the identity of the human collective in question. One is what might be called “region­
selling:” the way in which political actors disseminate their conception of their 
imagined community to others, both within and outside the community. 8 One is what 
might be called “region-making:” the way in which external forces attempt to define 
regions, sometimes in dialogue with, sometimes in the absence of voices from within 
the area in question. 19 And another is what might be called “region-joining:” efforts by 
political actors outside a self-defined region to secure inclusion in this collective 
identity. In this case, the goal is to examine how (to slightly change Neumann’s
11 Neumann 1999: 117-122.
12 Hurrell 1995b: 333, 334.
13 Acharya 2000: 4. These points are in line with thinking advanced in the field of critical geopolitics,
where one increasingly hears the argument that “what really makes a difference in international 
relations is the way in which a state’s relative location is constructed and what strategic meaning is 
given to its territory” (Berg 2000: 2).
14 Mansfield and Milner 1999: 590-591.
15 Hurrell 1995b: 333-334. Russell Fifield, for instance, identifies five major steps in the evolution of
Southeast Asia as a regional identity: “the creation o f the Southeast Asia Command; the development 
of Southeast Asian Studies, especially in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s; the first and 
second Indochinese wars and the articulation of the ‘domino theory’ by successive US 
administrations; the decolonization process; and the acceptance and development of the regional 
concept by the region’s governing elite” (cited in Acharya 2000: 10).
16 Hurrell 1995a: 41.
17 Neumann 1999: 114-1 15. See also, for example, Acharya 2000 and Sidaway 2002. Acharya suggests
that in some cases region-building can be a consequence of an existing sense of shared identity, while 
in other cases it can be an effort to cobble together a common identity in the face of shared problems 
(Acharya 2000: 1).
18 See, for example, Neumann 1999: 113-141.
19 See, for example, Fry 2002, Sidaway 2002.
20 This last category is reminiscent of Sven Tagil’s concept of ethnic “identification,” the “active, willful
process of consciously adhering to a specific ethnic community” (cited in Waever 1990b: 19).
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formulation) certain people, at a certain point in history, within a certain political 
context, attempt to secure their inclusion within a generally recognized “region.”21 
It is on this “region-joining” aspect of the Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns 
outlined in Chapters Three and Four that this chapter will focus.
Russian and Baltic engagement with “Europe”
The construction of “Europe” as a region is a process that has been under way since the 
consolidation of the idea of “Christendom:” as Delanty has argued, every age has 
“reinvented the idea of Europe in the mirror of its own identity.” The concept of 
Europe was initially formed (in the late fifteenth century) within a religious discourse 
which equated Europe with Western Christianity. However, the sixteenth century 
witnessed a growing use of the concept of Europe in an international political context, 
with states beginning to “speak” to each other within a formalized context of criss­
crossing relations (military, economic, political, and legal) that was referred to as 
“Europe.” 24 This project— what Delanty calls “a debased normative standard”— 
culminated in the Concert of Europe. Meanwhile, Delanty argues, “Europe” took on 
associations with a universalistic idea of civilization, while nations became the 
repositories of particularistic national cultures.
After the rise of the competing concept of Mitteleuropa and the collapse of the idea of 
European unity in the course of two World Wars, the rebuilding of the “idea of Europe” 
in the countries of what were now known as “Western Europe” became part of post-war 
reconstruction and an important political project in the context of the Cold War. 
“Europe” increasingly became perceived as Western Europe, spreading out from the six 
signatories of the Treaty of Rom e.26 The defining of “Europe” operated on two logics, 
one of differentiation, the other of drawing together. At the level of differentiation, as 
Delanty writes, the Cold War subsumed Europe into “a wider opposition of West versus 
East...A new historical category was born, to which Europe was subordinated: the 
North Atlantic.” At the level of drawing together, the new European project was 
dominated by the language of the market: with the idea of Europe as a spiritual or 
philosophical community discredited by the two World Wars, the new Europe was an 
economic community.28 The project of Europe, as Waever writes, was not to launch 
Europe back onto the stage of world history but to prevent another world war from 
starting on European soil. Economic and political integration was designed to promote 
peace and prosperity, not to seek out a unique or dominant role in world politics.29 But 
at the same time, a new politics of European identity was coming into being, seeking 
legitimation in bourgeois high culture and “best practice” standards of human rights.
From the middle of the 1980s, however, with a breakdown in the post-war liberal 
consensus represented by the Atlantic alliance, serious political and intellectual debate
21 Neumann 1999: 146. A focus on region construction, and in particular on region-building and region­
joining, has the potential to serve as a counterweight to elements of the literature focusing on identity 
in international politics that have shown a tendency to focus on the construction of difference at the 
expense of the construction of collective identities (cf. Neumann 1999: 36-37).
22 Delanty 1995: 1.
23 Delanty 1995: 14.
24 Ifversen 1998: 20-21.
25 Delanty 1995: 14.
26 Waever 1993: 173.
27 Delanty 1995: 122.
28 Heffernan 1998: 203-209.
29 Waever 1995: 175.
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about the meaning and scope of Europe reemerged.30 As Ole Waever has written, 
“Europe [was beginning] to emerge from the long shadows cast by the Second World 
War. The air of guilt stemming from colonialism, war and holocaust had largely 
evaporated and after four decades of superpower domination it was the USA and the 
USSR that tended to attract criticism on the wider world stage.”31 In this atmosphere of 
debate, CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s dramatic shift in Soviet 
rhetoric—in which “Europe” previously had appeared only as a narrow, descriptive 
term—towards invocation of a “Common European Home” further encouraged hope 
that the narrow equation of “Europe” with western Europe might be coming to an end. 
Furthermore, after the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
debate over what constituted “Europe” took on broader scope across the continent. At 
the level of drawing together, the Maastricht debate of 1992-1993, the gradual 
expansion of European institutions such as the Council of Europe, and talk of possible 
expansion of the European Union and NATO led to a growing sense of a Europe that 
might be both deeper and broader. At the same time the emergence of the Balkans as 
Europe’s “anti-Europe” not only acted as a new outlet for impulses towards 
differentiation, but also created a powerful anti-model for European behaviour. In this 
climate, debate intensified over what Europe was, where it was going, and who 
belonged within its fold.
Well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, discussion and debate had emerged in the 
Baltic states and in the Russian Federation over these nations’ appropriate relationship 
to “Europe;” after the collapse, these debates intensified. The geopolitical reasoning 
involved in deciding where their nations were located would help Russian and Baltic 
elites to “choose a suitable historical truth from many, separate versions of “our people” 
and “the others,” and set up a hierarchy of friendly and hostile nations as well as 
proximate and distant countries.”43 But equally importantly, the decisions over where 
their nations were located would help Baltic and Russian governments and 
representatives to identify their “circles of recognition:” the audiences from whom 
Russian and Baltic representatives hoped for recognition and respect.34
In approaching the question of their nation’s relationship to Europe, as well as their 
opponents’, Baltic and Russian representatives approached Europe in at least three 
ways: as a locus of security, as a locus of prosperity, and as a locus of identity.
Europe as a locus of security
The notion of Europe as a locus of security, although pervasive in both Baltic and 
Russian thought, was naturally far more obvious in Baltic rhetoric. In the Baltic case, 
representatives operating first and foremost from a concern for individualized security: 
maintenance of their individual states’ political sovereignty through freedom from
3U Heffernan 1998: 217. As Heffernan observes, “[t]he Anglo-American agenda was markedly at odds 
with the consensual orthodoxy of most western European countries, where economic and social 
policies remained interventionist and where geopolitical objectives were still influenced by the idea of  
detente with the east” (Heffernan 1998: 217).
31 Waever 1993: 175.
3J As Maria Todorova has noted, the Balkans have become “the object of a number of externalized 
political, ideological, and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative 
characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image o f the ‘European’ and ‘the west’ 
has been constructed...the rest of Europe proclaims itself ‘civilized’ partly in contrast (Todorova 
1994: 455).
33 Berg 2000: 2.
34 Ringmar 1996: 81.
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military or economic attack or political subversion. 35 Baltic conviction that Russia 
constituted a danger to Baltic sovereignty, as outlined in Chapters Three and 
Four, was accompanied by recognition that Baltic military forces by themselves were 
always goin^ to be incapable of guaranteeing territorial integrity or political 
sovereignty. As a consequence, Baltic leaders, rejecting any concept of neutrality, 
considered a degree of integration into European security complexes as absolutely vital 
to guaranteeing Baltic sovereignty and territory— to “protect the ethnic nation and 
secure the protecting state.”37 As Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis put it, “[i]f 
Central European countries and the Baltic states do not find shelter under the NATO 
wing of nolitical protection, they will be left to face ever-increasing pressure from 
Russia.”3 Many Baltic leaders also believed that over the longer run, participation in 
European security structures would further improve the international position of the 
Baltic states and consequently better defend their national interests in any foreign policy 
field.39
Russian representatives, on the other hand, conceived of Europe as a locus of a different 
kind of security, that associated with the containment of conflicts in the former Soviet 
space.40 Russian representatives had indicated repeatedly their hopes that European 
standards of state behaviour would eventually spread to the territory of the CIS to 
prevent outbreaks of ethnic conflict or separatist violence; they further hoped that CSCE 
norms would prevail in interstate relations within the CIS and on the whole territory of 
the former Soviet Union.41 A vital Russian goal within the context of this broader 
agenda was of course the protection of Russophones across the entire territory of the 
former Union, including the Baltic states. But the project of curtailing the kind of 
violent instability that had already broken out in Tajikistan and threatened to spread 
across much of Central Asia and to the Russian Federation itself was also one in which 
Russian representatives hoped that European structures, particularly the CSCE, might 
play a role. It was of course possible that institutions like the CSCE would themselves 
have to change to keep up with the times. But as Russian Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev told the United Nations Human Rights Commission in January 1992, Russian 
leaders were convinced that “the creation of a strong, democratic, and stable Russia and 
the construction of a new Europe are inseparable.”42
Europe as a locus o f  prosperity
The notion of Europe as a locus of prosperity for both Baltic and Russian 
representatives moved beyond the issue (in the Baltic case) of vulnerability to economic 
attack to the question of rebuilding their nations’ economies. The contrast between 
continuing prosperity in the countries of western Europe and stagnation in the Soviet 
bloc (most strikingly evident in the case of the divided Germany) had already been a 
powerful impetus towards a rejection of the planned economic model.43 The economic
35 Asmus and Nurick 1996: 122-123. For an intriguing and useful overview of dimensions of “security,”
see Manners 2001.
36 When asked in November 1992 how long Latvian forces could hold out against a Russian attack, a
Latvian defense official replied “twelve minutes” (Lieven 1994: 320). For more on Baltic conceptions 
of the danger from the East, see Vares 1998: 102-103, Pavlovaite 2000: 7.
37 Asmus and Nurick 1996: 123; Pavlovaite 2000: 19.
38 Lithuanian Radio, 8 December 1993 (SfVB, 13 December 1993: E/3).
39 Vares 1998: 102-103.
40 Flynn and Farrell 1999: 514
41 See, for instance, the statement by Kozyrev at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting
in January 1992 (TASS, 27 January 1992 (SfVB, 29 January 1992: A 1/2)).
42 TASS, 27 January 1992 (SfVB, 29 January 1992: Al/2).
43 Malcolm 1994a: 12.
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decline, verging on collapse, that accompanied the transition away from planned 
economies in the Baltic states and Russia, however, made the situation even more 
urgent. At the most basic level, therefore, both Russian and Baltic representatives 
expected substantial aid from the West for their transition to market economies and for 
the creation of modern, democratic institutions.44 The Baltic states lacked their own 
currencies and central banks; their economic planning institutions had to be constructed 
from scratch.45 The Russian Federation, meanwhile, faced equally parlous conditions in 
its dysfunctional heritage of Soviet banking and planning structures and a currency 
initially shared by eleven other economies in worse shape than its own. As a 
consequence, both the Baltic and Russian governments moved towards what Bobo Lo 
has called the “economization” of foreign policy, working to mobilize international 
support for economic reforms, to attract Western public and private investment, 
improve market access for exports, or (in the Russian case) to obtain relief from 
mounting obligations under the old Soviet debt.46 Baltic governments were particularly 
insistent that over the longer run, Baltic integration in the European trading system, and 
eventually ̂ possibly even into the EU, would be vital to the region’s future economic 
prosperity.
Particularly in the Baltic states, however, the issue was not just one of assistance or 
integration but one of fundamental reorientation. Despite occasional claims to 
aspirations to play the role of economic “bridges” between West and East, Baltic 
economic planners (particularly in Estonia) nevertheless hastened to sever their 
economic links with Russia as quickly as they turned towards the West. Baltic 
determination to sever trading links with Russia to the greatest extent possible stemmed 
partly from a desire to identify themselves with the developed European economies and 
states; partly from hostility towards Russia by radical nationalists; partly from a desire 
to reduce their vulnerability to Russian economic blackmail; and partly from anxiety 
over the precarious state of the Russian economy. Economic reforms in Estonia, and 
to a lesser degree in Lithuania and Latvia, were designed to achieve competitiveness in 
the European market as rapidly as possible, with little concern for their impact on 
economic ties with countries to their east.49
44 Arnswald 1998: 20-21.
45 Lieven 1994: 316.
46 Financial assistance from the West had the further political dimension of providing domestic 
legitimation for reformist regimes. As Kozyrev observed: “[everything that promotes economic 
development and normal life for the Russians would be in line with our interests in foreign policy” 
(Lo 2002a: 44-45; Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 December 1991: 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-247, 24 December 1991: 
50)).
47 Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997: 32. Notably, Baltic leaders showed little interest in the establishment of
a common Baltic economic space: instead of pushing for integration, Baltic leaderships concentrated 
on competitive strengthening of their own nation’s economic structures (Vihalemm 1997: 142).
48 Estonian planners reportedly were particularly insistent that Estonia should not be relegated to the
position of entrepot (Lieven 1994: 331). As noted in Chapter Four, the Baltic states indeed rode out 
reasonably well both instability in the Russian economy and occasional Russian efforts at economic 
pressure; Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar commented in early 1994 that Russian efforts at pressure 
demonstrated that the course adopted by the Estonian government to reorient the Estonia economy 
towards the West was the only correct one (Estonian Radio, 29 March 1994 (SWB, 1 April 1994: E/1).
49 Interestingly, Lauristin and Vihalemm (1997: 108) write: “Despite the international recognition of 
results achieved by Estonia’s liberal economic policy, they appeared alien and incomprehensible to 
many people and did not receive unanimous public support at home. There were definite 
psychological shortcomings in the implementations of the plans. Unlike in the Czech Republic, the 
reforms were not sufficiently explained to the people. More concerned with international reactions, 
the government failed to develop public relations in its own country.”
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Europe as a locus o f  identity
But both Russian and Baltic representatives also saw “Europe” as a locus of something 
far more fundamental, one of identity. The concept of “Europe” was a vivid one in all 
four capitals. Few Baltic or Russian representatives would have disagreed with 
Gorbachev’s characterization, made in 1987, that “Europe ‘from the Atlantic to the 
Urals’ is a cultural historical entity united by the common heritage of the Renaissance 
and the Enlightenment, of the great philosophical and social teachings of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.”50 The questions for all sides, however, were those of where 
their nations fit in to this entity; what functions it could play for them; and how it could 
help them answer the questions posed by Lennart Meri in 1988: “Who are we? Where 
are we from? Where are we going?”51
Russia’s relationship to Europe had historically been highly complicated. Russian 
geographers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had played an important role in 
the mapping of the European continent, contributing to an “objective” conception of 
Russia as European; but Russian confidence in Russia’s place in Europe as a broader 
cultural or political project had never been unshakeable (as this dissertation’s 
conclusion will discuss in rather more detail). The reformers who made up the bulk of 
the Yeltsin foreign policy team, however, saw Russia’s European glass as more than 
half full. It was true that prior to Peter the Great’s reign, Muscovites, although closely 
involved in the strategic and economic dealings of northern Europe, “regarded 
themselves, and were regarded by the states that developed out of Latin Christendom, as 
outside the civilization and traditions of Europe.”53 By the eighteenth century, however, 
it had become “commonplace both in Russia and abroad to think that the difference 
between Russia and the rest of Europe was not very significant,” with Peter’s reign 
having established Russia as a solid member of the European comity of nations.54 
Furthermore, it was through the engagement with European politics begun under Peter 
that the Russian empire began to acquire the characteristics that would eventually make 
it a major player in European and world politics; as Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov has written, “[i]t was through Europe that Russia was destined to find her place 
as a world power.”55 By the nineteenth century, by which time the Russian empire was 
embroiled in virtually all aspects of European interstate relations and dynastic politics, 
debates between Russian liberals and socialists over Russia was a “sister” or a “cousin” 
in the European family nevertheless presupposed the applicability of the kinship 
metaphor.56 Despite the efforts of generations of Soviet ideologists to emphasize the 
distance that separated Soviet civilization from that of the “decadent” West, with 
Western culture presenting endless opportunities for “subversion,” Europe remained 
Russians’ essential point of reference throughout the Soviet period.57
Furthermore, the theme of Russian indivisibility from Europe had experienced a 
dramatic upturn in the final decade of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the Soviet 
military presence in Germany’s eastern zone and the other Warsaw Pact countries had 
brought the Soviet Union “into Europe” willy-nilly after World War II, Soviet era
50 Gorbachev 1987: 197-198.
51 Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997: 104.
52 Bassin 1991, Hauner 1992.
53 Watson 1984: 64.
54 Vihavainen 1990: 3.
55 Ivanov 2002: 33.
56 Neumann 1996: 60. Adam Watson dates Russia’s full acceptance as a great power by the European
states as having taken place around 1760 (Watson 1984: 71).
57 Malcolm 1994a: 1,9; Neumann 1996: 95-157.
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rhetoric had for most of the post-war period been dedicated to undermining European 
unity, with the process of western European integration “denounced as an instrument of 
capitalists seeking to shore up their faltering authority by facilitating international trade 
and intensifying the exploitation of the working class.”58 To the extent that common 
bonds between the Soviet Union and western Europe surfaced in Soviet rhetoric, it was 
as part of repeated efforts to decouple the United States from Europe and to weaken 
NATO, with Soviet representatives arguing that “we Europeans should stand together in 
peace, but we are being thwarted by the intrusive presence of the Americans in 
Europe.”59 By the late Soviet period, however, all this had changed. First, as Ole Waever 
has noted, the Soviet approach towards European unity had changed: while previous 
Soviet leaderships had sought to push the US out of Europe, Gorbachev’s main concern 
was now to make sure that the Soviet Union itself was not pushed out.60 “Now and 
then,” he complained, some people “as if inadvertently... equate ‘Europe’ with ‘Western 
Europe.’ Such ploys, however, cannot change the geographic and historical realities.”61 
Second, however, Gorbachev also emphasized a new vision of Europe that had less to 
do with geopolitical categories than with an understanding of common interests, 
interdependence, and all-human values, as well as cultural reasons for Soviet 
engagement in European affairs.62 “We are Europeans,” he argued; “the history of 
Russia is an organic part of the great European history.”63 This “common European 
home” theme, Neil Malcolm argues, was more than just a ploy aimed at Western public 
and leadership opinion; “for the most Westernized groups in the Soviet elite, it 
represented the culmination of a long-running organic process in Soviet post-war 
intellectual life, rooted in a revulsion against Stalinism and neo-Stalinist nationalism 
and isolationism, something which with the wisdom of hindsight seems perfectly 
predictable.”64
Russian reformers enthusiastically took up this theme. Immediately after being 
appointed RSFSR Foreign Minister, Kozyrev stressed that “[a]n entirely new foundation 
should be laid for the Russian Federation’s relationship with Western Europe. Instead of 
advancing senseless ideological claims, the two sides should work for a single and 
unified European system.”65 Asked by an interviewer in November 1990 whether 
Russia would be a “desired guest” in Europe, Kozyrev replied “We are at a very low 
point economically, and we can still see worse times coming. But...from the point of 
view of cultural and spiritual potential, Russia is far from destitute...it is with her 
baggage, with her dignity that she can be accepted in the, as we say, common European 
home.”66 Indeed, Boris Yeltsin's first trip abroad as Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme 
Soviet, in April 1991, had been to the Council of Europe and the European Parliament: 
there he announced to the press his intention to “correct a 73-year old injustice” and to 
“return Russia to Europe.” 7 By the time that Kozyrev traveled to Strasbourg to submit 
Russia’s application to the Council of Europe, the nineteenth-century “family” 
metaphor had resurfaced: “In the capacity of a great power we wish to enter into the 
family of democratic nations of Europe.”* 6
58 Malcolm 1994a: 8; Heffernan 1998: 222; see also Ulam 1983.
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Meanwhile, that their own nations deserved to be considered a legitimate part of the 
European cultural complex was never in doubt in Baltic minds. As Eiki Berg has 
observed, this was partly due to geopolitical reasoning drawing on “[thousands o f years 
of permanent settlement on the eastern coast of Baltic Sea and the north-south trade 
links described by Tacitus.” 69 But Baltic thinkers also emphasized the longevity of the 
Baltic Christian traditions and the centuries of German, Swedish and Polish cultural and 
political influence to link their nations to the broader European cultural project.70 (For 
instance, the Lithuanian Law on the Basics of National Security lists amongst its 
“guiding principles” the statement that “the Lithuanian State, established many 
centuries ago and resting on the Christian cultural foundation unifying Europe, is an 
integral part of the community of European nations.” 71) Furthermore, many Baltic 
representatives considered their nations not only to be European, but also to be Europe’s 
easternmost outposts.72 Indeed, many Baltic thinkers drew on the “clash of 
civilizations” thesis of American political scientist Samuel Huntington to validate their 
conception of the Baltic states as “the last resort of the West-European Roman (Catholic 
and Protestant) tradition located at the border of the Slavic Byzantine (Orthodox) 
world.” 73 As Meri was fond of saying (often within Russian earshot), “our border marks 
the border of European values.” 74
Starting from this point, for Baltic representatives “Europe” functioned first and 
foremost as a place where the Baltic nations could reconnect with their pre-World War 
II past. 75 Baltic thinkers argued that the Baltic states had been removed from their 
proper civilizational context by Soviet occupation.76 The restoration of independence, as 
Pavlovaite has described, was presented in all three Baltic states as an opportunity to 
resuscitate “true” Baltic identities through a reunion with a “Europe” that stood in 
opposition to everything that the communist past and the Russia present represented. 77 
For example, Meri, after being sworn in as Estonian President, told journalists that he 
wanted to make Estonia part of Europe again: “For more than half a century, Estonia 
has been cut off from the rest of the world... we will use all our perseverance to strongly 
integrate Estonia into Europe again.” But a return to Europe also constituted a path by 
which Baltic thinkers could distance themselves both from Russia and from their own 
communist past.79 For many Baltic representatives, “Europe” ended on their state’s 
eastern border, and membership in European organizations was seen as the 
institutionalization of this move.” 0 Taken together, this return to a “natural” place of 
belonging thus was constructed as “an overcoming of enforced estrangement in the past 
and a distancing from the East that represents danger and threat to the sovereignty of the 
state.” 81
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This Baltic theme of reunion with Europe occurred in tandem with the broader move to 
“return to Europe” of all the former Soviet bloc states of eastern and central Europe; and 
indeed, some Baltic thinkers were anxious to represent it as part of the same historical 
trend.82 In this line of thought, the three Baltic nations were an organic part of an 
Eastern European community of belief in Europe, the existence of which had prompted 
Hugh Seton Watson to write that “[njowhere in the world is there so widespread a belief 
in the reality, and the importance, of a European cultural community, as in the countries
o i
lying between the EEC and the Soviet Union.” Central European writers had in fact 
rebuked Western Europe for usurping the marker “European,” arguing that this could 
not be done without Europe “losing a vital (or even ‘organic’) ingredient of itself.”84 
Few Baltic thinkers were prepared to go this far; but many were happy to paint 
themselves as keepers of a flame who were relieved to find themselves reunited with the 
bonfire party. As Meri, at his first Estonian press conference as Foreign Minister of an 
independent Estonia, said: “I wouldn’t like to oppose Western Europe to Eastern 
Europe. Estonia is a part of Central Europe, a concept that has been forgotten. Now it is 
reemerging.”85
Of course, the question of with which Europe—that of 1939 or 1989—the Baltic states 
were to be reunited was not so simple. As Grazina Minotaite has noted, “[t]he Baltic 
states themselves saw the fact as the restoration of historical justice, as getting back to 
Europe from which they were brutally cut off in 1940. Yet on one interpretation this 
return is here conceived as the restoration of former states, while on the other 
interpretation it is conceived as joining the Europe of liberal democracies.” While 
initially the former interpretation dominated both domestic and foreign policy, with the 
restoration of interwar constitutions and citizenship laws aimed at restoring inter-war 
ethnic compositions, by mid-1993 it was becoming evident to Baltic leaderships that 
Europe expected them to catch up with the times.
But both Russian and Baltic representatives knew that what they thought of Europe was 
not the only thing that was important; equally important (as Meri said) was “what 
Europe thinks of us.” Russian representatives might have described themselves as 
having to overcome European prejudice; Baltic representatives might have described 
themselves as having to overcome European ignorance. Certainly good will towards 
Russia was running high; for all that it had taken some time for Western leaderships to 
embrace Yeltsin, substantial optimism existed in European capitals that, as European 
thinkers had sporadically argued across the centuries, Russia (whatever its existing 
political state) had the potential to be an excellent student of European political and 
economic practices.89 However, many Europeans also continued to view Russia’s 
“Europeanness” with varying degrees of ambivalence. As Iver Neumann has argued, 
Russia historically had played the role of Europe’s main limnar, with European 
ambivalence at various points focusing on the distinction between the Roman (Catholic 
and Protestant) and Orthodox traditions; the alleged thinness of the line between 
Russian culture and barbarism (an argument that sometimes drew on racialist 
conceptions of the “Asiatic” quality of the Russian gene pool); and a putative Russian
82 Arnswald 1998: 21-22.
83 Cited in Heffernan 1998: 220.
84 Neumann 1999: 149.
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fascination with authoritarianism.90 The Cold War had permitted the explosion of these 
themes, with “Soviet” and “Russian” freely equated in European minds, and the worst 
qualities of both conflated; there was no guarantee that these themes would not 
experience a resurgence. Meanwhile, Baltic representatives were keenly aware that for 
most of their brief period of independence, the Baltic states had been considered 
peripheral to Europe. While Czechoslovakia had at least had its Munich, the Baltic 
states had been abandoned by the West with barely a mention. Indeed, the Yalta 
conference, while creating “a geopolitical entity, ‘Eastern Europe,’ [that] as a polity or 
community of destiny had never before existed,”91 had written the Baltic states out of 
even that attenuated relationship to the European mainstream. While the non­
recognition policy had kept the Baltic states in the moral spotlight for Western 
governments, and Western goodwill had been built up by the three states’ non-violent 
independence strategies, Baltic representatives knew that there was no guarantee that 
the previous view of the Baltic region as somewhat peripheral to Europe might not 
reemerge. Both sides, then, needed to put their nations “not only on the geographical 
map of Europe, but on the mental map of Western policymakers.”92 As Estonian 
Foreign Minister Toomas Henrik lives told the Estonian parliament: “Estonia must 
uniquely place itself in the w est.. .because no one else will do it for us.”93
Joining Europe
Unsurprisingly, the three organizations we have already encountered— the
CSCE/OSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO—were three of the forums in which 
Baltic and Russian representatives conducted their most persistent efforts to see their 
nations returned to Europe. In part, this was because these three organizations brought 
together representatives of many western European states, with the CSCE the most 
inclusive and NATO the most exclusive. But in part, it was also because these three 
institutions, plus the European Community (EC, later to become the European Union 
(EU)), had been at the forefront of debates over the future nature and composition of 
“Europe.”
It is worth noting that these four institutions constituted in 1992 very different types of 
organizations, with different criteria for membership and different types of input into 
the formulation of “Europe.’ The CSCE took a broad, non-geographic approach to 
membership: all the former Warsaw Pact signatories and all the former republics of the 
Soviet Union, including the Central Asian states, were granted virtually automatic 
membership. Nor did the CSCE/OSCE show excessive regard for issues of type of 
government or concern for human rights; the CSCE/OSCE process was in essence a 
political one, a setting for give-and-take rather than absolute rulings.94 The Council of 
Europe's definition of “Europe,” on the other hand, coincided with the geographical 
definition of the European continent, extending from the Atlantic to the Urals.95 The
90 Neumann 1999: 65-1 12; for another examination of European attitudes towards Russia’s relationship to
Europe, see Watson 1984.
91 Hellerand Feher 1990: 16.
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Council had already indicated its intention to expand its membership to European states 
that shared its commitment to democratic, rights-defending government.96 However, the 
criteria by which this commitment were deemed to be demonstrated (already informally 
in place, and codified in the Vienna Declaration of October 1993) were relatively 
rigorous, and included a list of specific legal criteria, and membership required a formal 
application and a lengthy assessment process. Membership in the Council thus 
required a formal application and a lengthy assessment process. The EC/EU similarly 
tied potential membership to a geographical conception of Europe, and had similar 
aspirations to see the entire continent eventually united under its regime. However, the 
Community had not yet taken the formal decision to expand. Furthermore, since non­
performing Community members had the potential to impose tangible costs on other 
members, it was evident that were the Community to decide to expand, it would be 
relatively inflexible in demanding from prospective members a high degree of 
compatibility of financial, trading and monetary systems, as well as relatively high 
levels of prosperity. EC/EU membership thus would in effect be a sign that a state had 
achieved western European levels of prosperity through western European economic 
models. 98 Finally, NATO was by this time expressing rhetorical commitment to a 
movement away from a simple alliance structure towards becoming “a security 
community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies.”99 
However, as its name suggested, NATO had no restrictively European focus in its 
membership policies; indeed, it had no official aspirations to incorporating all or even 
most European countries. In 1992, the possibility of NATO expanding its membership 
was only under preliminary discussion; it was already clear that if expansion were to 
occur, membership would be by invitation, and would depend on achieving exacting 
standards of compatibility not only of political structures and foreign policy aims, but
with other states neighboring the ‘geographical’ boundaries. The boundaries of Europe have not yet 
been comprehensively defined under international law. The Council of Europe should therefore in 
principle base itself on the generally accepted geographical limits of Europe. Accordingly, within their 
internationally recognized borders, all member states of the Council are European...The states whose 
legislative assemblies enjoy special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly are also considered 
European...The possibility of membership is open to Serbia, Montenegro and Andorra...In view of 
their cultural links with Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia would have the possibility of 
applying for membership provided they clearly indicate their will to be considered as part of Europe. 
However, a new iron curtain should not be drawn behind these states, as this would run the risk of 
preventing the spread of the Council’s basic values to other countries” (PACE Recommendation 1247, 
4 October 1994).
9(5 However, as the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee later outlined to the 
PACE, some Council members argued that regardless of whether Russia was geographically 
European, it should be excluded from potential membership “because the view is held that a shifting 
of the political axis would take place if one of the two great powers of the second half of this century 
were to become a member of the Council and the other one were to be left out” (PACE ORD, 26 
January 1994: 140).
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sign the European Convention on Human Rights and accept the Convention’s supervisory machinery 
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“the values that define our European identity” (Vienna Declaration, 9 October 1993 
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also of military structures. NATO membership (assuming that the organization were 
willing to expand) thus would confirm not only legal and ideological but also military 
strategic and technological compatibility with western Europe's greatest powers, as well 
as with the United States.
It was in the halls of these organizations that Russian and Baltic representatives pleaded 
their case for their nations’ Europeanness. As a member of the first Latvian delegation 
to attend the PACE as special guests said, “our fifty-year-long dream is being fulfilled. 
We are ready and determined to return to the free world not just as observers but as 
active participants in European and world democratic structures, so as to become a full 
member of the Council of Europe...We are proud that we are Europeans and that we 
can finally be embraced by our European brothers and sisters.”100 Estonian delegates 
similarly emphasized that “we are returning, with your support, to the European and 
world community to which we have belonged for seventy years both spiritually and de 
yw/T.” 101 Meanwhile, Russian delegates to the PACE stated that “Russia sincerely hopes 
to become reintegrated into Europe, at a human as well as a political level. Russia and 
the Russian delegation are attached to Europe’s common principles and its common 
moral and cultural values. The European experience of the past decades is helping us to 
renew and restore our own traditional values—values that are true and constructive, not 
totalitarian and destructive— and hence Russian history, which is closely linked to 
European history.” " Both Baltic and Russian statements emphasized that the Soviet 
system had deprived their nations of their rightful place in Europe. So, for instance, 
Estonian representatives at the PACE noted that the occupation of 1940 “excluded” the 
Balts from Europe; meanwhile Russian delegates deplored the Soviet censorship that 
had kept Russia from its rightful cultural milieu, while optimistically noting that 
Russia’s cultural Europeanness was allowing it to move relatively painlessly away from 
communist ideology.1 3
Naturally, Baltic and Russian representatives were anxious for a degree of confirmation 
of their nations’ acceptance into Europe. This confirmation could, in the eyes of Baltic 
and Russian representatives, take several forms. One was simply rhetorical confirmation 
by other representatives. Another was support on issues of importance, particularly 
those concerning their opponents; for instance, Latvian delegates declared that the 
inclusion of the Baltic states’ concerns in the Helsinki Final Document of July 1992 was 
a confirmation that “Latvia has indeed regained its place in Europe.” 104 Another was the 
removal of any distinguishing marks that might impose a stigma of non-Europeanness 
through criticism of state practice— for instance, the CSCE/OSCE monitoring missions 
in Estonia and Latvia.103
But the most potent form of recognition, Baltic and Russian representatives clearly felt, 
would be membership in European institutions. Which of these institutions to focus on, 
of course, was another story. The CSCE/OSCE, as mentioned above, was already all- 
inclusive. NATO and the EU were engaged in debates about which way their structures 
should evolve, and whether they should expand at all. Furthermore, the Baltic and 
Russian governments had very different attitudes towards NATO. Baltic governments
100 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 246.
101 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 246.
102 PACE ORD, 5 October 1992: 437.
103 PACE ORD, 31 January 1995: 51; PACE ORD, 25 April 1995:345.
104 Statement, Latvian Supreme Council Chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs, CSCE Summit Meeting, 
Helsinki, 9 July 1992.
105 For a discussion of Estonian efforts to rid the country of the stigma of the OSCE monitoring mission, 
see Sousa Freire 2001.
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aspired to membership in an expanded and revitalized NATO; the Russian government, 
on the other hand, was adding its voice to those arguing that the alliance should be 
scaled back or abolished. Meanwhile, the Council of Europe not only had begun the 
process of enlargement, but also had a history of aggressively promoting itself as 
representing the “essence” of Europe through its role as protector of “core” European 
values. European governments might disagree on the degree of political and economic 
integration (via the EU) or military integration (via NATO) that they wanted, but the 
democratic and rights-observing values exemplified and promoted by the Council were 
(so Council literature argued) a constant among western European states. As a 
consequence, the organization was increasingly synonymous with a particular 
conception of the European region. The Council of Europe, therefore, was a logical first 
port of call for an institutional certification of “Europeanness,” even though the general 
case was argued in the halls of all three organizations.
Both Russian and Baltic representatives clearly saw the Council as having the potential 
to bring a number of benefits. Some of these were practical. On the one hand, 
membership in the Council would provide access to assistance, both financial and in the 
form of advice, that would help to strengthen domestic democratic and economic 
institutions. On the other hand, both Russian and Baltic representatives saw membership 
in the Council having the potential to help with foreign policy problems. For example, 
Kozyrev argued in 1992 that “Russia is attracted to the Council of Europe by real 
interests of the Russian state, primarily the need for further cooperation in upgrading 
national legislation, including the new Constitution.” He also mentioned the 
attractiveness of economic cooperation, describing the Russian government as 
particularly interested in programs aimed at the development of small and medium 
businesses and farms and the commercialization of large state enterprises. However, he 
also described the Council as potentially helpful in matters having to do with openness 
of borders and the interests of Russians in the former Union republics, as well as the 
interests of representatives of the republics’ nationalities living in Russia. All in all, he 
believed, the Council could play an important role in preventing and eliminating spots 
of armed conflict.”106
However, the Council’s value went beyond practical issues. As noted above, it served as 
a marker of adherence to a particular set of values. As a member of a Council delegation 
that visited the Baltic states in April 1992 put it, “[membership in the Council is a 
badge of stable democracy. Baltic and Russian representatives felt, as the Russian 
Consul General in Strasbourg Vladimir Sukhov put it, that admission to the Council 
would have “weighty symbolic significance,” since they would thereby be recognized as 
states “having made an irreversible choice in the favor of democracy and respect for 
human rights.”108 These values were, to Russian and Baltic representatives, ineluctably 
associated with a liberal conception of “Europe.” Gorbachev had expressed the 
sentiments of most Russian and Baltic reformers when he described the Council in July 
1989 as “one of the epicentres of European politics and the European Idea.”109 
Furthermore, it was evident that in the post-Cold War climate, these values were no
106 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (SWB, 12 May 1992: A 1/2).
107 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 April 1992: 3.
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109 PACE ORD, 6 July 1989: 198-205. Secretary General of the Council, Catherine Lalumiere, concurred: 
as she said on the occasion of the Baltic states being granted special guest status: “There is no other 
political organization [in Europe] that symbolizes these values [of democracy and human rights] so 
effectively. There is no other political organization that can offer the peoples of Central and Eastern 
Europe new moral and ideological reference points to replace the ones which they have lost” (PACE 
ORD, 18 September 1991: 250-251).
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longer the exclusive province of the western European states; rather, they were the 
values to which millions of citizens of the former Soviet bloc believed that they aspired, 
and thus (as Kozyrev said) the Council’s “most precious treasure.” 110 As a consequence, 
tangible adherence to these values appeared to many Baltic and Russian representatives 
to be proof of true “Europeanness,” not just in the sense of adherence to western 
European values, but in the sense of adherence to the values of (as one PACE delegate 
put it) “the Europe in which we believe.” * 111 And of course, it did not hurt that the stamp 
of adherence to these values had practical as well as abstract benefit: Council of Europe 
representatives egged potential members on by noting that Council membership was an 
effective prerequisite for membership in the European Community, with its powerful
119economic benefits.
How, then, did Russian and Baltic representatives approach the Council of Europe after
i i o
the collapse of the Soviet Union? As noted above, at the most basic level, Baltic and 
Russian representatives stressed at the Council and elsewhere the degree to which their 
nations and governments identified themselves as part of Europe. But Baltic and 
Russian representatives also advanced more specific arguments as to the suitability and 
desirability of their states’ membership in the Council. 114 Baltic representatives pursued 
a few basic themes. First, they argued that legally, their states were up to scratch. As an 
Estonian delegate told the PACE, “We have succeeded in ridding ourselves of the 
heritage of the totalitarian regime by adopting measures on human rights, on the rights 
of minorities, and on democratic pluralism, with the aim of creating a state governed by 
the rule of law .” 115 Second, they argued, as one Estonian deputy put it, that non-member 
status was “destabilizing” for their nations; as a consequence, delay in admission was 
dangerous, both for their nations and for Europe. 116 This last factor was invoked ever 
more anxiously as relations with Russia became more tense; for instance, Latvian
110 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 16).
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even more interesting. In particular, it would be extremely interesting to know if Baltic representatives 
used a tactic that Frank Schimmelfenning has described as common among Eastern European 
applicants to the Eli, that of “shaming,” or the public exposure of illegitimate goals and behaviours 
(Schimmelfennig 2001b: 64-65). As Schimmelfennig writes, “The Central and Eastern European 
governments have based their claims to membership on the standard of legitimacy of the European 
international community: European identity and unity, liberal democracy, and multilateralism. They 
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that failing to do so would be an act of disloyalty to the ideational foundations of the European 
international community. They uncovered inconsistencies between the constitutive values and the past 
rhetoric of the EC, on the one hand, and the community’s current behaviour toward the Central and 
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applicants have attempted to emphasize that “for the new democracies, Europe remains a powerful 
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years of oppression” (Schimmelfennig 2001b: 68, 72).
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parliamentary speaker Anatolijs Gorbunovs, in letter to the leaders of the 32 member 
parliaments of the Council, argued that the issue could become “a destabilizing factor in 
Latvia’s internal politics at a time when the population is very sensitive to Russian- 
Latvian relations.”117
Russian lines of argument, although they showed initial similarities to the lines of 
argument of Baltic representatives, rapidly diverged dramatically. Russian 
representatives similarly opened by arguing that legally, the Russian Federation was 
nearly up to scratch. Kozyrev, submitting Russia’s application for membership, had said 
that “[t]he foundational values of the Council of Europe—the priority of human rights, 
pluralistic democracy, and supremacy of law—were defended on the August 1991 
barricades by Russians now striving to make them a fact of daily life.”118 But 
unfortunately, “striving” was still the operative word: in fact, the Russian Federation’s 
ability to meet many of the Council’s basic legal requirements, such as a constitution 
that had been ratified by a democratically elected legislature, was far from clear. As a 
consequence, Russian representative argued, as Justice Minister Yuri Kalmykov told a 
PACE delegation, that “[t]he situation in the country is not ideal, but everything 
possible is being done to maintain human rights at the level required for Council 
membership.”119 Furthermore, Russian reformers also advanced the destabilization 
argument, although in the form of warnings that unless Europe helped them, it would 
soon face a Russia governed by national-patriots (the “red-browns”). 20
But the argument to which Russian representatives rapidly turned was that admitting 
Russia to the Council of Europe was as much in the Council’s interest as it was in 
Russia’s. As Kozyrev said, when submitting Russia’s application: “[t]he young Russian 
democracy will not be able to flourish without Europe with its huge democratic 
experience. In its turn, Europe will not defeat the challenges of the post-communist era 
without a powerful, stable and democratically transformed Russia.” To a large 
degree, the faith of Russian representatives in this argument stemmed from a sense of 
the difficulty of the European mission to spread democratic values across the entire 
former Soviet bloc. As Sukhov said, “[i]t is worth keeping in mind that our full 
membership [in the COE] is in the interests... of the Council of Europe. The latter faces 
the task of becoming an all-European organization, capable of unifying towards one 
goal the West and the post-totalitarian East of the continent. To take on the resolution of 
a problem of this scale without Russia really isn’t realistic.”122 But it also emerged from 
a strong sense of what Kozyrev called Russia’s enormous and original political, 
historic-cultural, and economic potential, which would complement the Council’s 
existing resources. As a consequence, Russian representatives frequently painted a 
picture of Russian admission to the Council as a process of, as Kozyrev described it, 
“rapprochement and mutual adaptation” rather than Russia adapting to the Council’s
117 The Baltic Independent, 30 September-6 October 1994: 4. In his letter, Gorbunovs gently hinted that 
the “hinderances placed in the path of Latvia becoming a member of the Council” were causing 
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requirements.124 At the very least, Russia and the Council were on their way towards, as 
Kozyrev said, “our joint progress into the future.” 125
But it was evident from the start that a membership battle was brewing between the 
Russian Federation and the three Baltic states. Russian initial statements were veiled; a 
Russian delegate to the May 1992 PACE session declared only that “I cannot conceal 
the fact that our main preoccupation is the violation of human rights, notably the rights 
of minorities in the republics of the former Soviet Union, including some of those which 
have applied to join the Council of Europe and will become members of it.” 126 But three 
days later Kozyrev accompanied Russia’s application to the Council with a memo 
entitled “On the Violation of Human Rights in the Baltic Countries,” criticizing Baltic 
citizenship policy. The memorandum noted that “ [t]he young Russian democracy, 
risking its initial achievements, backed the desire of the Baltic republics to restore their 
independence. We hoped they would be an example for the rest. But something quite 
different happened. Extreme nationalism is rearing its head there. Human inequality has 
been legalized. Violations of human rights and, above all, the rights of the Russian- 
speaking population have become widespread and systematic.” 128 It argued that 
“[undoubtedly each state has the right to handle independently the matter of citizenship 
and procedures for granting it. However, one cannot help noticing that the situation 
created as a result of the above mentioned laws is one that paves the way for 
intolerance, aggressive nationalism and xenophobia....Preconditions have been created 
for a massive violation of human rights. The events of the last few days in Estonia point 
to the likelihood of organized anti-discrimination action (strikes etc.) by the Russian- 
speaking population, which could destabilize the situation in these countries and in 
Europe as a whole.” And it expressed the hope that “an analysis of the ‘unfavorable’ 
situation by the Council may contribute to the search for a way out o f this complicated 
problem.” 130
From this point on, the battle over Council membership was engaged. This struggle 
went through two major phases. From 1992 to mid-1993, Russian delegates tried to 
keep Estonia and Latvia from gaining membership. Then, after Lithuania and Estonia 
were admitted in May 1993, the focus of the battle shifted, with Baltic delegates 
concentrating on keeping Russia out of the Council.131 In the course of their arguments, 
Baltic and Russian delegates drew on all the themes raised in Chapters Three and Four,
124 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 August 1992: 1, 4. Indeed, Kozyrev once went so far as to say that 
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deploying the full range of arguments about their opponents’ natures in aid of their 
specific argument that they should not be extended the Council’s imprimatur.
Russian and Baltic arguments against each other’s memberships took several forms. For 
their part, Russian representatives argued that legally, Estonia and Latvia were not up to 
scratch. As Kozyrev’s memorandum of May 1992 argued, “obvious prerequisites have 
been created for the large-scale violation of human rights.” Russian representatives 
argued that Estonia and Latvia were ignoring European admonitions; for instance, 
Russian representatives circulated a Foreign Ministry statement on Latvian citizenship 
bill that stated that “Latvian parliamentarians continue to ignore recommendations 
made by the Council of Europe and CSCE specialists.” While Russian representatives 
did not suggest that Baltic legal systems were irredeemable, nevertheless they argued, as 
Kozyrev did in a letter to Council General Secretary Catherine Lalumiere, that Estonian 
and Latvia membership would be “premature.”134 Indeed, Russian representatives 
argued, admitting Estonia or Latvia right away would effectively validate aggressive 
nationalism by providing international legitimation of discrimination against the 
Russophone population. 1 3 They further argued that such admission would establish 
double standards; as one Russian representative told the PACE, it was no good to pass 
resolutions condemning abuses of human rights in Yugoslavia if the same principles 
were not applied in Estonia.136 Finally, in the case of Latvia, they drew on images of the 
image of the Baltic governments as unreliable and cited the Estonian law on aliens as 
evidence that Council membership would encourage even more aggressive behavior. 
Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly Ramazan 
Abdulatipov drew together most of these themes: “[m]any [Russian-speakers resident in 
Latvia] actively supported the nationalist movement in Latvia...They weren’t the only 
ones who were fooled [by the democratic positions and slogans of the movement]. 
When the Russian parliament, reformist forces in the then-RSFSR supporting the 
formation of the new Baltic governments, we hoped that together with democratic 
Russia would be civilized democratic countries. Thus thought, and acted, Boris Yeltsin 
and democratic circles in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, upon taking 
power, yesterday’s Latvian democrats quickly transformed themselves into harsh 
nationalist-ethnocrats... [If Latvia is admitted to the Council of Europe] this will be 
taken in Latvia as approval on the part of the West for the conducting of national-radical 
policies of ethnic ‘cleansing’ and will weaken the position of those favoring a more 
considered course of action.”137 In short, Russian representatives argued, the Council
should “adhere to its founding principles. ,138
Baltic representatives, for their part, also advanced the argument that Russian practice 
fell short of the Council’s standards. “Just as a banker would not accept a dollar that is 
slightly forged,” argued Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas (formerly a banker), 
“this body should not succumb to accepting members that fall slightly short of Council 
norms. The goal of the Council is to forge democracy, not to settle for a forged
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democracy.” 139 As long as Russian troops were on Baltic soil, these remained a 
prominent focal point of Baltic opposition. But most Baltic representatives treated these 
as only the most immediate manifestations of a more fundamental problem: the question 
of how the Russian government perceived and intended to interact with its neighbors. 
As one Lithuanian delegate told the PACE: “The liberal democratic, communist, and 
some other political parties in Russia from time to time make statements about the 
creation of a unitary or federal Russia covering the whole territory of the former Soviet 
Union where the Russian ethnic minorities would play an important role in this process. 
The Council of Europe ought to find some forms of response to such statements.” 140
In this situation, Baltic representatives urged Russian leaders to prove their innocence 
by disassociation. For example, Brazauskas told the PACE that a troop withdrawal 
would favorably reflect Russia’s intention to conduct peaceful relations with its 
neighbors; however, “[t]he Baltic states and, I assume, the Council of Europe would 
[further] appreciate a formal renunciation by the Russian authorities of the statements 
made by certain Russian parliamentarians and political groupings which deny the 
legality of Baltic independence and question the territorial integrity of other European 
states.” 141 Specifically, Baltic representatives such as Estonian Foreign Minister Jiiri 
Luik argued that Russia must “officially reject its concept of the Near Abroad, which 
we see as a euphemism for the antiquated idea of spheres of influence. This concept, 
which intellectually drives Russia foreign policy today, is in complete contradiction to 
the mentality of cooperation and integration that marks democratic European thought of 
the late 20th century.” 142 Baltic representatives further urged the Russian government to 
officially condemn extremist statements by the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and to 
“affirm their willingness to respect the independence and territorial integrity of all states 
in central and eastern Europe.”143
Issues of the future were not the only ones on which Baltic representatives focused. One 
issue on which Baltic representatives were particularly insistent was that the Russian 
government should issue a formal denunciation of the USSR’s incorporation of the 
Baltic states, which (they reminded their audiences) the Council itself had repeatedly 
denounced in the past.144 As Luik told the Committee of Ministers, the Council’s 
resolutions over the years denouncing the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into 
the USSR showed the Council’s dedication to democracy and sovereignty: “We are 
convinced that this dedication to historical and intellectual honesty should remain one of 
the high standards that the Council demands of prospective members.” 145 Meri 
redirected this retrospective thrust into the future, arguing that for Russia to be 
considered for Council membership, the Estonian government expected Moscow to 
“honestly and openly distance itself from the policy of the former USSR,” to “state 
officially that it does not regard itself as a successor to the aggressive Stalinist policy,” 
and to “declare officially that it does not consider itself the legal heir of the Stalinist 
policy of aggression.”1 6 A Lithuanian deputy to the PACE similarly complained: 
“What is being done in the textbooks with the two-headed Russian eagle on them? 
There one can find maps drawn according to the old Soviet style, where Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania are still called Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as texts with notes
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about the ‘liberating’ missions of the Soviet Army in the 1940s. This new educational 
system in Russia is not an internal problem of Russia. This is the problem of our 
security. These textbooks are preparing millions of young people for the future.” 147
Representatives of the three Baltic states made it clear that their hospitality to the idea 
of Russian membership was also dependent on parochial concerns. Lithuanian 
representatives complained about Russian intransigence over property issues; as 
Landsbergis told the PACE, “I could not recently and I will not in future be able to vote 
in favour of a country that still occupies the territories and buildings of my own country, 
such as the embassies of Lithuania in Paris and Rome...The Second World War, with 
all these Nazis and occupations, must be finished before we discuss full accession by 
Russia.” Latvian representatives were concerned about the continuing presence of 
retired army officers and the Russia’s “callous” disregard of issues of reparations.149 
And Estonian representatives raised questions early on about the status of ethnic 
minorities in Russia, as well as demanding that the Russian Federation promise to 
resolve its border disputes according to international law.150
Finally, needless to say, the war in Chechnya became the most important point of 
opposition for Baltic representatives. Estonian delegate Tunne Kelam put the case 
succinctly: “The methods of the Russian authorities [in Chechnya] are totally opposed 
to the behaviour expected from a democratic state based upon the rule of law...the 
actions of the Russian authorities show complete disregard and lack of respect for the 
most basic principles of this Organization.”15 In light of this fact, Baltic representatives 
argued, Russian membership in the Council was doubly inappropriate. First, it would 
send the wrong message to members: as Kelam argued, “ [i]f we accept a member whose 
hands are dripping with blood, then any other country would say it is justified to act in 
the same way.”1?2 Second, it would set a fox to guard the chicken coop: as one Latvian 
representative asked the PACE, “how could Russia, [which “continues to indulge in 
human massacre”], as a member of the Council of Europe, become a judge of other 
nations’ behaviour?”153 Furthermore, Baltic deputies argued, delaying Council 
membership was one way of making the Russian government realize that its actions had 
consequences outside its borders: as a Latvian delegate put it, the Council needed “to 
demonstrate to Russia itself—indeed, not only to Russia but to others—that there is no 
possibility of paying a cheap price for a decision to use weapons against people.” 154
Ultimately, however, Baltic deputies relied on expressions of moral outrage. In so 
doing, they pitted themselves against the bland language of diplomacy; as Landsbergis 
said, “I am convinced that to call evil by its name is the first means by which to stop 
it.” 155 Kelam urged the PACE: “To begin, let us be precise in our terms: this is not just a 
‘situation.’ This is a war.”156 And Landsbergis told deputies: “When Mr. Kozyrev calls 
the invasion of a city with tanks and killings of civilians ‘a material strengthening of the 
negotiation process’ or when he justifies the bombing of an orphanage or a nursing
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home saying that ‘Russia is forced to kill them because they resist!’—this is the same 
cynical mockery as that when someone still tries to call the complete disaster and 
massive exile from Chechnya ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘bringing order’.” And when 
dissimulating language was peeled back, Baltic deputies argued, the moral qualities of 
the situation were clear: as Kelam put it, “[ijt is immoral to accept a country with blood 
on its hands.” As Landsbergis told the PACE: “If Russia decides to be non-European 
in its behavior, non-democratic and not-ruled-by-law, then we have nothing more to 
decide. It is their choice to stay outside Europe...Of course, we all know about great 
Russia’s contributions to European culture. But this business of drunken killers 
attacking mountain villages and bus stations with rockets does not remind us of the 
dances of the little swans at the Bolshoi. Today Russia’s name is destruction; 
therefore...we should not wish for a similar destruction here.” 159
Indeed, Baltic representatives argued that admission of Russia to the Council would 
have implications far broader than the immediate legal ramifications: it would constitute 
an abandonment of the Council’s ideals and the Council’s identity. As Landsbergis told 
the PACE, “[w]e have a choice and a right to make a choice between a Europe based on 
principle and one has few principles and is based on benefits. I have a strange feeling 
that if we choose the second, we shall face the worst agony of the European spiritual 
heritage. It was our function to be honest and to believe. I say ‘was’ rather than ‘is;’ the 
worst may happen if the Council agrees to lose its identity before Russia is asked to 
restore its specific, but also European identity. It should at least be asked not to be so 
anti-Western.” 160 And such an abandonment, Baltic representatives argued, would lead 
in turn to a return to a world of Yalta-style sphere-of-influence politics. Baltic 
representatives repeatedly told Council members that, as Estonian deputy Tunne Kelam 
put it, “Russia’s so-called ‘near abroad’ policy...is truly alarming for Russia’s 
neighbors. We take that view because it envisages a new division of spheres of 
influence in Eastern Europe.” 161 It was Europe’s responsibility, Baltic representatives 
argued in the Council and elsewhere, to take all possible measures to prevent the 
emergence of what Meri called “Russia’s regrettable Monroe doctrine.” 1 2 To signal 
otherwise through the acceptance of Russia, as Kelam put it, would “place the future of 
democracy in all of Europe in doubt.” 163 As Meri argued, “Europe will bleed to death, 
both morally and physically. A thousand little jabs, which each on its own seems 
painless and insignificant, can bring about a fatal result: the destruction of Europe’s 
basic values, and thus its peaceful and democratic future.” 164
Of course, Russian and Baltic representatives fought back against these claims. In their 
efforts, Baltic delegates were clearly anxious that Russian arguments were having some 
effect on what they considered to be otherwise well-disposed audiences; as a 
consequence, they devoted substantial energy to refuting what they called a 
“disinformation campaign.” 163 As in the broader “identity diplomacy” campaigns 
described in Chapters Three and Four, Baltic representatives circulated information 
refuting Russian statements; publicized the favorable findings of other organizations, 
such as the CSCE and the UN; and invited Council members to come to the Baltic states
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on fact-finding trips. 166 They further hit back in the PACE, calling Russian 
presentations “slander.”167 After Lithuania and Estonia were admitted to the Council in 
May 1993, Lithuanian and Estonian delegates continued to strongly argue Latvia’s case; 
for instance, Luik told the PACE that “Latvia’s legal system is based on universally 
recognized principles of justice and that Latvia is a democratic state which honors and 
fully respects human rights.”168 And particularly as the Russian campaign in Chechnya 
intensified, they suggested that Russian delegates had no moral leg to stand on in 
criticizing Baltic policy. As an Estonian delegate put it, “[tjoday we have heard in some 
speeches about so-called discrimination against Russian-speaking people in Estonia and 
Latvia...since those countries have regained independence, no human being has died in 
those countries for being Russian....The first human right—the right to life—has been 
guaranteed by law, by morality, and by the tradition of those societies. It is very 
different in some other member states or applicant states to the Council of Europe.”169
Russian delegates were in a somewhat different position in their counter-campaign. 
From the beginning, but particularly after the Chechen campaign got under way, the 
Baltic states were not the only opponents of Russian Council membership; a resolution 
to suspend Russia’s application for membership indefinitely was approved nearly 
unanimously in February 1995. Russian delegates directed the occasional remark 
towards Baltic criticisms; for example, a Russian representative welcoming Lithuania’s 
access to the Council commented that contrary to Baltic accusations, Russia entertained 
no imperial ambitions towards the Baltic states, and that “no past bitterness should be 
allowed to prevent Russia’s full inclusion in the international community.”171 But for 
the most part, Russian delegates did not dignify individual Baltic lines of argument with 
a response, instead concentrating their efforts on addressing doubters as a whole. For 
the most part, Russian arguments continued to focus on the need for the Council to 
encourage Russia in its efforts at reform. Russian representatives accentuated the 
positive: as Russian delegate Vladimir Lukin, head of the Duma Foreign Relations 
Committee, told the PACE, Russians “achieved freedom of expression and the media, 
freedom of non-governmental organizations and free and fair elections at all levels; 
millions of people no longer lived in political fear.” Furthermore, Russian 
representatives argued, at least the Russian government realized that it still needed to 
improve. As a letter from Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Chairman of 
the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko, and Chairman of the State Duma Ivan 
Rybkin urging Russia’s admission stated: “Our desire to gain full membership of the
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COE is a logical consequence of our current policy aimed at establishing the rule of law 
strengthening democracy, and genuinely securing human rights in Russia. We have 
succeeded in obtaining substantial results in this regard. However, we are aware that we 
still have a long way to go. The main thing is to perceive the dynamics of the current 
transformations, estimate the existing achievements at their full value, and observe the 
determination of Russia’s political forces as well as its leaders and mass media to carry 
on legal reform .” 173 With this broader transformation, items of individual concern 
would, Russian representatives assured their audiences, change as well. As a Russian 
delegate told the PACE, membership “could help to cure the Chechen problem...[and] 
would help Russia attain European standards in international relations. As Goethe said, 
endeavor will always be rewarded with success.” 174
Implicit, and often explicit, in the arguments of Russian reformers was the threat that if 
Russia did not receive European help, worse might be to come. While the issues 
resulting in Russia’s suspension had been resolved, Lukin told the PACE, and the threat 
of a return to communism had been laid to rest, there was still a danger of Russia 
backsliding into fascism. Consequently, he asked the Council “to encourage Russia 
along the democratic path.” (The wrong choice, he later argued, would have reflected 
as badly on the Council as it did on Russia: “Was Russia to become one of the 
democratic countries of Europe or would the Council of Europe play Pontius Pilate and 
wash its hands of the country?” 176) Even the communist delegate Gennadiy Zyuganov 
told the PACE that “[acceptance of Russia by the Council was in Europe’s interest,” as 
the alternative would “encourage the war-mongers, fundamentalists and nationalists.” 177
But at the same time, Russian representatives continued to stress that the Council could 
benefit from Russian membership. As the letter from Yeltsin and others stated, “[t]he 
admission of Russia to the COE in the near future will be of historical significance. New 
important prerequisites for the creation of a greater Europe with a common 
humanitarian legal social and cultural space will be created. The transformation of the 
Council into an organization comprising the whole of Europe will make it possible to 
defend together the common values shared by all European nations and ensure 
democratic security in a consistent manner.” 178 Russian delegates further reminded the 
PACE that “many European security problems could only be solved with Russia’s 
help.” 179
Russian and Baltic arguments started from the implicit or explicit positions described 
above: that their opponents were aggressive, undemocratic, and threatening, not just to 
their neighbors, but to European security or values. Russian delegates used the language 
of “ethnic cleansing” and repeatedly invoked the “unreliability” of the Estonian and 
Latvian governments. Baltic representatives continued to draw historical analogies to 
Soviet period; as one Latvian delegate told the PACE: “The suppression of the freedom 
movement of the Chechen nation, which not so long ago had been “punished” by the 
Soviet Union...had not ended.” Meanwhile, Chechnya was the spur for a fresh round
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of historical analogy to the Nazis from Baltic deputies. For instance, Landsbergis told 
the PACE that Landsbergis at PACE: “[S]pecial methods employed by Moscow could 
be compared to the total destruction and annihilation carried out by the German national 
socialists in Warsaw... ‘Never again,’ it was stated later as a solemn oath; but now we 
have it again...the Russian Gauleiters and Sturmbandführers. . .‘will level the city to the 
ground, then leave it and forget about it,’ as one of the defending commanders said 
recently.”181
But Baltic representatives also called into question the very concept of Russia’s 
potential to be European, at least in the immediate future. Kelam opined to the press that 
admitting Russia would mean “Europe’s political boundaries will extend to the Pacific 
and verge on China. Europe in a certain sense would become a peninsula adjoining the 
turbulent continent of Asia. It would be far from clear whether Europe would start 
organizing Asia or whether parts of Asia would gradually start ‘disorganizing’ 
Europe.”1 2 And Meri, as noted earlier, told the PACE: “[t]he problem that we have to 
face is that, unfortunately, a great number of Russians are not Europeans, but rather a 
special kind of people. In theoretical literature we call them homo sovieticus.”m
Hard feelings: Take Two
The proposition that social inclusion and exclusion can be a powerful source of feeling 
is hardly a controversial one, with supporting research emerging in both social 
psychology and the sociology of emotion.1 4 Furthermore, the responses of both Baltic 
and Russian representatives to the process of seeking Council membership certainly 
conformed to the literature’s expectations. On the Baltic side, admission to the Council 
for their nations was a joyful occasion, with representatives taking the Council’s 
acceptance as a vindication of their self-conception as European. As Meri told the press, 
“[w]e have always considered ourselves Europeans, and Estonia, a European country. 
But it is one thing what we think of ourselves, and it’s another matter what Europe 
thinks of us.”185 Speaker of the Estonian parliament Ülo Nugis told the PACE that “[w]e 
are honored to be included in this prestigious organization of European democratic 
states.”186 Latvian delegates told the PACE that “Latvia’s accession to the Council of 
Europe is for us the second most important event [since independence]... Upon our 
return into the community of European countries, the occupation of Latvia, which began 
in 1940, ceased.”187 A Lithuanian delegate, commenting on Latvia’s accession, called 
membership in the Council a demonstration that the Baltic states are “fully-fledged
i o o
members of the European family.”
Meanwhile, in keeping with the sociology of emotion literature’s predictions, 
resentment over Russia’s exclusion had been growing among Russian representatives. 
Kozyrev had stated in early 1992 that “I must say that we have satisfied ourselves that 
Europe is waiting for us and we are ready to enter it.” A group of Supreme Soviet 
deputies representing all parliamentary factions denounced the Council’s “double
181 PACE ORD, 2 February 1995: 243
182 The Baltic Independent, 26 January-1 February 1996: 6.
183 PACE ORD, 25 April 1995: 320.
184 See Abrams and Hogg 1990, Dijker et al. 1996.
185 BNS, 15 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-094, 18 May 1993: 56).
186 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1074.
187 PACE ORD, 31 January 1995:48. 
m  PACE ORD, 31 January 1995:54.
189 Russia’s Radio, 12 March 1992 {SWB, 13 March 1992: Al/1).
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Standards” in admission of new members, say admission was being “artificially 
delayed” through the imposition of additional terms of admission, and demanded: “Is it 
acceptable to make Russia wait too long in the European antechamber?”190 Deputy 
Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin complained in late 1993 that Russia’s failure to 
be admitted to the Council of Europe “is becoming a bit embarrassing...W e’ve been 
knocking on the door of the Council for a year and a half and yet we’re told wait, wait, 
while countries are being accepted which, in my opinion, do not differ from Russia in 
any positive way as far as democratic standards are concerned. We say quite openly 
that, on the whole, we can get on fine without the Council, but it would be better if we 
were members.” 191 Yeltsin indeed turned down an invitation to the Council’s summit 
meeting in October 1993, saying he would only attend once Russia was a member. 192 
As Lukin grumbled, “The impression is that the Russians are bad because they are 
Russian.”193 Indeed, when Russian membership finally came in January 1996, Russian 
Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, addressing the PACE, took a reserved tone, 
saying that Russia was “well aware that membership imposes serious obligations,” 
which he was confident that the Russian government would meet.194 (But Yeltsin was 
delighted: “Well, here we are in Europe!” 1 5)
Little direct mention exists in the literature of sociology of emotion, however, of the 
emotional implications of competition over group membership. 196 And if Baltic and 
Russian representatives were happy to see their own nations included in Europe at last, 
they were not so pleased by the Council’s decisions to admit their opponents.197 
Kozyrev, who had sent a personal letter to the Council arguing against Estonian 
membership, pulled out of the May 1993 session of the Committee of Ministers in 
protest at Estonia’s admission, saying that it might be interpreted as international 
legitimation of discrimination against Russophones in Estonia.198 “We expect,” Kozyrev 
complained, “the application of the corresponding Council procedures and mechanisms 
for the purpose of conducting a more fundamental legal appraisal of Estonia’s 
legislation in the sphere of human rights to protect the nonindigenous population from 
aggressive nationalism and an apologia for ethnic cleansing.”199 Russian delegate 
Yevgenniy Ambartsumov told the PACE on the event of Estonia’s accession that: 
“[s]ome years ago I was one of the Russian democrats who went to Estonia, before it 
declared independence, to try to convince the Russian-speaking minorities to support 
the Estonian national movement, as we hoped that, if it were victorious, it would help to
190 ITAR-TASS, 6 July 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-128, 7 July 1993: 20); Izvestiya, 6 July 1993: 4 (FBIS-SOV- 
93-128, 7 July 1993: 20). A few years later, State Duma deputy Mikhail Lapshin told reporters: “I’ve 
been to Council of Europe meetings more than once, and I’ve never been so humiliated in my whole 
life. Even before Chechnya, there was always some reason why they didn’t accept us” {Prism, 20 
October 1995: 1).
191 Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 17 October 1993 {SWB, 19 October 1993: B/6).
192 Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 17 October 1993 {SWB, 19 October 1993: B/6).
193 RIA-Novosti, 10 October 1994.
194 Nevertheless, he called Russian admission “a major step towards the genuine unification of Europe” 
and stressed that Russia was not joining the Council “with empty hands:” its cultural, historic, 
scientific and intellectual potential would enrich the activities of the Council (ITAR-TASS, 28 
February 1996 (FBIS-SOV-96-041,28 February 1996 (electronic))).
195 Moscow News, 2-8 February 1996: 5.
196 Susan Fiske and Janet Ruscher’s general observations on interdependent relationships, however, seem 
apposite: “[t]o the extent that two people are interdependent (willingly or not), they have the ability to 
interrupt or facilitate each other's goals... Hence, any interdependent relationship would be a candidate 
for the experience of strong emotional reactions” (Fiske and Ruscher 1993: 244-245).
197 A notable exception was Lithuania’s accession, which Russian representatives welcomed {PACE 
ORD, 11 May 1993:935).
198 BNS, 12 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-091, 13 May 1993: 6).
199 Izvestiya, 2 July 1993: 3 (FBIS-SOV-93-126, 2 July 1993: 15).
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guarantee equal rights for all those living on Estonian territory. Today, I am frankly 
disappointed because human right are not fully secured to the Russian-speaking sections 
of the population. Is this not discrimination?”200 Latvian accession in January 1995, 
although not greeted with the same antipathy, nevertheless provoked a comment from 
Foreign Ministry representatives that the Council “seems to have resorted to double-
• 701standards practice once again.”
Furthermore, Estonian inclusion in particular appeared to heighten Russian pique over 
continued exclusion. In mid-July 1992, Russian delegates to the PACE told reporters 
that “there shouldn’t be any problems with entry into the Council of Europe...which 
one can’t say about, for instance, the Baltic states or Moldova.” Now, Sergei Krylov, 
Executive Secretary of the Russian Foreign Ministry, commented after Estonia’s 
admission that “the Council of Europe has decided that “Estonia is worthy of its 
‘mark’...On the other hand, there isn’t much fervor about letting Russia in. In a purely 
human way this really causes a feeling of annoyance. Wasn’t Russia the first to 
recognize the independence of the Baltic states, doesn’t it sincerely strive to help the 
former Union republics to receive all the attributes of statehood, including membership 
in international organizations?”203 Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy 
Karasin complained in October 1993 that “[i]t is not quite clear why Russia has for 18 
months now been waiting for membership in the Council of Europe while countries 
such as Estonia and Romania have been admitted.”204
Nor were Baltic delegates happy to see Russia accepted into the Council in January 
1996. Although substantial opposition still existed in the Council to Russian actions in 
Chechnya, a number of individuals and delegations (the German delegation in 
particular) had been pressing for admission on the grounds that it was better to have 
Russia in than out.205 A Council of Europe delegation to Moscow in January 1996 
recommended Russian admission on the grounds that Russia had started to reform its 
legal system and that admission would encourage further reform. Nevertheless, the 
delegation said that due to the continuation of serious violations of human rights in 
Chechnya and frequent violations by the criminal justice system of rights of the 
accused, Russia could not currently be considered to be a “rule of law state.”206 
Capitalizing on these lingering doubts, Baltic representatives had been instrumental in 
securing three of the longest list of conditions ever put forward for a new member: that 
Russia settle international as well as internal disputes by peaceful means; that it settle 
international border disputes according to the principles of international law, abiding by 
existing international treaties; and that it “denounce as wrong the concept of two 
different categories of foreign countries, whereby some are treated as a zone of special 
influence called the ‘near abroad’.”207 The Estonian delegation head, Kristiina Ojuland, 
told the press that the conditions were accepted by the PACE leadership to buy Baltic
200 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1064.
201 Interfax, 1 February 1995 (FBIS-SOV-95-022, 1 Februrary 1995 (electronic)).
202 Izvestiya, 2 July 1992: 6.
203 Moscow News, 21 May 1993: 4.
204 RIA-Novosti, 12 October 1993.
205 German delegates argued that once admitted Russia would be obliged to accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and ensure that its legislation conforms with that convention; 
furthermore, Russian citizens would have the right to appeal to the European Court if they feit that 
their rights had been violated ( The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1).
206 Open Media Research Institute Daily Report, Russia (henceforth OMRI Daily Report), 15 January 
1996.
207 “Opinion on Russia’s request for membership,” 25 January 1996 (Opinion no. 193 (1996)). The 
Russian government had already agreed to assist in returning home persons who had been deported to 
locations in the RSFSR from the Baltic republics during the Soviet period.
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votes. Nevertheless, the whole Estonian delegation voted against admission (the only 
delegation to do so); two Latvian delegates voted “no” and one was absent; and one 
Lithuanian delegate voted “no,” one abstained, and two “preferred to be out of the hall” 
when the vote was taken.209 (Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenniy Primakov sent letters 
of thanks to the Lithuanian and Latvian delegations, but not to the Estonian one; a 
Russian diplomat told the press that “there was simply nothing for which to thank 
Estonia.”21 ) Landsbergis complained that “I am disappointed to see a Europe that 
rejects the Chechen nation’s right to self-determination,” believing that 90% of those 
who had voted “yes” did so out of “fear of Russia.” 211
Baltic opposition to Russian membership in fact heightened the tension between the 
four delegations to the Council. After Russia’s admission, Yeltsin called on deputies 
serving as PACE delegates to “resist attempts [at the PACE] to put pressure on Russia, 
to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs, or to apply double standards.”212 Meanwhile, 
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenniy Primakov told the PACE that Russia “expects” the 
Council to take “more consistent and vigorous steps” to protect the rights of 
Russophones in the Baltic states.213 For his part, Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vähi 
warned that when Estonia assumed the chairmanship of the PACE in May 1996, it— “as 
a country honoring all its commitments”— would pay “particular attention” to the 
observation of human rights in Russia.214 As Kelam told the press, Estonian 
representatives saw Estonia’s role in the Council as being one of pointing out things that 
“larger countries were afraid for some reason to say...Often, Estonia plays a moral 
role...W e try to boldly stress the moral values of the organization, in particular in 
connection with Russia. There should be no double standards for different countries, 
and we are in a position where we should remind everyone of this.”215
208
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the diplomatic debates over national “identities” described 
in Chapters Three and Four play into related debates over the ways in which these 
identities can be grouped in the world— in this case, into regions such as “Europe.” It 
has argued that Russian and Baltic representatives conceived of Europe, and European 
audiences, as their “circle of recognition” due in part to their conceptions of Europe as a 
locus of security, as a locus of prosperity, and a locus of identity. It has argued that in 
the struggle to see their nations included in the Council of Europe, a key regional 
marker institution, Baltic and Russian representatives drew not only on technical issues 
of legal compatibility, but also on more general characterizations of their nations’ 
“Europeanness.” It also has argued that Russian and Baltic representatives drew on 
many of the themes outlined in Chapters Three and Four, as well as more specific 
arguments, to convince their audiences of the degree to which the nature or behavior of 
their opponents should not be considered to be worthy of Council membership, and
“°8 The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1.
“°9 The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1. Of 263 delegates to the PACE, 35 voted ‘no,’ with 15 
abstentions.
210 Cited in Girnius 1996a: 43.
211 The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1. Baltic representatives reportedly had themselves come 
under pressure; Estonian representatives claimed afterwards that the Finns threatened to withdraw 
support for Tallinn’s EU and NATO aspirations if the Estonian delegation voted against Russian 
membership, and Latvian sources said that German representatives had issued similar threats in Riga 
(The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1).
212 OMRI Daily Report, 13 March 1996.
213 OMRI Daily Report, 3 May 1996.
2,4 Interfax, 20 April 1996 (FBIS-SOV-96-080, 20 April 1996 (electronic)).
215 The Baltic Independent, 5-11 May 1995: 1.
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hence of certification as “European.” And it has attempted to outline why the results of 
these battles might have evoked hard feelings in their participants.
The battle over membership in the Council of Europe was but the first of the battles 
over membership in European institutions that were to play themselves out between 
Baltic and Russian representatives. Russian opposition to possible Baltic membership in 
NATO, Baltic opposition to a restructuring of NATO that would give Russia a 
substantially expanded voice in that organization, and Russian efforts to hold Estonian 
and Latvian applications to the EU hostage to border issues are, regrettably, outside the 
scope of this thesis. But in each of these battles, the “identity diplomacy” themes that 
this thesis has introduced in Chapters Three and Four continued to reverberate. And as 
with the struggle for Council membership, all of these battles—particularly over NATO 
membership—evoked strong feelings in their participants.
But a few questions remain unanswered by our analysis so far. First, it is not completely 
clear why Russians from across the political spectrum, many of whom held Europe in 
some suspicion, were at least initially united in support of joining the Council. 
Slavophile and Eurasianist strains of thought had been growing in Russian politics; for 
moderates in this camp, Russia at the very least had “the choice whether or not to be 
part of Europe, depending on whether the latter corresponds to Russian notions of 
humanity, Christianity, and social order.” Hardliners, on the other hand, celebrated 
the allegedly non-European traits in Russian culture as advantages that would 
eventually take Russia ahead of the “decaying West.” Russian national-patriot 
representatives like Rybkin and Sergei Baburin were not people who identified strongly 
with European values or a European identity for Russia. Yet with virtually no 
exceptions, Russian politicians expressed their desire to see Russia take a seat in the 
Council of Europe.21
Second, it is not entirely clear why both Russian and Baltic representatives expended 
such energy on keeping their opponents out of the Council, and out of Europe. 
Regional membership was not, after all, a zero-sum game. Indeed, Russian and Baltic 
representatives showed no particular concern over questions of membership for Eastern 
European states; Baltic representatives supported the admission of Ukraine (on the basis 
of its “substantial progress in the theory and praxis of establishing democratic 
institutions”), which prior to the Chechen war could not have been said to have been far 
ahead of Russia in terms of consolidation of democratic institutions.219 Nor could 
Council membership for their opponents be said to pose any serious dangers to Baltic 
security, or to Baltic Russophones; indeed, Council programs for member states were 
designed to help the democratization processes that Russian and Baltic representatives 
professed to so fervently hope for in their opponents. Baltic and Russian representatives 
may have hoped that Council membership could serve as a bargaining chip: if the 
Council agreed with Baltic or Russian characterizations of their problems with their 
neighbors, it could threaten to withhold membership until appropriate changes were 
made. But if this was the case, why were Baltic and Russian representatives so certain
210 Denys de Rougemont, cited ir. Malcolm 1994a: 2. For discussions of the intellectual history of 
Slavophilism and its manifestations in Soviet and Russian politics, see Carr 1956, Malcolm 1994a, 
Morozov 2001, Neumann 1996, Vihavainen 1990.
217 Morozov 2001: 2.
218 The lone exception, in this as so many things, was Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir 
Zhirinovskiy, whose opposition to all things European was undisguised.
219 http://www.vm.ee/speeches/1994/94novl0.html (accessed 30 September 1997).
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that their opponents wanted Council membership badly enough to change their 
policies? 220 It is to these questions that Chapter Six turns its attention.
2j )A s the Foreign Ministry admitted in an exchange of articles with Pravda, Council membership was 
potentially expensive; the Russian contribution, for instance, was estimated at close to US$15 million 
a year (Pravda, 28 July 1993: 7 (FBIS-SOV-93-144, 29 July 1993: 14)).
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Chapter Six: Not Our Kind, Dear
In the previous chapter, we have seen that Russian and Baltic representatives were eager 
to secure membership in European organizations for a variety of reasons: to ensure their 
states’ security, to enhance their states’ prosperity, and to cement their states’ identity as 
“European.” Yet these factors do not entirely explain the fact that Baltic and Russian 
representatives argued nearly as passionately to see their opponents excluded from 
European structures as they did to see their own states included.
This chapter focuses on a final aspect of the debates over identities that pervade 
diplomatic exchanges. This dissertation has so far argued that representatives attempt to 
gain international consensus on their nation’s identities and the identities of their 
opponents, and that they attempt to group these identities into collectivities such as 
regions. But this chapter argues that in the course of their “identity diplomacy,” 
representatives attempt to do something else as well: to position these identities 
relationally in social terms. From this point of view, Europe’s attractiveness stemmed at 
least in part from a function as a locus not only of security, prosperity, and identity, but 
also of status: membership in the European club, which (as Chapter Five has already 
discussed) could be symbolized by Council of Europe membership, had the potential to 
both confer and confirm a degree of social status on the Baltic states and Russia.
The IR literature has, of course, dedicated substantial discussion to issues of prestige 
and status. As Sylvan, Graff, and Pugliese have observed, however, much of the 
scholarly literature treats “prestige” and “status” as effectively interchangeable 
concepts, as does much of the literature examining Russian foreign policy. 1 The two 
concepts, however, are usefully distinct: prestige may be thought of as “influence or 
good reputation derived from past achievements or association,” while (social) status 
may be thought of “social position, rank, or relation to others.”2 Needless to say, the 
social nature of the concepts of prestige and status makes them incompatible with any 
analysis of interstate interaction as taking place in an asocial system. To pursue prestige 
or status for their nations, governments must exist in a state of mutual awareness and 
assessment; furthermore, the assessment of prestige requires a minimal notion of shared 
values, and the assessment of status, a minimal shared conception of social structure. 
“Status” is thus a more inherently comparative concept than “prestige,” and the pursuit 
of status (with its clearer distinctions between winners and losers) carries, as we shall 
see, the potential for substantial competitive—and hence emotional—engagement.
Prestige and status
The pursuit of prestige and status in international politics is an issue that has interested 
International Relations (IR) scholars for many years. As David Sylvan, Corrine Graff 
and Elisabetta Pugliese have observed, many branches of IR turned their backs in the 
1970s and 1980s on the sociology of international politics and on social phenomena 
such as the pursuit of status, with scholarly interest focused instead on identifying 
gradations of power.3 This relative lack of interest, however, was a departure from past
1 See Sylvan, Graff, and Pugliese 1998 for a further discussion. In the Russian studies literature, see, for
example, Tuminez 1996, Sestanovich 1996. The majority of these authors use “prest'ge” as a catch­
all term to refer to both prestige and status.
2 Concise Oxford Dictionary 1982.
3 Sylvan, Graff, and Pugliese 1998.
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scholarship and philosophy. Thucydides’ Athenians, after all, cited concern for their 
“honor” as their second reason for their expansionist ambitions, behind fear of Persia 
but ahead of profit.4 “Glory” was for Hobbes one of the three principal sources of 
quarrel, and a key focal point for Grotius as well.5 Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, and 
Hans Morgenthau all dedicated substantial attention to the concepts of “glory” or 
“prestige.” 6 Scholars outside IR did not shy away from applying the concepts: Weber 
himself wrote on the interplay of power and prestige in the designation of “Great 
Powers.” 7 Furthermore, these themes, even if perhaps underrepresented, certainly have 
not vanished from the IR literature. Scholars with a sociological focus, as well as writers 
within the subset literature of Foreign Policy Analysis, take for granted the notion that 
national leaders and elites pursue prestige and status for their nations in the international
o # #
system. Efforts have further been made to assess the status ordering of interstate 
society from positivist as well as post-positivist perspectives.9
From whom, however, do governments seek recognition of prestige or status? Much of 
the classical literature on prestige and status is imprecise on this subject, leaving the 
reader with the impression that governments broadcast their desire for prestige or status 
with equal intensity across the entire states system. 10 However, Sylvan, Graff and 
Pugliese have argued that governments seeking esteem for their nations “do so with 
respect to specific others...For example, during the heyday of European imperialism, 
Great Powers arguably sought recognition of their status from various groups of 
European states, as well as from selected non-European states. They also sought 
recognition of this status from particular groups within their own countries, e.g., 
newspaper editorialists or financiers who provided state loans. But they did not seek it 
from most other groups within states, or from many non-European polities (states or 
otherwise). We can therefore say that Great Powers sought esteem from a particular 
collection of members of different groups who, jointly, could be said to form the Great 
Powers’ ‘international society’ .” * 11 Iver Neumann’s work on state diplomacy and the 
landmines issue similarly suggests that state representatives on occasion also seek the 
esteem of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations. 12 Consequently, 
Erik Ringmar’s concept of “circles of recognition” is once again appropriate; and once 
again, the nature and composition of the “circle of recognition” from which state 
representatives seek confirmation of prestige or status is a question that requires 
empirical examination from instance to instance.
How do governments approach their “circles of recognition” in search of prestige or 
status? One way, that on which the IR literature has focused to the greatest extent, is 
through the acquisition of military or economic might. 13 Another, clearly, is through 
worthy deeds. 14 But the social nature of the concepts of prestige and status, their 
inherent dependence on the assessment of others, also makes them amenable to pursuit 
through persuasion. As a consequence, the pursuit of prestige and status is an endeavor 
to which diplomats have devoted much time and energy over the years. Christian Reus-
4 Thucydides 1972: 80.
5 Cited in Neumann 1997: 320.
6 Aron 1962: 71-93; Wight 1978: 95-99; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 86-100.
7 Weber 1946: 159-179.
8 See, for instance, Luard 1990 and Cottam 1997 for good bibliographies.
9 Singer and Small 1966; Doty 1991, 1996.
10 See, for instance, Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 86-100.
11 Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese 1998: 9.
12 Neumann 2001a.
13 See, for example, Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 92-93.
14 See, for example, Neumann 2001a.
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Smit, discussing the “oratorical diplomacy” of the Renaissance Italian city-states, notes 
that the primary role of resident ambassadors was not to negotiate; “instead, they 
maintained the identity of their city-state, cultivating and maintaining an image of 
communal honor and glory.” 15 Various authors have observed that the “old diplomacy” 
of absolutist Europe was preoccupied with social hierarchies, which produced an 
obsessive attention to diplomatic protocol that Garrett Mattingly has described as the 
“chief burden” of the ambassador’s representative function. 16 With the post-World War 
I spread of the principle of sovereign equality of states, many of the most glaringly 
visible manifestations of status competition between states were mitigated in practice. 17 
However, state representatives continue to dedicate substantial energy, not only to 
describing their nations’ characters, but also to declaiming their nations’ virtues in 
pursuit of social esteem.
Both Russian and Baltic representatives had signaled early their determination to secure 
prestige, in the general sense of a positive image, for their nations in the eyes of the 
world at large. Even before Baltic independence was restored, Edgar Savisaar, chairman 
of the Estonian Council of Ministers, told Estonian representatives that “We must not 
relinquish the position that we have won internationally...The word “Estonia” must 
have a ring of prestige, plausibility and trust to it.” Russian Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev, meanwhile, wrote in his New Year’s outline of foreign policy priorities for the 
newly independent Russian Federation that “present-day Russian diplomacy...[wants] 
the word ‘Russian’ to have a proud ring.” 19 As a consequence, Russian and Baltic 
representatives—as already suggested in Chapters Three and Four—spent a fair amount 
of time declaiming their nations’ virtues. Baltic representatives stressed their nations’ 
ability to weather adversity and their rapid transition to a new life. Within a month of 
the collapse of the USSR, Estonian delegates were telling the PACE that “[w]e have 
succeeded in ridding ourselves of the heritage of the totalitarian regime by adopting 
measures on human rights, on the rights of minorities, and on democratic pluralism, 
with the aim of creating a state governed by the rule of law.” 20 Russian representatives, 
meanwhile, placed much of their emphasis on, as Kozyrev put it, Russia’s “originality, 
cultural traditions and colossal economic potential.” 21 But Russian representatives also 
stressed the new Russian government’s break with disgraced practices; Yeltsin told the 
a joint session of the US Congress that “it is Russia that has put an end to imperial 
policies and was the first to recognize the independence of the Baltic states.” 22 As a 
consequence of these attributes, both Baltic and Russian representatives were happy to 
present their nations as bearing the prestigious label of “civilized.” 23
15 Reus-Smit 1999: 79-81; see also Mattingly 1955: 240-241,250-251..
16 See, for example, Morgenthau 1985: 87-89 for the case of Napoleon’s meeting with the Pope; Nicolson
1969: 98-101 for the case of the Ambassador’s carriage; Reus-Smit 1999:109 for the case of the 
Westphalia negotiations.
17 See, for instance, the change in the procedure of designating the doyen o f a local diplomatic corps— a
position that previously was reserved for one of the ambassadors of the Western powers, but that now 
is occupied by the resident ambassador with the longest length of service in that capital, regardless of 
country of origin (Nicolson 1969: 130). But anyone who doubts that many o f the same motivating 
factors still operate, and in many of the same ways, has but to read accounts o f Chinese concern for 
due diplomatic deference from Beijing’s international partners or of De Gaulle’s concern that in all 
things international, France should “conserve sa figure” (Gries 1999; Passeron 1962: 383).
18 Tallinn Domestic Service, 9 March 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-048, 12 March 1991:70).
19 Izvestiya, 2 January 1992: 1 (SWB, 4 January 1992: A 1/1).
20 PA CE ORD, 18 September 1991: 246.
21 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 14).
22 Moscow Russian Television, 17 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-118, 18 June 1992: 12).
23 Izvesitya, 8 May 1992: 1; Lieven 1994: 374-384.
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But as this final term suggests, the individual virtues being declaimed by Russian and 
Baltic representatives did not exist in a social vacuum. Indeed, while the pursuit of 
prestige, in the generalized sense of a positive image, need not be explicitly competitive, 
nevertheless the choice of images presented reflects a sense of community values.
Rather, both Baltic and Russian representatives stressed their desire to see their nations 
occupy a “worthy” place in the world—in other words, to establish their nation’s social 
position, rank, or relation to others in the global social arena. It was to this pursuit of 
social status that Russian and Baltic representatives turned much of their attention.
Russian and Baltic representatives had several different rhetorical tactics for portraying 
their nations as occupying social positions superior to those of other states. One way in 
was to emphasize a Russian or Baltic pedagogical role. Russian representatives drew on 
several centuries of mission civilisatrice thinking to justify and conceptualize a post- 
Soviet role for Russia as a bringer of norms of “civilized” behaviour to the former 
republics, especially those in the Caucasus and Central Asia.24 As Kozyrev told an 
interviewer in early 1992, “we are interested in involving [all the post-Soviet] republics 
in civilized international intercourse.”25 Meanwhile, Inga Pavlovaite has documented a 
similar strain of thinking emerging in Lithuanian thinking about relations with “less 
lucky” neighbors such as Belarus and Kaliningrad. But both Russian and Baltic 
conceptualizations of this pedagogical role were linked to another, less individualized 
source of status—association with Europe. The norms that both Baltic and Russian 
representatives sought to spread were, as Russian and Baltic representatives made clear, 
broader European ones. Baltic representatives drew directly on their success in securing 
admission to European organizations such as the Council of Europe to portray 
themselves as teachers “of European norms acquired at the school of Europe.”27 
Meanwhile, the “civilized principles” that Russia had a particular responsibility to 
establish on post-Soviet territory were those exemplified, in Kozyrev’s opinion, by the 
CSCE and other European organizations.28 In stressing their ability to act as the 
conduits of these European norms, Baltic and Russian representatives thus were 
stressing their links with the originating cultural complex. Indeed, Seymour Becker’s 
observation about the imperial period of Russian engagement with Central Asia was still 
relevant: “In bringing to her Oriental subjects the fruits of Western civilization, Russia 
would be demonstrating her membership in the exclusive club of European nations.” 29
In the previous chapter, we have already discussed Europe as a region. But to 
understand how it might be possible to discuss Europe as a “club,” we must talk for a 
moment about the nature of and composition of interstate society.
Clubs in interstate society
:4 Russia’s colonization of the east was emphasized by Russian scholars as a vital part of disseminating 
European civilization among Asiatic “barbarians” (Hauner 1990: 39). For discussions o f the Russian 
mission civilisatrice in Central Asia during the imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, see Bassin 
1994, Becker 1991, Brooks 1981, Hauner 1990.
23 Russian Television, 3 March 1992 (SfVB, 5 March 1992: Al/1).
26 Pavlovaite 2000: 8.
27 Schimmelfenning 2001a: 129-130.
28 Polityka (Warsaw), 4 September 1993: 1, 14 (FBIS-SOV-93-172, 8 September 1993: 20).
29 Becker notes that at least during the imperial period, Russian thinkers conceived of their mission 
civilisatrice as going one further than Western efforts: “in absorbing these subjects into the Russian 
nation, still in the process of formation, Russia would be carrying out her civilizing mission on a level 
unattainable by the West” (Becker 1991: 61 -62).
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Much of the literature dedicated to the analysis of interstate society has considered the 
issue of the nature of this society. One of the questions that has arisen in this literature 
that of where this society might sit between Ferdinand Tönnies’ ideal societal types of 
gemeinschaft (held together by bonds of common sentiment, experience, and identity) 
and gesellschaft (more consciously organizational, contractual and constructed in 
character) societies.30 Notably, efforts to fit modern interstate society neatly into one or 
the other category have proven largely unsatisfactory. At the most basic level, as Ole 
Waever has pointed out, imposing dichotomies such as the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft 
split on any nuanced social environment (domestic as well as international) can obscure 
as much as it reveals, since few social environments are likely to fall neatly into these 
ideal types.31 But it also is quite possible to view the totality of modern interstate 
society as possessing qualities of both ideal types. Certainly some scholars have 
emphasized the practical, contractual quality of interstate social interaction, arguing that 
states share few goals or purposes. However, as Reus-Smit observes, “[i]n one 
sense...modem international society is indeed a practical [gesellschaft] association, but 
in an equally important sense, a deep structural sense, it is informed by the institutional 
and organizational values of the constitutively prior European (now Western) 
gemeinschaft society.” That this is so is partly because European “international 
society” only expanded its boundaries to new members once members of the inner 
circle had accepted many of their cultural norms.34
But these gemeinschaft bonds also can be said to have expanded to the broader society 
of states simply due to the process of recognition that states extend to one another.35 The 
question of what entities are entitled to be considered as states is clearly one that enjoys 
no objective answer. The Montevideo Convention of 1933, which remains the only 
attempt at defining what constitutes a state that has gained international ratification, 
lists four qualities required of a state as a person of international law: a defined territory, 
a permanent population, a government, and a “capacity to enter into relations with the 
other states.”3' But the first three criteria specified by the Convention are in fact 
possessed by a number of political entities that lack the ultimate prize of juridical 
sovereignty (for example, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). A “state” thus is 
not merely a territorial or political actor, but an entity with social meaning (particularly 
to representatives of other states) that depends for its existence upon intersubjective 
recognition from representatives of other entities deemed to be “states.”39 In the absence 
of a supreme authority to constitute or legitimize states, it is thus the last criterion of the 
Montevideo Convention, that of the reciprocal recognition of other participants in 
diplomacy, that is in fact the vital one.40 The numerical expansion of the collectivity of
30 Buzan (1993: 333).
31 Waever 1998: 113-1 14.
32 See for example Nardin 1983. Even E.H. Carr, whose name is often associated with the group of
scholars interested in interstate society, occasionally subscribed to this view; he wrote disgustedly to a 
colleague that “[n]o international society exists, but an open club without substantive rules” (cited in 
Keal 2000: 66).
33 Reus-Smit 1999: 37-38.
34 Little 1995: 30.
35 Buzan 1993: 335.
36 Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that it had only 19 signatories, three of whom attached 
reservations.
37 http:// taiwandocuments.org/monetvideo01.htm, accessed 28 February 2001.
38 Pegg 1998: 26.
39 Dunne 1995: 376-377.
40 O’Hagan 1998: 180; Dunne 2001: 75. Indeed, the Baltic states continued to exist in international law
owing to the refusal o f other states to withdraw their recognition of those states as sovereign entities; 
the Soviet Union’s use of force against the Baltic states did not constitute a legal step capable of
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sovereign states, which some have described as having been accompanied by a 
jettisoning of legal or moral standards, thus has not been haphazard: it has privileged 
entities whose political and economic organization are recognizable and acceptable to 
existing members.41
This phenomenon has had two obvious consequences. On the one hand, as Tim Dunne 
has noted, many potentially self-determining communities were, and continue to be, 
denied membership in the purportedly “universal” post-World War II international 
society.42 On the other hand, the process of the expansion of the collectivity of states 
has been one that has helped to cement a sense of collective identity among the 
members of the society of states, as like has accepted like.43 Indeed, participation in 
diplomacy—one of the prizes of statehood—has the potential to bring participants 
further together. The privileged communications system that diplomacy sets up between 
diplomatic participants creates an important condition for the sense of shared identity. 
As Peter Marshall, himself a retired British ambassador, writes: “[sovereign actors] with 
the capacity to communicate with one another will readily understand the extent to 
which they face problems in common. The prospects for dealing with them are likely to 
be improved by tackling them in a spirit of mutual comprehension, even mutual 
commiseration.” 44 The co-evolution of diplomatic services has further ensured a degree 
of community in the way that state representatives address problems among the 
community of states.45 This degree of gemenischaft feeling thus has the potential to be 
relatively evenly distributed across all participants in the arena of diplomatic 
interaction, even though the formal bonds of the interstate society in which they operate 
are of a weak, gesellschaft model. Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that many state 
representatives carry both societal ideal types in their heads; the way in which they 
think of interstate society at any given moment depends to a large degree on the nature 
of the problems facing them, and by extension facing interstate society. When state 
representatives discuss threats coming from outside interstate society—for instance, 
from terrorist organizations—their discussions tend to emphasize the gemeinschaft 
aspects of the society of states, focusing heavily on shared qualities (such, indeed, as 
statehood itself) and the need to pull together in the name of common values.46 When
nullifying this recognition (Kaslas 1976: 276-277). James, arguing why the collectivity o f states 
should be called a “society” and not a “system,” focuses on precisely these issues o f recognition, 
admission, and exclusion: “The collectivity of states has... set up a very significant entrance barrier [in 
the concept of sovereignty]... A “system” usually refers to a closed arrangement; there is no question 
of an admission procedure. One does not think, for example, in terms of joining the digestive system” 
(James 1993: 285-286).
41 Jackson 1990: 55; Donelly 1998: 13; Keal 2000: 64. As Keal has observed, at least “in its constabulary
role of determining legitimacy, international society is a purposive association” (2000: 70).
42 Dunne 2001: 91.
43 As David Strang has demonstrated, state status is hard to shake. Since the beginnings of the European
states-system (which Strang puts at 1415), once mutual recognition has been established, sovereign 
state status has almost never been revoked— a fact that Strang attributes to the cultural constitution of 
the Western states system (Strang 1991: 162). The Soviet government would o f course have liked to 
see the Baltic states added to the short list o f anomalies.
44 Marshall 1997:41.
45 As Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, writing about the period after the 1815 Congress of Vienna,
observes: “As one of the most active participants in European politics at the time, Russia’s diplomatic 
service developed in close interaction with the diplomatic agencies of the other leading powers” 
(Ivanov 2002: 36).
46 They further can be indignant when other state representatives fail to heed their appeals. See, for
instance, Barbara Tuchman’s discussion of British protests to other nations over their tolerance for the 
sale to the rebellious American colonists of military supplies. In regards this issue, Tuchman opines, 
“...it was the Dutch more than the Colonies who were raising British blood pressure...[worse even 
than the “insolence” o f rebels who “annoy and disturb” the British empire was that a] “nation— a
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facing problems from within the states system, on the other hand, representatives are 
much more likely to emphasize the contractual, gesellschaft quality of the ties binding 
them to their opponents—sometimes to the point of disowning all shared identity or 
values through the application of the label “pariah state,” the recipient of which label 
can then be treated as a an entity subject to social, and in some cases legal, exclusion 
from “legitimate” interstate society.47
These points made, however, it would appear that some groupings of states have 
stronger gemeinschaft-typQ bonds—senses of shared identities and shared values—than 
those current in the community of states as a whole. The European example is of course 
the one most frequently raised,48 and its coincidence with the historical site of origin of 
modem interstate society has led some to speak of “core” and “peripheral” interstate 
societies. An early example of such a visualization can be seen in the works of Wight, 
who, drawing on Grotius (who saw a universal society extending to the entire human 
race, but also a particular bond uniting Christian states), wrote of the expanding 
interstate system of the nineteenth century that “a proper view of the nascent states- 
system will be stereoscopic, seeing in the state-system a dual nature, two concentric 
circles, European and universal.” 47 More recent examples of this conceptualization can 
be seen in the works of Barry Buzan, including those with Richard Little. “Especially in 
the later twentieth century,” Buzan and Little argue, “the Western states began to 
develop a much more intense set of shared rules, norms and institutions amongst 
themselves on a wider range of issues than they shared with the rest of the international 
system”—a process that they describe as establishing a “core” of interstate society that 
“creates pressures (both coercive and persuasive) on the periphery to follow the core’s 
path.” 50
This (roughly) Western core/non-Western periphery distinction is useful in identifying 
one gemeischaft-Xype grouping in world politics, and in highlighting the fact that 
gemeinschaft bonds can indeed arise within gesellschaft-type groupings, particularly 
when the levels of gesellschaft-Xype bonds differ within the group.51 However, 
excessive focus on the Western core/non-Western periphery distinction runs the risk of 
obscuring the existence of other gemeinschaft-type groupings in interstate society. In 
fact, the interstate social sphere is one of multiple and frequently overlapping social 
groupings of states whose governments perceive themselves, for material or other 
reasons, as having something in common—be this problems, opportunities, 
responsibilities, concerns, values, or identities (to list only a few potential factors). In
member o f the club, as it were—should not only condone but assist them.” (Tuchman 1989: 20—  
italics mine).
47 See James 1993: 228 for a discussion of pariah status and Dore 1984: 408-415 on the issue of senses of
community among those who act on the behalf o f states, as well as among national elites.
48 See Diez and Whitman 2002 for a good bibliography.
49 Wight 1977: 118, 126.
50 Buzan and Little 2000: 338. This language appears to echo the work of Goldgeier and McFaul, who
posited the existence of “two worlds” in international politics (Goldgeier and McFaul 1992). In both 
cases, the use of the term “core” carries deterministic overtones, with Buzan and Little’s choice of 
words in particular carrying the powerful suggestion that any gemeinschaft associations that emerge 
among states in the “periphery” are unlikely to develop along very different lines from those that have 
evolved between the European states (Buzan and Little 2000: 338). Waever’s term of “nodal points” 
avoids these teleological implications (Wasver 1996: 235).
51 One might argue that an important factor that has drawn many Europeans together, creating the 
possibility for the collective identification necessary for a gemeinschaft grouping, is the extent and 
depth of gesellschaft-sty\e legal harmonization between the states of the European Union— a project 
so uniquely extensive as to have fostered a sense in many European policymakers and populations of 
participation in an unprecedented political project.
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these circumstances, state governments frequently will draw themselves together into 
association, creating entities that may usefully be thought of as “clubs.” Some of these 
clubs possess formal organizational structure, others little or none, existing as circles of 
mutual recognition akin to cliques in other social arenas. Furthermore, as will be 
discussed in greater detail in a moment, membership criteria and policies vary widely, 
from the effectively unlimited to the effectively closed.
While their structure and membership policies may vary, all these entities possess a 
characteristic feature: members perceive and describe each other as being, at least in 
relation to some issues, more of a “like unit,” to borrow Buzan’s term, than other 
states. This is the case even in instances of groupings that at first glance seem highly 
technical. For example, the Egmont Group, to which Russia was admitted in June 2002, 
would on the face of it appear to be a simple problem-solving exercise, designed to 
promote coordination and information exchange towards what might seem to be a 
universal goal of governments: combating money laundering and other ways of 
legalizing criminal incomes. However, on further examination, it becomes evident that 
many governments have little interest in combating money laundering. What appears at 
first glance to be a simple problem of technical cooperation turns out to involve an 
underlying value judgment about the practice being combated and a willingness to 
devote “significant” resources to its eradication. As a consequence, the importance of 
the recognition of existing members as a “like unit” appears as crucial to membership as 
it is to entry into the club of states, and as politicized. For example, in the case of the 
Egmont Group, the judgment of what constitutes a “significant” commitment to 
combating money laundering on the part of an applicant government turns out to be 
highly subjective. As a consequence, clubs may experience the same evolution of 
gemeinschaß feeling through the process of like recognizing like as we have described 
in regards to the society of states.
Of course, different clubs start out with different degrees of a sense of shared identity or 
values; consequently, the intensity of gemeinschaß feeling within these groupings varies 
widely. 54 It is difficult, for instance, to argue that the Chinese and US governments 
enjoy a powerful sense of shared identity or values by virtue of their mutual 
membership of the nuclear club. Nevertheless, as with the society of states, a sense of 
shared problems, shared opportunities, or shared responsibilities often leads to a sense 
of at least minimal collective or shared identity, at least in relation to the issues falling 
within the group’s remit. As Wasver has observed, “the distinction between regulatory 
rules and constitutive rules is problematic, and regulative rules will always end up 
becoming more or less constitutive as well. Whatever ‘practical’ arrangement is formed 
among a group of powers, will therefore also tend to become part (maybe only a small 
part, but part nevertheless) of the identity of these units.”55 Furthermore, as with the
52 Buzan 1993.
53 RIA Novosti, 6 June 2002 (Johnson’s Russia List 6294, 7 June 2002).
54 Classical economic theories of clubs discuss them as interest-based organizations designed to maximize
the welfare of their members. In this view, members will not join or remain in the club unless a net 
gain results from membership; more importantly, club enlargement will take place only if existing 
members reap net benefits from admitting a new member (Schimmelfennig 2001a: 165, 166-168). If 
the “benefits” in question are limited to material benefits, however, this conception of clubs fails to 
accommodate the identity- and value-based dimensions of many existing clubs in international as well 
as domestic society. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that many use the word “club” to denote 
primarily identity- or value-based, rather than material-interest-based, organizations. For instance, in 
opposing NATO expansion, British Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind argued that NATO “was not 
a club but a security organization. New members would have to clearly enhance the security of the 
organization” (Mihalka 1994: 6).
55 Waever 1998: 106.
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society of states as a whole, the very process of obtaining and maintaining club 
membership is one that fosters a degree of gemeinschaft feeling among self-designated 
like units.5
Up to this point, the “clubs” under discussion might be said to be difficult to distinguish 
from many international organizations, or from groupings of states such as Emmanuel 
Adler’s “imagined security communities.” 57 Indeed, in some cases efforts to draw 
distinctions between the applicability of these concepts would be labored and artificial. 
But one characteristic does set some clubs apart: they are perceived by their members, 
or by aspiring members, as loci of status within a particular circle of recognition. 58 
(While the nature of such clubs is still open to an empirical examination, it would seem 
likely that they would be entities whose membership was in principle open—unlike, for 
instance, the British Commonwealth, with its limits on membership to former British 
colonies or dependencies—but whose entrance qualifications were high and somewhat 
subjective, making applicants highly dependent on recognition from existing members.) 
These are the entities that are routinely described within their circle of recognition as 
“prestigious.” Indeed, their prestige may be far from universal; to governments outside 
their circle of recognition, they may be effectively irrelevant. But within their circles of 
recognition, membership in these clubs serves as both a marker and a source of status. 
Indeed, the more a club’s members consider membership to convey a sense of 
superiority, the less important the opinion of those who are not potential members 
becomes.59
From the preceding discussion, it is possible to argue that many regional institutions 
function at least in part as clubs. We have already noted in Chapter Four that the process 
of region-building frequently involves efforts to add a sense of collective identity—to 
inject the gemenischaft spirit, in effect—into geographic proximity or shared concerns. 
To the extent that certain organizations remain exclusive in nature (not automatically 
incorporating every member of a geographic region) while at the same time claiming to 
represent the essence of a region, they serve as clubs within the regional context. But 
when, as was the case with the Council of Europe, they are sufficiently identified with 
increase the “clubby” feel of the regional concept.
To Russian and Baltic policymakers still recovering from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, then, “Europe” was the region-cwm-club par excellence. To some degree this
56 March and Olsen 1998: 960.
57 Adler 1997.
58 Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese 1998; Luard 1990: 170. For a thorough discussion o f status groups in the
context o f international politics, see Luard 1990: 168-176.
59 Policymakers are by no means insensitive to the status issues involved in expanding club membership.
Indeed, extending membership in a desirable club has been a time-honored way of rewarding a 
government for good behaviour, welcoming a new government that is presumed to be more friendly 
than its predecessor to existing members, or encouraging a recalcitrant interlocutor. As Steven 
Sestanovich has written, discussing Western efforts after the end of the Cold War to integrate the post- 
Soviet states into the Western international system: “Western policy paid special attention to the 
institutional side of it—to the ‘club memberships’ that would give countries that had been kept out of 
the Western mainstream a place in Western institutions. Their participation was expected to give them 
a stake in a more regularized, consensual, rules-based international order. The prestige of membership 
would confirm that they had not been permanently relegated to second-class status by decades of 
communism... Most important, the practical benefits of drawing steadily closer to Western institutions 
would create continuing incentives for governments and societies to reshape themselves— their 
economies, their military establishments, their international conduct, their way of thinking” 
(Sestanovich 2000: 6). At the time of writing, Sestanovich was ambassador-at-large and special 
advisor to the US Secretary of State for the New Independent States (NIS).
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was due to cultural prestige: as Igor Ivanov was to write in 2002, Europe maintains its 
place as “the world’s leading intellectual and cultural center.”60 But Europe’s cachet 
was also hardly surprising, since European domination of the interstate club had been a 
feature of international politics since at least the nineteenth century. To a certain degree 
this domination was unsurprising: after all, as Bull has observed, the rules and 
institutions of international society were not only made by Europeans; “in a certain 
sense, they were made for them.”61 As a consequence, “the international rules and 
institutions of the late nineteenth century reflected and sanctified the dominant position 
of the European powers, expressed on the one hand in the institution of colonialism and 
on the other hand in a maintenance of a distinction between states that were full 
members and states that were merely partial members of international society.”62
This domination took two forms. The first was the application of material power by 
European states to issues only tangentially related to their own survival or well-being. 
This aspect of domination has been most visible in the activities of the club of the Great 
Powers—states who both formally and informally have asserted the right (and have 
accorded each other the right) to determine and act on issues that affect the peace and 
security of the international system as a whole, said to exist in addition to (or as 
opposed to) the narrower interests of their own states.63 This reciprocal arrangement 
had its abortive beginnings in the Holy Alliance of 1815, inspired by the Russian tsar 
Alexander I, which envisaged a Europe whose affairs would be dictated by an alliance 
of sovereigns pledged to defend the spiritual, religious, and social values of their 
common European civilization against the destructive revolutionary forces that 
Alexander saw manifesting themselves in Russia as well as in France and other 
countries.64 The treaties on which the Alliance was based clearly assigned a ruling role 
to five self-identified “major” states—Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Prussia, and 
Russia—with “minor” states expected to submit to the decisions taken jointly by the 
preponderant powers.65 As Watson has written: “In the eighteenth century Europe was 
regarded as a commonwealth divided into several states, of which Russia was one of the 
most powerful. It was what we call an international society, but not yet a collectivity in 
whose name great powers presumed to act. The use of the term Europe as a diplomatic 
entity, in the sense of a group of states having common interests and duties and in 
whose name member states could take joint decisions, is no older than the nineteenth 
century. The change which this usage reflected was brought about especially by 
Alexander and Metternich.”66 Although the organized system of international 
government envisioned by Alexander lasted only a few years, this distinction between 
great and small powers as an institution of international politics and organization, 
carrying differences in legal status, continued to reverberate in international politics, 
manifesting itself in the membership lists for the permanent members of the Council of 
the League of Nations and the United Nations Security Council. While the ultimate 
inclusion of Japan in the former, and China in the latter, went some way towards 
breaking the European lock on the club, nevertheless the right to determine what
60 This was despite the fact that Europe had “forfeited its ability to effect change in the world” (Ivanov
2002: 93).
61 Bull 2000: 180 (italics added for clarity).
62 Bull 2000: 181.
63 Bull 1977: 196. Of course, particularly for a state of global reach, no international issue can truly be
said to exist in isolation from national interests; but it is one of the conventions of the Great Power 
club to treat disinterested action as a possibility.
64 Watson 1984: 71-72.
65 Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 483.
66 Watson 1984: 72.
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constituted threats to law and order remained solidly in Western (and numerically 
disproportionately in European) hands.
Related to this last point, the second form of European domination of the interstate club 
was social, relating to the moral value of what constituted “civilization” at the global 
level. The history of this seizure of the social high ground in the global arena bv 
European state representatives has been well-documented by English School writers.67 
For our purposes, it is simply worth noting that he expansion of European material 
power and the projection of European military and economic power onto the global 
stage that occurred between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries initially did not 
reflect universal assumptions by European statesmen of their ability (or, in some cases, 
their right) to impose social as well as material domination.68 “Prior to the nineteenth 
century,” Robert Jackson writes, “it was natural for Europeans to assume the superiority 
of their civilization but not its hegemony.” 69 However, between the mid-seventeenth to 
the early nineteenth centuries, “the states-system came to be described as European by 
those who operated and described it.” 70 Furthermore, during this period, a waxing idea 
of the “unity and intimacy” of European states laid the grounds for the growth in the 
nineteenth century of an element of cultural chauvinism and racism in the attitudes of 
European statesmen, who came to think of their nations as superior not only to pre­
literate (“savage”) peoples but also to peoples non-European civilizations, and 
conceived of their states as “forming an exclusive club enjoying rights superior to those 
of other political communities.” 71 Faced with two problems— protecting the lives and 
property of Europeans abroad, and determining which countries deserved recognition as 
sovereign states—the European colonial powers adopted a “standard of civilization” 
that not only defined “civilized” state conduct, but also laid down criteria that non- 
European entities had to meet to gain admission to the rights and privileges of the 
diplomatic and legal system that had developed among European states. This standard, 
while initially informal, eventually emerged as “an explicit legal principle and an 
integral part of the international law of the time.” As Bull and Watson have written, 
“the very conception of the entry of non-European states into international society, 
conceived of as a process whereby candidates were accepted by the original members, 
prepared and finally deemed to have graduated, took for granted a world directorate of 
European states.” 74 Application of the standard “resulted in the incorporation of some 
political systems into the exclusive club of independent states by constitutive 
recognition, and the subordination of the rest within a dependent framework of 
colonialism.”7" While the inclusion of non-European states into the legal and diplomatic 
framework of interstate society (a gradual process prior to World War II, but that 
accelerated dramatically in the post-war era of decolonization) gradually reduced 
European domination of that grouping, nevertheless the principles animating interstate 
society continued to be European ones.
67 Gong 1984 and Bull and Watson 1984 are the classic texts for this discussion.
68 Bull 1984: 123.
69 Jackson 1990: 72.
70 Bull 2000: 176.
71 Bull and Watson 1984:426.
72 Jackson 1990: 72; Gong 1984: 3-6. One of the requirements of a “civilized” state, incidentally, was the
establishment and maintenance of “adequate and permanent avenue for diplomatic interchange and 
international communication” (Gong 1984: 18).
73 Gong 1984: 14-15.
74 Bull and Watson 1984: 428.
75 Jackson 1990: 61.
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Despite the demise of the nineteenth-century legal “standard of civilization” and the end 
of European formal dominance of the interstate system, reports of the death of the 
concept of standards of civilization may have been exaggerated.76 As Jack Donnelly has 
detailed, in the period between the two World Wars, the insistence of the European 
powers on the adherence of newly sovereign European polities to treaties on the 
treatment of their own citizens “brought the standard of civilization back home” to 
European soil. In the wake of the Holocaust, European leaders and populations further 
turned their interest in raising the global moral tone inwards. The development of a 
substantial body of human rights law saw the interwar efforts to bring the standard of 
civilization “back home” dramatically expanded in substance and applied to all 
European states, not just the newer ones.78 Indeed, the post-war preoccupation with 
human rights at home became a factor enhancing Western European cohesion, as 
policymakers built on internationally recognized human rights to develop “best 
practice” standards.79 With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, it was these “best practice” standards that defined the outlines of the “core 
Europe” whose outlines emerged through membership in European organizations. 
Furthermore, these best practice standards were from 1975 on a prominent feature of 
East-West relations, with increasing European unity on human rights issues translating 
into pressure on the Soviet government through the CSCE process. As Neil Kritz has 
noted, the USSR and its satellites had already committed themselves to much more 
comprehensive catalogues of rights in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—commitments which they had 
ignored with impunity. But the CSCE accords linked human rights obligations to 
cooperation in the fields of security, technology, and trade, and provided for regular 
review by the participating states of the implementation of these commitments. 
Furthermore, CSCE meetings subjected Soviet bloc governments to public 
embarrassment, as Warsaw Pact delegations were forced to sit and listen as the Western 
delegations presented names of imprisoned activists and “refuseniks” barred from 
emigrating.8 Western governments might ultimately be unprepared to jeopardize good 
relations with the Soviet Union over human rights issues, but their public rhetorical 
commitment validated the aspirations of Soviet bloc human rights activists and gave 
them a sense of being part of a larger European political project.82 The legitimacy of 
European efforts to establish a new “standard of civilization” was thus well-accepted 
among Russian and Baltic reformers. As Kozyrev said, “[y]ou can drive a tank in the 
wrong lane defying traffic rules. But our choice is different: to progress according to 
generally accepted rules. They were invented by the West, and I’m a Westerner in this 
respect.”83
76 Dunne 2001: 91.
77 States created after the First World War, including the three Baltic states, in order to obtain League of
Nations membership were required to issue declarations undertaking substantial obligations for the 
protection of religious and ethnic minorities on their territories; furthermore, “these rights were 
declared ‘obligations of international concern’ ” (Donnelly 1998: 10).
78 Donnelly 1998: 14.
79 Donnelly 1998: 15.
80 Kritz 1993: 18.
81 Kritz 1993: 18.
82 As Gong and Dunne have argued, the evolution of the standard of civilization is associated with the
evolution of Europe as a political, not merely cultural idea. The original European political project 
was associated with organization of territory into sovereign states, constant diplomatic 
communication, and shared principles of public law and politics, as well as religious foundations. 
Now, the European political project is associated with the manner in which governments treat their 
people, with a steady privileging of liberal democratic constitutional entities (Gong 1984: 46; Dunne 
2001: 76).
83 Moscow News Fax Digest, 26 May 1992: 1-3 (FB1S-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992: 27).
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Joining the club
Both Baltic and Russian representatives were thus anxious to see their nations 
considered as appropriate members of the European club. However, the two sides took 
very different rhetorical tacks. Russian representatives had stressed since before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the need for Russia to regain a “worthy” place in the 
world. To Russian representatives, that “worthy” place was patently the European club, 
as well as the West more broadly.84 As Kozyrev said in December 1991, “one of our 
foreign policy priorities in to get back in the ranks of our natural partners and allies. At 
the end of the last century Russia held its proper place among states like France,
• o  c
Germany and the United States. We need to get back to that circle.” Two years later, 
he was stressing the same theme: Russia needs “to occupy a worthy position in the club
o z
of leading Western states, democratic states.”
In justifying their pre-eminent suitability for membership in the European club, Russian 
representatives drew heavily on a notion of Russian potential, a theme strongly 
enunciated by Kozyrev. After all, Russia was (as Kozyrev stressed) “a whole 
continent.” Kozyrev noted that Russian entry into the COE is essentially would be 
“the beginning of a process of rapprochement and mutual adaptation, because the 
Russian Federation is not simply one of the new members but an entire continent with
OQ
an enormous and original political, historical-cultural, and also economic potential.” 
As a consequence of this potential, Russia eventually (Kozyrev opined) “can and should 
become not worse that its Western partners in terms of democratic and cultural 
development.”90
But faith in this potential was justified, rhetorically as well as psychologically, by 
confidence in another quality: Russia’s derzhavnost’, or “great powerness.” 9‘ One of 
Kozyrev’s most-repeated phrases was that Russia was “fated” or “doomed” to be a great
84 As Bobo Lo has written, “[f]or all the fissures over whether Russia is principally Slavic, European or
Eurasian, the fact is that no alternative civilizational orientation has ever received serious 
consideration. Reduced to its essentials, the debate has centred on the modalities of interaction with 
the West and the extent to which Russia should seek to ‘integrate’, not whether it should go east or 
south. [This] fundamental premise—the ‘superiority’ and emotional/intellectual closeness of the West 
to Russia—remains basically intact, as true for Slavists and Eurasianists as for Westernizing liberals” 
(Lo forthcoming).
85 Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 December 1991: 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-247, 24 December 1991: 50).
86 Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 14 November 1993 (SWB, 20 November 1993: B/l).
87 This theme is not a new one, as Michael Urban has observed: “Russian makers of symbol and myth
have repeatedly transformed the sense of inadequacy engendered by contact with the west into a 
profusion of stories about some greatness to come” (Urban 1994: 740).
88 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 14).
89 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 August 1992: 1,4.
90 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 14)
91 Some Western scholars have argued that concern with the politics of status was the province of Russian
statist nationalists and was only taken on by reformers as a consequence of changes in the 
international environment, domestic politics, and elite interests (see, for instance, Tuminez 1996). 
Because reformers disassociated themselves from other goals of the statist nationalists—empire­
saving, Great Russian ethnic nationalism—and described themselves as moving away from the 
“ideological” foreign policy goals embodied by statist nationalists, these observers assumed that they 
had turned their backs on the pursuit of international status as well. Bobo Lo, however, has 
convincingly argued that an emphasis on derzhavnost’ was always one of the few things on which the 
Russian political elite, divided on virtually every other issue, could agree (Lo 2002: 21). Steve 
Sestanovich has indeed argued that given the circumstances in which Russian leaders found 
themselves in 1992, status-pursuing policies were not only understandable but virtually inevitable 
(Sestanovich 1996: 7-8).
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power. “ This “fate,” in this thinking, stemmed not only from Russian material or other 
characteristics, but also from the perception of other states. “It is not all that easy,” 
Kozyrev noted, “to become a normal great power, and the world sees Russia precisely 
as a great power. Instead of being a superpower— the USSR—based on a military 
threat, we must become a normal power that is based not on threats, but at the same 
time is able to live in a world where there are conflicts.”93 The abiding principle of this 
derzhavnost’ ideology, as Bobo Lo has observed, “was the belief in Russia’s global 
status.”94 Submitting Russia’s membership application in May 1992, Kozyrev told 
reporters that “Russia, as a great country declaring its intention to join the Council of 
Europe, is striving not be isolated from the life of the international community and 
would like to develop comprehensive cooperation with the Council.”95 Meanwhile, 
Yevgenniy Ambartsumov told the press that joining the Council would give Russia “the 
ability to include itself in all democratic processes unfolding on our continent.”96
92
A second, closely related point was that solutions to international problems were 
“inconceivable” without Russian participation. As Kozyrev said, when submitting 
Russia’s application: “[t]he young Russian democracy will not be able to flourish 
without Europe with its huge democratic experience. In its turn, Europe will not defeat 
the challenges of the post-communist era without a powerful, stable and democratically 
transformed Russia.” 8 To a large degree, the faith of Russian representatives in this 
argument stemmed from a sense of the difficulty of the European mission to spread 
democratic values across the entire former Soviet bloc. As Russian Consul General in 
Strasbourg Vladimir Sukhov said, “[i]t is worth keeping in mind that our full 
membership [in the COE] is in the interests... of the Council of Europe. The latter faces 
the task of becoming an all-European organization, capable of unifying towards one 
goal the West and the post-totalitarian East of the continent. To take on the resolution of 
a problem of this scale without Russia really isn’t realistic.”99 Consequently, any 
organization benefited from its membership. As Kozyrev put it: “A whole continent 
with its originality, cultural traditions and colossal economic potential is joining the 
great European club...Democratic Russia is joining Europe and Europe is adapting to 
democratic Russia. ” 10() Indeed, one Russian delegate went so far as to suggest that 
“Russia is interested in affiliation with the Council of Europe, but the Council is equally 
interested in Russia’s membership. This will enhance its prestige and transform the 
organization into a unique instrument of pan-European cooperation.” 101 “In a word,” Lo 
writes, “Russia was ‘indispensable’.” Russia’s joining the Council would further 
enable it to play “an integrating role” in common European processes.103
92 See, for instance, ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 14). The theme was
consistently echoed by Yeltsin at meetings with world leaders; for instance, at his meeting with 
presidential candidate Bill Clinton in late 1992, Yeltsin stressed that “[w]e’re not asking for handouts. 
Russia is a great power. What we want from the U.S. is a model of leadership for others to follow” 
(Talbott 2002: 32).
93 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 April 1992 (SfVB, 3 April 1992: A 1/1).
94 Lo 2002: 53.
95 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (SfVB, 12 May 1992: A 1/3).
96 Izvestiya, 6 May 1992: 7.
97 Lo 2002: 53.
98 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (SfVB, 12 May 1992: A 1/2).
99 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 March 1994: 4.
100 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 14).
101 Izvestiya, 7 May 1992: 7 (FBSI-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 14).
102 Lo 2002: 53-54.
103 ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (SfVB, 12 May 1992: Al/3).
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A corollary of these two themes, however, was an assumption by Russian 
representatives of Russia’s additional right to have a say in decisions taken by 
organizations of which it was not yet a member, particularly on issues such as 
membership. For example, as already mentioned in Chapter Five, Kozyrev took the 
unusual step of sending a personal letter to Council of Europe General Secretary 
Catherine Lalumiere in which he was “sharply critical” of the Council’s plans to extend 
membership to Estonia, calling such a move “premature.” 104 Arguing that the planned 
inclusion of Estonia in “the club of genuinely democratic states” would serve as 
international legitimation of discrimination, according to Izvestiya, Kozyrev 
“demanded” that the question be deferred. 105 After Estonian admission went ahead 
regardless, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembskiy complained 
that the fact that Kozyrev’s arguments had gone unheeded in Strasbourg was 
“surprising, in view of the fairly constructive relations prevailing recently between the 
Council of Europe leadership and Moscow.” 106 “In these circumstances,” 
Yastrzhembskiy noted, “the minister has taken the difficult decision for us of refraining 
from his trip to Strasbourg and his address to the Council of Europe.” 107
Meanwhile, Baltic representatives were initially much more cautious in their approach. 
As outlined in Chapter Five, they argued their worth primarily on technical grounds; in 
particular, they stressed that their state structures and policies were compatible with 
European practice. For the most part, however, Baltic representatives were very modest 
about their nations’ place in the world. As Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys 
said, “[w]e would like to be not a small state, but a partner. The reality, however, is 
different: there are both superpowers and small states. Lithuania has been performing 
the function of a superpower...by initiating a number of changes in Europe and the 
former USSR. Flowever, it is extremely difficult to remain in this position.” 10
But as each Baltic state gained Council membership, their representatives became much 
bolder in their ability to comment on status issues concerning the Council and its 
membership, and in particular on the issue of Russian membership. Baltic 
representatives argued the Council had made no exceptions in considering Baltic 
membership; now it must make no exceptions concerning others. 109 Estonia, stressed 
Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste, had been given “a clean bill of health;” now 
“Estonia believes that believes that the COE must maintain the same high standards of 
admission for new members-states as those applied to current members.” 110 Latvian 
delegates similarly noted after their admission that “Latvia had worked hard to get in 
itself;” as a consequence, Riga opposed easy membership for Russia. 111
One of the main points of Baltic representatives was that Russia’s derzhavnost’, to 
whatever extent it existed, was not a quality that was translatable into status in the new 
democratic, rule-of-law Europe. The Council, the Estonian Foreign Ministry argued, 
should not alter its standards of admission for “political, geographic or other
104 BNS, 12 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-091, 13 May 1993: 6).
105 Izvestiya, 12 May 1993: 3 (FBIS-SOV-93-091, 13 May 1993: 1 1).
106 Izvestiya, 13 May 1993: 1 (FBIS-SOV-93-091, 13 May 1993: 7).
107 ITAR-TASS, 12 May 1993 {SWB, 14 May 1993: Al/1).
108 Lietuvos Aidas, 31 March 1993: 9 (FBIS-SOV-93-070, 14 April 1993: 85).
109 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, 11 May 1995 (FBIS-SOV-95-092, 11 May 1995 
(electronic)).
110 http://www.ve.ee/speeches/93/93nov4.html (accessed 30 September 1997).
1,1 The Baltic Independent, 10-16 February 1995: 2.
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reasons.” 112 Rather, Estonian Foreign Minister Jiiri Luik argued, “[w]e believe that the 
Council must be careful to apply human and civil rights standards non-selectively. 
There can be no exceptions because of size or geographical location, because of cultural 
heritage or history, because states are in transition or because the political situation is 
delicate. The standards that are applied to one must be valid for all other Council of 
Europe states. In other words, there can be no rubber rulers.” 113 The unacceptability of 
applying double standards based on calculations of power was a common theme. “We 
must avoid,” Kelam told the PACE, “the slippery slope of small nations having to prove 
themselves as diligent schoolboys and be subjected to thorough and detailed 
examinations, whereas big countries could become members mainly as a result of 
political decisions.”114 Meri similarly argued that Russia could not be admitted just 
because it was a great power: “more civilians have already been killed in Chechnya than 
in Bosnia before rump Yugoslavia became a pariah in the international community.”115 
Indeed, if anything, Russian derzhavnost’ should subject it to the highest standards, 
Kelam argued: “Russia is not a small child for whom you constantly make concessions. 
You can’t go on saying that it has a difficult childhood behind it, that one of its parents 
was a criminal, and that if you don’t give in it will start behaving even worse. Russia is 
a superpower and must be treated as such.”116
Indeed, Baltic delegates argued that inclusion of Russia would be disastrous to the 
prestige of a status group of which they now were concerned members. First, they 
argued that Russian admission would require a lowering of Council standards—a step 
they naturally opposed. Kelam told the PACE: “The Council of Europe is a quality 
organization embodying high standards of democracy. We have to find concrete ways 
of ensuring that enlargement will not lower those high standards.”117 Luik agreed, 
telling the Committee of Ministers that “[t]he choice we face is simple. We can either 
decide to lower standards to fit subjective conditions, or we can maintain those 
standards to the ultimate benefit of Europe’s values.” Latvian Prime Minister Valdis 
Gailis similarly told the PACE: “The Council of Europe sets out justifiably high criteria 
for membership. Latvia expects that those requirements will not be lowered for any 
applicant country.”119
Second, and more importantly, Baltic representatives argued that admitting a Russia that 
was not yet up to the Council’s standards would harm the reputation of the Council
itself. Luik told the Committee of Ministers: “I urge all of us seated here to guard the
120credibility of the Council of Europe when considering potential new members.”
“If the Council accepts Russia,” Kelam argued, “it will be hit by a quality crisis that 
could reduce it to a regional UN: an ecumenical organization representing all 
interests.” 121 Velliste concurred: “Finally, in the area of relations with potential 
member-states, I will stress the desirability of maintaining the COE’s historically high 
standards. If, for some reason, the Council were to relax heretofore strict standards, the 
danger of diluting the strength of the institution could well arise. [Estonia wants] the
112 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, 11 May 1995 (FBIS-SOV-95-092, 11 May 1995 
(electronic)).
113 http://www.vm.ee/speeches/1994/94novl0.html (accessed 30 September 1997).
114 PACE ORD, 3 October 1994: 654.
115 The Baltic Independent, 28 April-4 May 1995: 1.
116 The Baltic Independent, 13-19 January 1995: 1.
117 PACE ORD, 3 October 1994: 654.
118 http://www.vm.ee/speeches/1994/94novl0.html (accessed 30 September 1997).
119 PACE ORD, 27 June 1995: 538.
120 http://www.vm.ee/speeches/1994/94mayl l.html (accessed 30 September 1997).
121 The Baltic Independent, 26 January -1 February 1996: 6.
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Council to retain its integrity as a guarantor of democracy and as Europe’s premier 
standard-bearer in these questions of fundamental importance to us all... Any politically- 
motivated lowering of standards for admission to the Council could result in an 
undesirable decline in the prestige of the Council of Europe itself and a decline in 
confidence in its statutory principles and objectives.” 122 As Kelam told the PACE: “Let 
us be realists. The Council of Europe is not, unfortunately, a potent and many-sided 
organization that is in a position to save Russia and to solve the future of that vast 
country. On the contrary, by venturing such a solution we would put at risk our own 
basic values. We would put at risk our credibility and moral strength as a unique human 
rights organization. Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Gailis took a more altruistic line, 
telling the PACE that Latvia viewed Russia’s application with “neighborly 
understanding,” but that a lowering of the Council’s “justifiably high criteria for 
membership” not only would cause the Council to lose credibility, but would harm the 
interests of the inhabitants of the applicant country granted membership on more lenient 
terms. 124 But Landsbergis warned the PACE that “[i]t would be a pity to see our 
respected international institutions run the danger of becoming ridiculous.” 25
Hard feelings: Take Three
The subject of status negotiations is one of the topics in the sociology of emotion 
literature that has received the most detailed analysis and empirical testing. In 
particular, one group of researchers, of whom perhaps the most prominent is Theodore 
Kemper, has moved beyond a narrow focus on capabilities to focus on a question of 
relevance to the study of emotional response across political or other boundaries: the 
degree to which particular social-relational patterns are productive of particular 
emotions. Kemper’s research suggests that negotiations of relations of power (defined 
as the ability to secure involuntary compliance) and status (defined as the ability to 
secure voluntary compliance) are particularly likely to generate strong and predictable 
emotional outcomes; indeed, argues that “emotions are among the primary effects 
produced by power and status behaviors.” Kemper's results are in broad agreement 
with those of other sociologists and social psychologists, including those of Candace 
Clark, a sociologist, who has focused on the creation and negotiation rank, standing, or
1 97“social place” in face-to-face encounters and relationships.
Russian and Baltic responses to the competition to gain European recognition bear 
many of the hallmarks of Kemper’s predictions. Interestingly, Baltic representatives 
periodically let slip that they considered their nations to be in a membership race. An 
Estonian Foreign Ministry press office representative called Estonia’s achieving 
Council membership before Russia “very important;” Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis 
Birkavs described Latvia’s gaining admission prior to Russian entry “imperative.”
And indeed, particularly Estonian admission to the Council led Baltic representatives to 
invoke the language of victory and defeat. Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar told the 
press that a “fierce propaganda has been conducted against Estonia so as to prevent
122 http://www.ve.ee/speeches/93/93nov4.html (accessed 30 September 1997).
123 PACE ORD, 25 January 1996: 242. Kelam later posed reporters the rhetorical question: “Will 
democratic Europe have the will and resolve to transform gigantic, turbulent, I’m-the-enfant-terrible- 
of-Europe Russia into a true democracy? Hardly...No form of education ever succeeds if the desire to 
be educated is not present” (The Baltic Independent, 26 January -1 February 1996: 6).
124 PACE ORD, 27 June 1995: 538.
125 PACE ORD, 25 January 1996: 239.
126 Kemper 1990:212,227.
127 Clark 1990: 305
U8 The Baltic Independent, 14-20 May 1993: 1; The Baltic Independent, 23-29 September 1994: 4.
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Estonia from becoming a member of the Council of Europe. Now, however, Estonia has 
won a victory in that war.”129 Latvian representatives similarly called Estonia’s 
admission “the most severe diplomatic defeat” for Russia.130 Estonia, said Velliste, was 
now safe from “ungrounded accusations:” “If some country would try accusing us 
without any ground, we won’t have to pay much attention to this.”131
Indeed, the admission of the three Baltic states before Russia brought on not a little 
gloating. It sometimes seemed that few Baltic representatives could mention their 
nation’s acceptance into the Council, and into the collective European identity, without 
mentioning Russia’s continued—in their view justified—exclusion. Baltic statements 
wavered between the condescending (“The electorate in Russia is influenced by the 
perverse totalitarian education system that prevailed during the past 70 years. That is 
why the only thing left for us is to help them to rebuild the lost milestones of European 
standards of relations between human beings... the Council of Europe with its firm stand 
today should help our Russian colleagues to adopt necessary laws now lacking and to 
learn how to respect them”) and the triumphal (“Instead of Estonia integrating into the 
CIS, as many Russian politicians call for, Estonia will have the opportunity to oversee 
Russian integration into the Council of Europe”). Baltic speakers emphasized the 
“we” in statements calling for Russia’s continued exclusion from the Council (see, for 
example, Kelam’s “Let us be realists” statement cited above ). And Baltic 
representatives were delighted to stress that this “we” that was sitting in judgment on 
Russia constituted, as Estonian parliamentary speaker Toomas Savi put it in the context 
of a discussion of Chechnya, “[t]he community of civilized states.”134
Meanwhile, Russian reformers had begun to express concerns that Russia was being 
slighted by its Western partners, and particularly in regard to the Baltic states. Yeltsin, 
in a speech at the Foreign Ministry collegium, criticized the Ministry’s performance, 
saying: “Russia has begun to be perceived in the West as a country which only ever says 
‘yes.’ A state which does not notice how particular accords are violated with regard to 
it. What is not allowed with regard to other great powers has become allowed with 
regard to Russia. And as a result...interest in us has begun to decline in the past two 
months...Yet Russia is not a country that can be kept in the waiting room. We can 
express a certain gratitude to the West for its support....But we also have every grounds 
for expressing disillusionment...Moreover, a policy of double standards is retained in
129 Latvian Radio, 12 May 1993 (SWB, 15 May 1993: A2/1).
130 BNS, 14 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-094, 18 May 1993: 1). The Russian Foreign Ministry countered 
that “[t]he admission of Estonia is not a defeat for the Foreign Ministry but a reflection of positive 
changes taking place in the post communist world. Membership n the Council places additional 
responsibilities on Tallinn to make its laws and practices correspond to European and international 
law” ITAR-TASS, 18 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-095, 19 May 1993: 16). However, in light of 
Kozyrev’s non-attendance at the Council, their protestations seemed unconvincing.
131 BNS, 17 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-094, 18 May 1993: 56).
132 PACE ORD, 2 February 1995: 248.
133 PACE ORD, 25 January 1996: 242; Radio Tallinn, 23 June 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-121, 25 June 1993: 
68) .
134 PACE ORD, 22 January 1996: 10. Indeed, Baltic representatives became highly exercised at any 
suggestion that they might have received special treatment, particularly when comparisons to Russia 
appeared to be in the air. In 1996 the Council’s General Secretary, promoting Russian membership, 
argued that the Council had already applied a “favorable interpretation” of its rules when Estonia 
applied in 1993: “By making Estonia a member we have been promoting positive developments...and 
when we make Russia a member, we are going to promote positive developments in that country too.” 
Estonian deputies reacted sharply: Tunne Kelam said that no concessions had been made, while 
Kristiina Ojuland said that there had been concessions to some new members “but never to an 
applicant country that is killing innocent people.” The Baltic Independent, 26 January-1 February 
1996: 1.
176
regard to us. How much talk there was about discrimination along national lines in the 
former USSR, but now that the Baltic states are pursuing the same policy, this has not 
been a cause of indignation among the world public.” 135 Kozyrev’s decision to cancel a 
visit to the Council after Estonia’s admission reflected Russian indignation at being 
denied a voice in the Council’s membership decisions. As Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Sergei Yastrzhembskiy said, “we are somewhat surprised that no heed is being paid to 
Russia’s arguments in this instance. In these circumstances the minister has taken the 
difficult decision for us of refraining from his trip to Strasbourg and his address to the 
Council of Europe.” 136
Resentment of Moscow’s continued exclusion thus was only reinforced by the 
implications for Russian status. As Bobo Lo has noted, the Russian logical corollary to 
the assumption of Russian indispensability was that Russia had a right of involvement 
in any matter it deemed important to its interests; no one had the right to exclude or 
marginalize it from the processes of international decisionmaking, including 
membership in major international organizations. Furthermore, as Neumann has 
observed, Russian representatives experienced “an obvious sense of disequilibrium 
between accepting the role of ‘learner’ from Europe and maintaining the notion that 
Russia is a European great power, a notion that presupposes some kind of equilibrium 
with (other) European great powers.” As a consequence, Russian reactions to 
continued exclusion increasingly focused on the perceived loss of status associated with 
“this great European people,” as Yevgenniy Ambartsumov put it to the PACE, being 
kept in the Council’s “halfway house.” Russia was being treated as some “third-rate” 
country, Ruslan Khasbulatov complained after coming back from a PACE session, and 
there was an apparent desire to “dictate terms to Russia.” 140 Indeed, increasingly 
Russian representatives spoke of letting the Council come to Russia, rather than 
remaining in the position of the eternal supplicant. As presidential aide Viktor Kostikov 
put it, “Russia considers itself to be a great power and the successor to the Soviet Union 
and all its might. Everyone understands that Russia cannot and does not want to stand in 
the doorway of the ‘European home’ asking permission to enter.” 141
Interestingly, Russian and Baltic representatives were not the only ones to become 
exercised over membership issues: Russian efforts to secure Estonian exclusion had 
brought on a blast from Council. At the PACE session marking Estonian accession, a 
Swedish representative publicly chided the Russian delegation: “We have all received 
letters or representations from the Russian government advising us not to admit Estonia 
to the Council of Europe at this point. That letter from the Russian foreign minister may 
go down in the annals of history as one of the most unproductive letters ever. Whatever 
resistance there was in the Assembly to Estonian membership was finally broken by that 
letter...That shows that certain limits and norms have to be observed in post-colonial 
diplomacy. I thin that our Russian friends will soon learn that lesson.” 142 A Polish 
delegate added that “ Mr. Kozyrev sent us a special letter. I would like to speak very 
delicately about that letter. It is really tactless. I do not want to speak provocatively. It is 
really interference by a Russian minister in the internal affairs of independent Estonia. It
135 Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 October 1992: 1 (SWB, 29 October 1992: A 1/3).
136 ITAR-TASS, 12 May 1993 (SWB, 14 May 1993: Al/1).
137 Lo 2002: 53.
138 Neumann 1999: 108.
139 PACE ORD, 30 June 1993: 1242.
140 ITAR-TASS, 15 July 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-135, 16 July 1993: 11).
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is also very tactless in respect of all of us in the Council of Europe.” 143 And one of the 
rapporteurs for relations with non-member states “strongly emphasized” that “the way 
in which the Russian delegation has demanded special rights with respect to Estonia has 
startled many of us.” Lalumiere also reportedly later told Khasbulatov that she had been 
“surprised” by Russian deputies’ “arrogance as regards our procedure for admissions to 
the Council of Europe. No on is opposed to admitting Russia. There is a certain 
procedure and no one is allowed to disregard it.” (Khasbulatov’s response was: “I 
personally am not a supporter of Russia’s hasty accession to European structures. We 
are not poor relations and we are not asking anything of them. We must cooperate and 
get to know each other. And then when the Council of Europe expresses a desire and 
readiness to invite us into membership in its club, we will join.”144)
Perhaps as a consequence, Russian deputies were quick to seize on any occasion to 
inform the Council of the foolishness of its decision on Estonia. The passage of the law 
on aliens provided Russian representatives with an opportunity to press home the 
argument that Council membership was being used to legitimize discriminatory 
practices rather than serving as a brake on such activities. Kozyrev sent a stiff letter of 
protest to Lalumiere claiming that the Estonian authorities had perceived the Council of 
Europe’s admission as “a ‘blessing’ for their course of ethnic cleansing in the 
republic.” 145 Alexandr Udaltsov, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Baltic desk, regretted 
that membership failed to produce a “positive effect” in Estonia; on the contrary, after 
admission “Estonian authorities felt that they had their hands free.” 146 Deputy Foreign 
Minister Churkin similarly argued that the Estonians had interpreted their admission as 
an opportunity to go on the offensive. 147 Some Russian representatives phrased their 
complaints in a tone of gentle disappointment: for example, Vasiliy Svirin, heading up 
Russian talks with Estonia, told the press that “[w]e expected that [Estonia’s admission] 
to the family of highly civilized states would induce it to gradually eliminate 
discrimination [against Russophones]...To our great disappointment, this was not to 
be.” 148 But others issued a clear “we told you so” to the Council. Ambartsumov noted: 
“The Russian Supreme Soviet and Foreign Ministry warned the PACE that Estonia 
could regard Council of Europe membership as a virtual green light for its 
discriminatory policy...and could even toughen it up. Which is what has happened. And 
the example of Estonia is inspiring Latvia to similar illegal measures.” 149 “Their deeds,” 
Churkin complained,” are at variance with their words [and] their actions are at variance 
with contemporary standards of civilized conduct, with the high standards of the CSCE 
and of the Council of Europe, to which Estonia—despite our serious objections—was 
admitted recently. Incidentally, what is now happening once again demonstrates that the 
decision by the Council of Europe was erroneous and that Russia was correct to 
warn...that the Estonian authorities would regard this as carte blanche to do anything 
they wanted.” 150 Indeed, Russian representatives murmured, the Council had let itself 
down. The Council, Kozyrev opined, “demonstrated unacceptable complacency by 
accepting Estonia into its ranks a few days ago, and, what is more, as one of the first in 
Eastern Europe. And this is despite the presence in that republic of hundreds of 
thousands of people without citizenship, frustrated in their basic rights! So even our
143 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1063.
144 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 June 1993: 1.
145 Izvestiya, 2 July 1993: 3 (FBIS-SOV-93-126, 2 July 1993: 15).
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partners have room for improvement.”131 Such a basic error, Kozyrev indeed wrote to 
Lalumiere, might “cause a fall in the prestige” of the Council.132
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the diplomatic debates described in Chapters Three through 
Six played into an additional debate over the ordering of identities, in this case through 
social status. It has argued that Russian and Baltic representatives approached the 
European “club” as a locus of status in interstate society, capable of both conferring and 
confirming social status. As a result, Russian and Baltic representatives advanced 
justifications for their nations’ inclusion in Europe in status terms. The chapter has 
suggested that Russian representatives argued not only that Russia’s derzhavnost’ (great 
power quality) made it a fitting member of the European club, but that its inclusion 
would actually lift the status of that club. Meanwhile, Baltic representatives argued the 
opposite: that not only was Russia’s derzhavnost’ irrelevant to true “Europeanness,” but 
that the inclusion of Russia in the European club on the grounds of derzhavnost ’ had the 
potential to lower the club’s international status.
In attempting to draw on derzhavnost ’ as a justification for European status, Russian 
representatives showed a confusion over contemporary European self-conceptions. As 
Bruce Porter has argued, Russia has always faced two Europes. The first was “the 
liberal, democratic West of the Enlightenment, the West that embodied high principles 
of individual worth, human liberty and dignity, rationality, dialogue and tolerance, the 
rule of law, representative government, and constitutionalism...This was the West that 
the Westemizers of old (and those of today) thought they were following. The other 
West was the militarized, regimented, technological juggernaut embodied by the armies 
of Charles XII of Sweden, Frederick the Great of Prussia, Napoleon Bonaparte of 
France, Kaiser Wilhelm of Imperial Germany, and Adolf Hitler of Nazi Germany. This 
was the West that time and time again sparred with or invaded Russia, that dazzled 
Russian leaders with its technical-military superiority, and that acted as a constant spur 
to military modernization and bureaucratic reform.”133 By failing to appreciate that what 
was currency for status in the second Europe (derzhavnost ’) was not currently currency 
in the first, Russian representatives not only failed to achieve their goal of rapid 
inclusion in the European club, but in fact highlighted the differences between 
mainstream Russian conceptions of the ordering of interstate society and those 
dominant in the gemeinschaft community of the European club.
This chapter concludes this dissertation’s examination of the rhetorical strategies of 
Baltic and Russian representatives on a dark note. It has been an argument of this thesis 
that diplomatic debates over character, collective identities, and social ordering have the 
potential to engage their participants emotionally; in the story outlined here, the impact 
of such debates has been one to leave bad feeling among participants. Various scholars, 
most prominently Jack Barbalet, have argued that emotion is a prime factor driving 
changes in social structure.154 Such scholars would be likely to see Russia’s backing 
away from European engagement across the course of the 1990s as being at least in part 
a result of the disappointments, humiliations, and frustrations of failing to find 
recognition, either of collective identity or of status, within the European “family.”
151 Izvestiya, 22 May 1993: 5 (FBIS-SOV-93-098, 24 May 1993: 36).
152 BNS, 12 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-091, 13 May 1993: 6).
153 Porter 1996: 125-126.
154 Barbalet 1998.
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Pessimists among them might also anticipate continued Russian efforts to either drop 
out of or secure changes in the European structures that have created the occasion for 
such frustrations. 155 That Russian engagement has not in fact ended, however, is a 
reminder that “identity diplomacy” need not be deterministic.
i55As Ronald Dore discusses, “the resentful urge” to correct one nation’s perceived deprivation of, among 
other things, prestige continues to be a source of tension between status quo and non-status quo 
powers (Dore 1984: 412).
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Conclusion
This dissertation has argued that diplomatic exchanges are permeated with three types 
of debates: debates concerning identities, debates concerning the grouping of identities, 
and debates concerning the relational social positioning of identities. Through an 
examination of Russia and Baltic diplomatic rhetoric, it has attempted to demonstrate 
that Baltic and Russian representatives sought to win European audiences over to 
conceptions of their own nations as democratic, peaceloving, and having broken in 
important respects with their Soviet past. It has attempted to demonstrate that at the 
same time, Russian and Baltic representatives sought to portray their opponents and 
undemocratic and aggressive (whether internationally or towards their own 
populations); furthermore, they sought to portray their opponents’ actions as threats not 
only to their own interest, but also to European security and/or values. It has further 
argued that Baltic and Russian representatives drew on these characterizations to make a 
another argument: that their nations were appropriate members of the European cultural 
and political complex, as exemplified by the emblematic organization of the Council of 
Europe, and that their opponents were not. It suggests that in so doing, Russian and 
Baltic representatives in fact argued two cases. In the first instance, Baltic and Russian 
representatives argued that the nature and behavior of their states made them 
appropriate members of Europe, while their opponents’ nature and behavior rendered 
their Europeanness suspect. In the second instance, Russian and Baltic representatives 
argued that their own nations were appropriate members of a “Europe” thought of not 
only as a political or cultural construct but also as a status group, or club, in interstate 
society. In so doing, Russian representatives argued not only that Russia’s derzhavnost' 
(great power quality) made it a fitting member of the European club, but that its 
inclusion would actually lift the status of the club. Baltic representatives, meanwhile, 
argued the opposite: not only that Russia’s derzhavnost’ was irrelevant to true 
“Europeanness,” but that inclusion of Russia in the European club had the potential to 
lower the club’s status.
This dissertation has further argued that it should not be surprising that all three of these 
debates engaged and frustrated their participants, generating hard feelings particularly 
on the Russian side. It has drawn on the literature of the sociology of emotion, which 
sees the types of dense social interaction exemplified by such diplomatic exchanges as 
prime instigators of feeling, to suggest the possible emotional implications of debates 
over self-representation, over group membership, and over status positions. While not 
attempting to assess the intensity or to assign causal value to the feeling caused in 
Russian and Baltic representatives by these debates, it has tried to suggest that 
discussions of such debates that that fail to give a place to feeling strip processes of the 
production of knowledge of much of their meaning for those involved.
Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the story outlined in this dissertation was 
the campaign by Baltic representatives to become authoritative sources of knowledge 
about Russia in the European arena. Post-structural and post-colonial analyses, for 
reasons with which one can easily sympathize, have often focused on instances where 
the power to characterize and categorize has been closely tied to material or political 
power. 1 Indeed, during the Russian imperial and Soviet eras, the fields of geography, 
ethnography, and anthropology were largely dominated by ethnic Russians, who 
occupied a predominant if not always strictly dominant position in imperial Russian and
1 See, for instance, Doty 1991, 1996b; Said 1978, 1993.
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Soviet society.2 As a consequence of the strong Baltic intellectual tradition, the Baltic 
peoples were studiers as well as the studied; but Russians were for the most part 
unaccustomed to having knowledge about them produced by other ethnic groups. Nor 
were Baltic representatives entirely confident about their chances in the global 
information environment; for instance, as already noted in Chapter Four, Estonian 
Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste complained that “a small nation like Estonia doesn’t 
have the resources to compete with a huge nation’s propaganda machine. It’s no 
surprise: the front page of the New York Times is not automatically open to us.” 3 But 
Baltic representatives stressed, as Landsbergis put it, the contribution of their “special 
historical experience” to their ability to speak authoritatively on things Russian. 4 As 
Meri said: “Having been behind the Iron Curtain, we know the way Russians think.” 5
Regrettably, it has been beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine in more than 
the most fleeting detail the responses of European audiences to Russian and Baltic 
“identity diplomacy” campaigns. This work has been able to do no more than indicate 
the degree of European official legitimation extended to particular Baltic and Russian 
characterizations; it has not been able to assess the degree to which European audiences, 
in extending this legitimation, had been persuaded by Russian and Baltic rhetoric, 
selected those themes of Baltic or Russian rhetoric that fit in with their own 
predispositions, or were moved by entirely different factors. Indeed, a fascinating 
history waits to be written about the impact of Russian and Baltic representations on 
how European institutions and governments have faced a changing “Europe.” But that, 
dear readers, is another story.
2 See, for examinations of Russian imperial or Soviet geography, Bassin 1991, 1994; for anthropology,
Balzer 1995; for ethnography/ethnology, Bromley 1974, Dunn and Dunn 1974, Hirsch 1997; and for 
general discussions of the production of history or scholarship, Slezkine 1997, Tillett 1969. For 
discussions of the place of ethnic Russians in the Soviet Union, see Dunlop 1997, Szporluk 1989, 
1994.
3 The Baltic Independent, 11-17 December 1992: 8.
4 PACE ORD, 11 May 1993: 931.
3 The Baltic Independent, 1-7 May 1992: 4. Meri later told reporters that he knew Russia better than 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (Estonian Radio, 17 February 1994 {SWB, 23 February 
1994: E/1)). Interestingly, this language was picked up by the President of the PACE, Miguel 
Martinez, who reportedly said during a visit to Tallinn in November 1995 during which Russian 
membership was discussed that “Estonia was one of the few members o f the Council o f Europe who 
knew Russia well” (Radio Tallinn, 20 November 1995 (FBIS-SOV-95-224, 20 November 1995 
(electronic))).
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